Use these fair questions to grade the Islamic Republic's perfomance, popularity


by FG


1. Why is the average Iranian poorer 30 years after the revolution?

2. How did so many hardline clerics become multi-millionaires over 30 years?

3. Why are such clerics loudest in calling for brutal punishment of anyone who complains?

4. What did Khamenei’s family do to EARN all the Shah’s palaces and $36 billion?

5. One top goal of the 1979 revolution was to lead to eliminate thievery, corruption and cronyism and produce a better life for all Iranians.

Based on THAT GOAL, what grade would you give the Islamic Republic after 30 years?

6. Is 30 years enough of a test. That is, do you think anyone believes the regime would behave any differently if given another 30 years?


1. Do you feel this regime is “about Islam” or about making a tiny circle of clerics rich beyond their wildest dreams?

2. Of the many crimes over 30 years, how many had anything to do with “defending Islam?“

3. Should those who govern in ther name of religion behave morally?

NOTE: By that I mean no rigging of trials and elections, no stealing, no beatings, no raping, no torture, no death squads, no mosque, dorm and home break-ins, etc.

4. Could you recommend Mr. Khamenei as an ideal role model for any child?

5. Do you believe Khamenei is God or his designated representative?

(WARNING: Your answer determines whether executing protestors for “crimes against God” is legitimate or just a sneaky way of murdering those who dissent--a counterpart to Neda's murder carried out by the very same people under a guise of legality).

6. A second big goal of the 1979 revolution was to achieve more justice and end crimes such as those committed by Savak.

BASED ON THAT GOAL, what grade does the Islamic Republic deserve?


1. In which of these three areas has the Islamic Republic done a single thing one can admire: economic matters, moral conduct, religious worth?.

2. Taking into account your previous answers, do you think the average person would NEED foreign spies to make him hate the Islamic Republic or are there many natural reasons to feel that way?

3. The Iranian people are intensely nationalistic.  Why would they listen to foreign spies an d fall for their propaganda?

4. How could foreign spies operate so successfully in a police state with eyes and ears everywhere?


How can you NOT reach the same answers as everyone else (not that you would admit it).

Not even you can believe such a regime can be anything but detested so why do you pretend?

NOTE: I recently offered Sargoud Perouz an easy test of the regime’s popularity he'd welcome if he actually believed such nonsense.  Guess what happened.   See for yourself at:





more from FG

Latest on economic problems & Islamic Republic's prospects

by FG on

1915 GMT: On the Economic Front (cont.): The Central Bank has issued a gloomy report about Iran’s economic performance in recent months, with declining investment, output, and exports. The report has appeared in both the Green movement’s Rah-e-Sabz and the pro-Rafsanjani Ayande News.

1800 GMT: On the Economic Front. The Swiss engineering group ABB AG has stopped taking new orders in Iran with a view to ending operations in the country.

Note: Both of the above appeared in enduring American.   How long will it be until Swiss diplomats are arrested for spies?  Is it safe for any western country to maintain an embassy and diplomatic relations with this regime?  It's like inviting them to take you hostage.

I also like this passage in a letter from Arshama at the same site:

Killing protesters on Ashura and closing down mosques during the holy month of Moharram alongside with rising poverty (47 % of Iranians below poverty line) are the two most evident proofs for the failure of a system, which prides itself on being Islamic and committed to the “mostazafan” (deprived). I believe that the process of democratisation and secularisation, which started with Khatami and the reformers is irreversible and is slowly spreading throughout the Iranian society.

Finally, I like this passage from an analysis by Pelin on why Mousavi and Karoubbi persist in apparently believing the Islamic Republic can be saved at this point via reform:

Discussing whether holding the middle ground (reform within the system) is a sincere belief or just a strategy by Karroubi and Mousavi is such a byzantine debate!

First, because even if they wanted, challenging the regime upfront (by calling for an end to the Islamic Republic) would be plain suicidal from the duo, and would allow the regime to present them as traitors (or “mohareb”) and break the green movement. Let’s not forget they ran for elections within the regime framework, giving away the middle ground – their best line of defense for now – would play perfectly in the regime’s hands as it would make it much easier to isolate them and divide the green movement.

Second,...I have witnessed directly the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, and there are some similarities with what’s going on in Iran. Once a dynamic of challenge to the regime is put in motion, even if initially led by moderate reformists, it’s all but certain that it will lead to the regime’s end, because it’s just impossible to halt it middle of the road – even if the initial (moderate) leaders may not realize it. Remember Gorbatchev only wanted to reform – and keep in place – the communist system.

Also, some of the champions of the anti-communist revolutions started their fight by challenging the regime to live up to its declared principles (which of course it could not) rather than calling for regime change upfront (which would have made them much easier targets for repression).

Actually, in my reading the system (of the Islamic Republic) missed its chance to survive when it denied the election victory of moderate reformist Mousavi. Halting the challenge half-way – at least for some time – was still possible then, as it had been under Khatami. But by choosing the path of radical confrontation (thus abandoning the middle ground), the regime signed it death warrant, and is now living on borrowed time.