Poll: Pessimism On The Rise Among Iranians

New findings from an IranPoll/University of Maryland survey, conducted after the protests that struck several Iranian cities last month, find that the Iranian people are increasingly pessimistic about the state of Iran’s economy and its relationship with the West.

When asked about the state of the Iranian economy, 68.9 percent of respondents say it is either somewhat or very bad. This is up from 63.4 percent in June of last year. Moreover, the percentage of respondents who say conditions are very bad has gone up from 33.9 percent last June to 40.7 percent. When asked whether the economy is getting better or worse, 58.4 percent say worse and 31.3 percent say better, compared with 50.2 and 39.1 percent, respectively, in June. Only 17.3 percent say that their own family’s economic situation has improved over the past four years, down from 23 percent in May of last year.

Iranians’ specific complaints about the state of the economy seem to revolve primarily around corruption and poverty. For example, when asked in an open-ended question to name the single biggest problem facing Iran, 40.1 percent say unemployment, making it far and away the most frequently cited problem. And when asked whether foreign pressure or domestic corruption is the greater hindrance to the economy, 63.3 percent cite domestic corruption compared to 32.1 percent who choose foreign pressure.

Large majorities seem to agree with many of the economic complaints made by the December protesters. For example, 85.2 percent agreed with the statement “the government should do more to fight financial and bureaucratic corruption in Iran,” 81.3 percent agreed that “the government should do more to keep the price of food products from increasing,” 73.2 percent agreed that “the government should not increase the price of gasoline,” and 69.2 agreed that “the government should not cut cash subsidies,” a component of President Hassan Rouhani’s new budget and one that the Iranian parliament is currently challenging.

Support for the Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA), after ticking up a bit in 2017, is once again on the decline. Only 55.1 percent of Iranians strongly or somewhat approve of the deal, compared with 67.1 percent in June. That figure is comparable to what it was in December 2016, the deal’s previous low point in terms of Iranian popular support. When asked if the deal and its resulting sanctions relief have improved the lives of Iranians, 74.8 percent said that they had not, up from 70.3 percent in June. A slim majority, 52.5 percent, believes that Iran has not received the benefits it was promised under the accord.

For most Iranians, there is one reason why they haven’t felt the full benefits of the JCPOA: the United States—or perhaps, to be more specific, Donald Trump. Over 60 percent believe that the United States has not lifted all the sanctions it agreed to lift under the deal, a figure significantly higher than the 38.9 percent who believed that in December 2016. A whopping 90.2 percent believe that Iran’s relationship with the U.S. has either worsened or not improved as a result of the deal, up from 67.7 percent last May. And 86.4 percent are not very confident or not confident at all that the U.S. will meet its JCPOA obligations, up from 71.6 percent in May. Overall, 78 percent of Iranians believe that the United States has violated either the letter or the spirit of the JCPOA.

As for Europe, Iranians are feeling more positive. Sixty percent are very or somewhat confident that European nations will meet their JCPOA obligations, up from 53.4 percent in May. But 92.6 percent believe that the U.S. is trying to prevent other countries from normalizing political and economic relations with Iran (which would violate the JCPOA), compared with 80.9 percent who felt that way in May. Of the 73 percent who believe European countries are moving slower than they could to do business with Iran, 83.4 percent believe the reason is U.S. pressure.

When asked about Trump and his threats to withdrawn from the nuclear accord, Iranians are defiant. On Trump’s overall policies toward Iran, 69.2 percent characterize them as “completely hostile,” which contributes to 93.5 percent having a somewhat or very unfavorable view of the United States. If the U.S. is found to be in violation of the JCPOA, 58.7 percent believe the Iranian government should respond by restarting some of the elements of its nuclear program that it agreed to freeze under the JCPOA. If Trump pulls the U.S. out of the agreement, 52.8 percent believe Iran should withdraw as well—though 54.6 percent would either strongly or somewhat support an Iranian decision to continue abiding by the deal’s terms as long as the other members of the P5+1 (Britain, China, France, Germany, and Russia) did so as well.

As for Trump’s demands to renegotiate parts of the JCPOA, most Iranians reject the idea. Over 64 percent say that Iran should not agree to renegotiate limits on its nuclear program “under any circumstances,” while over 70 percent say that Iran should not agree to suspend its missile development program even under threat of American sanctions. The latter figure is unsurprising, given that 73.8 percent say that Iran’s missile program is “very important.”

Most troubling may be the conclusion that Iranians have drawn from the JCPOA experience. A sizable majority (67.4 percent) agree that “the JCPOA experience shows that it is not worthwhile for Iran to make concessions, because Iran cannot have confidence that if it makes a concession world powers will honor their side of an agreement.” Although this may be welcome news to the Trump administration and the neoconservatives who seem increasingly to be directing its foreign policy, any future administration that wants to pursue negotiations with Iran may find rocky road ahead of it.

Via LobeLog

Derek Davison :Derek Davison is a Washington-based researcher and writer on international affairs and American politics. He has Master's degrees in Middle East Studies from the University of Chicago, where he specialized in Iranian history and policy, and in Public Policy and Management from Carnegie Mellon University, where he studied American foreign policy and Russian/Cold War history.