I have been trying to think through what is different and what is the same in the Middle East since I was first assigned to Nasser's Egypt in the mid-1960s. At times during those 40+ years, prospects were pretty bleak for the US, but they always seemed to recover. Is there still that resilience in American policy that will permit us to bounce back?
It is easier to see the similarities then and now: the strong nationalism, the abiding grievances against outside powers aligned against popular forces, the sense that poverty derives from injustice and corruption and a deep religious faith establishing an identity across borders.
Autocracies remain in control, supported from outside (then the US and USSR, now just the US) and by armies and security services, and seeking to monopolize the channels of communication and the political process. In this context it is very difficult to imagine an Iranian-type revolution taking over any country in the region and almost as hard to conjure up a Nasser-like coup.
Nevertheless, it is in the realm of soft power – the political mobilization abilities of the state – that the old order is badly weakened. While the state's police powers have been modernized and strengthened in many ways, states are no longer totalitarian, i.e., holding all the levers. Every one of the Moslem regimes from Turkey and Iran westward must now take serious account of its Islamic popular movements.
In the 1960s Egypt could jail and execute the leaders of Moslem Brothers and relax a bit. Syria in the 1980s could slaughter them and calm would return. Egypt in the 1990s could make mass arrests and quell the problem for awhile. I think those days are fast fading.
Dealing with Islamists has become progressively more difficult because their appeal has spread without ideological competition. Israel's brutality in Palestine and Lebanon – aided by America – is a powerful nutrient for the movement, as is the residue of American brutality in Iraq.
Apart from active Arab fighters (Nasrallah), the sole leader giving voice to the bitterness and convictions of ordinary folk is Ahmadinejad. If Washington were to have its [proclaimed] way and achieve free elections for all, I doubt that a single regime, Turkey and perhaps Iran apart, would be left standing. To Washington's silent relief there is not much chance of a flowering of democracy.
Although the state is more secure in its police powers, it faces a rapid growth in that noxious modern phenomenon: small group resistance or terrorism, if you prefer. Suicide bombers have badly rattled the Israelis and ruined Iraq; they can do the same to other Arab regimes. Iranian youth took the Shah's bullets until his troops would fire no longer. Ordinary people prefer ordinary calm. Will they side with their repressive governments allied with non-Moslem outsiders when disorder is the rule? Nasser never had to confront people power.
Can regimes be helped by playing the Sunni vs. Shia card as the Saudis, Jordanians and Egyptians have tried? First, doing so tells you that they are the most exposed, the politically weakest of the status quo bunch. Second, the positive reaction of Egyptian youth to the Iranian revolution – bringing down a dictator and his imperial boss – is a bit of history the Sunni supremacists might study.
That positive reaction faded only when Saddam, the neo-Nasser, was depicted going to war to “defend” the Arab world against the mullahs. If the US or Israel attacks Iran, I suspect there would be a strong reaction against them and the status quo regimes Washington sustains. Absent such an attack, stirring up Sunni subjects against the Shia is apt to stir the latter in the Gulf and fool few in the Sunni heart lands.
Still groping for historical analogies, it seems to me that Iran has inherited the Egypt chair of regional leadership. The US went after Nasser with an economic squeeze and indirect pressure – Saudis opposing them in Yemen and Israel bashing Syria which led to the 1967 war Now we see the same indirect tactics against Tehran. Hoped-for UN sanctions to squeeze the economy; Israel bashing Hizbollah and, perhaps later, Syria.
We read that the Saudis are being called in to split off Syria. And there seems to be an effort at internal subversion among Iran's ethnic groups. None of these tactics are apt to bring regime change in Tehran. A direct military strike may be the only remaining option.
Can anything be done – beyond re-saddling Karen Hughes – to put America's fortunes on a better course and help the cause of moderation in the region? Old Near East hands will immediately respond that a fair Arab-Israel settlement is essential. In my darker moments I wonder if it is not too late for that remedy – as if there were the slightest chance it might be made to happen by the current or a successor regime in Washington.
What about the current Washington/Jerusalem plan? Will smashing Hizbollah and installing international peace keepers plus a façade of Lebanese troops on Israel's border – while continuing the usual Israeli bloody bullying of the Palestinians – calm the region and allow people to think moderate thoughts? There may be a pause in violence, but hardly an end thereto.
I think that the only thing that will change policy in Washington is for the American people to suffer a severe shock from a disruption of oil supplies. That, and plain good sense finally taking hold might lead them to conclude, as many have with Iraq, that Washington's bias, lies and ineptitude in the region is grounds for regime change here. A change of that magnitude would require the defeat of spin masters who dominate public opinion in this nation. They, alas, seem even tougher opponents against the cause of peace than fighters in the Middle East.
Henry Precht is a retired Foreign Service Officer and the author of “A Diplomat's Progress“ (Williams & Company, Publishers , 2004).
