Letters

Disfunctional, undemocratic

In response to Ghamari-Tabrizi's "What’s the matter with Iran?":

Prof. Ghamari-Tabrizi's analysis of the Iranian presidential election is at once eloquent, illuminating, and unfortunately misleading in parts. I share his critique of the reformists and much of his sentiment, but I do not so easily overlook the track record of Khamenei, Jannati, Yazdi, et. al. --including their obvious disdain for democracy, their alarming self-righteousness, or their lack of tolerance for dissent.

Let no-one forget how time and time again the reforms advocated by the 2nd of Khordad front were stymied -- at times violently, and more often, with violence looming as an instrument of politics. This behavior is not democratic, it is authoritarian

The tragedy of the reform movement was indeed that it did not stand its ground; and the tragedy of Iranian politics is that in the current system, democracy and authoritarianism (in the form of unchecked religious oversight) coexist. The pendulum has undeniably swung in favor of the latter, pushed along by the interference of those who abhor and fear political competition.

I disagree with Ghamari-Tabrizi in his assessment that:

The reformist camp paid dearly for this mistaken identification of the President as the vanguard for social change. Rather than generating it, the President's proper responsibility was to create the political opportunity for social change. Social change ought to happen bottom-up, through institutionalized movements of rights and justice, but it needs to be recognized top-down.

The role of a political leader is to lead; being a figurehead does not suffice. Khatami's downfall was that he was not willing to push his ideological convictions to their natural conclusion--to operationalize the 20 million votes he received in 1997. In retrospect, his unwillingness to do so may have plunged Iran back into a generation of darkness, from which the country was just emerging at the time. In which area have Khamenei and his reactionary allies shown any inclination to "recognize social change from the top-down?"

All we have seen is the tamping down of demands for change, and reliance on brute force when needed. Where they have given any ground, they have had no real choice (i.e., essentially unenforceable things in the long-run such as satellite dishes, headscarves, toenail paint, etc.) When have they ever resorted to political battle on even terms, unbolstered by the threat of violence?

Does Ghamari-Tabrizi really think that "bottom-up social change" stands a chance in this atmosphere when holding the presidency and parliament didn't? If the reactionaries don't shy away from blatantly violating the parliamentary immunity of MPs, why would they stop at murdering dissidents or crushing signs of opposition? (Which they have engaged in repeatedly). Does he not grasp, at long last, that they will pay as much lip service to the rhetoric of democracy as necessary, only to return to the language of force the instant their rule is threatened?

I state these observations not as one who wishes for Iran's "liberation" by the US. Rather, I am an observer of Iranian politics who is coming to the conclusion that barring a change in leadership (or, less likely, a change of heart in the leaderhip), the limits of the Islamic Republic are now laid bare for all to see. The reactionaries have made their decision, and it has been a long time in the making: No more "pragmatists" like Rafsanjani or "reformists" like Khatami. That time is over. We are now entering the era of the sole ascendancy of the reactionaries. Wishful thinking will not make that fact any less real.

Likewise, I disagree with Ghamari-Tabrizi's reducing Khatami and the 2nd of Khordad to "an instrument for making the country more attractive to IMF suitors," which I think does a great disservice to the many sacrifices made to bring real democracy to Iran in the past decade. He himself credits the reform movement with shifting the political discourse. Isn't it possible that economic reforms (i.e., breaking the mafia-like strangle-hold of the reactionaries over Iran's economy) was one of the few avenues left for positive change, especially as the political ones were shut down one by one via the Guardians Council, Tehran prosecutor, the Special Court for the Clergy, or the Press Court?

I do not disagree that Tom Friedman is largely a dreamer whose prescriptions need a large dose of reality. Fortunately, Iran posses the economic wherewithal to cushion the blow of opening its economy to freer trade and greater integration into the global economy. Opting out, in this day and age, will only hinder development and string out the corruption embedded in Iran's stagnant and closed economy. This is why WTO accession will be the thin edge of the wedge that can separate the mullahs from their economic lifeline. US support for this is one of the best developments in US-Iranian relations in a very long time. Moreover, Iran is not now subject to IMF or World Bank conditionality, as it has a minimal amount of loans from them which are not essential. Acting as if that is the case, as Ghamari-Tabrizi does, is simply inaccurate.

I am also not so quick to consider the Islamic Republic a functional democracy as he is and thus to accept the recent electoral outcome as legitimate on democratic grounds.

The president-elect and his allies need to know that the commodities of the western culture industry do not mesmerize all Iranians, and indeed many respect and value their religious and cultural particularities. The result of this election shows that even with an open and democratic election, this faction will not disappear from Iranian political landscape. The freer the electoral process in Iran, the stronger the legitimacy of its institutions.

Iran is fortunate to possess political institutions that are relatively well-developed by the standards of the developing world. But the Islamic Republic is at best a flawed representative system, and the greater the interference by religious oversight institutions, the weaker the quality of the democracy. Conversely, the stronger the republican aspects of the system are allowed to be, the more democratic the system is. That is why the system does possess the potential to be a functional democracy and has demonstrated that potential in the past.

It is unfortunate that the reactionary elements now fully in control of the Iranian state don't think twice about undermining the very representative institutions that provide the little legitimacy the system has left. Ghamari-Tabrizi appears to overlook the active role of these people to impose their selected candidates on the electorate during this presidential election, to illegally intimidate rivals and voters, or completely transcend the constitution by mobilizing the Pasdaran and Basij on the streets and the polling stations.

This faction may be with us for a while, but I contend that its existence is being actively and illegally extended by maneuvering that violates core tenets of democratic governance. This was no free electoral process, even by Iranian standards. The 2000 Majles elections were by far freer--arguably the most democratic elections Iran had witnessed in half a century. Iranian politics and the Iranian people will be worse off because of it.

Bahram Rajaee

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Disfunctional, undemocratic

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