PUTIN-ASSAD TACTICS REQUIRE A FAVORABLE INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
1. In Iran where are the counterparts to “fight or die” Alawites or the ever loyal 5th Armored Division?
2. Is it likely that Iranian minorities (Kurds, Arabs, Bahai and man Azeris) would rally around their #1 tormentor?
3. Are “negative attitudes” among his troops today greater or less than among Assad’s forces when Syria’s revolution started?
4. Is it possible to pulverize towns and cities without control of the air? Assad’s monopoly not only inflicts direct damage but also allows additional damage from tanks and artillery which defectors would not leave behind otherwise. Lacking air power, Khamenei’s only option is Stalingrad-style urban warfare which always favors the defense.
5. Compared to Assad, Khamenei’s troops have to cover far more ground and oppress far more people, possibly with even less troops. Aside from defectors, how many will be confined to base?
EXTERNAL CONDITIONS WERE FAR MORE FAVORABLE IN ASSAD’S CASE YET HE IS LOSING!
1. Several practical factors deterred a no-fly zone but don’t exist in Iran’s case.
2. Assistance from Russia, Hezbollah, China and Iran prolonged Assad’s regime. Where will Iran find foreign “enablers?”
3. The argument in favor of western invention were less clear cut and the risks higher in Syria.
IF IRANIANS DO ASK FOR OUTSIDE HELP…
1. They won’t ask until they learn the same lesson Syrians did: Tyrants view any refusal to fight back with contempt… not admiration. Hence we have seen 33 months of “no mercy” as the reward for tainted pacifism. It’s time for realism!
2. No request for assistance will be honored until Iranians demonstrate that “It is a real revolution this time not a reformist tea party.”
3. If the West agrees to help, we cannot provide it instantly for logistical reasons and because allied forces must first remove Iradar, anti-air and anti-missile installations before turning attention to flashier tasks most desired by Iranians.
4. No foreign power will rovide ground troops other than small special force units working closely with the Iranian Free Army.
WHY NOT AN “ORAL DEFECTION PLEDGE” CAMPAIGN FOR THE IRANIAN MILITARY?
If you have family members or close friends in the military, ask them to make ORAL pledges to defect (with their weapons) the moment Khamenei starts brutalizing demonstrators again. Such pledges need not and should not require consultation with other troops before Khamenei crosses the Red Line. At that point, the quicker pledges respond and the more who do so, the quicker the start for the Second Iranian Revolution.