Iran-U.S.
From confrontation to modus vivendi?
Iran-U.S. relations 19 years after the hostage crisis
November 4, 1998
The Iranian
Lecture by Hooshang Amirahmadi, Rutgers University professor
and president of the American-Iranian Council at the Graduate Institute
for Strategic and International Security Studies in Geneva, Switzerland,
October 12-13, 1998:
I wish to begin with the proposition that U.S.-Iran relations have entered
into an irreversible normalization process: the question is no longer if
but when.
As many of you know, several openings in the past were reversed leading
to an exacerbation of the spiral conflict between the two governments.
We are of course in the beginning of a very protracted process and surprises
of a positive or negative consequence for the relations in both sides,
in the side of Iran in particular, should not be discounted. Nonetheless,
I believe, the future will witness more reduction in tension between the
two countries. Where do we stand in the normalization process is hard to
tell as contradictory signals and policies in both sides make a determination
complicated.
We are certainly moving away from confrontation and mutual demonization
that characterized relations between the two governments, toward remission
and mutual recognition. In this respect, the most important development
has been a change of tone and a willingness to listen and reciprocate,
a development I have called "poetry reading". As a consequence,
the wall of mistrust is being slowly demolished though both sides continue
to remain suspicious of each other's intention. The poems in the U.S. side
include a few masterpieces: visa relaxation even for the Iranian diplomats,
recognition of the "Islamic Revolution" as a sustainable reality
(by the Secretary Albright in her Iran policy speech where she also offered
Iran to work with the U.S. in drawing a "road map" for political
dialogue and eventual normalization of relations), granting of a D'Amato
Act waiver to Total, Petronas and Gazprom, and of course the "cultural
exchanges" that have followed the nice words the two presidents had
to say about the two peoples and their civilizations.
Meanwhile, important personalities in the Congress and beyond (such
as Lee Hamilton and James Baker) have spoken against sanctions and in favor
of a dialogue with Iran, and the U.S. has dropped the human rights abuse
charges against Iran and has praised Tehran for its positive role in narcotics
traffic control and regional cooperation. Iran and the U.S. are now working
together, within the UN Six Plus Two framework, for a resolution to the
Afghanistan crisis. Secretary Albright was disappointed that Dr. Kharazi
did not attend the UN-arranged meeting in New York City in September but
instead sent his deputy, Dr. Javad Zarif. Nonetheless, to show its seriousness
for dialogue with Iran, the Clinton Administration sent several of its
top-ranking foreign policy decision-makers to listen to Dr. Kharazi when
he spoke at the Asia Society in New York City a few days later on 28 September,
1998. They included Martin Indyk, the architect of dual containment policy,
Thomas Pikering and David Welch.
The Iranian poetry reading of course began with President Khatami's
CNN interview in which he not only expressed regret for the hostage episode
but went so far as to equate the purposes of the American and Islamic revolutions.
Note that till then, the Islamic leaders in Iran had claimed that their
movement was diametrically opposed to anything Western. In the mean time,
the official Iran has stopped such internationally unacceptable behaviors
as "U.S. flag-burning" and "down with the U.S." slogan.
Instead, Iran has done its best to be a good host to Americans visiting
the country, American sportsmen in particular. Speeches by President Khatami
at the Summit of the Organization of Islamic Conference in Tehran last
year and at the UN General Assembly this year (September 1998) were equally
hospitable to many of Iran's adversaries including the United States. President
Khatami's call for a dialogue among civilizations and his policy of reducing
tensions with adversaries are received enthusiastically by the West and
Iran's neighbors.
Yet, the most significant compromises on the Iranian side have included
renouncing international terrorism and distancing itself from the Fetva
against Mr. Rushdie, accepting the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian
people in the peace negotiations (President Khatami is said to have sent
a message for President Clinton on this through Yaser Arafat following
OIC meeting), and offering to cooperate with the U.S. on narcotics traffic
control, weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism. The offer
of cooperation was made by Dr. Kharazi in his speech responding to Secretary
Albright. On nuclear matter, Iran has tried to reassure the U.S. and Israel,
thus far unsuccessfully, that it has no nuclear ambitions, that it will
accept any degree of international monitoring, that it supports a nuclear-free
Middle East, that it will remain an active and loyal member of NPT and
other international treaties, and that it is ready to listen to proposals
from the U.S. on a resolution to the nuclear dispute.
I call these developments "poetry reading" because while very
significant, they do not signify a policy change and have not led to a
much-needed political dialogue in which outstanding claims between the
two governments are placed on a negotiation table and resolved. The U.S.
continues its policies of economic sanctions and political isolation of
Iran as it considers Iran a world leader in international terrorism, alleges
that Tehran is building an offensive non-conventional military capability
including weapons of mass destruction and missiles, and accuses Iran of
undermining the Arab-Israeli peace process. To address these issues, the
Clinton Administration has proposed a "roadmap" approach that
Iran says it cannot accept for the time being. In its part, Iran accuses
the U.S. of continuing a containment policy that, to use Dr. Kharazi's
charges, aims to destroy the country's prospect for economic development
and political stability.
From Iran's perspective, Washington's Iran policy reflects a Cold War
mindset and has become a hostage of Tel Aviv, and that the Jewish lobby
in the U.S. tends to control the Congress with whom a weakened Clinton
Administration cannot reach a consensus regarding its Iran policy. Iran
sees in the recent U.S. "opening" to Iran a built-in contradiction:
as more carrots are offered even more sticks are added to the policy basket.
Examples include introduction of Radio Free Iran, undeclared support for
the Taliban, and a "conspiracy" against oil prices. What Iran
wishes to see U.S. do instead is to take a symbolic step in freeing Iranian
assets, drop U.S. objection to constructing oil and gas pipelines from
Central Asia and the Caucasus through Iran, and lift economic sanctions,
perhaps in this same order. Iran has always said that it will reciprocate.
While both sides are willing to make peace neither side wishes to take
the first significant step. Iran suspects both Washington's intention and
ability to resolve its problems with Tehran on the basis of mutual respect
and interest. Washington, in turn, does not trust Iran's "tension-reducing"
policy (which Washington considers designed to improve Iran's relations
with Europe and the neighbors rather that with the U.S.), and doubts that
President Khatami is capable of making the final decision on U.S.-Iran
relations. The hard liners, in Washington's view, are opposed to normalization
of relations and their ultimate aim is to disappoint President Khatami
rather than help him.
The truth is, however, somewhere in between. Washington has moved away
from passively endorsing dialogue with Iran to actively pursuing it. The
containment policy has become increasingly refocused toward Iraq. The fact
is, the ill-conceived assumptions of the policy about Iran has made it
untenable. It has increasingly become obvious that Iran cannot be isolated,
that Iran is strategically and economically important, and that a stronger
Iran is better for regional stability than a weaker one. Economic sanctions
are under attack and pressure on the Clinton Administration from the American
oil companies and a larger coalition of businesses called the USA-Engage
has been increasing exponentially. The power of the coalition would noticeably
rise should the military-industrial sector decide to join.
More importantly, the Iran alternative for the oil and gas transport
from the Caspian basin in a reduced oil-price situation has become more
attractive to American companies than the so-called East-West axis that
the U.S. has been pursuing. The U.S. interest in independent development
of the states in Central Asia and Caucasus is an additional incentive for
the U.S. to mend relations with Iran. The rising geopolitical ambitions
of the Russian Federation and its sustained interest in dominating the
"near abroad", the Chinese growing interest and incursion in
the oil regions, particularly the Central Asian fields, and the continuing
problems with the Middle East peace process, Iraq, Afghanistan and other
troubled spots in the region are making the U.S. ever more serious to close
gap with Iran.
More significantly, the American public has shown a willingness to pardon
Iran for its anti-American policies and actions in the past and President
Clinton is said to be impressed with President Khatami. A panel discussion
between a former American captive and his Iranian captor last July (1998),
organize by the assistance of American-Iranian Council, led to reconciliation
and mutual recognition. All these and other developments have made and
will make the U.S. stay the present course of normalization of relations
with Iran. Iran has even more reasons to open-up to the U.S.. President
Khatami was elected on a platform of change, and foreign policy including
U.S.-Iran relations, cannot be excluded from that public purpose. While
he has emphasized domestic political reform, lack of elite consensus on
that issue has pushed President Khatami increasingly in the direction of
activism in foreign policy where tension-reduction has been a key purpose.
Another impetus for the new proactive foreign policy came from the successful
1997 Tehran Summit of the Organization of Islamic Conference. Yet, Iran
may not reduce tension in its international relations unless relations
with the U.S. are normalized. There is another reason why President Khatami
needs the U.S.: Iranian economy is in a free-falling state and with the
oil prices in decline, the economy can become a cause of his ultimate failure
or success as he struggles with his conservative rivals. Of the three main
comparative and competitive advantages that Iran offers the world, geography,
oil and gas, and a talented workforce, the first two are directly neutralized
by the U.S. and the third remains underutilized because of a lack of vision
for the country's future.
A more fundamental reason Iran should want to stay the present course
of normalizing relations with the U.S. has to do with the fact that even
the conservatives want to reduce tension with the U.S.. They may not be
opposed to even establishing relations if domestic politics were to resolve
in their favor. A source of this conservative willingness is the fundamental
changes that have swept the country in the last 10 years. While the institution
of rouhaniyat (the religious institution) and their traditional supporters
have increasingly weakened, the forces of nationalism and modernization
have become strengthened. Iranian revolutionaries have become pragmatic
as the revolution has matured.
Meanwhile, the emerging young generations are against isolation and
are calling for integration and democratic changes. Finally, it is important
to note that while Iran speaks of a people-to-people diplomacy and cultural
exchanges with the U.S., the reality is somewhat different: that in Iran
side only government is actively involved! That is, the U.S.-Iran dialogue
is already advanced to the level of government in Iran side while in the
U.S. side, semi-governmental institutions, even, at times governmental
ones, if not directly, indirectly are involved. As this continues, it is
advisable for both sides to not exclude the so-called opposing forces.
A better strategy is rather to call for the inclusion of conservatives
in Iran and the Jewish lobby in the U.S.
Over the last several years, the main enemy of the U.S.-Iran relations
has been in the process, not principles. The two sides have no outstanding
non-negotiable issues among them; they have ever tended to make procedural
issues into non-negotiable principles. For the U.S. and Iran it is advisable
to work hard to convert the non-converted. Both sides must also realize
that the roles of their Soccer Game last June (1998) does not necessarily
apply to their eventual diplomatic negotiations: here most often than not
the ball is simultaneously in both courts. Only then a more global process
of normalization will develop, guaranteeing eventual success.
Lecture by Hooshang Amirahmadi, Rutgers University professor
and president of the American-Iranian Council at the Graduate Institute
for Strategic and International Security Studies in Geneva, Switzerland,
October 12-13, 1998:
