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Breaking the stalemate
Desperate times require revolutionary initiatives

January 21, 2002
The Iranian

As we speak, prominent Iranians are being tried behind the closed doors in violation of the current Iranian Constitution. As we speak a few Majles representatives face prosecution by courts in violation of their parliamentary immunity. One of the representatives, Mr. Loghmanian, was temporarily imprisoned and released when the Speaker of the Majles and a large number of the representatives walked out of the Majles in protest. It seems that the extremists only understand force and threat of annihilation. What are the elected officials' roles in the country's affairs? Is the Constitution relevant anymore? Or, is it relevant only when it could be used to pursue unholy goals of those who have monopolized the system?

The current political stalemate in Iran will be resolved, sooner rather than later, by either of the following ways:

-- An event, probably a non-political event such as the soccer fiasco of the last fall, will spark an ever-growing series of riots, confrontation, killings, and memorials until the system collapses. A dynamic similar but much more bloodier and heart wrenching than the dynamic of the mid-to-late seventies that eventually relegated the Shahanshahi regime of Pahlavi to the history books.

-- Higher-ups in the current regime will wake up and come out of their current deep denial and see the writing on the walls that the system, as it is, does not work, will not work, and needs a complete overhaul. Persian bazaar type haggling will not do the job in saving the establishment -- the President and those in the Majles, Showray-e Negahban (Guardians Council), Showray-e Maslehat-e Nezam (Expediency Council), Majles-e Khobregan (Experts Assembly), and the faghih (religious leader) himself will be treated similarly and will be thrown out in a bloody confrontation that nobody wants. Negotiations and bargaining could only buy those in the establishment time.

The overhaul, of course, will happen if they realize that it is in the best interest of each and every individual in the government, Islam, and Iran to stop Iran's political and economic hemorrhage domestically and internationally. Coming to an understanding that the time is getting shorter and shorter every day is neither unprecedented nor beyond comprehension of the high level inner circle of the regime. They need to make their minds up and stop selfish political maneuvers and let people clearly know the political system that they envisage for the country and let the people decide.

What are the alternatives?

1-- A real theocracy: At this juncture, we do not really know whether or not people do or do not subscribe to the concept of velayat-e faghih unless they are given a real opportunity to give their opinions in a real referendum on the question. There are currently many people in Iranian prisons just because they have expressed an opinion in this regard. But for the sake of argument, let us assume that we do want to have a system that includes the institution of the faghih. That is, a permanent absolute leader who oversees the general direction of the country.

In this case the faghih should have the absolute authority to run the country according to his vision and ordinary people should not expect to be a part of the decision making process of the system except for carrying out what they are ordered to do. The appointed President would be the chief operating officer and the Showray-e Maslehat whose members would be appointed by the leader would design rules and regulations to carry out the vision provided by the faghih. It would not be an innovative institution rather; it would only find better and more efficient ways of implementing the leader's vision. In this context, there is no need for Majles, Showray-e Negahban, and Majles-e Khobregan. Their mere existence creates unnecessary bureaucratic inefficiencies that do not serve the system well. This system would, more or less, operate the same way the Vatican is doing its business.

2-- A theocracy with a democratic facade: In this system, we need to keep a permanent leader who is immune of people's views and votes and only vulnerable to revolutions and bloodshed. Since we need to pretend a semblance of democracy for those who could not see beyond their noses, some of the organs of the system must have some safety valves to allow steam out of the system. However, they should not be allowed to have adequate power to change the structure of the system. That is, they could be speaking about the issues that are near and dear to what people desire, but not enough to carry them out if those issues are in contradiction with the system.

Execution of law and order would be outside the realm of power of the elected officials. They would be directly under the leader's control. Military and police would be under the control of the leader as well to quell any potential disobedience from the public at large or elements of the system that might think differently. Time and again the elected officials should be reminded through forceful means that they should not let their power go into their heads that their powers are real and be reminded that they are there to implement the leader's wishes and not those of the electorate.

3-- A limited theocracy/democracy with a faghih: In this system, the intention would be to keep the country under the theocratic rules while people are given a role in the system. In his system everyone would be subject to elections to some extent.

-- The Majles would elect the leader for seven year terms from a list of one to three nominees selected by the high-ranking ayatollahs (maraj'a taghlid). He/she could be reelected more than once. This would ensure the presence and the control of the country by the religious establishment as well as a choice to the people through their representatives.

-- The people would directly elect the Majles and the President for four-year terms. There should be a three-term limit on each representative and a two-term limit on the presidency. Candidates for the Majles and the presidency would be nominated directly by political parties or by submitting a petition that is endorsed by at least 5% of the electorates in each district.

-- Judges are appointed by the leader for life subject to their confirmation by the Majles. This would ensure their independence from all other organs of the government after they are confirmed.

-- If there were disagreements between the President and the Majles over any policy, the final arbiter would be the leader.

4-- A limited theocracy/democracy without a faghih: In this system, the intention would be to keep the country under the theocratic rules while people are given a real role in the system. In his system the leader assumes the role of the President and everyone would be subject to elections to some extent.

-- The Majles would elect the leader/president for seven-year terms from a list of one to three nominees selected by the high-ranking ayatollahs (maraj'a taghlid). He/she could be reelected more than once. This would ensure the presence and the control of the country by the religious establishment as well as a choice to the people through their representatives.

-- The people would directly elect the Majles for four-year terms. There should be a three-term limit on each representative. Candidates for the Majles would be nominated directly by political parties or by submitting a petition that is endorsed by at least 5% of the electorates in each district.

-- Judges are appointed by the leader for life subject to their confirmation by the Majles. This would ensure their independence from all other organs of the government after they are confirmed.

-- If there were disagreements between the leader and the Majles over any policy, the final arbiter would be the leader. However, Majles could override the leader by a two third-majority.

5-- A democracy: In this system there would not be any permanent features, except the people. All officials except those that required for safeguarding the Constitution such as judges are subject to frequent elections and checks and balances. There would be term limits. The system would be based on individual freedoms (religious, political, social, and economic), human rights, and separation of church and state. A tolerant and humane system that is only concerned with the welfare of the people: a government of the people, by the people, and for the people.

Precedent for drastic actions in the IRI

We all remember the invasion of Iran by Iraq and its bloody consequences. During the eight-year bloodshed hundreds of thousands were killed, maimed, and injured with no end in sight. Iran wanted to go to Jerusalem (ghods) through Iraq and Iraq wanted to bring at least Khoozestan under its control. This is not a place to discuss the reasons for that action. However, we do know that Iran, despite frequent overtures by many countries and the United Nations, rejected any peace or cease-fire proposal for eight years.

But later, almost out of the blue, Iran did an about-face and made a 180-degree change of policy. Ayatollah Khomeini accepted the United Nations' cease-fire proposal (accepted to drink from the "poisonous cup") that had been on the table for a while. His drastic change of heart was indeed an arguably belated but wise and appropriate decision to preserve the system as well as the country. Had he not drunk from the "poisonous cup," the war would have most probably resulted in much larger casualties and probably would have ended the Islamic regime, as we know it today.

The current regime should learn from that experience and take revolutionary steps toward real and substantial reform/overhaul of the system before it is too late for everyone.

Author

Hamid Zangeneh is professor economics at Widener University, Chester, Pennsylvania. He received his Ph.D. in economics from the University of Missouri-Columbia.

Comment for The Iranian letters section Comment for the writer Hamid Zangeneh

Comment for The Iranian letters section Comment for the writer Mark Mordue