Nuclear cards

For Iranians and Americans with a sense of history, these are worrisome times.  Iran’s leadership, determined to defend Iran’s sovereignty over its energy resources, is confronting global powers who are just as determined to check in Iran’s threat to regional stability and compel Iran to meet its legal international obligations. 

Of course, Ahmadinezhad is no Mosaddeq, Bush is no Eisenhower, Blair is no Churchill and controlling nuclear development is not the same as controlling who pumps and sells the oil from under your feet.  But the principles involved are so eerily similar that they can obscure a still more frightening political pattern:  the tendency of national governments to use foreign policy to reinforce their domestic political standing. 

It is always a risky game, and one for which the average citizen tends to pay a higher price than the leadership that rolls the dice.  Whatever the merits of oil nationalization in 1951, there is no question that it propelled Mohammad Mosaddeq to the office of Prime Minister and, temporarily, strengthened his hand in his main domestic agenda of taming the Pahlavi monarchy. 

Of course, it was the average Iranian who had to pay the price of the international oil boycott and the domestic political turbulence that was stoked and exploited by the US and Great Britain.  Other Middle Eastern leaders have won and lost in this game of diplomatic brinksmanship.  In Egypt, Nasser arguably won in the Suez Crisis in 1956 and lost in 1967 – but both episodes were costly for the Egyptian people. 

The leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran has historically been willing to take huge international risks to solidify its position at home:  the Hostage Crisis of 1979-1981, the refusal to negotiate an end to the war with Iraq in the mid-80s’ when Iran had gained the upper hand and, now, the quest for homemade nuclear fuel (it just tastes better, I guess). 

In the 1980’s, the leadership of the Islamic Republic was defending itself against its former partners in the 1979 revolution (the Tudeh, the MKO, and secular-liberal opposition) and now it is consolidating its position against a potentially more dangerous rival:  shicite Islamic liberalism. 

Consequently, there is no real debate among Iranians at home or in the Iranian diaspora on the merits of nuclear power or nuclear weapons.  The issue quickly becomes polarized around being soft on national sovereignty (the preferred spin of the current Iranian government) or being soft on militant Islamic fundamentalism (the preferred spin of the Iranian expatriate opposition and – surprise, surprise – the US government and, lately, “old” Europe too). 

Now, why do governments take such international risks?  One answer is that they sometimes underestimate the costs relative to potential gains on the domestic front (Bush II on Iraq, Johnson on Vietnam, Wilson on Mexico, Jefferson on the “Barbary states” leap to mind).  But, sometimes in terms of real politik , they get it right.  After shameful inaction in Rawanda (1994) and Srebrenica (1995) and having just survived an impeachment trial (February 1999), Clinton understood rather precisely what he could do about Serbia in Kosovo:  he bombed them. 

Milosevic could not counter US bombing and the more things dragged on, the more Clinton “faced” opposition demands that he use ground troops to bring the conflict to an end.  Not even the accidental US bombing of the Chinese embassy and Russian grumpiness throughout the campaign could deter the US-led air war.   Bombing campaigns, even long drawn-out ones that fail to “shock and awe” enemies into submitting but instead grind away relentlessly at “carefully selected” targets, are risk free in domestic political terms.

Is Bush taking a greater risk by pressuring Iran on its nuclear program while American troops are embroiled in Iraq, or, is Ahmadinezhad taking a greater risk in pressing ahead with Iran’s nuclear program?  Can Ahmadinezhad use the confrontation with the US and its allies to further intimidate Iran’s domestic opposition?  Can Bush continue to use “real threats to America’s security” to escape scrutiny on domestic spying and provide some patriotic cover for his congressional allies in the upcoming elections?

From the summits of power, the domestic political jackpots to be won by international gamesmanship seem an acceptable risk.  How does it look to you, my fellow citizens?  When should we ask that our leaders try risking their political careers instead of human lives?  A renewed global dialogue on nuclear disarmament, instead of the current poker game, would set the right tone and let everyone take a step back from the brink.  Then, or perhaps simultaneously, the US and Iran should have direct talks on a range of issues, with the long-term goal being the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

About
Camron Michael Amin is associate professor of history at the University of Michigan-Dearborn. He was project director for the Modern Middle East Sourcebook Project and is the co-editor of The Modern Middle East: A Sourcebook for History (forthcoming from Oxford in 2005) and The Electronic Middle East Sourcebook Project.

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