 Fresh look back
Iran-U.S. relations in 1977
February 19, 2005
iranian.com
In the heat of today's rethoric, it is perhaps
useful to enter
a time machine and take a look at Iran's past relations with the
U.S., when they where characterized by enlightened self-interest
and inter-dependence in both regional and global spheres. The
magnitude of that relationship was partially enhanced by the presence
of several thousand Americans in Iran engaged in military, industrial,
advisory, and training programs. The cumulative bilateral trade
between the two countries was expected at the time to reach upwards
of $60 billion just for the years 1979-82. Take a fresh look
at Ambassador Mahmoud Foroughi's interesting paper on the
subject that I found in my old archive. -- Farhad
Sepahbody
Iran's Policy Towards the United States
by Ambassador
Mahmoud Foroughi
Symposium on Iran
Washington D.C. October 1977
Organized by the Institute for International, Political and Economic
Studies (Teheran)
and Stanford Research Center
An adequate discussion of Iranian foreign policy should
take into account the context and the bases of the policy as
a whole.
The foreign' policy of any vigilant country may be understood
and assessed in terms of its national objectives and capabilities,
bereft of platitudes, wishful thinking, and moralization. I
shall attempt to explain the national objectives of Iran and the
bases
of Iran's foreign policy, both in its general context and with
respect to the United States. These interests and objectives
have been openly proclaimed and are being openly pursued by the
Iranian
government.
From the viewpoint of Iranian foreign policy in general, two
phenomena have been most outstanding. First, the unique geographic
location of Iran - at the crossroads of the East and West and
between the Eurasian land mass to the north and the ice-free waters
of the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, and the Arabian Sea to
the south - provides the basic explanation for centuries of migrations,
warfare, depredations, and conquests on the Iranian plateau. Of
course, in modern times the discovery of oil in the Persian Gulf
basin has greatly augmented the strategic significance of Iran.
Second, for centuries the rulers of Iran, with few exceptions,
have striven to maintain the independence of the country despite
the difficulties created by geographic location.
Consequently, Iran, confronted since the latter half of the
eighteenth century by Anglo-Russian encroachments and domination,
gradually assumed a special direction in its international relations
and foreign policy - to gain the support of any effective third
power as a counterweight against Great Britain and czarist Russia.
Early in the nineteenth century, Iran had looked to France and
other European powers for help, and towards the middle of that
century to America, the "disinterested and distant" power
in the New World.
These frantic efforts by Iran to preserve its integrity and
independence were unsuccessful until after World War I when the
United States became interested in Iranian oil resources. Prior
to that, the third powers had been too realistic to entangle themselves
in the powerful Anglo-Russian stranglehold over Iran. Incidentally,
some writers who disparage this aspect of Iranian diplomacy as "machinations" and "oriental
intrigue," do less than justice to historical truth. The
depredations of Britain and Russia had given Iran sufficient cause
to reach for any straw, though the efforts remained fruitless
for a long time.
THE FOUNDATIONS OF IRAN'S FOREIGN POLICY
The Iranian nation today derives its inspiration from the Achaemenian
Empire for the motivations and drives of its political, economic,
and social development. As in Achaemenian times, the national
objectives of present-day Iran are politico-economic in content
with a cosmopolitan outlook. Iranian foreign policy, reflecting
that content and outlook, is nationalist in purpose and independent
in character. It is founded faithfully and solidly on the purposes
and principles of the United Nations' Charter. Its immutable aim
is to safeguard the political and territorial integrity of the
country, promote the soci0-economic well-being of the nation,
and contribute towards the maintenance of international peace
and security.
Any discerning analysis of Iran's foreign policy must take into
account two basic facts. First, the policy is planned, formulated,
and conducted under the personal direction of His Imperial Majesty
the Shahanshah, with appropriate responsibilities for the legislative
and executive branches of the government.
Second, during the past decade foreign policy has been kept
under constant review and adjustment. It has been expanded in
scope and coordinated with the economic plans and military requirements
of the nation. As a result of this dynamic and purposeful coordination,
the stability and prosperity of the nation have grown remarkably.
Implementing the policy - The objectives and bases of Iran's
independent foreign policy may be better understood and assessed
by citing several examples of its application:
(1) Under the U.N. Charter, Iran is unalterably opposed to the
use of force in international questions and disputes and to the
retention of other peoples' territories. Accordingly, Iran supports
the Arab cause in the Arab-Israeli conflict and all the relevant
resolutions of the United Nations;
(2) Iran has maintained good relations with all peace-loving
states and has contributed materially to good-neighborly relations
with the countries in the region;
(3) Iran initiated measures to improve its relations with the
Soviet Union when, on 15 September 1962, it assured the Soviet
government that it would not grant any foreign nation the right
of possessing any kind of rocket bases on Iranian soil. Since
then, Soviet-Iranian relations and mutual cooperation have been
substantially improved and expanded.
(4) Cordial and mutually beneficial relations have been established
with the Peoples' Republic of China; and
(5) The outstanding feature of Iranian policy during the past
decade has been the increasing attention which Iran has devoted
to the affairs of the Persian Gulf and the strengthening of the
defenses of the region. This aspect of Iranian foreign policy
needs further explanation for it is governed by considerations
of vital national and international concern.
The Persian Gulf, the Straits of Hormuz, and the Sea of Oman
not only constitute the southern borders of the country but also
form the very artery through which pass the entirety of Iran's
oil exports as well as most of its key imports. Moreover, 74 percent
of the European and 85 percent of the Japanese crude oil requirements
pass through those waters.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the thrust of Iranian
foreign policy is directed towards the maintenance of stability
in the Persian Gulf and the freedom and safety of unmolested international
commerce and shipping, without denying in the least the legitimate
rights of the other littoral states. however, Iran has repeatedly
declared that it will not tolerate any subversive activity which
might endanger the security of the Straits of Hormuz or the freedom
of navigation for international commerce in the Persian Gulf and
the Sea of Oman.
Building a strong military Within this context, His Imperial
Majesty had intended to strengthen Iran's military capabilities
as early as 1959-60. In 1 965, when the government adopted legislation
to strengthen the Iranian armed forces, His Majesty declared that
the future military planning of the country would be based on
the Persian Gulf rather than the northern frontier. Even before
January 1968, when Britain announced finally that its forces would
be withdrawn from the Persian Gulf in December 1971, the Iranian
government had already started to ensure the security of the basin.
The Iranian armed forces were progressively strengthened and expanded,
both in operational technology as well as armaments and facilities.
The principal naval base was transferred from Khorramshahr to
Bandar Abbas where major port facilities were also developed for
handling expanded international commerce. Construction of a large
new base for the three armed services was started at Chah-Bahar
near the Pakistan border and the Sea of Oman. All these measures,
including the military assistance given by Iran to the government
of Oman for the suppression of the Dhofar rebellion, are related
to the maintenance of security in the region. In addition to its
own efforts to ensure the security of the Persian Gulf, Iran has
endeavored to bring about mutual cooperation among the littoral
countries. His Majesty has declared that the states bordering
the Persian Gulf alone should be responsible for its security
without outside interference and that they should organize a system
of mutual assistance.
Iran has made special efforts to improve relations with the
Persian Gulf states. Agreements have been reached on the delineation
of the continental shelf. In 1970, Iran relinquished its long-established
claims over Bahrain Islands, through the procedures of the U.N.
Security Council and on the basis of the principle of self-determination.
This gesture was warmly welcomed by the countries concerned.
Furthermore, the relations between Iran and Iraq had been strained
since the late 1950s over several questions, principally that
of the Shatt al-Arab. Relations became more tense in November
1971 when Iran reoccupied the islets of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs
to which it had historic claims. Iraq severed diplomatic relations
with both Britain and Iran, began a systematic expulsion of Iranian
nationals from its territory, and submitted the question to the
U.N. Security Council. However, the differences were resolved
pursuant to the agreement reached in March 1975, through the good
offices of the president of Algeria. Relations with Iraq are much
improved; the solution of these problems already has had a salutary
effect on the affairs of the region.
Another area of serious concern for Iran is the southeastern
border of the country near Pakistan's province of Baluchistan
where an endemic separatist movement constitutes a threat to the
security of the Persian Gulf. Shortly after the Indo-Pakistan
war and the separation of East Pakistan in December 1971, His
Imperial Majesty declared that a similar separatist development
in West Pakistan would pose grave problems f6r Iran. Since then
the Iranian government has taken measures to strengthen Pakistan
in its policy of resisting separatism in Baluchistan and the Northwest
Province. Iran has contributed towards a lowering of tensions
between India and Pakistan and between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
It has also given substantial economic assistance to these countries.
Under the circumstances sketched above, the security of the
Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf have assumed increasing importance
for Iran. The Shah has proposed that the Indian Ocean region should
remain free of superpower rivalry and be declared a nuclear-free
zone. At the same time, it is realized that if one superpower
continues with its activities in the region, the other superpower
can hardly be expected to remain outside. Also, Iran has suggested
a plan for the establishment of a common market for the region
as a whole, which is being considered by the riparian states concerned.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS
It would be impossible, within the limited scope of this presentation,
to cover adequately the foreign policy of Iran with respect to
the vast and complex relationships that align' and hold together
Iran and the United States today. This paper is confined to a
review of isolated episodes, indicative of the main trends in
the development of Iranian foreign policy towards the United States
and to comments on the present situation. It is hoped that this
will convey the contrast between the small beginnings and slow
development of U.S.- Iranian relations, on the one hand, and their
rapid expansion since 1953 to the enormous economic and strategic
stakes involved today.
The first contact
The great Prime Minister Mirza Taqi Kilan
Ainir Kabir was one of the first to realize the potential importance
of America for Iran. He prepared the ground for the approach to
the United States. However, unhappily for Iran, his life was cut
short and he could not see the initial fruition of his far-sighted
policy. In 1851, a draft treaty was negotiated between the American
and Iranian envoys to the Sublime Porte at Constantinople. After
the draft treaty was revised, in accordance with American wishes
to include a "most favored nation" clause, the U.S.
Senate gave its consent to ratification; but the treaty remained
dormant and expired. Three years later, the American minister
at Constantinople informed Washington of his understanding that
the 1851 treaty has been blocked by Britain, though Russia was
now promoting the renewal of negotiations. The minister reported
that Iran was interested in buying American warships and obtaining
the services of naval personnel. Early in 1855, an Iranian diplomat
submitted to the American minister at Vienna a draft treaty which
included provisions for the use of American naval forces to protect
the Iranian merchant marine and certain islands and ports "from
the preponderance" of an unnamed power.
Naturally, the United States could not accept Iran's request
for intervention. Britain and Russia were engaged in the Crimean
War. America was preoccupied with the question of slavery and
continental problems and was determined to avoid overseas entanglements.
The United States desired the establishment of diplomatic relations
primarily for the protection of its citizens in Iran and the possible
promotion of commerce. These aims were made clear to Iran. In
May-June 1855, the United States elicited and received Russia's
promise to aid the U.S.-Iranian negotiations. However, the State
Department cautioned the American minister at Constantinople to
observe strict secrecy against the possibilities of sabotage by
British or French agents.
Treaty of 1856 and establishment of legations (1883,
1888)
The successful conclusion of negotiations and the signature of
the Treaty of Commerce and Friendship took place in Constantinople
on 13 December 1856, though Russia had earlier withdrawn its support,
probably because of American refusal to intervene in the Persian
Gulf. The acceptance of America's terms by Iran was reported to
be closely related to the latter's negotiations with Great Britain
for the conclusion of the Anglo-Iranian war over Herat.
President Buchanan proclaimed the treaty in August 1857. He
urged the U.S. Congress to make the necessary appropriations for
the establishment of a legation in Tehran. No action, however,
was taken by Congress for the next quarter of a century. During
the Kurdish raids of 1880-82 in northwest Iran, the United States
was obliged, in the absence of an American envoy in Tehran, to
request the good offices of the British government for the protection
of the American missionaries in the disturbed area. This episode
led to the opening of the American legation in Tehran early in
1883.
The first American minister, Samuel Benjamin, reported to Washington
that Iran, in its anxiety to counteract Anglo-Russian domination,
would welcome the introduction of American capital to exploit
the untapped wealth of "coal, lead, copper, and petroleum." The
U.S. government remained indifferent to these economic possibilities
and petroleum was seldom mentioned again in the next 35 years.
Throughout this period, successive American envoys reported
on the desire of the Iranian government to attract U.S. support,
in various ways:
preparation of a plan for modernization of the country through
American capital and know-how, construction of railroads, adoption
of American educational methods and building of American-type
schools, establishment of an oriental institute for dissemination
of knowledge on Iranian affairs in the United States, employment
of American technicians and advisers for the exploration and exploitation
of mines, and purchase of Gatling guns. Several of these envoys
recommended to their government one or more of these possibilities.
However, the State Department maintained its "hands-off" policy.
Its primary concern remained the protection of the lives and property
of American citizens in Iran.
The first Iranian minister arrived in Washington in October
1888. He submitted to President Cleveland a confidential document,
an interesting plea in a florid style. It expressed the wish of
the government of Iran to modernize the country by improving agriculture,
commerce, and industry through American know-how. It spoke of
the increasing restraints imposed by Russia and Britain upon Iran
and of the possible dangers for Iran of the loss of its independence.
It expressed the fervent desire of the Iranian government to strengthen
relations with America and requested the United States to safeguard
Iran from Anglo-Russian aggression. However, the United States
was not prepared to abandon its policy of non-involvement.
Protection of American citizens
Until the First World War,
the main diplomatic concern of the United States in Iran was the
protection of its citizens, most of which consisted of Protestant
missionaries. Their presence caused some difficult problems for
Iran because the authority of the central government was weak
and the lines of communication in the country primitive.
The missionaries were located primarily in the northwest and
western parts of the country where there was chronic foreign interference
or occupation. These areas were also subject to the raids of Kurdish
tribes which roamed freely across the Turkish-Iranian frontier.
Moreover, amid these difficulties, the United States did not maintain
diplomatic representation in Iran for a quarter of a century after
the conclusion of the Treaty of 1856. Not until 1906 did the United
States establish a consulate at Tabriz in northwest Iran. In the
absence of American diplomatic representation, the United States
sought the good offices of the British or Russian governments
to protect the missionaries. Politically, this further complicated
the relations between Iran and the Anglo-Russian powers.
The Iranian government, in line with its policy of trying to
attract the political and economic support of the United States,
did everything possible within its limited powers to accommodate
the American missionaries. For instance, in connection with the
murder of Reverend Benjamin Labarree, the Iranian government went
so far in its efforts to meet the American demands for justice
that a war was precipitated between Iran and Turkey, resulting
in the Turkish occupation of some Iranian territory until the
First World War.
The missionaries first came to Iran in l834. Gradually more
arrived, altogether 50 or 60 families, and they expanded their
activities into education, medicine, health, and welfare. Their
proselytizing mission was confined primarily to the Christian
and Jewish minorities; but whenever they tried to convert Muslims,
inter-faith tensions arose.
The American missionaries made very important contributions
to the development of Iran. They constructed not only chapels
and churches but also hospitals, dispensaries, welfare centers,
and schools, including the famous Alborz College. Many of them
lived and died in Iran in the service of the people. The most
renowned among them was the late Dr. Samuel Jordan whose name
honors one of the principal streets of Tehran today.
It is not surprising, therefore, that prior to the First World
War the United States enjoyed the psychological advantage of the
humanitarian, sympathetic, and wholesome friendliness which the
missionaries had created in Iran.
The king, Nasseredin Shah, entertained liberal views towards
the Christian and Jewish minorities. Mindful of the sensitivities
of the United States, he showed special appreciation of the missionaries
and authorized them to erect chapels and distribute their religious
tracts and books. In 1851, he repealed a previous (1842) edict
which had outlawed proselytizing among the Christians; in 1878
conversion of the Jews to Christianity was made legal. Missionary
activities were gradually expanded in the fields of education
and medicine.
A different, nonreligious aspect of the problem of protection
of American citizens was concerned with those Iranians who, having
acquired American citizenship, had returned to Iran for business
or other purposes. Taking advantage of American protection, some
of them pursued questionable activities and, whenever in difficulty,
they sought asylum with the American legation or consulates. Among
them, the cases of Haji Sayyah and Mehran Baghdasarian became
very well known; Haji Sayyah's entered textbooks on international
law. The American envoys reported that these people had become
naturalized Americans in order to take unfair advantage of U.S.
protection in Iran and to avoid the true duties of citizenship.
Because the Iranian government adamantly refused to recognize
the rights of expatriation and asylum, the United States eventually
made a distinction between native-born and naturalized American
citizens in Iran. In 1901, the State Department issued a general
warning to naturalized American citizens returning" to Iran
that the Iranian government probably would not recognize their
acquired citizenship.
Constitutional Revolution (1906-10)
The Constitutional Revolution
profoundly influenced the foreign policy of Iran. The Constitution
conferred upon the Majlis important powers related to foreign
affairs - the right of final approval of treaties and agreements,
boundaries, financial matters, natural resources. and concessions.
The Constitutional Revolution was a nationalist movement. The
deputies elected to the First and Second Majlis demonstrated a
courageous sense of patriotism against great odds, even when confronted
by the overwhelming power of the invading Russian armies. They
rejected czarist threats and ultimatums and took the consequences
of the Russian bombardment of the Majlis and the Holy Shrine of
Imam Reza, and of the widespread massacres, looting. burning,
and destruction perpetrated by the Russian armed forces.
As for Great Britain, within one year it lost the goodwill of
the Constitutional Movement which it had gained by the extensive "bast" (asylum)
it had provided in 1906 to the Constitutionalists in the compound
of the British legation in Tehran. The goodwill was entirely dissipated
because of the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 31
August 1907, which practically annihilated the independence of
Iran. The two powers divided the country into spheres of influence,
with the central desert area left as the 'neutral zone."
In terms of foreign policy, the Constitutional Movement, with
its strict adherence to the concept of nationalism, pressed for
total and complete independence. Under the circumstances of overwhelming
Anglo-Russian domination. this policy proved unattainable. It
deprived Iranian foreign policy of the maneuverability which might
have compensated partially for Iran's lack of power. From an internal
point of view, also, the Constitutionalists could do little to
unify the divisive forces within the nation, who proved only too
willing to serve the Anglo-Russian interests.
Throughout the period of Constitutional Revolution in Iran,
the United States United States adhered to its policy of strict
non-involvement in any aspect of Iranian politics. In June 1908,
after Mohammad Ali Shah had launched his counter-revolution, the
Constitutionalists appealed to the American minister to intercede
with the shah on their behalf. The minister declined, stating
that he had strict instructions not to intervene in the domestic
affairs of Iran. The minister also rejected the requests of the
Constitutionalists for asylum in the U.S. legation. In the opinion
of one American observer, had the United States given some moral
support to the Constitutionalists, there could have been a legacy
for the identification of America with the aspirations of the
Iranian people. On the other hand, once the Constitutionalists
had overthrown Mohammad Ali Shah and installed his young son,
Sultan Ahmad Shah, on the throne, the United States recognized
the regime in line with its established policy of de facto recognition.
The Morgan Shuster mission (1911)
The antecedents and negotiations
pertaining to Morgan Shuster and the aftermath of his mission
represented the first important issue in U.S.-Iranian relations
that was unrelated to missionary problems. From the viewpoint
of Iranian foreign policy, it was a serious attempt on the part
of the Constitutional government to defy the domination of Britain
and Russia. The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 had confronted
Iran with formidable problems, primarily the impending loss of
independence. Iran seemed to have no recourse except America,
although the United States had repeatedly declined to intervene.
As early as March 1908 the American minister in Tehran had reported
to Secretary' of State Elihu Root that Iran wished to seek American
advisers. The secretary brought the request to the attention of
President Theodore Roosevelt and then made a sympathetic reply.
However, this phase of negotiations soon came to an end because
in June 1 908 the Russians bombarded the parliament building and
dispersed the Majlis.
After the overthrow of Mohammad Ali Shah, the government resumed
its efforts to gain American support. In June 1910, the Majlis,
purposely sidestepping the financial provisions of the Anglo-Russian
Convention of 1907, passed legislation to seek a loan of $5 million
from the United States, at seven-percent interest and to employ
a foreign adviser for the Ministry of Finance. This request, however,
seemed too serious for the United States to accept, for it might
have been construed as interference with Anglo-Russian plans in
Iran. The State Department had guessed rightly.
In September 1910, the Russian ambassador at Washington informed
the State Department that his government and England would find
the employment of an American adviser by Iran "inconvenient." He
hoped that the United States would refuse the Iranian request,
in recognition of the predominance of Russian and British interests
in Iran.
Though the United States did not wish by any action to weaken
its proclaimed "open door" policy, it believed that
American interests in Iran were not of sufficient practical importance
to warrant the displeasure of Britain and Russia. In return for
this deference to Anglo-Russian wishes in Iran, the United States
expected a reciprocal cooperative attitude on the part of those
powers in regard to America's "open door" policy in
China and, also, prospective American railroad interests in Turkey.
It is interesting to note that soon after this expectation of
a quid pro quo had been conveyed to the British government, Britain
and Russia indicated that they would no longer object to the recruitment
of Americans for Iran but that they would maintain their positive
control over Iranian affairs. In order to further assuage Britain,
the State Department suggested to the American minister in Tehran
that if British bankers with financial stakes in Iran should care
to recommend American experts, the State Department would forward
the names to the Iranian government. However, the American minister,
after having consulted with the Iranian authorities, replied that
Iran would welcome America and Americans but would reject advisers
recommended by the British.
In December 1910, the Iranian minister at Washington was instructed
to approach the State Department and obtain the services of a
treasurer-general and assistants for Iran. President Howard Taft
personally recommended Morgan Shuster for the post. This was consistent
with the philosophy of "dollar diplomacy" which the
president himself had initiated. After recruiting the American
advisers, the State Department formally notified them that they
were in the employ of the Iranian government and in no way represented
the United States. Throughout the episode, the State Department
did not veer from this attitude.
Morgan Shuster arrived in Iran on 12 May 1911. Within a month
of his arrival, Shuster sought and obtained from Ihe Majlis, on
13 June 1911, a law which conferred upon the office of the treasurer-general "full
complete powers in the handling of finances."
Meanwhile, Shuster, much to the surprise of the foreign colony
in Tehran, succeeded in centralizing the fiscal structure and
collecting sufficient revenues to cover government expenses, including
the required installments on foreign debts.
The Anglo-Russian powers opposed the Shuster mission from its
inception, though they did not 'wish to declare it openly at first,
in view of the American expectation of a quid pro quo and President
Taft's personal recommendation of Morgan Shuster. Britain and
Russia opposed Shuster be cause he interpreted literally the Anglo-Russian
Convention of 1907 in which those powers had pledged themselves
to uphold Iran's sovereignty. He regarded himself as an employee
of the Iranian government. Moreover, the mission symbolized the
determination of the Majlis to effect financial reforms and emancipation
in defiance of the Anglo-Russian Convention. The situation was
intolerable, especially for Russia which had gained ascendency
through the control of Iranian finances in 1900. ( continued part
3 )
When Shuster attempted to secure the services of a Major Stokes
to head the Treasury- Gendarmerie, both Britain and Russia jointly
threatened to invade Iran for this presumed violation of the Anglo-Russian
Convention of 1907. As the Russian troops crossed the Iranian
frontier, the Majlis adopted, on 2 November 1911, a resolution
reiterating confidence in Shuster. On 29 November, Russia, supported
by Britain, delivered the second ultimatum, with a 48-hour limit,
demanding (1) dismissal of the Shuster mission; (2) commitment
by Iran not to engage foreign subjects without first obtaining
the consent of the Russian and the British legations; and (3)
payment by Iran of an indemnity to defray the expenses of the
Russian troops invading Iran.
Although the Russian troops in Iran were threatening to seize
all the northern provinces, the Majlis voted unanimously to reject
the ultimatum. The cabinet resigned, but soon it foisted a coup
d'etat against the Majlis and expelled the deputies from the house
of parliament.
Morgan Shuster was compelled to leave Iran on 11 January 1912,
exactly eight months after he had arrived. However, he became
a national hero and his expulsion continued to exert strong influence
on nationalist sentiments and Iranian foreign policy for many
decades to come. Indeed, in 1917 and again in 1921 Iran requested
the United States for Shuster's services. But both times the Americans
declined to recommend him, in deference to Britain's sensibilities.
Even after the downfall of the czarist regime, the department
would not recommend Shuster in order to avoid antagonizing Great
Britain. On the other hand, the Shuster episode aroused American
public opinion about the plight of Iran under overwhelming Anglo-Russian
pressure. For the first time, Iran assumed an important international
image before the public. In the words of one American observer,
Iran "emerged as a brave though hopelessly weak victim of
power politics."
World War I and the peace conference
The geographic location
of Iran once more proved calamitous for the country during the
First World War. Although Iran had declared its neutrality on
1 November 1914, the belligerents - Russia, Great Britain, and
Turkey - found ample cause to violate Iranian neutrality. Conscious
of its own defenseless situation, Iran appealed to the United
States, but America was hardly in a position to alter' the course
of the war.
Hostilities between the Anglo-Russian armies, on the one side,
and the Turkish forces, on the other, continued on Iranian soil,
in the western and northwestern parts of the country. These caused
widespread havoc and hardship for the people. The prolongation
of the warfare, the forcible requisitioning by the belligerents
of the scanty local foodstuffs and fuel materials, together with
a succession of unusu4ly severe winters, proved catastrophic.
Hundreds of thousands of people died of violence, starvation,
and disease.
It was an experience of apocalyptic proportions, whose impact
can be understood only by those few who are still alive today
to remember the starkly deplorable conditions of World War I.
A British historian admits that Iran "had been exposed to
violations and sufferings not endured by any other neutral country."
Consequently, Iran, confronted by the immediate problems of
relief and rehabilitation far beyond its resources, once more
appealed to the United States; this time for a loan of $2 million
for famine relief. The Department urged private relief societies
in America to respond, and a most generous response flowed through
these channels. With the missionaries in the lead, an extensive
relief organization (Persian Relief Committee) was established
in 1916, under the chairmanship of the American minister in Tehran.
In the United States, a fund-raising agency (American Persian
Relief Commission), under the directorship of President Judson
of the University of Chicago, collected more than $2,250,000 (a
considerable sum in those days) for relief and welfare. Through
additional American financing, seed-grains were imported from
India. Further appropriations were allocated by the American Red
Cross. In November 1918, the Iranian foreign minister expressed
the gratitude of his government to the United States that the
generous American aid had brought the two peoples closer together
than ever before.
During the early years of the war, the United States drew a
clear distinction between its official policy of non-interference
and Iran's transactions with private American organizations and
firms. For instance in 1916, when Sultan Ahmad Shah requested
asylum for his own person in the U.S. legation in Tehran, he was
refused. Subsequently, when he requested permission to hoist the
American flag over his palace, he was refused again. Also, in
191 ~ 15, when the Iranian government approached the United States
for a confidential loan of $10 million, the State Department preferred
that the request be handled through private concerns. The crown
jewels were to serve as collateral for this loan. Another secret
proposal of the Iranian government for the sale of the crown jewels
was referred to a private jewelry firm. These secret negotiations
were cut short in May 1916 when the Anglo-Russian governments
jointly established absolute control over Iranian finances.
After the October Revolution in Russia and the entry of the
United States into the war, American policy with respect to Iran
began to change gradually. On the one hand, the anxiety of the
State Department about the safety of the missionaries in northwest
Iran was considerably relieved after they had moved to southern
Iran. On the other hand, the United States became increasingly
anxious about the possible effects of German propaganda in Iran.
With these factors in mind, the State Department, in January 1918,
assured the Iranian government that the United States strongly
sympathized with Iran's desire to maintain its freedom and sovereignty,
and that America would not be a party to any act infringing upon
them. This statement was published in Tehran newspapers. In reply,
the foreign minister of Iran denied rumors that his government
intended to join the war on the side of the Central Powers. But
he complained bitterly about the Anglo-Russian treatment of Iran.
As for the British policy, Great Britain had already started
shifting away from the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, even
before the conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (13 March
1918) by which socialist Russia withdrew from the war against
the Central Powers. In January 1 91 8, the British government
recommended to the United States that it send military officers
to Iran for the training of the Iranian army. Also, it proposed
that the United States should associate itself with the British
postwar plans for Iran. The United States replied that the Iranian
government had been made aware of America's sympathy with Iran's
desire for independence and that a joint declaration with Britain
might be misunderstood in Iran. The meaning of the message was
clear.
Before the end of the war, the Constitutionalist leaders of
Iran had become preoccupied with the question of Iran's participation
at an eventual peace conference. They hoped that through such
participation Iran might be able not only to receive compensation
for the enormous losses and sufferings it had incurred during
the war but also to stave off British plans for a protectorate
over the country. The British already had plans for the annexation
of Mesopotamia to their empire.
In January 1917, the Iranian minister in Washington wrote to
the State Department that Iran relied upon the United States to
right the wrongs inflicted upon it, and that Iran looked for American
assistance "whenever a peace conference shall take place." Secretary
of State Robert Lansing took "due note." In December1917,
the Iranian minister submitted a memorandum to the State Department,
which set forth in detail the depredations of the belligerents
in Iran. It requested the assistance of the United States to secure
representation for Iran at the conference. Attached to the note
was a list of Iran's post-war objectives. Secretary Lansing's
reply was sympathetic but noncommittal. In October 1918, the Iranian
chargé d' affaires again presented to the State Department
additional documents describing the extent of Iran's wartime losses.
He expressed the hope that America's great principles of humanity
and justice would be applied in the case of Iran after the war.
The request was repeated shortly after the armistice agreement.
In December 1918, the foreign minister of Iran submitted to
the American minister in Tehran a note which was forwarded to
the U.S. mission ~t the Paris Peace Conference. It expressed the
hope that the United States would sponsor, on Iran's behalf in
the conference, the following Iranian demands: membership and
participation at the peace conference; political and economic
independence for Iran; abolition of treaties and customs agreements
which violated the integrity of the nation; reconsideration of
all the treaties and agreements to which Iran was a party, abrogation
of capitulations, and freedom for Iran to enter into new commercial
treaties and agreements and to revise tariffs, and reparation
of boundaries.
An American writer on U.S.-Iranian relations of this period
states that Iran's appeal to the United States reflected accurately
public opinion in Iran. Wilsonian idealism offered great hope
to the Iranian people. The American chargé d' affaires
in Tehran reported to the State Department: "Since the end
of the war more thought has been given to the regeneration of
Persia and all seem to turn instinctively to America for help...
in the rebuilding of the country. In a sense, Iran seemed to rely
on the United States for the fulfillment of its Constitutional
Revolution."
Despite its efforts, however, Iran was not permitted a hearing
at the Versailles peace conference. By all accounts, this was
a great national disappointment. The records show that at Versailles
the United States exerted strong pressure on behalf of Iran. But
the British foreign minister, Lord Balfour, refused three successive
requests from Secretary Lansing that Iran be given a hearing.
Soon, the reason became clear for at this very time the British
were negotiating in Tehran with the prime minister, secretly and
personally, the so-called Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919.
From the viewpoint of Iranian foreign policy, World War I had
several important consequences:
(1) The October Revolution restored the pre-1907 Anglo-Russian
rivalry in the region, giving it an additional ideological dimension.
Although Soviet Russia voluntarily abandoned the capitulatory
privileges and the czarist claims and interests in Iran, it represented
a powerful neighbor with a social system different from that of
Iran.
(2) The emergence of the United States as the most powerful
state in the world was to prove helpful for Iran because of American
espousal of the principles of the "open door" and "self-determination" and
the awakening American interest in Iranian affairs. At last, the
United States, after 35 years of diplomatic contact with Iran
and the experiences of World War I, had gained some insight into
Iranian thinking and had arrived at a stage where its traditional
policy of non-involvement in the political affairs of Iran was
to be modified. America had realized that, among the Western states,
it remained the only one in which Iran still had faith;
(3) The rapid decline of Britain relieved Iran of British intentions
for a virtual protectorate; and most important
(4) The gradual revival of Iran was motivated by an intensified
sense of nationalism demonstrated by the early abrogation of the
Anglo-Iranian Agreement of 1919, with the open support of the
United States.
The epoch of Reza Shah the Great
The history of this period
testifies to the immense debt of gratitude which the Iranian nation
owes to the memory of Reza Shah the Great for the momentous services
he rendered Iran. He unified and saved a splintered, down-trodden
nation. He strengthened and consolidated the armed forces, established
central government authority throughout the country, and terminated
feudal and tribal anarchy. He cancelled the unequal treaties,
agreements and concessions, and abrogated extra-territorial rights
and capitulatory privileges. He pursued a realistic foreign policy,
nationalist in character and commensurate with the objectives
and capabilities of the nation. In giving Iran a sense of purpose
and self-respect, he personified the nation's historic recuperative
powers which have manifested themselves on several desperate occasions
in its long history.
During this period, Iran, in pursuit of its traditional third-power
policy, made efforts to gain the support of the United States
in two ways: acquisition of administrative and technical know-how
through the employment of American advisers; and financial assistance
through loans. The United States enjoyed the goodwill which had
been created by its support of Iran at the Paris Peace Conference
and by its opposition to the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919.
Above all, the United States had become interested in the possibilities
for the exploitation of oil resources in Iran.
Negotiations with American oil companies for a possible concession
in north Iran did not materialize. However, employment of American
advisers proved successful. During 1922- 27, Dr. Arthur C. Millspaugh,
the American financial adviser, was able to increase national
revenues, control expenditures, and improve the credit position
of the government. This was made possible because, for the first
time in centuries, Reza Shah had been able to extend the authority
of the central government throughout Iran. Taxes were collected,
primarily from landlords with minimum difficulties and red tape.
After the expiry of the Millspaugh mission, the Iranian government
continued its administrative, judicial, financial, and educational
reforms and the establishment of needed institutions. Iran achieved
unprecedented economic progress. The Trans-Iranian Railway, which
proved indispensable for the Allies during the Second World War,
was constructed without foreign loans and with little oil income.
These were the early foundations for the development of the nation.
Presenty bilateral relations
In the past quarter of a century,
relations with the United States have assumed a primary place
in the foreign policy of Iran. During the Second World War, as
earlier, Iran favored the United States as the third power. In
November 1943, His Imperial Majesty enunciated the policy that
continued and growing American interests in Iran would be in the
best interest of the nation and that three powers were better
than two. The basic aim was to counterbalance Anglo-Russian pressures
and strengthen the security of the country through American support,
and to remedy the socio-economic ills of the country with the
assistance of American aid and know-how.
National independence remained the cornerstone of Iranian foreign
policy. History had given ample evidence that, without national
strength and security. it was impossible to attain true national
independence and to achieve political. economic, and social development.
The experience of Iran during the two world wars had shown that
mere declarations of neutrality, without commensurate national
strength, could not guarantee the territorial integrity of the
nation. This was the inexorable lesson of the turbulent history
of Iran.
 After the start of the cold war and bipolarity of post-war power
politics that gravitated around the two superpowers, Iran could
not pursue a neutralist course or third-power diplomacy in world
affairs. The only realistic choice was the adoption of "positive
nationalism" to safeguard national independence through strength
and cooperation with the West led by the United States. Therefore,
soon after I 953 Iran abandoned the third-power policy and aligned
itself formally with the United States through agreements.
Middle East Treaty Organization (The Baghdad Pact)
On 11th
October 1955. for considerations of national security, Iran joined
the Baghdad Pact. a mutual security organization. established
in consistence with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. whose members
already included three neighboring ~1uslim countries (Turkey,
Iraq, and Pakistan) in addition to Britain, with the United States
as an observer. Iran's accession completed the Middle Last alignment
of the so- called "northern tier," linking it to NATO
through Turkey and to SLATO through Pakistan. The United States
joined the military cominittee of the Baghdad Pact and expressed
willingness to provide military and economic support.
Eisenhower Doctrine
On 21 January 1957, the governments.of
Iran. Turkey. Pakistan, and Iraq expressed their support for the
U.S. joint congressional resolution (known as the Eisenhower Doctrine)
whereby the president was authorized to employ American forces
to protect the independence and integrity of any nation in the
Middle East requesting such aid against "overt armed aggression
from any nation controlled by international communism." Appropriation
of additional funds for military and economic aid in the Middle
Last region was also authorized.
CENTO
One of the results of the Iraqi revolution of 14 July
1958 was the withdrawal of Iraq from the Baghdad Pact and the
renaming of the pact as the Central Treaty Organization. The United
States became a member of CENTO's military, economic, and counter-subversion
committees and signed bilateral agreements of military and economic
cooperation with Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey. In terms of foreign
policy, U.S.-Iranian relations were subjected to a thorough reassessment.
On 28 July 1958 the declaration of the CENTO ministerial meeting
in London affirmed the determination of the members "to maintain
their collective security and to resist aggression, direct or
indirect," The latter phrase carried special significance
concerning the problem of subversion. Under the declaration, the
United States agreed to cooperate with the member nations of CE
NTO for their security and defense and to enter promptly into
agreements designed to effect their cooperation.
Defense Agreement of 1959
Pursuant to the declaration of 28
July 1958 the governments of Iran and the United States concluded
an agreement of 5 March 1959. By the agreement, the United States
regarded as "vital to its national interest" the independence
and integrity of Iran. Under the agreement, the United States
provided Iran with increasing military and economic aid. Previously,
American aid had been based on the agreements on 1943 and 1947
as confirmed by the Mutual Defense Agreement of 1950. Prior to
1947, all American and had been technical and advisory in nature.
Since then Iran has received military equipment as well.
From 1953 onward Iran received substantial amounts of assistance
from the United States. Between 1949-52, total American assistance
had amounted to $l6.7 million in military and $16.5 million in
economic aid. However, between 1953 and 1961, military aid rose
to $463 million, and economic aid totaled $611 million; of the
latter, $345 million was in outright grants.
Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations and Consular
Rights
Iran and the United States signed the treaty on 15 August 1955
and it entered into force on 16 June 1957. The treaty deals with
foreign investments and enterprises, and its provisions are designed
to encourage American investments in Iran. The treaty replaced
the provisional agreement of 11 July 1928, related to personal
status and family law, and it confirmed the trade agreement of
18 April1943.
After 1953 commercial and economic relations between Iran and
the United States expanded rapidly. These were principally the
petroleum sector through the participation of the American oil
companies in the consortium and arrangements with the National
Iranian Oil Company.
The hallmarks of present policy
Today, U.S.-Iranian relations
are characterized by enlightened self-interest and interdependence
in both regional and global spheres. The enormous magnitude of
this relationship is partially indicated by the presence of several
thousand Americans in Iran engaged in military, industrial, advisory,
and training programs. The cumulative bilateral trade between
the two countries is expected to reach upwards of $60 billion
during the next three years.
An important objective in the relationship is to maintain the
security of the region as a whole and the freedom of the sea lanes
in order to ensure the uninterrupted transport of Iran's key imports
as well as oil to the United States, Western Europe, and Japan.
The contribution made by Iran towards the maintenance of security
in the Persian Gulf region has already been mentioned briefly.
A related consideration is Iran's dependence upon American cooperation
in regional security programs and for the economic and industrial
development of the nation. All these factors coincide and combine
with the desire and determination of both Iran and the United
States to contribute towards the maintenance of stability in the
region and of a peaceful international order.
 This paper has given some indication of the small beginnings,
slow development, and rapid expansion of U.S.-Iranian relations,
especially since the Second World War. Though it seems futile
to predict foreign policy in these days of r3?~id international
development and change, it is reasonable to assume that U.S.-Iranian
relations will further develop and strengthen, given the nationalist
direction of Iran's foreign policy and the global involvement
of both Iran and the United States in the maintenance of international
peace and security. - October 1977
About
Farhad Sepahbody was Iran's last ambassador to Morocco under
the Pahlavi Dynasty.
See his features in iranian.com.
Visit his homepage.
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Fresh look back
