Make Iran an offer it can't refuse
First, the UN will ask the IAEA to design an industrial-scale enrichment facility for Iran

 

 

Dan Badger
November 17, 2006
iranian.com

The reasons for the current impasse over Iran's uranium enrichment programme are simple. So is the solution for breaking the impasse.

The impasse exists because 1) power-plant-grade enrichment is the first step on the path to weapons-grade enrichment; 2) neither the IAEA nor anyone else has been able to produce any evidence that Iran is lying when it claims it has no weapons intentions (and it didn't help when the House Intelligence Committee recently issued a report purporting to prove weapons intentions that was immediately rejected as "erroneous, misleading and unsubstantiated," not by Iran but by the IAEA); and 3) until the burden of proof is met, Russian and China will block sanctions by the UN Security Council.

The simple solution: make an offer that Iran cannot refuse if it wants to maintain the credibility of its no-weapons-intentions story. 

When Iran rejected Russia's proposal to provide an "assured" supply of power reactor fuel from Russia, this did not undermine Iran's credibility, even in Russia's eyes. Perhaps this was because Russia realizes that it is perceived as a not-very-reliable energy supplier to neighbours with whom political issues arise. Or perhaps it was because Iran's refusal to accept energy dependence doesn't seem unreasonable when most other large nations have made energy independence a central objective of energy and national-security policy.

To provide a real test of Iran's intentions, the offer must go further. It should be based on the President Ahmadinejad made in his UN speech a year ago: an industrial-scale, international enrichment consortium, based in Iran, to supply fuel to Iranian power-plants. 

Of course it would be foolish to embrace Ahmadinejad's proposal in a manner that allows Iran to abscond with our nuclear know-how, throw us out of the country, and use what they have learned to build a bomb. Here is how this can be avoided:

First, the UN will ask the IAEA to design an industrial-scale enrichment facility that does not incorporate any know-how that Iran does not already possess at pilot scale. (No P2 centrifuges, for example.) If the IAEA says this cannot be done, stop here.

Next, we propose that this IAEA-designed facility will be built in Iran by an international consortium (Iran will be a member), subject to these conditions:

1. Iran will agree not to carry out any uranium enrichment research, development or production activities except at the consortium facility.

2. The IAEA will be allowed to carry out an intrusive inspections program throughout Iran.

3. The facility at Natanz must be built according to IAEA specifications, and above ground.

4. Iran must agree that, once the facility is operational, the IAEA may shut it down and lock it down without Iran's permission if the IAEA, in its sole discretion, has reason to believe that Iran is pursuing nuclear enrichment activities anywhere other than at the consortium facility.

5. Iran must agree that the armed air forces of NATO are entitled to destroy the facility if Iran takes any action to prevent the IAEA from shutting down and locking down the facility.

This proposal would set a clear test of Iranian intentions. If Iran refuses to accept now what Ahmadinejad has previously proposed, it would have to be on grounds that the conditions are too onerous. Yet they are merely those necessary to assure the rest of the world that enrichment in Iran does not progress beyond power-plant-grade. When the USA and Europe renew their demand for sanctions following an Iranian rejection, Russia and China will find it much more difficult to justify further waffling. Even if they do continue to waffle, we will have lost nothing, and will have gained much high ground both over Iran, and over the wafflers.

And if Iran accepts? Hawks will scoff at the idea that the IAEA can design and oversee an industrial-scale uranium enrichment facility that Iran can't and won't use to gain time and know-how in its quest for nuclear weapons. But why would we accept the judgment of hawks rather than that of the IAEA? Who turned out to be right when hawks and IAEA disagreed on the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's nuclear aspirations?

If Iran accepts, it will be because their intentions really are peaceful, or because they believe they can fool the IAEA, or because they believe the international community will lack the will to destroy the enrichment plant once Iran's weapons intentions are made manifest.

In the first case, everyone wins. In the second case, Iran will be punished for its mistake unless the hawks are right and the IAEA is wrong. In the third case, Iran will be punished for its mistake unless the NATO powers do indeed lack the resolve to eliminate an Iranian enrichment facility that has gone out of control, in which case shame on us.

There is an emerging consensus that the US should talk with Iran about its nuclear program, without making prior capitulation to our primary demand a pre-condition for talks. But we also need fresh ideas on what to talk about. Why not an offer that Iran can't refuse? Comment