1. Can’t even control rigged elections.
Prior to 1975, the Shah allowed two political parties—Mardom and Iran-e Novin—to compete in elections. Iranians called them the “yes” and “yes, sir” parties and elections were tightly choreographed. But then the Mardom Party won a few local elections they weren’t supposed to. The Shah worried it would become a focal point for real opposition, so he panicked and forced a one-party system on the nation, despite having previously written, “If I were a dictator rather than a constitutional monarch then I might be tempted to sponsor a single dominant party such as Hitler organized…” The result was an unmitigated disaster that further undermined his legitimacy.
Fast forward to Khamenei. One would think having the power to disqualify any political candidate at will would guarantee presidential election results that met with his satisfaction. Not so. In 1997, Khatami was an unwelcome surprise. In 2005, Ahmadinejad did well the first round only because of last-minute ballot stuffing designed to block a reform-oriented Karroubi presidency. And in 2009 Khamenei thought he was safe because he got Khatami not to run—the reformists would never rally around an old has-been like Mousavi…But of course, they did, so the regime panicked and cheated.
Why allow yourself to get saddled with Khatami and repeatedly resort to last-minute cheating when you can stack the deck before the game starts? To be sure there are complicated, behind-the-scenes power struggles going on, but Iran scholar Ervand Abrahamian also reminds us that, “One should never underestimate the role of stupidity in history.”
2. False confessions.
In the early 1970s, the Shah launched a crackdown on leftist opposition groups. Captured dissidents were usually tortured until they died or “confessed”. The “confessions” were typically videotaped stage-managed affairs in which the prisoner would admit to great wrongdoing, condemn their previous actions, and profess undying admiration for the Shah. The lucky ones got off with just being forced to write what at the time were called “shit-eating-letters”. Ayatollah Khomeini condemned the practice, and when he took power, allowed a prohibition against forced confessions to be written into the new constitution—and then promptly started torturing people and extracting forced confessions.
Khamenei is currently continuing this wretched practice, the latest example of which being the patently false confessions offered by haggard-looking reformists at their show trials.
3. Evin Prison.
The Shah ordered Evin Prison built in 1971. It was surrounded by high walls, modeled after US maximum security prisons, and situated in what were then the lightly-populated foothills of the Alborz Mountains overlooking northern Tehran (the city has since expanded so that it meets the prison). Originally designed for 320 inmates, by 1977 it had been expanded to hold 1500. Political prisoners were common, as was torture at the hands of SAVAK, the Shah’s domestic intelligence organization.
The 1979 revolution did nothing to check the growth of Evin—only the politics of the prisoners inside changed—and by 1983 the prison held 15,000 inmates. For political prisoners, Khamenei has continued the tradition of using Evin as a destination of first resort. The torture methods used in the time of the Shah are still in use today, but SAVAK is now called VEVAK.
4. Legitimacy questioned from the start.
After Britain and the Soviet Union invaded and occupied Iran in 1941, the Allies forced the Shah’s father to abdicate. This paved the way for the weaker and more malleable son to claim the crown, but in a way that clearly undermined his legitimacy.
As for Khamenei, he was a mere hojjatoleslam when appointed Supreme Leader, two notches below the rank of a Grand Ayatollah—which is what the constitution said you had to be to qualify for the position. The problem was none of the real Grand Ayatollahs wanted the job as offered, so the constitution was quickly changed to allow for someone with Khamenei’s questionable religious credentials to serve. From the start, many, including in the clergy, viewed this move and Khamenei with considerable suspicion.
This list was by no means meant to be exhaustive. I welcome more comparisons in the comments.
