alexarjomand

For 30 years I had been under the impression that as unsophisticated and barbarous as the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) appeared, it had an uncanny intelligence for holding onto power. They had achieved this appearance by adhering to three main principles:

1. Managing to get the population genuinely involved in the election process thereby creating a façade of legitimacy. This was particularly the case in the first elections post the revolution (Banisadr) and the two elections won by Khatami, were there was widespread participation in the polls, particularly by the young, leaving no doubt with respect to the legitimacy of the government. It was probably also the case four years ago, when Ahmadinejad, despite cheating in the first round, benefitted from an overwhelming “anyone but Rafsanjani” vote in the second round.

The legitimacy of the elections allowed Ahmadinejad and other representatives of the regime to strut their stuff on the world stage and to resist all pressure by opposition groups and the West for change. In fact many in the Western press (Roger Cohen before his conversion, Elaine Sciolino, etc) became apologists for the regime, preaching its legitimacy.

2. Refusing to intellectually grow over time and playing to the lowest common denominator, in order to stifle cultural growth and social expectations. The IRI leadership has consistently regressed intellectually over its 30 year period. Long gone are the days when Soroush was the theoretician of the IRI and the likes of Beheshti, Taleghani, Montazeri, Abdollah Nouri and others its driving forces. They have now been replaced by such intellectual “powerhouses” as Ahmad Khatami, Janati (the Delavar), Shariatmadari of Kayhan and Ejeii.

Moussavi and Zahra Rahnavard are prime examples of backward thinking and lack of progress in the 80s. Rahnavard espousal of the hejab as the be all and end all for all Iranian women and her husband’s attribution, at the time of his premiership, of the outcry for high watermelon prices to foreign interference, are examples of this backward thinking were the politicians consistently lowered the tone of the debate. A case in point of the intellectual regression, are the children of the early leaders. Mojtaba Khameneii has turned out to be no more than a criminal thug and Rafsanjani and Nateghnoori’s children are kleptos with their noses in multiple troughs. Last but not least is Ahmadinejad, whose contribution to that trajectory needs no elaboration.

This lowering of the tone and refusing to move with the times has been instrumental in allowing the regime to suppress the population and resist the winds of change, thereby allowing it to maintain control.

3. Maintaining cohesion at the highest level against all opposition and forces for change. The IRI, which is no more than a kleptocracy disguised as an Islamic state, has been a master of resolving internal differences whilst maintaining a united front. Rafsanjani and Khameneii, and others in the regime, have had implicit agreements that allowed them to divide the spoils and share power.

This unity in the face of opposition has been the single most effective mechanism that has kept the IRI in power. They understood that there was more than enough to share and that the only way that their kleptocracy would thrive was that if they stuck together.

All of that changed in the aftermath of the 12 June elections, when in one fell swoop the protagonists of the regime either threw aside the three principles that had allowed them to retain power, or figured out that their assumptions were not as sound as they had envisioned:

1. Massive and clumsy election fraud completely de-legitimised the presidency and the IRI. What seemed to have been a planned coup by one of the main security and economic pillars of the regime, the Revolutionary Guards, backfired on a grand scale as Moussavi’s unexpected success in mobilising the anti-regime vote made a mockery of the announced election results and inflamed an already under pressure and frustrated population. After 30 years the IRI managed to throw away the fruits of its hard-earned legitimacy and will never be able to recoup it again.

2. The IRI finally figured out that despite their best efforts to promote backwardness and the forces of reaction, a young, well-educated and globally connected (satellite and internet) population cannot be suppressed. The contrast in mentality between the governing clique and the general population is now simply so large that it is no longer sustainable. The difference in the intellectual quality of the opposition (witness the intellectual growth of Moussavi and Rahnavard) and the IRI power elite is simply stunning.

3. Deep splits in the regime have emerged which are intractable and we now seem to be witnessing a battle to the death. Splits had been emerging within the IRI as long as four years ago, and possibly long before that, when Rafsanjani threw his hat in the ring and announced his candidacy for the presidency before being trounced by Ahmadinejad. The main motivations behind the split seem to be part ideological (some within the IRI would probably want less involvement with Hezbollah and Hamas and a less confrontational relationship with the West) and part economic (Rafsanjani and the Guards represent powerful financial interests which have been locking horns in the domestic economic arena and somehow have decided that there is not enough spoils to go around for both parties.)

The behaviour of the regime over the past few weeks seems to suggest that they are intent on flaming the differences:

§ Sham trials are making a mockery of due process and the regime and accelerating the loss of legitimacy faster than anything imaginable

§ Principals of the regime are picking sides (particularly evident within the Expediency council, the parliament and the religious hierarchy)

§ Differences are emerging within the cliques (Ejeii’s strong attack on Ahmadinejad for appointing Mashaii led to his dimissal)

§ Khameneii had to resort to publishing an open letter to Ahmadinejad to dismiss Mashaii—Ahmadinejad seems to be deluded into thinking that he won the elections with a huge margin and can act with impunity.

§ Khatami and Moussavi keep throwing the IRI’s constitution in the face of the regime and claiming descendancy from Khomeini.

For Iran and Iranians, this is mostly good news. For what seemed like an impossible task and against all odds, the end of the IRI, is now within reach. We need to be vigilant to ensure that the movement is not hijacked or subverted. More on that later….