In 1988, when Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of Iranian regime, reached the conclusion that it was not possible to gain a victory in the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88), he accepted the UNSC Resolution 598 and terminated the war and at the same time, called it drinking the chalice of poison. War ended in 20 August 1988. In an effort to find out when the regime of Iran drinks chalice of poison, we are going to look into what happened in the case of Iran –Iraq war in those years.
Here are some of the events that happened in the final months before the acceptance of the 598 Resolution by Iran which led to “Drinking of the Chalice of Poison” by Khomeini in 1988:
1- From April 1988 to August 1988, the Iraqis had four major victories in the war. They captured the Al-faw peninsula and they used chemical weapons in wide scale.
2- Almost all Arab countries were supporting the Sunni régime of Iraq. Some of them, like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were paying money to Saddam. Kuwait also let Saddam use its ports for imports. Some others, like Egypt, had sent mercenaries to the war fronts. Iran was facing a war with the entire Arab Sunni states. These states were ready to enter a new stage by 1987.
3- Increasing international intervention and pressures by international and regional organizations on Iran. these organizations were frustrated from the insistence of the Iranian regime on war and they had started to issue decorations and statements and resolutions one after another against the regime of Iran.
4- Almost all Western countries were siding with Saddam. Some of the Western countries had direct role in supplying Iraqi regime and supporting the Iraqi army and especially air force.
5- Eradiation of the almost entire air force of Iran. Shortly before the termination of war, Iran had lost almost all of its air force. The situation has continued more or less. Iran has now concentrated on missiles.
6- France gave the latest models of aircraft (Mirage and Super Etendard) to the Iraqi and the French pilots were flying them.
7- The US had started to get involved directly and a limited confrontation also happened in the Persian Gulf. The US attacked a commercial airliner and although the US said that it was a mistake and years later paid compensation to the survivors (not to the Iranian government), at the time of the incident, Iranian officials considered it as intentional act for sending warnings to the regime of Iran.
8- Iran had stated attacking oil takers of the other Persian Gulf states, especially Kuwaiti ones, claiming that these countries were using their oil revenues to financially support Saddam. The US administration in the US tried to protect them by putting them under the US flag. Washington first tried to send warnings to Iran through the Swiss Embassy in Tehran but soon it became clear that Iran, not only does not pay attention to these warnings, but it was also planning to attack the oil installation of the Saudi Arabia. The US was escorting the Kuwaiti oil tankers when one of its ships hit a sea mine. Later in the Operation Praying Mantis the US Marine forces destroyed a considerable part of the Iranian naval installations in the Persian Gulf within couple of hours.
9- Saddam brought the war to cities by firing missiles into Tehran and some other major cities. These missiles had to come a long way to hit their targets. Therefore, most of its power was spent to reach the area of target. They were not making considerable destruction in hit areas. Also, they were not accurate at all and almost none of them hit any of the sensitive targets (the house of Imam in Jamaran, important government offices. Majles, the Friday prayer and so on). However, they had devastating psychological effect. The people of Tehran were getting for the first time a real sense of what the war was. The people from all walks of life were seeking refuge out of Tehran and they had created major chaos wherever they went. Saddam never fired a chemical missile into Tehran but the people were always waiting for it. (When one of the missiles hit bakery and its flour stock was thrown to air, the people of Tehran got so afraid that the chemical attacks have began).
10- Rezaie, former commander of the IRGC, had sent a letter to Khomeini but it was not revealed at that time. After almost twenty years Rafsanjani revealed it. in that letter, he had said: “if we can organize 350 infantry brigades, purchase 2500 tanks, 3000 heavy cannons and 300 warplanes, and be able to manufacture laser and nuclear weapons which are nowadays among the necessities of modern warfare, then God Willing, we can think of offensive war activities.”.
11- Parts of the IRGC were seriously against accepting the 598. Now days we hear some of them still bragging “who made Khomeini drink the chalice of poison or we will not let this happen again”. However, it should be noted that in the light of existence of such negative and extremist forces that preferred war to peace, it was not really so easy for the leader to drink the chalice of poison. In fact, the leader died a short while after drinking the chalice of poison.
12- In the case of Iran-Iraq war, again we see a pattern of prolonging the case until the worst option is imposed. In various stages of the war, there were so many proposals by the United Nations, Non-aligned Movement, various international organizations, Arab countries, Arab League, and individuals of international importance for solving the problem and stopping two Muslim countries from killing each other in one of the bloodiest wars of the human history. The regime did not accept any of them until it was forced to accept the 598 Resolution of the United Nations Security Council. After the capturing of Khoramshahr back from the forces of Saddam, the Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were ready to pay good money to Iran as compensation of the war damages of Iran and end the hostilities. Khomeini rejected it. He and his associates were thinking that they will topple Saddam and then continue the war effort towards Israel ( Khomieni kept telling that the “Road to Jerusalem goes through Karbella in Iraq”). The rejection of the existing solutions and proposals continued until Saddam completed its arsenal of chemical elements. At the end of war in 1988, the Iraqis were killing the Iranian soldiers like attacking ants with pesticides. The policy of “human waves” lost its credibility to the chemical weapons. The Iranian army lost the control over the territories that it had gained in Iraq and the Iranian forces immediately and without any order retreated. The soldiers were fleeing the war fronts like hell. Khomeini thought there was no other way but to “drink the chalice of poison”.
13- Some of the high ranking officials in Iran depended on the religious superstition for making important decisions that they do not know the consequences of them for the county or themselves (I was personally a witness that one of the high ranking officials in the Iranian Ministry of Foreign affairs, who had the post of the deputy minister for political affairs for a long time due his role in the hostage taking issue, took a decision about something according to the same method. He ordered his secretary to call the office of an Ayatollah and ask him to “open book” for his decision. This means to open Koran [it has nothing to do with the Koran per se] and see what is written at the top of the page, which is randomly opened. There are usually two things at the top of the pages that is “good or bad”. This is called “Estekhraeh” which is some kind of divining.
14- The reality is that Iran had not intended to accept Resolution 598, nor was there genuine interest in resolving the issues that divided the two sides. The Security Council had adopted 598 a year earlier, in 1987. At that juncture, Iranian forces had been in Iraqi territory for several years, threatening Iraq’s biggest port city, Basra. Deceived by the fleeting superiority of their tactical position, Iranian war leaders dismissed 598 back then, instead feeding the Iranian people and Khomeini a diet of misinformation. They promised that, with a little more time and patience on the part of the nation, Iranian forces would overrun Iraq shortly. Now those very same leaders are claiming that they were early advocates for peace. No one is acknowledging an inescapable fact: under no condition would regional and global realities have given the Iranian forces a chance to take even one step further. What changed Iran’s position was not a set of brilliant proposals by self-proclaimed Iranian military and political strategists. There was one, and only one, reason for acceptance of the peace: the regime of the Islamic Republic was in danger of collapse in the face of decisive defeats on the battlefield and poor morale within military ranks and among the populace.
15- For most of the war, Iran held almost 40,000 Iraqis as POWs, while the Iraqi side had something close to 5,000. By the time Iran came around to acceptance of 598, the number of Iranian POWs in Iraqi custody had reached parity.
16- towards the end, the Iraqis had forced the Iranians out of their land. Despite claims by the likes of Rezaie, Saddam’s forces were well prepared to cross the border and capture large chunks of Iranian territory again, and they would have met with little resistance.
17- The armed opposition group MKO, having been driven out of Iran in 1981 into Saddam’s welcoming embrace, employed a new strategy in the waning days of the war. Untrained and lightly armed fighters from different countries filled their ranks, and they staged an attack riding from Iraq into Iran in ordinary passenger cars. Without direct reinforcement by the Iraqi army, they were sitting ducks and no match for any regular army. Thus, they were decimated before making much headway, and Khomeini ordered a mass slaughter of MKO prisoners in the summer of 1988. Over a few days, between three to eight thousand prisoners, mostly MKOs went to their deaths. The judicial death committee was asking the prisoners one question “are you still committed to your previous positions?” (In Persian: Aya- Hanooz Sareh –Moozeh-Hastied?) and whoever said “yes” was immediately executed.
Back in 1988, Khomeini enjoyed such respect and political clout among the ruling elite in Iran that he could accept the UNSC Resolution 598 and still remain in power. He famously called this act “drinking the chalice of poison.” No one in Iran today enjoys the stature he had. In fact, Rafsanjani, who became the commander of forces on behalf of Khamenei before the end of war, has revealed in his memoires that he told Khamenei to let him (Rafsanjani) be the person who accepts the UNSC Resolution. But Khomeini rejected it, because he was thinking that some commanders may reject a call by Rafsanjani. Therefore, the easy answer to our question (when does the Iranian regime drinks poisoned challice) is: when it feels that it is on the verge of collapse.
