Wait another six months
Giving Khatami and reformists more time
August 24, 3003
The Iranian
There
have been debates surrounding Khatami's resignation. Although,
the pick of the debate and the hype associated with the calls
for his resignation are behind us, I would, still,
like to revisit the issue in order to add another
reason to the argument that he should not resign now.
I would further like to indicate that, in light of new developments,
it may not be fair to those who argued for his resignation. At
the
time, the level of
frustration with the failure of the student
demonstrations, Khatami's
relaxed handling of its aftermath, and various
domestic pressures, were all reasons to make
emotional calls for his
immediate resignation.
Admittedly, I found the
pro-resignation
arguments
strong and convincing. However, in the final analysis,
I side with
those
who see his presence as an opportunity to formally
object to, and even
effectively neutralize, some of the hardliners' suppressive
policies. I
will also argue that notable economic improvements
should be allowed to
continue if certain progress is made on the political
front.
With regard to the legislative venues for struggle, made
possible by
the fact that reformists
are in power, one can point out to the government's reaction
to
the rejection of three major parliamentary bills by the Council
of Guardians. Two of them required Iran to adopt UN
conventions
on
eliminating torture and discrimination against women. The third
bill was
aimed at eliminating the council's power to bar
candidates from running
for office.
Khatami has expressed his dismay and
frustration with those
who have inhibited his reform programs and apologized
to the people for
not having been able to deliver his promises. But, he
has not sufficed
with apologies. His Minister of Interior immediately
announced that
the
provincial governors should not cooperate with "illegal" election
supervisory committees that have been organized by the
Council of Guardians
in
various cities. He has also forbidden provincial governors from
participatinng in any
committee meetings.
Any employee of the Ministry of Interior
who did not
implement
these instructions, he stressed, would be subject to
disciplinary
action
by the ministry. The illegality of such centers, he
argued, is due to
the
fact that their activities were not approved by
the Majlis. The government,
he
said, was determined to prevent any violation of the
law regardless of
the
source.
What possible consequence could result from such an
action by the
Interior
Ministry? It is clear that the reformists have decided
to stand behind
their demands for the approval of the twin bills. If
they actually
stick
to their guns until the new Majlis elections, one
could envision
opening
up of the Majlis to new and more radical candidates,
or a final clash
between the reformists and the conservatives.
I would further like to point out the significance of Khatami
administration's economic reforms that have started to make an
impact. Among such policies
were the unification of the
exchange
rate, creation of an oil reserve fund, replacement
of quantitative
restrictions with tariffs, revitalization of the
Tehran Stock Exchange, imposing a tax on the Bonyads, privatization
of public enterprises, introduction of a limited number of private
banks, enhanced
transparency and enforcement of accounting
regulations, improved
reporting
and bookkeeping practices of public companies,
and the passage of the new
foreign investment laws.
As a result, and on
the back of
stable
oil revenues, the Iranian economy registered a 7.5
percent real rate of
growth last year, excluding the oil sector which would
have brought it
down to 6.5 percent, government tax revenues grew by
24 percent during
the
last fiscal year, and for the first time since the
post-revolutionary
period, the unemployment rate declined. According to
the latest IMF
report, the Iranian economy was the strongest economy
in the Middle
East.
It is now generally accepted that Khatami's ability to
implement
political
and economic reforms was potentially limited from the
beginning. This
was
not only due to his malleable personality but also the strength
of
the conservatives over the security apparatus of the
regime. In spite
of
such limited capabilities, credit should be given to
Khatami for being
able to gradually undermine the source of legitimacy
of the hardline establishment on the existing legal grounds and
for elevating the level
of
tolerable political debate under the Islamic Republic.
At the same time, it is also evident that the
democratic movement
should
now look beyond Khatami and the reformists. All secular forces
and
individuals who supported Khatami from the beginning
knew that the
reformists were, and continue to be, confined to the
limits imposed by
the
Constitution of the Islamic Republic, in particular
the theocratic principle of
Velayat-e Faghih. However, this does not mean that tactical
support for Khatami in achieving the ultimate goal of
establishing a secular
democracy should end at this important time.
Proponents of resignation should stretch the limit of
their patience
for
another six months, and wait for the outcome of the
current struggle
over
the conduct of Majlis elections. Obviously, if reformists are
ignored, they should collectively resign. Indeed,
since little time is
left to the end of both Majlis and Khatami's terms,
collective
resignation
would be the only way to get their due credit in
achieving success in
areas of public administration and
economic reform.
Otherwise, history will write them down as complete
losers.
In the case of mass resignation, popular uprising
coupled with division
within the armed forces may ensue. This is
unfortunately based on a
realistic assumption that the hardliners would
continue to object to
proposed referendums on issues such as the role of the
Council of Guardians,
the scope of presidential power, revision of the
Constitution, and
normalization of relations with the US.
Two lessens of experience were learned in the course
of Khatami's
presidency. One that there are hardcore supporters of
the status quo
whose
economic and political interests do not allow a
peaceful
transformation
through political and economic reforms. Second, as long
as
the security apparatus and the military remain under conservative
control, a complete overhaul of the system will not be possible.
These
lessons may play well into the hands of
those who are
eager
to destabilize the regime by limited and surgical
strikes.
There has not yet been a scientific poll conducted in
Iran to estimate
the
number of Iranians who would welcome limited
external help to get
ride
of the hardliners. If one speculates that Khomeini's
own grandson is currently in favor of this strategy, the collective
resignation of reformists may significantly increase the number
of people in favor.
Author
Mehrdad Valibeigi is a professorial lecturer of economics at the
American University in Washington, DC.
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