Iran-U.S.: Limits to rapprochement
Federal News Service
July 22, 1999
PREPARED TESTIMONY OF JERROLD D. GREEN BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT - IRAN : LIMITS TO RAPPROCHEMENT
WEDNESDAY, JULY 21, 1999.
Statement before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee
on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs by Jerrold D. Green - RAND
Introduction
In recent times we have begun to see a gradual but subtle decline in
the acrimony that has characterized mutual perceptions of the United States
and the Islamic Republic of Iran . From the Iranian perspective, the most
undeniable sign of improvement began with President Mohammad Khatami's
address to the American people via a CNN interview where he advocated a
"dialogue of civilizations." Other indicators have included an
assortment of Track II type meetings between Iranians and Americans, sporting
competition between the two countries, a modest increase in U.S. tourism
to Iran , opportunities for American students to study in Iran , and a
variety of other extremely limited improvements. Far more significant have
been comments by senior American officials such as a speech delivered by
Secretary of State Madeline Albright to the Asia Society last spring, and
more recently, comments made by President Clinton at a Holocaust Day memorial
ceremony at the White House. Other factors which have contributed to an
improvement include public statements by such well known Americans as James
Baker and Lee Hamilton, as well as a Foreign Affairs article by Zbignew
Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft. The common theme linking these pronouncements
is a generalized recognition of the importance of Iran , and the utility
to the United States of gradually re- establishing some sort of relationship
with this key country. These efforts have been aided by the fact that most
U.S. allies have improved their relations with Iran . The United Kingdom
and Iran have agreed to re-establish diplomatic ties at the highest level,
reflecting British satisfaction that official Iranian government support
for the assassination of Salman Rushdie has come to an end. Having said
this, the bounty on Rushdie's life by an Iranian bonyad (foundation) remains
in place and was even increased in value. In this apparent paradox, we
findintra- Iranian disagreement about ties with the West which remains
a primary impediment to greater U.S.- Iranian rapprochement. Finally, other
actions which have generally been interpreted positively in Tehran include
the unwillingness of the White House to enforce the Iran -Libyan Sanctions
Act (ILSA) on foreign oil companies dealing with Iran (the French company
Total being the company in question), a recent suspension of the use of
food and medicine as an economic weapon by the United States which could
clear the way for an American grain sale to Iran , and a general lessening
of tensions on both sides whose significance is important but should at
all costs not be exaggerated.
Lingering Problems
Although it appears that most Americans, official and otherwise, seem
to be persuaded by President Khatami's overture to the American people,
it must also be recognized that the three issues that have traditionally
divided the two countries, from an American perspective, remain significant,
even though the magnitude of their significance may have lessened over
time. The first of these is reliance by the Islamic Republic on terrorism
which clearly has diminished in recent years. The next gap results from
Iran 's opposition to the American brokered Arab-Israeli peace effort.
For various reasons, this too seems to have diminished in significance.
In part, this diminution is a reflection of a reported discussion between
the Iranian leadership and Yasir Arafat at the OIC meeting in Tehran in
which Arafat was told by his Iranian interlocutors that although the Islamic
Republic might not favor an agreement made between Arafat and the Israelis,
that whatever agreement Arafat chose to make would be accepted by Tehran.
The diminished pace of the Arab-Israeli peace process has made Iran 's
aversion to it somewhat less significant, although the salience of thisproblem
will continue until Iran is willing to publicly and unconditionally accept
any Arab-Israeli peace arrangement deemed acceptable by Israel and the
Arab world. Having said this, a debate about Iran , not unlike that being
held in the United States, is also emerging in Israel with knowledgeable
Israelis trying to reassess Iran 's regional role and its implications
for Israel in much the same way that Americans have conducted parallel
assessments of their own of Iran . The final issue, and the one that remains
of greatest significance, is Iran 's attempt to develop a weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) capability. Here, the particular concern of the U.S.
is Iran 's drive to acquire nuclear weapons. From an Iranian perspective,
acquisition of these weapons can be understood as a reflect/on of Tehran's
concern about Iran 's regional status and attempts by its neighbors to
acquire the same weapons. The recent nuclear test by Pakistan, efforts
by Saddam Hussein to acquire a nuclear capability which was slowed but
certainly not eliminated by an Israeli attack on its nuclear facilities,
the possibility of "loose nukes" floating around former Soviet
Central Asia, and Iran 's inability to rearm itself due to a weak economy
and low oil prices, as well as the residual consequences of a debilitating
eight year war with Iraq, all conspire to make nuclear weapons a comparatively
cheap security alternative for the government of the Islamic Republic.
Despite this, the United States is unwilling to sanction such acquisition
and, indeed, Iran 's nuclear program has not only continued to divide the
U.S. and Iran , but also has contributed markedly to increased conflict
between the United States and Russia, which is clearly one of Iran 's primary
supporters. Thus, if asked to choose the primary impediment to rapprochement
with Iran from a U.S. perspective, I would argue that the nuclear issue
clearly reignssupreme, although the peace process and terrorism issues
could reassert themselves depending upon conditions in Tehran.
Impediments to rapprochement exist not only in the United States, but
also in Iran as well. Despite modest improvements in mutual perceptions,
in Iran there remains significant distrust of the United States, its methods,
and its motives. This can be attributed to a complex melange of factors
including the Mossadegh affair, U.S. support for the Shah, the U.S. commitment
to Israel, and a generalized belief amongst many, certainly not all, Iranians,
official and the man in the street, that the United States government wishes
Iran ill. Although these negative perceptions have diminished among some
in recent years, amongst others they remain tremendously significant. According
to some Iranians, the United States can do no right. For example, attempts
by NATO to assist Kosovar Muslims are regarded as laudable, except when
such attempts have their origins in Washington. In fact, some Iranians
find themselves conflicted over this issue as they believe that these beleaguered
Muslims should be assisted, but not by the United States. This contradiction
is important and results from systemic differences, cultural misunderstandings,
and a legacy of distrust which is difficult to erase. It is further exacerbated
by the fact that although President Khatami has shown himself to be a sophisticated
observer of the U.S. political scene, as well as of U.S. intentions, he
does not have unquestionable control of all components of the Iranian political
system. His opponents use his comparatively moderate views of the West
in general, and the United States in particular, as a means to undermine
him. Thus, periodic negative comments by Khatami about the United States
and its policies, although they may or may not reflect his personal views,
also should be perceived as attempts to keep his critics at bay by his
not appearing to be overly pro-American. Theculture of distrust towards
the United States in Iran is palpable and significant, yet at times contradictory
and ephemeral. It is difficult to pin it down with any specificity, although
it undoubtedly exists, and this distrust serves as a significant road block
to rapprochement between the two countries. This culture is part of a broader
uncertainty in Iran about the qualities and character of the Islamic Republic
itself, which asserts itself periodically in peculiar and unanticipated
ways. For example, it is generally thought that President Khatami's recent
trip to Italy, his meeting with the Pope as part of his dialogue of civilizations
effort, and other activities related to this trip represent a diplomatic
triumph for Iran . At the same time however, a parallel trip to France
was canceled in large part because President Khatami could not allow himself
to be photographed at meetings or at dinner tables in which wine bottles
would be visible and spirits might be served by his European hosts! France
refused to relent and to abstain from serving alcohol. Although this conflict
between the Islamically mandated abstemiousness of the Islamic Republic,
and the oenophilia of France seems almost comical, it is all too real and
prevented an important state visit from coming to pass. Such sensitivity,
when applied to the United States, is of even greater significance, and
highlights an insecurity and uncertainty amongst the stewards of the Islamic
Republic about what is desirable and acceptable for and in Iran , and what
is not. Conclusions The challenge to both the U.S. and to Iran is for each
to maintain its core principles while, at the same time, enhancing its
interests by seeking further rapprochement with a country too important
to be ignored. The United States will not back down from its commitment
to Israel, to its democratic principles, and to other values held dear
by the American people. The Iranians for their part, will maintaintheir
commitment to the notion and the reality of an Islamic Republic, despite
their own uncertainty about what such a polity is meant to look like or
how it should comport itself internationally. Khatami's efforts are serious
and should be regarded as such.
Excessive U.S. attraction to Khatami will hurt him in the eyes of his
competitors who eagerly seek new pretexts for conflict with the U.S. and
instruments to undermine him. On the other hand, if we ignore Khatami's
gestures, this will make rapprochement from Tehran even more difficult.
Thus, the United States is presented with a significant challenge. Certainly,
whatever Washington does it will be criticized or misinterpreted by some
in Tehran. This is inevitable, yet nonetheless problematic, and, thus makes
the process of rapprochement even more difficult. One way to transcend
some of these divisions is to devote greater attention to areas in which
the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran actually have issues
in common. These range from the continuing threat of Saddam Hussein, to
concern over the excesses of the Taliban in Afghanistan, in whom neither
Washington nor Tehran has much confidence.
Other common issues exist, such as the problem of drug trafficking,
on which Iran has taken a hard line. Certainly the legacy of distrust between
these two countries cannot be erased. Nonetheless, it could be muted somewhat
in recognition of areas in which the two countries actually share some
interests and might even be attenuated by remote collaboration, or at least,
mutual understanding.
Recent Developments and New Complications
Since this statement was initially written, two other factors have
emerged as potentially significant complications to any attempted rapprochement
between the United States and Iran . The first was the arrest of 13 Jews
in Shiraz on charges of espionage for Israel. Although this arrest has
been interpreted by many Khatamisupporters as an attempt by extremists
to undermine President Khatami, the reality remains that the 13 remain,
at this writing, in custody. Without a speedy and complete exoneration,
there is a strong likelihood that many in the U.S. will regard President
Khatami as lacking the necessary authority to promote any sort of rapprochement.
This skepticism is not restricted to the United States alone, but extends
to a number of Western European powers as well, many of whom have expressed
in the strongest possible terms their concern over the fate of the prisoners.
Even if these arrests are indeed an attempt by Khatami's opponents to undermine
him, their ability to do just this certainly injects a significant note
of uncertainty about his ability to rule. This uncertainty has been heightened
even further by another development which is of extreme importance. In
recent days there have been significant clashes between students at Tehran
University, said to be supporters of President Khatami, and those critical
of the students and, of Khatami as well, who represent key parts of the
government beyond Khatami's control, most notably the military and intelligence
services. Although the conflict between the groups appears to have been
suppressed, at least for the moment, the smoldering tensions between them
remains. And facile explanations about "prodemocratic forces"
in conflict with more authoritarian elements fail, in my view, to capture
the complexity of the political factionalism within Iran . The United States
is in a difficult situation, as any official comments made by U.S. officials
are likely to be used by extremist elements against President Khatami.
The recent demonstration in Washington by emigre Iranian groups exacerbates
this problem further as these groups are attempting to exploit the conflict
in Tehran as a means to advance their own political agendas. In short,
there is no ideal position for the United States to adopt otherthan to
make it abundantly clear to all, that the evolution of domestic Iranian
politics is an area to which the United States is attentive, but in which
it has no actual involvement. Certainly there are those in Iran who will
not accept such a statement at face value even though, in my view, it is
accurate. But the current tensions in Iran , which are unlikely to abate
soon, further complicate possible rapprochement with the United States
and frustrate the efforts of those elements of the Iranian state apparatus
who may seek such an improvement.
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