From Enduring America:
Saham News, the outlet of opposition figure Mehdi Karroubi, reports from a source that Karroubi and fellow 2009 Presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi may soon be released from strict house arrest.
SAHAM NEWS LINK (article is in iranian)
Khamenei’s “sacred word” is equal in value to Hitler’s pledges at Munich. His police state will return shortly after elections. Iranians will never enjoy democracy or human rights so long as this unreformable regime exists. Don’t be surprised at a “Be nice to Rafsanjani” move next.
If the Greens boycott the polls, the contest becomes a campaign between The Hated (Ahmadinejad faction) and The More Hated (the mullahs). The former wins unless the mullahs cheat. Either way the regime fragments even more. Khamenei also needs a large turnout to support his empty claims of “great popularity.” After stealing the last election, Khamenei insisted repeatedly that the big turnout showed “mass approval” for his way of governing–a boldfaced lie. Don’t let him do the same thing again.
Best Election Strategy: No matter who urges you to vote, don’t do it. Have green clothing ready and wear it prominently and publicly until polls close. Avoid large crowds, polling stations or public demonstrations otherwise.
ABOUT THE STRATEGIC ANALYSIS BELOW:
My intent was to look at the regime’s strategic situation as it might appear in Khamenei’s shoes as 2012 nears. By it’s nature it must include some predictions I’ve made previously and in this post because they remain highly probable. I wrote it a few hours earlier. You’ll also find some new stuff (why the Saudis will probably make the key move likely to bring down the regime). As the decision approaches, note the regime’s repeated bluster (“We’re all ready for it”). It shows how badly Khamenei is worried.
The heart of Iran’s problem is that its hostile actions have bred hostile counteractions from all sides. The regime engaged in endless attacks–open and covert or by propaganda–aimed at three different parties: the Iranian people, neighboring states and the West. Having been treated as hostile, all three have become hostile–perhaps permanently–and now act accordingly.
As a consequence, the regime’s long term survival prospects resemble those of Byzantium in 1453 but with two key differences. First, this siege is mainly economic. Secondly, most of the besieged cheer on the outside forces against mullah rulers seen as occupiers and perhaps only one step up from Al Queda.
THE GLOBAL TREND FOR 2012
Russia and China—Iran’s only significant sources of global support today—cannot be relied on for long. Both are certain to turn on Assad the moment his fall looks inevitable. Both will do the same to Khamenei.
In Russia’s case, the regime may not last that long. Internal dissent may grown to earthquake proportions before long. China has similar potential. It is the likely fate of any government so inflexible, stubborn and unimaginative as to ignore popular demands for a say in government in an age that requires computers and the internet for economic viability.
Diplomatically, Iran is a pariah.
Militarily, Khamenei can expect some tit-for-tat returns in 2012 for the asymetrical war he has waged for years and continues to wage against neighbors and the USA .
Economically, a ban on oil exports from Iran appears likely only if the Saudis agree to compensate by increasing short-term oil production. Why would they not? Because hostile neighbor with a long history of covert aggression is determined to produce nuclear weapons. To eliminate the Saudi’s long-run nightmare is worth the price. Thirty years of “mullah economics” created an Iranian economy that is one-sided and vulnerable. Oil revenues are essential to pay one’s workers, bribe one’s thugs and buy essential imports Iran’s economy once provided. The effect on Iran’s currency be devastating
The West in 1979 did not need a new enemy and showed no signs of hostility toward Iran’s revolution The mullahs’ ambition, both domestic and regional, made targeting the West mandatory. Promoting xenophobia would also be a useful way to counter the West’s seductive cultural, political and social freedoms. Friendly relations would encourage seduction, as the mullahs quickly foresaw.
DOMESTIC TRENDS FOR 2012
Internal fragmentation and economic discontent will increase. Popular support will not be recovered. Tthe Islamic Republic will attempt to survive as long as possible by bribery and force alone. With reformers out of the picture, Ahmadinejad’s faction will prevail over the hated mullahs. With cheating the mullahs “win.” Either outcome aggravates all present problems. Add an oil boycott to all that and the regime may not finish the year.
REGIONAL TRENDS FOR 2012
Hamas, a one-time ally in Gaza, appears on the road to defection. It would be miraculous if Assad, is still around by next December. Hezbollah will be in deep trouble afterwards. Will Iraq want to ally with a neighboring regime afflicted with what looks like terminal cancer, especially if a likely consequence would be imported arms and fighters to assist other minorities.
The IRI destroyed a prosperous Lebanon. It has since engaged in similar plots against several neighbors. to wreak similar havoc. Who wants the IRI to disappear? Almost everyone in the region and no one more than the Iranian majority.
Today almost all Arabs scoff at Iran’s Supreme Leader (“Khadaffi in a Turban” as one Syian called Khamenei) and mock his claims to popularity. Any claims that his version of Islam offers an ideal government or a model for prosperity boggle people’s minds. Democratic Islamists, having done extraordinarily well in post-Arab Spring elections, now represent the “Real Islam.”