16 months
Possible directions Iran may be heading
By Afshar Koorosh
August 13, 2003
The Iranian
Not dissimilar to the pre-crisis years of the late 1970s, the world
appears to have, once again, been caught off guard vis-à-vis
its assessment of the political dynamics of Iran and the survivability
of a regime, not long ago, classified as "secure" by
most Western intelligence and think-tank analyses.
September 11, the ensuing removal of the Taliban and the subsequent
forced fall of Baghdad have brought a new and very real focus on
the clerics of Tehran whom by most measures serve as the poster
boys of radical extremism, in quest of the atomic bomb.
In many respects, the international focus on Tehran has bolstered
and added fuel to the voice of domestic discontent against the
ruling religious regime. President Bush's axis-of-evil speech
followed by a crescendo of unprecedented personal overtures to
the Iranian people -- in support of their cause against the clerical
regime -- has had an undeniable influence on the Iranian psyche:
While the dissident movement and, for the most part, the people
welcome such overtures, the ruling regime, including its so-called
reformist faction, has been nerved by the underlying intent of
such calls.
Not withstanding, there is a real and vibrant civil discord brewing
in Iran which is simply based on an epic and uncompromising conflict
between a regime, set on ruling by divine right, and a populace
in need of earthly freedoms and opportunities.
Approaching his seventh year of presidency and term limited, Hojatolislam
Mohamad Khatami, by his own admission, has failed. Powerless or
unwilling, the mid-ranking cleric president failed to draw on a
mandate of "reform." Despite successive presidential
and legislative elections, no meaningful challenge was ever risked
against the ruling conservatives. Consequently, the recent student
crackdowns, preceded by the rejection of "reform legislations," by
the conservatives, are viewed as the final acts bringing as end
to what was once dubbed as the "2nd of Khordad Movement" (named
after Khatami's first election date).
Adding to its domestic turmoil, the regime's chronic inability
to steer away from militant positions on a variety of international
issues (i.e. pursuit of WMDs, obstruction of the Middle East peace
process, relations with Al Qaeda operatives, overt and covert support
of subversive anti terror forces in both Afghanistan and Iraq,
as well as the latest beating death of a Canadian-Iranian journalist,
etc.) has strengthened the case against it, legitimizing its classification
as a rogue, evil and non-conventional state.
Policy Reassessment
This dynamic has brought forth an urgent need, in many Western
capitals, for a serious reassessment of their respective "Iran
Policies". Any such reevaluation however will only translate
into an actual policy shift (away from "dialogue and engagement")
if its findings convincingly satisfy the following questions:
1)
Is there mass discontent in Iran? If so, how deep and how broad
based is it?
2) Is there leadership at the helm of the Iranian
discontent; and if so, is it armed with a strategy and organization
-- inside and outside of Iran?
3) Absence a leadership, how long
will public
voicing of dissent and protests be sustainable?
4) How brutal will
the regime get and how far will it go in its suppression?
5) What
are the prospects of a "Palace Coup," and or how far
will the regime bend in offering concessions to and compromise
with, the people or the "reformist" faction?
To most Iran experts, it is painfully and glaringly obvious that
the missing ingredients in the equation for regime change in Iran
are: leadership and organization, both domestically and among an
extraordinarily affluent diaspora.
Fractious, splintered, unimaginative, spiteful and apathetic are
words often used to describe the Iranian opposition. Hence, despite
years of "waiting for their moment," the Iranian opposition
is today ill-prepared and not in position to provide leadership
for a movement that has a very real and legitimate chance of bringing
positive and permanent challenge to a visibly paranoid and de-legitimized
regime.
Despite numerous attempts and calls for unity among and between
the various opposition groups, factions and personalities, very
little has been accomplished and prospects of a miraculous coalition
or even détente among such groups are dim.
This is especially troubling, since the regime's efficient
intelligence apparatus is, by and large, quite successful in regularly
draining the pools of political leaders that emerge from the domestic
front of its political opposition. Those "leaders," who
escape incarceration by the regime, find themselves in exile, where
they either get consumed by exile politics, or become ineffective
when disconnected from their domestic peers.
Window of Opportunity
Rushed by an increased acceleration of political events within
Iran, there is a growing and very legitimate concern over the closing
of a window of opportunity and the imminence of political chaos
in Iran.
Irrespective of political orientations, a strong case can be made
that the window of opportunity for meaningful change in Iran (either
via internal "reform" or regime change) is approximately
7-16 months -- with the next Majlis (February 2004) and presidential
(May 2005) elections as the critical focal milestones.
Based on this window, there are three distinct schools of thoughts
which attempt their best to foretell the unfolding of events in
Iran.
1) One school believes the regime will weather the storm: Arguing
that the so called pragmatists among the ruling elite are survivors
and, thanks to a leadership vacuum among the opposition, the regime
will buy itself time by inevitably offering a series of strategic
concessions. These concessions may come in two form: a) To the
West: in the areas of WMD's, the Middle East peace plan,
war on Al Qaeda and even human rights; and, b) To the Iranian
people: it will loosen some social controls, offer an amnesty,
concoct
revisions to the election vetting process and shift some of
the powers of the expediency council to the presidency. Under this
formula, the regime will find the perfect opportunity to unveil
"Khatami II," just in time for the next election cycle. (This
time perhaps a Western educated non-cleric, a former "dissident,"
or
even a "liberal" female can become the dark horse to
win the purse.)
2) The second school believes that the clerical regime will
be unable to stand the socio-economic and political heat and
will
be left with one of two options: a) A "palace coup" by
the conservatives in an attempt to save political Islam and
its "Republic" from the pagans. Or, b) A "palace coup" by
the pragmatists
/ reformers in an attempt to "bring to the people what
they want." (In either case, it is thought that Mr. Rafsanjani
will play the power broker. Unclear though, is which camp
he will choose to pay his brokerage fee?)
3) The third school believes that regime change is inevitable.
Irrespective of tactical maneuvers by the regime, or an
absence of an organized leadership by the opposition, this school
believes that the regime will be unable to stave off the
energy of dissent
and the demands of the youth -- who want nothing less
than
a complete exit of the clergy from governance and the establishment
of a secular democracy.
Haplessly optimistic, this group discounts the absence
of an organizational leadership for the freedom movement
by
subscribing
to one of two
views: a) That the movement is on the
verge of spawning its leadership, from within Iran, and
that it will happen literally
overnight.
Subscribers of this view believe that any such candidate will need
to have either an armed services or a religious, yet secular, credential;
or, b) There is an emerging non-traditionalist view that
regards the current Iranian movement as a completely new phenomenon,
breaking
all rules and traditions and bucking all historic trends. It argues
that Iran's freedom movement is so well ingrained among the
people that it needs not the traditional leadership; it needs not
a set traditional organization or a pre-defined disciplined strategy.
In fact, it attributes the resilience of this movement
to the very fact that there is nothing tangible for the regime
to "shut
down". The strength of the movement lies in the fact that
it is mature, entirely homegrown and genuine. It is popularly driven
and purely spontaneous -- driven by individuals, in the streets,
in the alleys and neighborhoods of Iran. This school argue that
Iran will produce the first "leaderless tidal wave of the
masses" culminating in regime paralysis.
U.S. Factor
Notwithstanding its domestic problems, the Islamic Republic is
also faced with increased and very serious challenge from outside
its borders.
As the remaining superpower, and more especially because of the
inherent "conspiratorial" psyche of the Iranian political
culture, the United States will have an important role in determining
the general direction and speed with which events unfold in Iran.
Yet, as reflected by grueling public debates and the ambiguities
emanating from various Iran policy camps in Washington, America's
direction and clarity of purpose will only come as a result of
its dealing with the following issues:
1) America's Paranoia: America suffers from a crippling paranoia
emanating from its Iran-experience over the last half century.
On one hand America feels bound by the principal of "in defense
of freedom, whenever and wherever," yet it suffers from its
own inability to bridge the gap between 1953 and 2003. Two historic
windows, half a century apart, with distinctly intertwining messages,
Iran's current political predicament provides America's
champions of "freedom" and "popular will" with
a golden opportunity to make the right choice by backing the right
side -- the people of Iran.
Irrespective of which face of history one sides with -- the coup
or counter-coup of 1953 -- there is clarity in the opportunity
afforded to America today. Instead of endless therapy sessions
over 1953, America's choice today must be non-other than
an unwavering support of the Iranian people. This resolve will
not only strengthen the rightful aspiration of 70 million people
-- but will also cure America's paranoia that has manifested itself
through catatonic foreign policy blunders such as Iran-Contra,
the Clinton/Albright apology or the ongoing continuous search for
"moderates" within
the regime.
2) America's alternatives? With Khatami's "reform
movement" virtually decapitated and in a hole, America's
political options on Iran are limited to: a) A few undesirables
within the regime's "conservative" camp -- with
the claim to have the ability to offer Washington "a deal;" b)
A daring, yet leaderless, student movement limited, in action,
thanks to the brute force and crushing suppression of the regime;
c) The disorganized opposition within Iran; or, d) The unimaginative,
pale and insipid Iranian opposition in exile.
It is an undeniable reality that without a tangible alternative,
it is difficult for any argument, no matter how morally just, to
win a U.S. foreign policy debate in favor of ridding the status
quo in Tehran -- especially with Baghdad and Kabul in such disarray.
Nevertheless, President Bush may have already limited his options
against Tehran with his increasingly uncompromising rhetoric.
Iran's freedom movement and dissidents are hopeful that,
much like Ronald Reagan's calls against the "evil empire", Bush's
doctrine of rhetoric against Iran will not let up. They hope that
similar to Reagan's Soviet policy, Bush's posture on
Iran is also firmly heeled on a personal commitment and belief
that ultimately (and despite a leadership vacuum at the helm of
Iran's freedom movement) it is the freedom movement itself
that remains America's only and clear alternative for investment.
3) With or without Europe? September 11 afforded America a unique
mandate to lead the global war or terror. That mandate however
found little translation when it came to international resolve
on Iraq. Led by commercial interests, important powers within the
European Union (EU) failed to follow America's lead threatening
to deepen an Atlantic rift. Predictably that experience, caused
American foreign policy careerist to draw a new line as to how
far America's unilateralism should be tested -- come
next time.
With vast gas and petroleum reserves, a consumer market of 70 million,
Iran serves as a valuable multi-billion dollar annual asset to
the EU. Hence, the very same commercial and political issues that
served as the core reason for Europe's mutiny against Washington
-- on Iraq -- are at play today with Iran. This time, however,
making the case for the EU are camps among foreign policy careerists
and certain lobby groups in America favoring "dialogue and
engagement" with the clerical regime as opposed to a unilateral
American confrontation with Tehran.
The clerical regime however, has not played its hand very well
with the EU in that, it has managed, on its own, to increasingly
make the case for Washington. The regime's belligerent and
militant posturing vis-à-vis its WMD program and gross human
rights violations, among other issues, are turning the tide against
Tehran. Many members of the EU are taking formal and serious positions
in support of Iran's freedom movement.
To exert successful pressure on the clerical regime, America needs
Europe. Hence, here lies a perfect opportunity to defuse friction
with the EU by favoring a multilateral policy and close alliance
with Europe in support of the Iranian freedom movement.
4) Election Fix: For decades, America's strength -- its democracy
and elective process -- has also been viewed as its weakness
when it comes to long-term formulation and commitment to foreign
policy. Every four years America's domestic politics and
electioneering, handicaps its foreign policy considerations.
With national elections (Presidential, the entire House and 2/3
of the Senate) 15 months away, the Bush administration will need
to stop the hemorrhage of public opinion support of its foreign
policy efforts in the Middle East. Suggesting that the Administration's
foreign policy choices will be severely limited by temptations
of "quick fixes" and "settling down" the
Middle East in favor of badly needed "success stories" and
campaign sound-bites.
Unless something dramatically energizes the Iranian political process,
within the next six months, it would be unreasonable to expect
the Administration to take dramatic risks on Iran -- as U.S. campaign
season kicks in by January/February 2004.
However, Iran and the story of its 50 million youth have a place
in America's forthcoming elections. What better story than
the story of freedom fighting for its place among a disenfranchised
generation looking, not away from, but to America for support?
Serious or Curious?
Despite an overall pessimism among Iran experts in regard to exiled
Iranian opposition, there has been, in recent months, a curious
buzz about an unlikely name: Pahlavi.
The former crown prince, "Reza Pahlavi of Iran," as
he prefers to be called, a few years ago embarked on a quiet campaign
to re-introduce himself to the world at large, but more especially
to the 50 million youth of Iran whom never knew him nor his father.
Young, modern, articulate and genuinely unassuming, Reza Pahlavi
has found much success in the West, especially in the aftermath
of 9/11, in presenting himself as a selfless "citizen-prince,"
calling for secularism by way of a referendum -- brought about
as a
result of a non-violent civil disobedience campaign of political
defiance.
Careful analysis, as reflected by sentiments within power circles
in Western capitals, however, suggest Reza Pahlavi's bold public
relations campaign significantly outweighs his organizational capabilities
inside and, surprisingly, outside Iran.
This analysis suggests that in many respects Reza
Pahlavi's strengths also appear to be his weaknesses: His high
name identification
among all Iranians; his recent success with a well disciplined
public relations campaign; as well as, his articulate campaign
message serve him as double edged swords:
1) To those who find
it counter-intuitive to support a return of monarchy in Iran,
the name Pahlavi is an insurmountable problem;
2) To those who
find
little problem with his message, the fact that he has become
an "overnight" media darling in the West is suspect and immediately
attributed to a "conspiracy
by the powers" to yet-again return a Pahlavi to the peacock
throne;
3) Ironically, to those who may be willing to take
him at face value, there is a looming contradiction between
Reza Pahalvi's
public relations campaign and an obvious inability or,
worse, lack of desire to assemble, forge, command or partake in
a
cohesive political mobilization effort (i.e. united opposition);
and,
4)
finally to those who are not convinced of his formula:
"Nonviolent political defiance and civil-disobedience = regime
paralysis
= facilitating a referendum and secular democracy," he
is suspect of either not being serious or, of being motivated by
ulterior
motives.
It remains to be seen, and especially difficult to gauge,
whether the citizen-prince is able to translate his strong
rhetoric
into a solid emotional connection with the frustrated
masses living
under the Islamic Republic. His message has great appeal,
but any legitimate chance for success largely depends
on his ability
to
personally overcome the serious questions that have,
for years, haunted him about his leadership skills and
personal
commitment
to the cause.
Nevertheless, Reza Pahlavi has made inroads and is a
name to be reckoned with. If for no other reason, for
the very
simple
fact
that the institution he represents still commands emotions
among Iranians and can command a natural constituency
deeply rooted
in Persian culture dating back well before both Islam
and Christianity.
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