 Are there any questions?
The Azeris of modern Iran
By
Salman J. Borhani
August 4, 2003
The Iranian
INTRODUCTION
As heir to the Persian Empire of
antiquity, successive Iranian governments have always struggled
to come to terms with the reality of the multi-ethnic Iranian society.
Although from its inception the empire included various different
ethnic groups, the
Persians acted as the ruling class, granting concessions to the outlaying regions
when it deemed necessary to do so. Intertwined with this concept is the primordial
idea that the inhabitants of the Iranian plateau have a common Persian heritage
that is unique and special among the vast swath of enemy invaders
at all of the empire's
borders.
The myth of a common Persian ancestry is betrayed by simple demographics. Of
a population exceeding 67 million, only 51% of the population is officially
known to be Persian. Kurds, Baluchi, Turkomans, and Arabs populate the frontiers
of Iran. Yet, for centuries one group, the ethnic Azeris, have dominated the
various minorities of Iran. Conservative estimates today pin them at between
20-45% of the supposed "Persian" state.
One question haunts and bedevils Tehran incessantly: Why have not Iranian Azeris,
a conspicuous minority numbering in the millions, shown a willingness to assert
their nationalist ambitions and join their newly independent kin north of the
border? The stakes are enormous. Iranian Azerbaijan, densely populated and
industrial, is intensely valuable to Tehran, while the newly independent Republic
of Azerbaijan holds huge amounts of oil and gas ready to be exploited by foreign
energy companies. Iranian mistrust of Baku's intentions has marred relations
since the early 1990's and military moves by either side could draw Western
forces into the vital oil-rich region.
In the most simplistic breakdown, the dormancy of Azeri nationalism in Iran
is the result of the historic bonds between Tehran and the Caucauses, the success
of the Shah and the Islamic Republic in integrating Azeris into the political
and economic elite
of the country, the overarching sense of a unique Shia/Iranian nationalism
developed by
the Shah and the Islamic Republic, the unity created by Saddam Hussein's
invasion in
1980, and the carrot and stick policy followed by the current reformist Khatami
administration.
THE IRANIAN AZERI
The Azeris differ from the majority Persians in that they do not speak Farsi.
Rather they have adopted a dialect of Turkish, slightly Persianified, that
is dubbed Azeri.
In fact, the Azeris in Iran call themselves torks and their language torki.
A Farsi speaker in Shiraz would find it extremely difficult to have a conversation
with a Tabriz native
who is not well versed in Farsi, while an Istanbuli can understand an Iranian
tork, after sorting through certain Farsi influenced words. Yet, perhaps
the most
important aspects that create binding commonalities are the Shia Islamic
traditions that
most Iramians share, and which conspicuously do not extend far into Anatolia
and the Caucuses.
The demographic power of the Iranian Azeris regularly grabs the attention
of policymakers in Tehran, yet Iranian Azerbaijan represents more than a
burgeoning
quarter of the Iranian population. The three provinces that make up Iranian
Azerbaijan
have the largest concentration of industry and trade outside of Tehran province.
The area
represents the Iranian land bridge to Europe through which major transportation
routes
transverse, the gateway to the oil wealth of the Caspian, and stands as
the conduit for pipelines shipping valuable Iranian liquefied gas to the
rest of the
world.
No monetary value can be put on Iranian Azerbaijan, yet the importance
of the Azeris to the rest of Iran and its national psyche is even
more visible
when
looking back
at the region's controversial past.
A VOLATILE HISTORY
While the British Empire was struggling to contain
revolutionary fervor within
her colonial borders, imperial Russia took the initiative on
its southern flank in engaging a reeling Persian military. Beyond the
mountains of Persia lay the elusive prize for
centuries of Russian tsars: the warm water ports of the Persian Gulf. The
temptation laid
Russian intentions bare and, with the British turning a blind eye, what
is today the
Republic of Azerbaijan and its rival Armenia were finally wrested away
from Tehran's
control in 1828. Thus began a traumatic division of the
region known as Azerbaijan,
splitting families and kin along a border straddling the tepid Araxes River.
The vast
majority of Azeris found themselves on the Iranian side of the border, peering
at their
"captive" brethren across the mountains to the north. The Iranians slowly
resigned
themselves to the loss of their northern frontier and the status quo remained
for over a
century until the fighting of the Second World War reached its peak.
THE ALLIED OCCUPATION
Afraid of pro-German tendencies in Tehran and in desperate
need of a land bridge
between the Asian and European theaters, the Soviets and British invaded
Iran and
divided it into spheres of influence: a British south and a Soviet north.
At the close of
the war Russia still occupied several northern Iranian provinces. It was
decided at
the Yalta and Tehran conferences that all foreign forces would leave Iran
at the end of the
war. Yet, Stalin, eying a later Communist advance to the Gulf, hesitated.
Only under
severe pressure from the Truman Administration did Soviet forces evacuate
Tabriz.
Immediately after the retreat, with the help of Tudeh apparatchiks,
the
independent Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan was established at Tabriz in
1946. The
retreating Soviets, in what can today be termed as a clear example of instrumentalism,
used their military power to ignite Azeri nationalism, trying to set certain
elements of the
Azeri masses against Tehran and, as result, gain a foothold in northern Iran.
The
Communist Party, both in Moscow and Tabriz, tried to wrap the mantle of
Stalinism
around nascent Azeri ethnic sentiment. The effect turned out to be quite
the opposite. The
Azeri masses, angry at being swallowed up by a hostile foreign power, resented
their new
colonial masters as Godless traitors. Iranian Azeris were painfully reminded
of the
Russians' last land grab that resulted in large swaths of Azeri territory
coming under
Moscow's control. Indeed, the idea of joining the feared atheist, Communist
neighbor
was disturbing to most Shia Azeris and hostility to the Soviets outweighed
any sense of
irredentism present in society.
CONSOLIDATION OF POWER BY TEHRAN
Contemporary analysts point to the fact that even under this independent
republic
Iranian Azeris remained roundly hostile to the idea of an independent Azerbaijani
nation,
much less one that served as a puppet government for an irreligious foreign
power.
Azerbaijani self-determination south of the Araxes
was short lived, however, as the
Pahlavi regime, with American support, quickly recovered
and moved north to crush
Azeri nationalism. Thus, the border between the two Azerbaijans was re-established
and the perturbed Mohammad Reza Shah took on an increasingly determined
campaign to re-imagine the Iranian nation along his Persian-centric view
of the state.
When the Shah regained the northern provinces in
1948, his rule increasing began
to center around the symbols of the Persian empire and, by extension,
Persian ethnic
nationalism. At the same time, however, Azeris began a massive but
steady integration
into Iranian society, dominating the bazari class
and becoming a major force in
business and trade. Yet the Shah, still fearing the massive Communist
threat from the
north, repeatedly denied the one concession Azeris constantly urged
for: linguistic
freedom.
The Shah's vision of Iran centered around the glorification of the
Persian Empire
and was heavily influenced by racial and ethnocentric outlooks that
were meant to put
Persians on a pedestal as the rightful heirs to the glory of Cyrus
the Great.
Its biases,
however, were not new in Iranian history. Primordialist notions of
Persian primacy and
separation from outlying, less sophisticated groups are ripe throughout
Iranian history.
Ancient maps give Fars province (the ancestral home
of the Persians) an exalted stature and described it as the center
of power for the "Kings of Iran".
During Pahlavi rule,
however, for the first time in 2,500 years, the advance of technology
and infrastructure
allowed for the Iranian government's power to reach the far reaches
of the empire and the
often paranoid Persian-dominated central government thus came into
direct confrontation
against "suspicious" ethnic groups.
The power of the state was often projected harshly, especially when
dealing with
language rights. The Pahlavi regime banned Azeri from schools, the
workplace, and the
media. No indigenous print capitalism, as Anderson would
put it, was allowed to
develop and the lack of opportunity in the provinces forced Azeris
to make educational
"pilgrimages" to Tehran instead of local provincial centers.
The
Shah's insistence on
promoting the primacy of Persian symbols, such as ancient capital
of Persepolis in Fars
province, the heavy handed suppression of the linguistic rights
of minorities, and the
general top-down centralized nature of his rule alienated many
ethnic groups who could
not fully accept the methods of nation building practiced by the
Persian shah in far away
Tehran. The Shah's famous branding of ethnic Azeris as torkhayeh
khar, or "Turkish donkeys", ingloriously institutionalized
the age-old Persian discrimination against thepeople of the northwes.
THE REVOLUTION
It should come as no surprise then that the Azeris were at the
forefront of the
broad anti-monarchial coalition that led to the 1979 Revolution.
Holding the levers of the
Iranian economy in their hands, Azeris organized massive strikes
that crippled
institutions both in the northwest and in Tehran. Yet, unlike the
Kurds farther south, the
Azeris did not use the revolutionary chaos that erupted after the
fall of the Peacock
Throne to ignite any sort of ethnic nationalism.
Contrary to calling for independence or even autonomy, Azeris mirrored
the rest
of Iranian society in demanding democracy, pluralism, and the expulsion
of foreign
interference, personified in the Shah himself. With a more open
society, which was the
original goal of the anti-Shah movement, the Azeris reasoned a
new government would
allow for linguistic freedom and the recognition of the role Azeris
play in Iranian
society.
The revolution resembled, in some ways, a rebellion
of the ethnically diverse
provinces against the perceived Persian bigotry of Tehran. Thus,
the revolutionary
sentiments of Azeris in 1979 portrayed more of a nationalist Iranian
tone rather than
ethnic nationalism, albeit tinged with a rejection of the Shah's
Persian-tilted version of
Iranian nationalism.
The revolutionary government initially feared the imagined specter
of
Azeri nationalism as much as the imperial government of the Shah,
especially any
sentiment created by a hostile Moscow that had just invaded Afghanistan.
Tehran again
rejected any idea of linguistic rights. Article 15 of the new Iranian
constitution,
granting linguistic rights to ethnic minorities, was (like many
other aspects of the liberal
document) conveniently ignored in the revolutionary fervor of the
day.
Azeris soon
found out that the establishment of the Islamic Republic did not
exactly correspond to the
dreams of respect and space from Tehran that they hoped would reach
fruition. A sense
of Persian-centered Iranian nationalism, instilled by thousands
of years of tradition, still
hovered around the centers of power in Tehran. Azeris shared in
the despair of the whole
country as the revolutionary government steadily became more repressive
and eactionary while the economy plummeted, leaving
millions jobless.
THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC AND SADDAM'S INVASION
Two forces prevented Azeri nationalist tendencies from gaining
ground in Iranian
Azerbaijan after the victory of the revolution: the invasion of
Iran by Arab Iraq and the
promotion of Shiism as the preeminent force in rallying the Iranian
populace in support
of the resistance against Saddam Hussein. In fact, the Iranian
Azeri city of Ardebil
witnessed record numbers of volunteers ready to sacrifice their
lives at the frontlines.
Soon Ardebil vaulted to second place after Isfahan
in the number of casualties seen
during the war, giving Azeris an even higher level of standing
among both the ruling elite
and the masses nationwide. The mindset of the Iranian
Azeri volunteer is important
to note; it is hard to imagine thousands of youths dying for a
country they do not see as
their own.
The imposition of a foreign invasion threatening
the very existence of the
Iranian state, coupled with the strong and pervasive influence
of Shia Islam throughout
Iran, brought together Azeris and Persians in defense of a common
homeland. Azeris and
Persians, along with a multitude of other ethnic groups, fought
and died together on the
frontlines battling an enemy every Iranian loathed: a virulent
brand of aggressive Arab
nationalism encapsulated by personage of Saddam Hussein.
INSTABILITY AND REFORM: THE CARROT AND THE STICK
The sudden fall of communism and the establishment of an independent
Azeri
state north of the Araxes River followed the end of the war.
Its unexpected occurrence
sent a shudder down official Tehran's spine. Yet, by the beginning
of the 1990's, Iranian
Azeris had woven themselves into every facet of Iranian life,
dominating the business
elite of the nation and even holding high positions of power.
Former Prime Minister Mir-Mousavi and current Supreme Leader
Khamenei
are but a few examples of ethnic Azeris
gaining positions of influence after the revolution.
As a result, the Azeri language began to witness a sort of official
rehabilitation.
Local television and mosques began to use Azeri in addition to
the standard Farsi.
The reformist administration of President Khatami went so far
as to support Azeri
language newspapers, many of which curiously withstood Khamenei's
wholesale attack
of the pro-democracy press in 2000. Many politicians visiting
the northwest even laced
their speeches with Azeri, to the roaring approval of the masses.
Of course, despite the
economic doldrums and the Islamic regime's often capricious attitude
toward the Iranian
people as a whole, its treatment of the Azeris stood in stark contrast
to the police tactics
of the Pahlavi crown.
The Azeri position and stature in Iranian society was so secure
by the 1990's that
some Iranian Azeris actually called for the re-integration of the
former Soviet Azeri
Republic back into Iran, causing much consternation in Moscow and
Baku. Abbas
Maleki, deputy Foreign Minister during the Rafsanjani presidency
and himself an
ethnic Azeri, referred to independent Azerbaijan's claims for unification
with Iranian
Azerbaijan in a Reuters interview. "They have some claims for a
united Azerbaijan," says
Maleki. "Most of the Azeri territory and population is in Iran,
so if they want, they can
join Iran."
Yet, the Khatami Administration treads carefully. The only recent
attempt at
separatist activity came when Mahmud Ali Chereghani, an activist
in Tabriz, called for
the separation of Azeri provinces from Iran and unification with
what he called "North
Azerbaijan". His arrest was swift and Tehran's response draconian.
On the whole, the post-revolutionary government
has adopted a constructivist approach, using the ideals of
sacrifice during the war and the
rallying cry of Shia Islam to
create a powerful ethnic attachment that saw as its primary objective
the defense of
Iranian territory. This attachment is to a broader supra-structure
above the
traditional notion of splintered ethnic groups that coalesces
around a Shia-dominated
Iranian cultural identity.
WHAT THE AZERI WANT IN TODAY'S IRAN
The Azeris have a long list of historical grievances. These complaints,
however,
mirror the cries of the entire Iranian population: frustration
with the constraints of
religious government, corruption, social restrictions, unemployment,
and inflation. Most
observers on the ground deny claims by groups in Baku and the
likes of Chereghani, who
claim wholesale disenchantment with the idea of the Iranian nation-state.
The frustrations of Iranian Azeris, as in 1979, are concurrent
with the mood of the
Iranian people as a whole. In 1999, pro-democracy protests in
Tabriz ranked second
only to the ones in Tehran in size and focused on the granting
of greater press freedoms
throughout the country. The thousands that demonstrated
at Tabriz University
conspicuously did not include any references to Azeri nationalism
in their agenda.
CONCLUSION
There is no doubt a historical bond between the Caucuses and
Tehran. Indeed,
what is now the Republic of Azerbaijan was part of Iran for most
of history. Looking at
at the issue of Azeri nationalism in this light causes us to
realize that Azeri ethnic feeling
is too intertwined with Iranian nationalism for a meaningful
voluntary separation to
occur.
This bond has, of course, seen strains throughout the past decades.
A combination
of state-sponsored suppression of Azeri sentiment (mainly during
Pahlavi
rule) and a massive integration movement toward the Iranian mainstream
(primarily
under the Islamic regime) has prevented the rise of ethnic nationalism
in the northwest. The result has been the establishment of an
over-arching sense of Iranian nationalism
skillfully manipulated and interlaced with loyalty to the precepts
of Shiism, which makes
an almost universal devotion to Iranian national identity possible. The war against the Iranian plateau's historic enemy,
the Arabs from the western
lowlands, cemented the feeling of Iranian nationalism that
was able to eclipse ethnic
nationalism across the new Islamic Republic. Non-Arab Iran
united in the face of an Arab
invasion, vowing not to repeat the catastrophic defeat of the
Persian Empire by the Arabs
centuries earlier.
The Azeri support of the war effort increased
the group's level of
acceptance among both the Iranian populace and the nation's
elites.With the foundation of a shared identity created
by years of war, recent
Iranian governments have felt more confident granting linguistic
rights to the Azeri
people. Any hint of Azeri separatism, however, is not tolerated
in Tehran, as
Cheraghani's arrest attested to.
Today, the Azeris in Iran seem to have attained
a minimum modicum of civil
rights, with the ability to open up more space for themselves
by influencing the teetering
national reform movement. Yet, it is doubtful that Tehran
will allow any move that would
lead to the severance of the rest of the Azerbaijan from
Iran. [See replies: Azeri
nationalism is Iranian nationalism, We
deserve better]]
Author
Salman J. Borhani is a graduate student at the
Seton Hall School of Diplomacy and International Relations in
South Orange, New Jersey.
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