Failing To Find Peace

Excerpt from "A Single Roll of the Dice"


Failing To Find Peace
by Trita Parsi

Excerpted from Trita Parsi's A Single Roll of the Dice: Obama's Diplomacy with Iran (Yale University press). Parsi, a Middle East foreign policy expert with extensive Capitol Hill and United Nations experience, interviewed 70 high-ranking officials from the U.S., Iran, Europe, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Brazil—including the top American and Iranian negotiators—for this book. Parsi uncovers the previously unknown story of American and Iranian negotiations during Obama's early years as president, the calculations behind the two nations' dealings, and the real reasons for their current stalemate.

The 30-year-old U.S.-Iran enmity is no longer a phenomenon; it is an institution. For three decades, politicians and bureaucrats in both countries have made careers out of demonizing each other. Firebrands in Iran have won political points by adding an ideological dimension to an already rooted animosity. Shrewd politicians, in turn, have shamelessly used ideology to advance their political objec­tives. Neighboring states in the Persian Gulf and beyond have taken advantage of this estrangement, often kindling the flames of division.

Israel and some of its supporters in the United States, in particular, have feared that a thaw in U.S. relations with Iran would come at the expense of America's special friendship with the Jewish state.

But the strategic cost to the United States and Iran of this pro­longed feud has been staggering. Harming both and benefiting nei­ther, the U.S.-Iran estrangement has complicated Washington's efforts to advance the peace process between the Israelis and Palestin­ians in the 1990s, win the struggle against al-Qaeda, or defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan and the insurgency in Iraq. Still, the strategic cost of this enmity has oftentimes been dwarfed by the domestic political cost to overcome it. In Washington, the political cost for attempting to resolve tensions with Iran has simply been too great and the political space too narrow to justify starting down a fraught and uncertain path to peace with Iran. Political divisions, in turn, have paralyzed Tehran at key intervals, with vying political factions not wishing to see their competitors define the outcome of a U.S.-Iran rapprochement or get credit for reducing tensions.

The hostility has been institutionalized because either too many forces on both sides calculate that they can better advance their own narrow interests by retaining the status quo, or the predictability of enmity is preferred to the unpredictability of peace making. Thus, over the years, this antipathy has survived -- and hardened -- because the cost of maintaining the status quo has not outweighed the risk of seeking peace -- until 2008, that is.

With the election of Barack Obama, the stars aligned for a radical shift in U.S.-Iran relations. Tensions between the United States and Iran had risen dramatically during the Bush administration, putting the two countries on the verge of war. While the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and the occupation of Iraq put American troops on Iran's eastern and western borders, respectively, the defeat of the Taliban and the end of Saddam Hussein's reign also removed two of Iran's key regional rivals from the strategic chessboard. Freed from the burden of its long-standing enemies, Iran was now a fast-ascending power that astutely took advantage of America's inability to win the peace in the Middle East. At the same time, Iran's advancing nuclear program added more fuel to the fire. Increasingly, Iran's rise, combined with America's painful predicament in the region, rendered a continuation of the U.S.-Iran rift too costly. Iran and the United States were grav­itating toward a confrontation that neither could afford.

Meanwhile, the American public had turned against not only president George W. Bush's invasion of Afghanistan and occupation of Iraq, but also the ideological foundation of Bush's worldview. Previously, Beltway hawks maintained that negotiations and compro­mise were not mere tools of diplomacy, but rather rewards that should be granted only to states that deserved an opportunity to talk to the United States. Inspired by this philosophy, Bush refused to engage with Iran during his entire presidency, even on issues of such importance as Iraq and Afghanistan (with the exception of episodic instances of brief diplomatic outreach for tactical purposes). More­over, the neoconservative philosophy, viewing the United States as the source of legitimacy at home and abroad, dictated that talking to the autocratic rulers in Tehran would help legitimize Iran's theo­cratic and repressive government. But while refusing engagement with Iran upheld a sense of ideological purity for the Bush White House, it did nothing to address the growing challenge that Iran posed to the United States in the region. During the Bush presidency, Iran amassed more than 8,000 centrifuges for its nuclear program while expanding its influence in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon.

This reality was widely acknowledged in the United States to­ward the end of the Bush administration. In March 2006 Congress appointed a bipartisan Iraq Study Group to assess the Iraq war and to make policy recommendations. One of the group's key endorse­ments was direct U.S. dialogue with Iran over Iraq and the situation in the Middle East--a stark refutation of the Bush White House ideology. And in September 2008, only two months before the U.S. presidential elections, five former secretaries of state -- Madeleine Albright, Colin Powell, Warren Christopher, Henry A. Kissinger, and James A. Baker III -- called on the United States to talk to Iran.

Then-Senator Obama recognized that unprecedented political space had emerged for new foreign policy thinking. So rather than shying away from the issue of diplomacy with Iran, Obama took the unusual step of making engagement with U.S. adversaries a central part of his foreign policy platform during the 2008 presidential elec­tion--something that, under normal circumstances in Washington, would have been considered political suicide. In the televised presi­dential debates, Obama boldly declared that it was "critical" that we "talk to the Syrians and the Iranians," and that those saying that the United States "shouldn't be talking to them ignore our own history."

Finally, the persona of Barack Obama himself was an important factor. He was a most unlikely candidate--and the most difficult one for the Iranian leadership to dismiss or vilify. Born to a Kenyan Muslim father and a American Midwestern mother, Obama spent most of his childhood in Hawaii and, later, in Indonesia, after his mother was remarried to an Indonesian. Having been exposed to both the Muslim and Christian religions, having grown up in a Third World country shortly after it had won its independence from colo­nial powers, and having the middle name Hussein--the name of one of the most revered figures in Shia tradition--Obama simply did not fit the Iranian stereotype of American, "imperialist" leaders--arro­gant, ignorant, and incapable of empathizing with the grievances of Third World states against Western powers.

Clearly, Obama recognized the historic opportunity that lay be­fore him. Only twelve and a half minutes into his presidency, he sought to seize it by extending America's hand of friendship in the hope that Iran would unclench its fist.

A year and a half into his presidency, President Barack Obama was celebrating not the diplomatic victory he had been seeking, but rather the imposition of sanc­tions he had hoped to avoid. Despite extensive out­reach, clear strategic benefits, and an unprecedented opportunity for engagement, Obama found himself stuck in the same confrontational relationship with Iran as that of other American pres­idents before him. And, as many officials in his administration had suspected, while sanctions might have been politically imperative from a domestic standpoint and could make life more difficult for the Iranians, they were not a solution to the standoff with Iran. "While Iran's leaders are feeling the pressure, the sanctions have not yet produced a change in Iran's strategic thinking about its nuclear program," Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control Robert Einhorn told an audience at the Arms Control Association in Washington, D.C., on March 9, 2011. Instead, under Obama's watch, the cycle of escalation and counterescalation continued with no sign of a solution in the offing.

While most of Obama's domestic critics opposed his pursuit of diplo­macy on the grounds that talking with Iran was useless and morally questionable, a few voices also disapproved of his engagement policy as being insincere and aimed only at paving the way for sanctions. Neither criticism is well grounded. Diplomacy was not only a strate­gic necessity, but also the least costly avenue to address the tensions with Iran. And rather than being a well-designed conspiracy, the president's vision for diplomacy was genuine, as was his initial out­reach. But faced with overwhelming resistance from Israel, Congress, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab allies, skeptics within his own admin­istration and, most importantly, the actions of the Iranian government itself, the president's vision and political space were continually com­promised. In the end, the diplomacy Obama pursued was only a shadow of the engagement he had envisioned.

Obama's vision for engagement met stiff resistance from the outset. The Iranians themselves, however, dealt the biggest blow to Obama. The election fraud and ensuing human rights violations strengthened the arguments of Obama's domestic critics and made the administration all the more reluctant to defend its engagement policy. These events also bolstered the critics of engagement within the administration who viewed the elec­tion fallout as vindication of their skepticism.

"You have the rigged elections of June 2009. Then the protests. And then, in a way, the moment was lost," David Miliband, then-foreign secretary of the United Kingdom, told me. The elections had a deep psychological impact on the administration. Though it stuck to its engagement policy and refused to come out in favor of the Green movement, its willingness to take bold steps on Iran essentially ended. Engagement started to become too risky and, with no immediate political benefits for the president domestically, the inclination was to revert to one's comfort zone. "When you don't know what's going on, and you don't feel like you have somebody you can communicate with on the other side of the table, you are going to revert back to what's safe," a State Department official explained. "And what's safe in the Iran context is demonization and just general negativity." By the time engagement finally could begin, in October 2009, Obama's room for maneuverability -- and his political will to fight for greater flexibility -- were almost nonexistent. He desperately needed a quick victory to create more time and space for diplomacy. But precisely because of his loss of maneuverability, he had little flexibility in negotiations and the discussions quickly turned into a "take-it-or-leave-it" proposi­tion -- the very approach that was doomed to fail.

In Vienna, the Iranians dealt a second blow to Obama by refus­ing to accept the Russian-American swap proposal without any revi­sions. Though administration officials recognized that the primary reason for Iran's refusal was paralysis caused by political infighting at home, the impact was the same: Obama had nothing to show for his outreach. His own party was revolting against him in Congress on this issue; many in his administration felt uneasy about the portrayal of the White House as insensitive to the plight of Iranian pro-democ­racy protesters defying the Islamic Republic's repression; and the Israeli government was reportedly turning to high-level Democratic donors to exert additional pressure on Obama to forsake diplomacy in order to save the Democratic Party in the upcoming midterm elections. Moreover, Iran's continued political paralysis made the potential for additional diplomacy unclear at best. Once the decision was made to activate the sanctions track, diplomacy had disappeared in all but name. That first became evident when Washington in­formed Tokyo that its efforts to mediate a solution were no longer welcome, and occurred again when Brazil and Turkey's successful bid to convince Tehran to agree to the Obama administration's terms for the fuel swap was brusquely rejected. Obama's open hand had turned into a clenched fist.

Throughout this period, despite the Iranian recognition of Obama's political dilemma at home, a combination of factors caused Tehran to refrain from helping create more space for engagement. On the one hand, doubts about Obama's intentions and abilities made an already risk-averse leadership in Tehran more disinclined to take a gamble for peace. "I don't think the Iranians quite knew what to make about the American outreach," Miliband said. "I think that it was such a change for them, that they didn't quite know how to handle it."

Even if the Iranians maintained the assumption that Obama genuinely wished to resolve the tensions between the two countries, they still doubted his ability to break with long-standing American policies on Iran in order to confront the forces of the status quo in Washington and beyond. Investing in an American president whose intentions and abilities were questionable was a tough sell in Tehran. The hard-line Iranian newspaper Kayhan called Obama "impotent" and asked rhetorically, "Who is wearing the trousers within the U.S. political hierarchy?" Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's insistence that Washington offer signs of real strategic change rather than just a change in tone was partly aimed at testing Obama's intentions and abilities for this very purpose. When I challenged one of Iran's nuclear negotiators on the Islamic Republic's deep skepticism of Obama and the unique oppor­tunities Tehran risked missing as a result, the official was unapolo­getic. "The U.S. should resolve its domestic political issues itself," he said. As time passed and Tehran increasingly perceived Obama as "no different from Bush in action," Iran's attitude hardened and the absence of action to help Obama turned into a desire to see him fail. Obama's opposition to war, it was said, was due not to a desire for peace but rather to America's lack of capability for war as a result of its engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan.

According to a former Iranian diplomat who maintains close contact with the leadership in Tehran, the Iranians still "regarded U.S. engagement as another means to get Iran to surrender." And after the failure in Vienna, where the Iranians concluded that accepting the fuel swap would not end the demand for Iran to suspend its enrichment ac­tivities, the Iranian takeaway message was that America's position on Iran had not changed much.

"What had been a precondition under Bush -- the suspension of enrichment -- had become a postcondition under Obama," said Mohammad Khazaee, Iran's ambassador to the UN. But rather than engaging in deliberate deception, the Obama administration simply had not settled on a desired endgame with Iran, on the nuclear issue or otherwise. For the Obama White House, the destination of diplomacy was simply a function of the journey. Still, the lack of clarity on the endgame was not just a point of criticism by Iran or by the president's domestic opponents. Even senior Obama administration officials were unclear on the strategy and the endgame, as evidenced by the leaked three-page memo, signed by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, that warned of the

U.S. lack of a coherent, long-term plan to deal with Iran's steady progress toward a nuclear capability. The memo came to light in April 2010 but was penned in January of that year -- just as the U.S. was embarking on the sanctions track.

There is the question of whether the Iranian government actually desires a deal with the United States. A common school of thought in Washington states that enmity with America -- the "Great Satan" -- is one of the uncompromising pillars of the Islamic Re­public. As a result, Tehran cannot come to terms with Washington without risking an internal identity and legitimacy crisis. The state ideology of the regime requires enmity with the U.S., and without it the internal contradictions of the Islamic Republic would reach a breaking point. Iran's periodic reluctance to engage with the U.S. is grounded in this ideological rigidity rather than in internal divisions in Iran, mistrust of the U.S., or disinterest in the specific deals the U.S. has put on the table. The main obstacle to a diplomatic break­through is not the manner of the diplomacy or its extent or lack thereof, or the specifics of the deal, but rather the regime's DNA.

The calculations of the Iranian hard-liners are, however, not so mysterious and incomprehensible that analysts have to resort to ge­netics to make sense of them. Part of the reluctance of hard-liners in Iran to negotiate with the U.S. has been rooted not necessarily in these ideological factors but in the fear that any relationship with the U.S. would force Iran to adopt policies in the region that are aligned with those of Washington and, to a certain extent, Israel. Iran would lose its independence and, much like Egypt after the Camp David agreement, its bid for leadership in the region. Moreover, by aligning with the U.S., Iran would be forced to invest in the survival of pro-American Arab dictatorships rather than pursuing policies that would win it soft power on the Arab street. Because the Iranian hard-liners have calcu­lated that the Arab street will ultimately overthrow the monarchial and pro-American regimes in the region, Iran's long-term security would be best achieved by aligning itself with the populace. Consequently, agreeing to any engagement with Washington -- on its terms and de­signed to rehabilitate Iran as a compliant U.S. ally -- would contradict Iran's long-term security interests in the region.

Likely cementing the hard-liners' view of the U.S. as an increasingly irrelevant power inca­pable of adjusting to the new realities of the region are the continued decline of the U.S. in the Middle East, the Arab spring of 2011, and the downfall of the regimes in Egypt, Tunisia, and beyond. Any realiza­tion that an opportunity was lost with Obama in 2009 probably has yet to sink in. "What happened is clearly proving what our officials including Supreme Leader said," Soltanieh said. "The Americans come sometimes with the good words but in practice they might have a knife to [stick] in your back."

Iran's suspicions and mistrust, whether justified or not, were paralyzing. What the Iranians failed to appreciate was that Obama's ability to drive the policy and "wear the pants" within the U.S. government was partly a function of how willing Iran was to take the same risk for peace that it had grown accustomed to taking for a continuation of the long-standing "no-war, no-peace" stalemate. In retrospect, once George W. Bush took office in 2001 and adopted a confrontational approach to Iran, reformists in former president Mohammad Khatami's circle came to regret their failure to recipro­cate President Bill Clinton's outreach. The unprecedented willing­ness of the Obama administration to reach out to Iran and embark on a cautious reconciliation process, even if inadequate, is unlikely to be re-created by any later U.S. administration for some time. Likewise, the opportunity Iran had with Obama in the first months of his presidency will likely not be fully appreciated by the decision makers in Tehran until much later.

Seeking to pin the failure on either side does not offer a better understanding of the complexity of the conflict. At times, both sides showed goodwill, but at other times both were overtaken by their suspicions and fears. Both sides miscalculated and made mistakes, and both sides felt that the other side was taking a smaller share of the risk for peacemaking. Both sides were interested at different times in some sort of a deal; the question was and remains whether they have been seeking the same deal. Only through sustained, persistent, and patient diplo­macy can that question be answered.

Ultimately, the failure of diplomacy between the U.S. and Iran came down to insufficient political will and the atmosphere of mis­trust that granted neither side any margin for error. The proposals put on the table may have been flawed; at different points either side may have played for time or sought to delay talks; and goodwill measures may not have been reciprocated. But these phenomena do not make U.S.-Iran talks unique; they are common features in almost all negotiations. Talks that succeed do not do so because the pro­posals are flawless and because both sides play fair. Rather, they succeed because the many flaws associated with the talks are over­come by the political will to reach a solution.

The will for a diplomatic solution must be strong enough to overcome every last hurdle. In the case of the U.S. and Iran, diplo­macy was in effect abandoned at the first hurdle. And though the desire for diplomacy was genuine, the administration's lack of confi­dence in its chances of succeeding -- several high-level officials in the Obama administration told me separately that they did not believe diplomacy would work -- raises the question as to whether the White House would fully invest in a policy it believed would fail. Lack of political will also plagued the bureaucracy. After the June election in Iran, in particular, a combination of fear and "old think" -- sticking to old patterns because they were comfortable and less risky -- set in and helped reduce the will to see diplomacy through.

"People are just afraid of their own shadows," a senior State Department official said. "You propose something and people all scurry for cover. ... There is a collective inability to break the patterns of the past and the principles of the past. I mean, thirty years of doing something in a certain way is pretty powerful." This "collective inability," which is also present on the Iranian side but not necessarily for the same reasons, is what makes U.S.-Iranian tensions more than just an an­tagonistic relationship. It is an institutionalized enmity.


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iraj khan


by iraj khan on

Iranian Americans we need to give back to this society:

This is what was announced by NIAC today: 

"The 2nd Annual National Iranian American Day of Service taking place on Saturday, March 3. In the spirit of the Iranian New Year, Norooz, we will be organizing teams of volunteers in cities throughout the U.S. to participate in a variety of service projects.  This is our chance to give back to those communities in which we live and work, while also sharing a piece of our rich culture and philanthropic spirit." //

Last year The National Iranian American Council (NIAC) organized 17 community service projects around the United States as part of the first ever National Iranian American Day of Service. March 12, 2011


Veiled Prophet of Khorasan

More info

by Veiled Prophet of Khorasan on


Thanks Amir. I want to rebut another point of Iraj Khan:

by far the greatest number of Iranian Americans (63%) cite the promotion of human rights and democracy as the most important, followed by thirty percent (30%) who cite the promotion of regime change." 

Yes but it does not mean the other 63 % do not want regime change. It just means their *first* priority is human rights. Regime change may be their second priority.

If only 6 % want an Islamic regime it means 94 % do not. That means regime change is desired by that majority. But people got different priorities. One person may have it at the top of their agenda. Another second; or at a lower level. But Amir is right without regime change we are not going to get human rights. How we get to there is another matter. Some want outside intervention others don't. The "alaki khosh" think just want and it will happen. Realists know some action is required.


Mola Nasreddin (aka iraj khan): VPK & Reality-Bites exposed your

by AMIR1973 on

fraud already. Have some shame. As long as there is a regime that kills Iranian men and women by the tens of thousands, that sends boys and teenagers to die in war by the hundreds of thousands, that rapes them in prison, that tortures them, and practices barbaric punishments, there can bo no human rights and no democracy for Iranians. Hence, regime change is the only way Iranians can achieve democracy and human rights. Khodetttti, Mola Nasreddin. Khodetttti.

iraj khan

What are the most important

by iraj khan on

issues for Iranian Americans according to the survey:

"The survey indicates that from among a list of six issues relating to U.S.-Iran relations, by far the greatest number of Iranian Americans (63%) cite the promotion of human rights and democracy as the most important, followed by thirty percent (30%) who cite the promotion of regime change." 


Veiled Prophet of Khorasan

The PAAIA Poll

by Veiled Prophet of Khorasan on


it also mentioned:

In contrast, only six percent (6%) believe that any form of an “Islamic Republic” would work well in Iran.

Yes only 6% want any form of Islamic Republic. Well how could they not want a change. I bet they do not want a US led regime change.


My point was NOT about regime change by US

by Reality-Bites on

Since the claim is NIAC represents the views of Iranian Americans, I was asking whether Trita Parsi and NIAC support regime change in Iran by the Iranian people themselves. Yes or no? If not, why not?

And on the subject of majority of Iranian Americans supporting regime change or not in Iran, from the PAAIA link "one" posted below this was the finding:

"....Iranian Americans want the Iranian regime to change.  For the above mentioned self-interested reason, two-thirds of Iranian Americans believe that Iran should be a secular democracy. ...".

That sounds to me like most Iranian Americans want to see regime change in Iran, although this is only one source. So, what is NIAC's stance on the regime change issue?

iraj khan

What percentage

by iraj khan on

of Iranian Americans want 'Regime Change'? 

One may want to know: 

According to the latest survey conducted by Zogby International about %30 of Iranian Americans want 'Regime Change'.

Meanwhile %97 are against a war between Iran and United States, hence these two completely separate issues should not be confused with each other. 


NIAC is not advocating 'Regime Change' for Iran while criticising The Islamic Repulic's undemocratic ways. NIAC is %100 against a war between Iran and United States.

PS. I am not representing NIAC. For more information about NIAC you can go here:


Veiled Prophet of Khorasan

Thanks RB

by Veiled Prophet of Khorasan on


Regarding military strike. Yes it makes sense that Israeli would oppose it. Because a military strike if done should not be by Israel. Rather must be done by America.

I am not advocating war but point out a logical issue. If one advocates war they presumably want success; right? To get there is best to leave Israel out of it. Just like Iraq.


To add to VPK's last point

by Reality-Bites on

I hazard an educated guess that the great majority of Iranian Americans and indeed Iranians living outside Iran, support regime change in Iran (by the Iranian people themselves).

Do Trita Parsi and his group also support regime change in Iran? If yes, where have TP and NIAC stated this? If not, why not?

Shazde Asdola Mirza

Kid Commie view of the world: No difference between USA and IRI

by Shazde Asdola Mirza on

Amazing how much a boy's views can be for ever shaped by his father's Tudeh Party past.

Veiled Prophet of Khorasan

97 % is bull

by Veiled Prophet of Khorasan on

However I think the reasoning goes as follows:
  • Poll says 97 % of Iranian Americans oppose war.
  • Parsi opposes war
  • Hence he represents 97%

This is bull of course say I like lower taxes. 90% of Americans want lower taxes. Does it mean I speak for 90 % of Americans! 

iraj khan


by iraj khan on

most undisturbed human beings strive to achieve peace and harmony in their daily lives and Israeli people are not any different either.

Sadegh Bozorgmehr

Iraj Khan, you made my day

by Sadegh Bozorgmehr on

I always believed that most Israelis oppose a military strike but in discussing the issue I could never say it because I hadn't seen polling data on the subject.

This confirms what I had always thought but did not say. Polling in the Iranian American community that I've seen recently also shows an overwhelming majority oppose war, and if I'm not mistaken the #1 policy option among Iranian Americans is diplomacy. I think that's a fair option that should be tried. Nothing else will create the opening for people to topple IRI and bring democracy. 

iraj khan

War is Counter-productive

by iraj khan on

And the issues between U.S.

and Iran can be approached and resolved diplomatically.

Most Israelies oppose a military strike against Iran too. 

"A number of important states (aside from Russia and China, consider India, Brazil, and Turkey) are troubled by the hard-line that Israel and the West have taken toward Tehran; and they flatly reject the use of force against it. In Israel, top former military and intelligence officials have warned that an attack on Iran would be counterproductive, and is indeed unnecessary, and public opinion polls show that most Israelis oppose a military strike."


Sadegh Bozorgmehr


by Sadegh Bozorgmehr on

I agree with you that trying the same approach that has been tried for 32 years isn't going to get rid of the regime. That is precisely why sanctions against the people and threats against Iran are a bad idea. Why continue the same policies that have failed? 


On a different note, the 60 followers figure you introduce here is interesting. Do you have a source for it?

Doost daaram pas hastam

Slick trick

by Doost daaram pas hastam on


Trita Parsi writes: "cost to the United States and Iran of this
pro­longed feud has been staggering. Harming both and benefiting
nei­ther, the U.S.-Iran estrangement has complicated Washington's
efforts to advance the peace process between the Israelis and
Palestin­ians in the 1990s, win the struggle against al-Qaeda, or
defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan and the insurgency in Iraq."

is a very slick argument because it is true but beside the point. To
appreciate Mr Parsi's slight of hand you should separate the IRI from
Iranian people. Once you do that it becomes clear that this animosity
benefits the IRI greatly. It will continue as long as there is an
IRI. Most US presidents tried very hard to improve relations and it
all came to nothing. Carter tried, Reagan tried, Bush senior tried,
Clinton tried and Obama tried. All such attempts were rejected. The
same is also true of European countries. They have terrible
relationship with IRI. As a matter of fact there are only a handful
of countries in the whole world that actually have friendly
relationships with the IRI. North Korea, Syria, Russia, China, and

needs many enemies and a state of crisis to justify its thuggish
behavior towards its citizens as well as an excuse for their utter
incompetence in running the affairs of Iran. That is why they will
not end their enmity with the west.




97% of Iranians voted for Trita (only 96% for Khamenei)

by AMIR1973 on

Mola Nasreddin (writing under his new name of iraj khan) is definitely a fan of the Rahbar (I mean Trita, not Seyyed Ali). Enough said.

iraj khan

Mr Parsi

by iraj khan on

is Against a War with Iran.

According to the latest survey,  

%97 of Iranian Americans also 

are Against the War with Iran.



by afshinazad on

Do you have evidence that trita Parsi representing 97% person of Iranian American? Or 97% of few of his followers which are not more than 60 people.

It is shameful to defend someone who is representing fascism.


G. Rahmanian

Poor Trita!

by G. Rahmanian on

Look who's defending him!

iraj khan

which do you choose

by iraj khan on

to have a democratic,

civilized approach

while expressing one's viewpoints?

This one who disagrees with Mr Parsi and says:

"someone who doesn’t give a shit about our people and our country, he is like one whore doesn't care who is f***king with, what he sees dollar sign nothing else."


Mr Parsi's approach who expresses his opinion

respectfully, peacefully and elequently?

Mr President, speaking on behalf of the %97 pro-diplomacy Iranian Americans, it is time for more diplomacy not less -- even if that means offending a powerful lobby that is hell-bent for war.

G. Rahmanian

Faramarz Jaan:

by G. Rahmanian on

IR officials might do anything at this point to save their tyrannical rule. They cannot be trusted.

Even if they allowed IAEA inspectors to do their job, it would only mean IR is buying time to achieve its goal of producing WMDs.

Iranianians must call for and work towards IR's downfall at all times.



by afshinazad on

Trita is someone who doesn’t give a shit about our people and our country, he is like one whore doesn't care who is f***king with, what he sees dollar sign nothing else, we could make all kind remarks and we could challenge each other, but we never understand what we trying to do, Trita Parsi is not our problem he is only mouth piece of regime, our problem is Islamic Regime which keep destroying our culture and economy and country.

We should stop following same bullshit and for once for all, we should understand what is important to us: is it political party? Is it person or the persons? What is most important for us is our country (Iran) and only country (Iran), rest of things are nothing but an excuse for our shortcoming, period.


It is a real shame....

by Roozbeh_Gilani on

That the old, tired lobbying attempts of the west residing Islamist regime lackeys - this time in form of a book addressed to US government- get so much time and attention on this site, whilst the desparate messages and letters of the most moderate and reformist minded Iranians, Jailed by the fascist islamist regime, to the "leader" of the islamist thieves, murderers and terrorists, ali khamenei are simply ignored.... 

To me this is a success, at distraction from islamist regime's crimes against Iranian people,  for the fascist islamist regime and it's west residing lackeys 

"Personal business must yield to collective interest."

iraj khan

We Say

by iraj khan on

"President Obama

Take War off the Table,

and join us as we stand up to the Israeli lobby group AIPAC"


The Grand Bargain cultists are here.....

by AMIR1973 on

It looks like Supreme NIAC Leader Parsi is once again trying to sell his knockoff Grand Bargain wares, and there are no buyers in either the USA or IRI (except for The Students of Trita's Line on Will they ever face the fact that their Grand Bargain ain't gonna happen?

Veiled Prophet of Khorasan

Much of bias

by Veiled Prophet of Khorasan on


Alright I see a lot of bias around here. Yes the person reviewing Parsi may not like him. But it does not mean that he is wrong. I don't know whether all the allegations about IRI are right but enough of them are right.

The moment they took hostages and refused to release them they declared war. The rest is suffering of innocent people at hands of primarily IRI. These people included Iranian people; American hostages; Lebanese people and on. 

I will not make excuses for the shooting down of Iranian jet. It was wrong and condemned by American naval commander David Carlson. But it does not excuse the actions of IRI. One wrong does not make another one right.

Regarding the 1953 coup that is up for debate. I do not consider it a reason for animosity. In fact the more I learn of Dr. Mossadegh the happier I am to not have lived under his rule. He pulled a coupe; so did the other side; then he lost.

Now if you really want to beat up on USA then blame them for WWII. The invasion of Iran and removal of Reza Shah. But we might as well thank them for kicking Russia out of northern Iran.

It is a long history and something has to stop.

Right now is a good time for IRI to go!

Pragmatism dictates we realize who has power and deal with it. America has power and so do Mollahs. I rather deal with America as evident by where I live. Anyone disagreeing please tell me.


Dr. Mohandess: bebin hala, omadi o nasazi...

by Bavafa on

Nadashtim ro man bayad begam :)

When did I “disdain or portray as total insanity” the capitalism?  Lotfan harf dahan ma nazrid, khob nist bekhosos baraye yek Aghaye Doctor VA Mohandess :)

I merely pointed out that the US does the same act, only promoting different ideas.  Now, you and I may think those ideas are correct but the interference in other nations are essentially the same as Khomenie’s export of the revolution.

Going back to the Provoking theme, I submitted to you that such acts do not justify the attack, it is not just my personal feeling and interpretation, it is the international law and as such Iraq was found guilty of an illegal invasion of Iran.  Now, lets go and re-write the international law just to show our disdain and hate for the IRI.

'Hambastegi' is the main key to victory 



Dr. Mohandes

by Faramarz on

You are a gentleman and a scholar! And a very patient one as well.

This discussion is going nowhere, but we gave it our best shot.

This week IAEA will be in Iran to do some serious inspection. If this Regime is really interested in cooperating with the world, it will open its kimono and let the world see what it has. 

My sense tells me that they will not and then we will have another blog by Trita defending the Regime and naming the usual suspects or as Yogi Berra said, "It is déjà vu all over again."

Dr. Mohandes

Ostad Mehrdad

by Dr. Mohandes on

Avalandesh ke... Y nadadi... Nadashteema!:))


I don't think i missed or even remotely made an attempt to dismiss anything, in fact i think i hit the nail right on the head, namely supporting Faramarz's assertion that Iran was the major provoking force behind many of the major conflicts leading up to the war. They indeed proved that by taking action and sending aid to Hammas and HB! So if that is not putting their money where their mouth is, i don't know what is.

Also, I hate to break this you, But the same capitalism and "revolution" that you so disdain and portray as total insanity and a criminal act, is what has brought prosperity and fortune tomany countries around the planet and your own self in jooo, ess, AA! so what is there to complain about?

So, indeed i really would not Justify any form of attack on USA for any reason whatsoever. I would, instead thank them and show some sense of gratitude for teaching me and so many other who happened to be "WILLING" to learn, how to fish and big ones too!