From containment to engagement

By Majid Tehranian
February 5, 1998
The Iranian

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U. S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War era has been fluctuating between two contradictory doctrines: containment and engagement. Containment was the paramount doctrine of the Cold War initially proposed by George Kennan in his well-known Mr. X Foreign Affairs article. It managed to limit the expansion of the Sino-Soviet bloc beyond its own borders. But old ideas, particularly successful ones, never die. They continue to overshadow and cloud our understanding of new realities.

The realities of the post-Cold War are radically different from the Cold War years. Soviet Union has disappeared. China has opened its gates to foreign investment and international trade. Although the United States is the single superpower around, it cannot dictate to the rest of the world. We are in a multipolar world in which Europe, Japan, China, Russia, Brazil, and India each have different policies to pursue in their own spheres of interests. Even small powers such as Israel, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Libya can thumb their nose at the United States and get away with it. Yet, U. S. foreign policy continues to be caught in the contradictions of pre and post-Cold War perspectives and policies.

Whereas during the Cold War, the bipolar structure of the world often persuaded the U.S. allies to swallow their pride and go along with its policies despite their reservations, in the post-Cold War era, there is no such compelling reason. Therefore, trying to contain the "enemies" by engaging the "allies" does not work. In the Cold War sense of the words, there are no allies or enemies left. The concepts have thus lost much of their efficacy. Nowhere are these contradictions best shown than in the Persian Gulf.

Following the successful rallying of the United Nations against Iraqi aggression in Kuwait, the United States has tried to follow a policy of "dual containment" against Iran and Iraq. That policy has failed to a degree that the State Department is now too embarrassed to continue using the phrase. Nevertheless, the substance of the policy continues to be pursued rather unsuccessfully. The Persian Gulf War allies and supporters are no longer willing to follow a policy that leads nowhere. Russia and China have refused to sanction a renewed bombing of Iraq while Europe is expressing misgivings.

In the case of Iran, United States finds itself alone in pursuing a policy of isolating that country. The time is ripe for a fundamental rethinking of the premises of such policies. In the post-Cold War era, engagement presents a far more realistic approach to world problems and trouble spots than containment. As the case of China is amply demonstrating, U. S. and other nations have been able to influence the Chinese leadership much more effectively by entering into trade and dialogue with that country than containing it.

Economic development in any country generally empowers new sectors of the population which, in turn, call for broader political participation in decision making. By impoverishing Iran and Iraq through economic sanctions, the United States has managed to provide ammunition to those that have labeled it as "the Great Satan." It has also turned a vicious dictator such as Saddam Hussein into a martyr in the eyes of some Arab nationalists.

A policy of engagement in the Persian Gulf would call for the United States to play an entirely a different role in that region. Comparable to the role that Britain played in the 19th century world affairs, that role could be that of a "balancer of power." Instead of isolating Iran and Iraq, the two most important countries in the region, the United States should act as an honest broker. It should immediately call for a Regional Security Conference under the auspices of the United Nations at which the five permanent members of the Security Council are also present as observers and guarantors of any agreement.

The aim of this conference should be to conclude (a) a regional non-aggression pact, (b) an arms control pact dealing with all weapons of mass destruction, and (c) a regional cooperation pact including an agreement on long-term stability in the flow and price of oil as well as consideration of a regional common market. The oil producers and consumers in this region have strong long-term economic interests that outweigh their present political differences. They are or should be all concerned with the long-term stability of price and flow of oil. They are or should be all committed to preserving the existing borders.

Finally, they all should be committed to a peaceful resolution of their disputes rather than wars that serve no purpose except the desire to dominate or the thirst for vengeance.

About the author

Majid Tehranian is professor of international communication at the University of Hawaii and director of the Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research. His latest books are Technologies of Power: Information Machines and Democratic Prospects (1990), Restructuring for World Peace: At the Threshold of the 21st Century (1992), and Globalism and Its Discontents Democracy, Development, and Discourse in a Fragmented World (1998). (Back to top)

Response

When Majid Tehranian penned his words about the future role of the United States in forging a new doctrine conducive to peace and prosperity in the Persian Gulf, he must have relished the possibility that some would come out and attack him frontally for some of his suggestions. I cannot dash his expectation in that regard. For what is worth, the Doha conference -- which was not -- points to the futility of the United States attempting to do anything in the Persian Gulf, other than pursuing a course of intimidation. No Persian Gulf country is oblivious to the fact that the U.S. armada is posed off their shores at a distance of half or less than Cuba is to the U.S. soil.

The Tehranian thesis posits that the U.S. play the same role as Great Britain did in the 19th century. Some how in that legacy he sees peace and honesty, neither one of which can be supported with the facts in evidence. If anything, the British "pacification" of the Persian Gulf was accomplished by the use of force against the maritime tribes, including a few on the Iranian coast. Moreover, when it came to acting as an arbiter of competing interests between the local powers, including Iran, Pax Britannica mostly sided with issues that (i) ensured British interests as opposed to Russian, or German; (ii) ensured Arab intersts as opposed to Iranian interests; and (iii) ensured interests of the friendly Arabs as opposed to those of the unfriendly Arabs. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the systematic British support of the locals' claims to the various Persian Gulf islands.

The United States is congenitally incapable of being a "balancer of powers," as Mr. Tehranian wishes. There is no fact in evidence to support the contention that in its foreign policy make-up the United States has ever persisted on balnace. Inevitably, she is drawn to favor one side of the conflict over another becuase its politicial culture, domestically and internationally, is still hostage to the puritanical notion that all in the world is either black or white, and that gray is a color with a lawyer.

For the U.S. to be able to call a regional security conference and ensure 100% regional attendance, she would require to put all the states in the Middle East/Persian Gulf in the same basket and treat them all equally and with no prejudice, with herself having no interest in any outcome. If the multitude of enmities in this region for the past one half century is any indication, this region of the world may be the Biblical location of Eden, but a Utopia it will never become -- least of all at the hands one whom the people in this region view a the Great Satan, defender of Zionism, killer of Iraqi children, and guardian of all manner of sultani, emiri, and sheikly royal mongrels left over from the era of British colnialism in this region.

Regards,

Guive Mirfendereski
<Guive@aol.com>

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