Photo by J. Javid
Second class
The legal status of Iranian women
By Mehrangiz Kar
April 18, 2000
The Iranian
This paper was prepared for a conference organized by Dialogue and
Action between the People of Iran and America (DAPIA)
in Cyprus in last November.
In many ways, the Iranian revolution has brought to the fore the discrepancy
between reality and mental perceptions. But in no other respect has the
inconsistency been more apparent than in the private and social lives of
women.
Soon after the revolution, Iranian women came to discover the gap between
the reality before them and the expectations that had prompted them to
take an active role in the course of the revolution. They also realized
the challenge that this gap was to pose before them. It is because of the
impact of the events resulting from this historical challenge that many
believe that the revolution has given birth to a kind of paradox in the
life of the Iranian women.
As will be pointed out below, because of the revolution, women have
gained greater influence and power to the extent that religious leaders
have been persuaded to legitimize female participation in social and political
processes. Yet because of the attitude that dominates the legislative circles
and preserves the laws based on gender discrimination, women have continued
to be treated as second class citizens.
The question is whether the situation created by the imperatives of
the process of transition of Iranian society from conditions of underdevelopment
and domination of traditions to that of development and modernity can promise
the final resolution to this paradox and bring about a fundamental reconsideration
of the demands of women in the third decade of the life of the revolutionary
system.
The fact is that the current economic, social and political conditions
of Iranian society have called upon women to play new roles that are essentially
different from what their status in a traditional and underdeveloped social
system would warrant. Yet what has created a crisis in the area of women's
legal rights is the imbalance that exists in the process of development
and certain approaches to the question of development. In other words,
while the legal system has its roots in the period of traditionalism, the
economic, social and cultural attributes of society are undergoing a process
of transformation. As a result, the legal system is no longer capable of
responding to the needs of this transitioning period of political, economic,
social and cultural reality.
The shortcomings of the legal system are more poignantly felt by women
than men. Women feel that their share in the benefits of revolution have
been shortchanged with the result that, in the eyes of the world, Iran
is a country standing firm in its opposition to the equality of the sexes.
Laws and orders legislated or issued after the revolution and violent application
of some of these laws against women lend credit to that view, and it is
on that basis that the Iranian political system is judged by others. What
has been concealed from the international community, however, are the enormous
possibilities for Iranian women to exert their influence over the political
processes that define their role, an influence that may, in time, alter
their destiny.
In this speech, I shall look at the legal and social status of women
from three angles. First, I will discuss what Iranian women have lost on
the orders of revolutionary and religious zealots. Then, what women have
succeeded in achieving over the past two decades through their own efforts
will be discussed. And finally, I shall venture to make certain predictions
about the condition of our women in the coming century.
What is certain is that the image of the Iranian woman in the course
of the past one hundred years scarcely resembles the prototype of the Muslim
woman as the world usually perceives her. The Iranian woman long ago left
the seraglio and the seraglio mentality that was reminiscent of the setting
for the tales of One Thousand and One Nights. She no longer submits to
her fate without question and no longer has the sole objective of finding
shelter and food within the walls of a wealthy man's harem. Instead, the
typical Iranian woman is one who has participated in every political, economic,
social and cultural challenge of the contemporary age and has been present
in the labor market for almost one hundred years. She has managed to obtain
employment of different kinds and has been active at various levels of
employment. From a political point of view, she has exerted her influence
and actively intervened in every political equation that seekers of power
have formulated in order to rise to the position of power. Two instances
worth mentioning are the way women acted in the course of the revolutionary
change in 1978-9 and the decisive role they played in the presidential
elections of May 1997, when they actually foiled pre-arranged political
changes and altered the predetermined course of events.
In addition, nationalistic, secular and reformist movements that, despite
the risk of incessant onslaughts by religious and traditionalist extremists,
increasingly insist on their democratic demands have come to appreciate
the significant role of women in the process of transfer of power. Yet
there still exists a large group of traditionalist zealots holding key
positions in the country who reject that fact. From their point of view,
women's rights and human rights activists are no more than rootless seculars,
infatuated with modernity and Western permissiveness, whose intended reforms
are bound to endanger the foundations of the religion, culture, family
and society. To them, modernizing models presented by reformists using
such "Westernized concepts" as freedom, equality and individualism
amount to a challenge in defiance of Islam that can only undermine the
structure of the Muslim family system and, ultimately, the Muslim ummah
itself.
Thus, the most powerful opponent of the human rights of women in Iran
is a mentality that attacks these values in the guise of religion and in
the name of religiosity. The great injuries that women suffered after the
victory of the 1979 revolution can hardly be described in a few words.
Yet these attacks have hardened the human character and experimental endeavors
of women and have increased their awareness and understanding. These changes
are no doubt a great asset for paving the way for inevitable reforms in
future
A few examples of the change that women have wrought in their status
over the past two decades can clarify the point. Existing figures about
candidates of state university admission examinations show that the share
of women in the total number of those sitting for the exams increased from
30.21 per cent in 1991 to about 52.1 per cent in 1998. At the same time,
girls have been more successful in gaining entrance. For instance, in the
current academic year, 51.4 per cent of candidates were women, of whom
52.1 per cent passed the examinations.
Not only that, but the evident growth of the spirit of inquiry among
Iranian girls has narrowed the field of influence of the fanatics in the
educational, sports, recreational and family circles. All these point to
a possible end of the age of traditionalistic domination of the political,
legal and cultural lives of the nation's women.
Meanwhile, the Iranian woman has borne the brunt of pressures needed
to arrive at this stage. Before the revolution, a number of reforms, for
instance in the laws relating to marriage and divorce, were legislated
in favor of women. These reforms, on the whole, came from the top of the
state apparatus. At the time, the political and cultural elite discovered
that in view of the long-standing contact with modernist ideals and the
appearance of educated women at various levels of employment, the traditional
legal structure could hardly meet the needs of women for protection within
the structure of the family. Moreover, to meet the imperatives of population
control, the state exerted such a policy, providing the means for family
planning that, in turn, enabled women to become socially more active. In
the corpus of laws legislated in response to the need for creation of new
employment and social opportunities for women, the Iranian women were granted
the right to sit as judges. They also could volunteer for military service
and spend their period of conscription as "soldiers of knowledge"
(village teachers) or "soldiers of health" (village doctors)
in remote rural areas. This gave many girls their first opportunity to
experience an independent life.
Nonetheless, while these achievements were appearing on the scene, the
traditional sector of society, led by religious opposition groups and aided
by some parts of the so-called modernized sections and secular groups opposing
the Shah, reacted to these reforms in a negative way. They also made effective
use of the platforms under their control to persuade society that supporting
the rights of women with the aim of arriving at gender equality was against
the laws of the religion-or no more than a ploy by the ruling circle to
disguise its plundering of the national wealth in the interest of global
imperialism.
Because the Shah's regime was oblivious to the need for political development,
such ideas succeeded in turning the tide against him and, in an atmosphere
of political oppression, grew into a towering threat. After the victory
of the Islamic revolution, as revolutionary extremists came to play the
dominant role in the formation of the new system, those ideas were translated
into policies, and the state, making use of its power, became active against
the civil and political rights of women. Separation of the sexes became
the focal point of state policy, and the process of revising existing laws
began with the repealing of the legal reforms of the previous regime. The
pretext for the onslaught against women's rights came from an order that
laws that were in contravention of religious (or sharia) rules had to be
revoked. The result was passage of new laws entailing the imposition of
new restrictions against women and their rights.
A few examples illustrate the nature of the reversal:
· Enforcement of compulsory hejab (or veil) or the Islamic code
of dress, which deprived women of the right to choose their own attire;
· Repeal of reforms in family laws;
· A ban on appointment of women as judges and expulsion or change
of the employment status of female judges;
· Forbidding women employed by the armed forces from receiving
military ranks and reducing their employment status to that of office employees;
· Stoppage of the family planning and population control policy;
· Legislation of the Islamic Penal Code according to which women's
right to live is not protected as the right of a full human being and in
which young girls of nine years of age (but not boys) are considered of
age of criminal responsibility, and the decision that testimony of women
is not the equivalent of the testimony of men;
· Emphasis on the absolute right of custody for the father or
the paternal grandfather in the matter of matrimony of female children
to the extent that the father or the grandfather can marry a child of nine
years of age to any man he intends.
The list is longer than stated above. What happened was the implementation
of severe measures against women with the pretext of preserving the religious
or revolutionary values of society.
What women lost was serious indeed. For a number of years, suppression
of women helped the authorities to dress up the social appearances and
relations in a way that conformed to the ideals of the traditionalist extremists.
Yet suppression has not been sufficient to give real effect to their plans.
With the passage of time, even certain layers of the state apparatus
discovered that suppression could no longer be affected with ease. They
came to evaluate the social conditions of women and, it seems, fearing
extensive protests in the future, joined the ranks of those who called
for moderation of the existing attitude. Members of this layer were unofficially
dubbed the moderates. What should not be forgotten is that making these
so-called moderate functionaries and politicians understand that it was
impossible to follow antiquated social models and impose the social conditions
of the Arabian peninsula of 1400 years ago on the revolutionary society
of Iran was the work of the Iranian women themselves.
Unfortunately, the fanatical extremism has continued to resist any change
that reflects social reality. The moderate ruling faction and its policy
of moderation have resulted, on the whole, in the passage of certain laws
relating to the status of women. To some extent, they have improved the
situation. In particular, within the last ten years, they have tried to
pass laws and rules to reduce the harshness of laws against women. But
their efforts have never crossed the lines beyond which they could be exposed
to attacks by the conservatives, who easily resort to allegations of promoting
the onslaught of the Western culture as a weapon of war. The moderates
have never been able, or willing, to overcome the attitude of extremist
traditionalists who base their arguments on ancient interpretations of
religious texts. The limit of reforms intended by the moderates has been
certain changes to improve the legal rights of women.
Indeed, it seems that the moderates themselves are not fundamentally
convinced of the need for the equality of the rights of men and women.
Indeed, even they can hardly tolerate it. As a result, the two approaches,
one supporting suppression of women and the other talking about moderating
that suppression, have continued to cooperate in all areas, especially
in the legislation of new laws. The outcome has been the passage of laws
based on suppression that only appear, on the surface, to be moderate.
In the best instances, what has happened has merely gone some way toward
restoring the laws of the past, and, as such, amount to no more than retrospective
measures. We can refer to such instances as permission for the appointment
of women with the rank of judges to work in the judiciary branch and rise
to the level of advising, but not ruling judges. Such a change is nothing
more than a half way return to the situation that existed two decades ago.
Other laws, such as inflation-adjusted calculation of the real value of
the dower-payable to women usually on being divorced-on the basis of the
rise in the cost of living and the right of divorcees to demand payment
for the work they have performed in the home of their husbands during married
life are among what we can call compensatory steps. The motive of moderates
in passing such laws has been reduction of the harms resulting from men's
absolute right of divorce and moderation of damages suffered by divorced
women. Neither the religious traditionalists nor the so-called religious
moderates have ever thought about limiting the absolute rights of divorce,
which remain the sole prerogative of men.
Other instances of such moderating laws include the following:
· The Family Planning Act, which is also a response to the rapid
pace of population growth in the first decade after the revolution;
· Formation of family guidance and assistance units attached
to special family courts;
· Amendment to the custody law according to which the mother
may, under certain conditions, demand the right of custody of the children
of divorced parents and actually receive the right.
We can add other examples to the list, but on the whole, one can hardly
claim that the moderates have done much to revise those articles and notes
of existing laws that constitute a direct attack on the human dignity and
rights of women. We cannot credit them with any serious attempt in that
direction.
With respect to women's political participation, no new laws have been
passed, but the application of the old law on election of local and rural
councils in 1998 must be viewed as a positive step. In the course of the
elections, held with a time lag of nineteen years, it became apparent that
a total of 297 women were elected to city and some 484 women to rural councils.
What is more, in 56 cities women topped the list of elected councilors
in terms of votes received, and in another 58, they came second. These
are signs of the change in social attitudes and public perception of the
capabilities of women.
In light of such promising signs of change as women's success in obtaining
higher education and convincing the electorates, even in the rural areas,
of their ability to manage public affairs, we can assume that the ground
is prepared for more changes to come.
For instance, during the past two years, nearly 1,000 women rose to
executive positions or retained their executive posts. Three women have
been appointed as the President's advisors, 16 women as advisors to ministers,
105 women as Directors General or Deputy Directors in two thirds of ministries,
and one woman has been appointed Vice President and another as the Deputy
Minister of Guidance and Islamic Culture. There are many women active in
various professional and academic positions.
Still, there is a long way to go before we have a proportionately satisfactory
number of women in top executive positions to reflect the number and level
of knowledge and experience of women in society. To move in that direction,
the state structure needs to be reformed and the attitude of political
layers of society to be improved. In particular, we ought to have an agreement
among all three branches of the State in support of the protection of the
rights of women through the passage of appropriate laws, their implementation
and safeguard.
In the midst of all this, the main achievement of the Iranian women-and
one that cannot be easily demonstrated by figures and statistics-is the
emergence of the motive and the continuation of what we can call the "modernist
Islamist" trend. The proponents of this movement try hard to extract
the necessary humanitarian and egalitarian concepts from the corpus of
religious texts and traditions. Those researchers that have put their hearts
in this movement are able to redefine and present the rights of women in
Islam in such a way as to conform to the needs of the contemporary society.
They draw our attention to the fact that if the political environment is
not opened up to allow a critique of both religious and non-religious traditionalism,
then our religious heritage will degenerate into a closed and introvert
entity incapable of holding a dialogue with other cultures and civilizations.
Worse, its domination will deprive us of the opportunity to receive and
assimilate the great achievements of the modern age in the areas of science
and culture.
The proponents of the movement declare that obstacles created before
the growth of religious thinking and freedom of expression are bound to
prevent us from understanding and using the principles of human rights,
which are among the most valuable achievements of the Twentieth Century.
Thus, if the political atmosphere of Iranian society can be cleansed
of oppression, and if modernist religious ideas succeed in advancing the
critique of traditionalism, then the rights of the Muslim woman can be
appraised in conformity with the conditions of the world in the new century.
What are the expectations of Iranian women at present? Their demands
constitute a long list, and even though a number of religious, political
and cultural figures in the country have derided women's demands and have
rejected them as against the religion, I am glad to say that the conditions
of women's' rights in Iran and the anomalies that exist have been a subject
for comment by international observers.
At no time before or after the revolution have Iranian women had the
opportunity to make use of the world media to publish their own ideas-and
image-and reach a wide audience. Of course more than anything else, we
owe this success to our own endurance, patience and perseverance against
the incessant onslaught of the anti-feminist approach that lurks in certain
layers of our political structure. Today, the condition of the Iranian
woman has not only become the subject of a national discourse, it has the
chance to become a major topic in the course of the dialogue of civilizations.
On the whole, I see a new stage in the social life of Iranian women
unfolding before our eyes, a stage closely linked with the totality of
the political life of the country. At this stage where the political survival
of the country is threatened by political superstitions and taboos concealed
in such disguises as the "Western political onslaught," the social
life of our women is the most accessible symbol that provokes the opponents
of the principle of freedom to attack it as the epitome of the enemy of
the revolution and Islam.
As I am speaking here, the guise of religiosity and revolutionary pretensions
are used to attack the social life of women in Iran. Despite the large
number of educated Iranian women who, inevitably, will enter the employment
market, I believe that this aggressive attitude has not been left much
stamina to sustain its attacks for much longer
There are signs indicating the end of the political life of traditional
extremists. One such sign was the result of the May 1997 presidential elections
when the world witnessed the preference of the Iranian people, especially
women. With their active presence at the polling stations, women ended
their presumed historical lethargy and voted overwhelmingly for the reform
programs promised by President Mohamad Khatami.
To most Iranian women, even those with strictly secular tendencies,
Khatami was better qualified than his rivals to carry out a program of
political development because of his election manifesto, in which he emphasized
the elimination of state violence at home, détente abroad, and above
all, defense of civil liberties. We hope that with the effort of reformists,
the opportunity will arise so that all three branches of the State-the
legislature, the judiciary and the executive-will be able to cooperate
in the direction of improving the condition of women's rights in Iran.
Today, the bone of contention between the reformists and the traditionalists
is the fateful subject of political development. While the majority of
the Iranian women naturally have sided with the reformists, it is still
hard to deny the fact that they have a long, arduous and hazardous way
to go before they have the appropriate channels for the expression of their
views in the form of independent civil societies and formations.
