I assert that only with bloodshed shall this Revolution come to fruition. Only when the blood of the islamic regime is spilled in the streets, as so done with the blood of the countless innocent Iranians, shall Iran wash away the stanching memory of 30 years of tyrannical theocracy; self termed the islamic republic.
Now, lets make a list of names that must be publically executed in the name of Justice:
1. Ayatollah Khomeini (DEAD)
2. Ayatollah Khamenei
3. Ayatollah Rafsanjani
4. Ayatollah (fill in the name)
5. Ahmadinejad
6. Rajavi(s)
7. Moussavi
PLEASE ADD TO THE LIST…TIA
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Since the elctions were fraudulent to begin with, I guess the rest of the matter is mute… so additional fraud is just icing on the islamic yellow cake. – AK69
•The most influential case for the stolen election has come from Salon contributor professor Juan Cole. The official results, Cole points out, have Ahmadinejad winning areas where he didn’t plausibly have majority support. It seems unlikely that he carried his rivals’ hometowns, or regions dominated by ethnic groups of which challengers Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karoubi were members, and Ahmadinejad was not. It’s as if George W. Bush had edged out John Kerry in Massachusetts. In fact, according to the official returns, Ahmadinejad performed relatively evenly across the country. This too is implausible, at least by historical standards. “In past elections there have been substantial ethnic and provincial variations,” Cole writes. Not only are the Interior Ministry numbers suspiciously smooth, but they were produced too quickly: usually, a three-day delay.
•If Cole’s is the most influential critique of the election results, then the most influential person to publicly voice doubts has certainly been Vice President Joe Biden. Said Biden, echoing Cole on Sunday’s “Meet The Press,” “Seventy percent of the vote comes out of the city, that’s not Ahmadinejad’s strong place,” Biden said. “The idea he gets 68 or whatever percent of the vote in a circumstance like that seems unlikely.”
•Before the election, it was thought that the only way Ahmadinejad would survive was for pro-reform voters to fail to turn out, points out the New Yorker’s Laura Secor. “If the current figures are to be believed, urban Iranians who voted for the reformist ex-president Mohammad Khatami in 1997 and 2001 have defected to Ahmadinejad in droves.”
•Ahmadinejad was polling in the mid-30s, notes a dubious Michael Tomasky in the Guardian. “If you’ve managed the economy that badly and the electorate bulges by about 28 percent (roughly speaking, 40 million to 29 million), I don’t care how adept you are at religious demagoguery, you are not getting 65 percent of that 28 percent.”
•The government “didn’t even attempt to disguise the fraud,” writes Andrew Sullivan of a graph of the seven batches of votes reported over the course of the night. The graph purports to show each wave of ballot counting breaking down nearly identically, about 2-to-1 for Ahmadinejad.
•Hold on, writes Nate Silver. This may just be how elections look; in fact, it’s not hard to produce a similar graph of the 2008 election. “The apparently extremely strong relationship is mostly an artifact of the exceptionally simple fact that as you count more votes, both candidates’ totals will tend to increase.” But don’t assume the election was fair just because that graph fails to prove fraud. Sniffing around survey data, Silver’s colleague Renard Sexton smells a rat. Ahmadinejad outran his numbers by too much, and the minor candidates didn’t register the support we’d have expected. (Most remarkably, Mehdi Karoubi earned paltry vote totals in his native Lorestan and nearby Khuzestan — which he won in 2005 with 55.5 percent and 36.7 percent, respectively.) “These figures would suggest that Ahmadinejad’s reported 65 percent of the national vote is at minimum outside of the trend.
