As late as June 12th a large number of Iranians managed to convince themselves–for the last time–that the Islamic Republic could evolve into something just, livable, honest, prosperous and humane. That is no longer conceivable.
Ideological governments that replace an unpopular leader start with an advantage of looking good upon first comparison. So long as they can still convince people of a rosy future, folks will accept all harshness or incompetence as temporary “inconveniences.” Early successes are relatively easy to achieve and build confidence. In this stage leaders and people seriously believe they are riding the wave of the future living under a system worthy of emulation.
Closed systems based on inflexible ideologies and featuring no real checks on abuse of power contain the same intrinsic flaws that ALWAYS must produce the same results: widespread corruption, extreme inefficiency and the growth of a reform-resistant privileged class). In time the populace can’t help miss seeing all of that. It becomes clear that promises won’t be kept. The old nursery rhyme about an egg-like creature describes what happens next:
Humpty-Dumpty sat on a wall
Humpty-Dumpty had a great fall
All the kings horses and all the kings men
Couldn’t put Humpty-Dumpty together again
What took the Soviet citizens more than 60 years took 30 years in Iran–the process of permanent and irreversible disillusionment.
Aging Soviet pensioners still mourn the USSR but who will mourn the Islamic Republic? Compared to any Soviet leader since 1953, Khamenei’s crimes have been orders of magnitude greater and so open. Where the USSR’s population was geriatric by 1990, Khamenei’s Islamic Republic was youthful, like his prime targets. Most of Stalin’s victims are in their gravers. Most of Khamenei’s victims have memories they will bear for decades.
Theoretically an ideological regime can survive allowing massive reform while there is still a window or opportunity (sufficient public trust). Historically it rarely happens. Vested interests charged with guarding against “deviancy” are too powerful. When things seem to be going well enough, the attitude becomes, “If it ain’t broke don’t fix it.” The problem is that once the decline begins, the stagnancy and corruption become so obvious.
For the Soviet Union, prime time for reform was the Sputnik era when many folks thought the Soviets would overtake the West . Two decades of mild-dulling stagnancy under Breshnev, Chernenko and Andropov erased all illusions about a rosy future for anyone outside the nomenklatura (privileged class). By the time time Gorbachev arrived, it was a case of too little, too late.
For Iran the optimal time for reform was the Khatami presidency. Instead of supporting reform, Khamenei did everything possible to torpedo it. If the Supreme Leader had taken the opposite course, the Islamic Republic would have changed beyond recognition, exactly as ultraconservatives charge. Would that have been so awful?
