Almost all literatures were written about the events in 1953 benefits Mosaddeq/hezbollahs cult.
It benefits Mosaddeqhist because by exaggerating the role of C.I.A they can cover up the unpopularity of Mossadeq among Iranians during August 1953.
It benefits Mossadeq's partners Hezbollahs because they can suppress any radical movement of Iranian people under the umbrella of C.I.A.
They both exaggerate the capability of American policy makers in general, and the capability of C.I.A, specifically. They make it sounds like an America can change any establishment in the world at any time they want. All their literatures regarding 1953 indicate pro-democracy movement in Iran was the work of C.I.A covert operation. These efforts intended to minimize the role of million Iranian's wishes for returning shah back to crown. In that regard, weight has been given to a handful of C.I.A agents, NOT million Iranian people who were present on the streets of Tehran and other cities in August of 1953.
Nonetheless, C.I.A after 60 years of it's establishment couldn't even detect the plan of handful bare feet Arab deserts on September 11. They didn't even have any intelligent to stop the plan which leaded to massacre of thousands innocent people. What kind of intelligent these people are talking about?
On the other hand, we were witnessing uprising of our people in June 2009. The Hezbollahs crowd, who inspired by Mosaddeq crowd, bashed democracy movement by saying it was the work of C.I.A.
Surely, there are thousand C.I.A records regarding June 2009, but they were NOT determined factor in terms of changing the establishment or future landscape of Iran politic. Surely, there were some C.I.A agents among the crowd, but thousand and thousand people who were killed or arrested are the main factors.
Operation Ajax intended to naturalize Moscow efforts to end Monarchy by establishing a Socialist government pro Soviet Union through Tudeh party. Iran's direction was toward communism if U.S wouldn't taken an action. U.S supported their sympathizers as Soviet supported their sympathizers through Tudeh party.
"The Soviets exerted considerable influence in Iran while occupying the country during the Second World War and as such they had some influence on the Tudeh at its inception. During the 1940s Rustam Aliev, a Soviet diplomat, had many contacts with the party and influenced its development. Aliev was a close ally of Ja'far Baqirov the chief of the Soviet Azarbaijan communist party who in turn was close to Lavrenti P. Beria, the head of G.P.U under Stalin. Baqirov played an important role during the Iranian Azarbaijan crisis of 1945-46; he met his demise after Beria's arrest following Stalin's death.
In terms of factionalism in the Tudeh, it is clear that both the hard- line and the moderate factions had great admiration for the October revolution and the Soviet Union as the citadel of victorious proletarian revolution. Members of both factions submitted to Soviet policy throughout the 1940s. Both factions believed that the party had to observe and respect its internationalist duties by coordinating the party's policies with those of the Soviet Union. It should also be noted that as long as Stalin was alive, the CPSU demanded discipline and obedience from fraternal parties around the world.
Within the context of general support for Soviet policies in Iran and around the world, the two Tudeh factions had different perceptions and relations with the Soviets. Members of the moderate faction have accused the hard-liner faction, especially Kambakhsh and Kianuri, of being outright KGB associates or operatives. Kishawarz has accused the Soviets of misusing the trust and admiration the Tudeh had for the October revolution and the Soviet Union. According to him, by misusing the belief we and the majority of party members honestly had in internationalism, the CPSU forced its operatives and spies on its "fraternal party".
Kishawarz suggested that through Soviet support these operatives rose in party ranks until they reached high party posts and gradually changed the Tudeh party of Iran to a tool of the Soviet Union's policy in Iran. Here, Kishawarz was criticizing the Soviet conduct in promoting Kambakhsh and Kianuri in the Tudeh. He suggested that both men, heads of the hard-liner faction, had ties to the G.P.U and were closely supported by Beria and Baqirov as long as Stalin was alive.
Another aspect of the Soviet influence on Tudeh was in policy making sphere. As noted, Zabih notes how the party leadership misread the CPSU's general guidelines on the international situation and views this as one of the contributing elements in the party's demise. The party's anti-Musaddiq policy during 1951-1952, promoted mainly by the hard-liner faction but which was also initially supported by some moderates, although not exactly similar to the Soviet policy toward Musaddiq, was partially based on misinterpretation of a CPSU policy. This policy, which eventually manifested itself in the resolutions of the nineteenth congress of the CPSU, held in October 1952, suggested that the bourgeoisie had let down the cause of democracy on the international scale and that now it was the duty of the international proletariat to pick up the banner of democracy. The hard-liner faction took this observation too literally and attacked Iranian nationalists as the manifestation of the Iranian national bourgeoisie.
Furthermore, the 1953 coup occurred at a time when the Soviet Union was going through profound internal change."
Tudeh State of Paralysis translated by Dr. maziar Behrooz