The post election events in Iran and the ensuing “selection” of Mr. Ahmadinejad and the subsequent brutal suppression of the popular furor is puzzling for any Iran observer. The Ayatollahs in Iran have hitherto prided themselves for ruling by consensus and having the masses behind them.
The recent events are a turning point as for the first time in the post revolution history of Iran the schism in the ruling clerical establishment was on display for the world to see, and for the savage suppression of the largely peaceful rallies by the “children of the revolution”.
The true intentions behind stealing the people’s votes and anointing President Ahmadinejad for a second term may be opaque, but we get some hints from the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s Friday sermon: “when it comes to serving the nation … the positions of the president [Ahmadinejad] are closer to mine.”
In Mr. Khamenei’s calculus, the “nation”, or more properly the regime, will be better served by Mr. Ahmadinejad, not Mr. Mousavi. The main issues on the horizon for the next President are the negotiations with the West on Iran’s nuclear enrichment program and relations with the USA. On both counts, Mr. Khamenei did not see a partner in Mr. Mousavi. The clerical establishment in Iran is keen on keeping its power by any means; it does this using a labyrinth of security and paramilitary forces. An essential prerequisite to ensure their grip on Iran is to have a winning card in their bag which ensures that the Western countries will abandon any thought of regime change, or eventually acquiesce to normal trade with it. If treatment of India, Pakistan, and other nuclear club members is any guide, the ruling clergy believe that a nuclear capability will give them that winning card to make the West abandon thoughts of interference and regime change.
The Mullahs are indeed looking to develop a nuclear weapon capability not to attack Israel, Europe, or the US interests, but as a defensive insurance against any Western interference to bring about regime change. Assured of their longevity, the Mullahs can continue their pillaging of Iran’s economical resources and leaving some crumbs for those they consider “khodi” or loyal to the regime. In other words, the Mullahs in Iran want a nuclear capability (weapon or quick weaponization) to ensure that they can keep the Iranian people in perpetual confinement; ironically, they have cleverly sold their nuclear program as a national empowerment and pride issue.
The Guardian Council which vets all political candidates, including all presidential candidates, did not envision that Mr. Mousavi, an “uninspiring political has been”, will indeed win the presidential election. This explains the haste in which the regime abandoned the election process and manipulated the results to keep Mr. Ahmadinejad in power.
The establishment also did not anticipate the popular uproar, in disbelief of a second term for Mr. Ahmadinejad, and reacted with blatant viciousness. For a regime boasting of having legitimacy from the people, and with fresh memories of the fall of another dictator, to so brutally put down its own people can only mean that the Ayatollah must see his nuclear weapon within reach and does not want to see Mr. Mousavi spoiling it. This is an unfortunate conclusion but is a logical explanation for the brutality and abandonment of the popular good will. Mr. Ahmadinejad advocates a confrontational foreign policy, tacitly endorsed by Mr. Khamenei; on the other hand, Mr. Mousavi campaigned on a pragmatic non-confrontational policy toward the West, much like President Khatami.
The hardliners firmly believe that in their negotiations with the West a hard line stance will serve them better. They point to the post 9/11 friendly gestures by President Khatami to the USA by helping America in Afghanistan, and his secret letter via the Swiss intermediaries to President Bush, in which he offered unconditional negotiations. That gesture was rewarded with the famous “axis of evil” label and additional sanctions. The take-away lesson from this experience for Mr. Khamenei, beside the humiliation factor for Iran’s government, was that Iran should only negotiate with the West from an uncompromising position of strength coupled with a foreign policy that is on the offense.
This explains two of the most visible policy agendas of President Ahmadinejad, namely the Holocaust denial and nuclear enrichment program. Going on attack by questioning the Holocaust, a crime in some Western countries, was a way to get back at the West for their mockery of Prophet Muhammad in cartoons, a taboo in Islamic countries. It is no coincidence that Mr. Ahmadinejad’s Holocaust denial becomes louder when Israel attacks Southern Lebanon and Gaza (Hamas), two of Mr. Khamenei’s regional allies. Similarly, Ahmadinejad accelerated the nuclear enrichment.
Indeed, when it comes to serving Khamenei, Ahmadinejad is the man, and he is being rewarded with another term.
