Najaf 1 - Qom 0
Schism within contemporary Shi'ism
August 30, 2004
iranian.com
The lingering conflict in Iraq, more than a year after the end
of the year, demonstrates the subtle dynamics of Iraqi Shi'ism
and the extent to which it affects power brokering in the Iraqi
state. By handing over the keys to the Imam Ali mosque, Iraq's
holiest Shi'ite shrine, Sadr was transferring the ideological legitimacy
to the authentic victor of the Najaf uprising, Grand Ayatollah
Sistani.
To create the waves of Shi'ite sympathy necessary
for the success of his revolt Sadr's strategy was to dare the
Iraqi government to violate the Shrine: in effect dare them to
be barbarians.
In the face of that challenge, Iraqi government on one hand had
to convince Sadr that they were prepared to cross that line if
it meant saving the integrity of Iraq or having Sistani intervene
on their behalf.
The big question was will Sistani throw his
weight behind beleaguered Allawi regime? Or would he call for
the mass
uprising that could have change the course of Iraq to exist
as a unified entity. The stakes were high and so were the repercussions.
Sadr overestimated the degree of protection the mosque and its
proximity to the shrine afforded him, since it could be easily
trespassed. His militias were not protected by any physical boundary
but by a sacred one from within the sanctuary, which civilized
men hesitate to cross. Mortars were fired from the courtyard of
the Imam Ali Shrine by men who didn"t even fortify their
positions, secure in the knowledge that they could slay men too
decent to fire back.
The exemplary self restraint by the forces
encircling the shrine discredited Sadr's strategy to use
the shrine as a shield to promote his delicate agenda of ideological
grandiosity. It was a rebuke to his strategy that Shiites refused
to descend on the shrine despite of his repetitive calls; a solitary
call by Ali Sistani was answered by thousands of weeping Iraqis.
It was significant that Grand Ayatollah Sistani, said to be under
treatment in London, remained largely silent on the fighting
which had engulfed his religious capital, almost as if the Pope
had no
comment on fighting raging through St. Peter's square.
Sistani's timely stroke helped broker a deal that on surface
looks a face saver for Sadr, as he and his forces were being decimated,
the deal allows Sadr to be a free man despite his indictment for
the murder of Khoei, for this concession he had agree to surrender
the mausoleum of Imam Ali, disarmament of his militia and promise
to join the mainstream Iraqi politics.
Scratching the wounds a
little deeper it was actually Sistani and Sadr who were fighting
for the heart and soul of Shiite mainstream sympathies; it is
Sistani who has emerged as winner and has emerged as the grandest
of the
Ayatollahs that has the power to incite popular resistance.
Sadr
was perfectly aware that with impending denunciation his future
role in Iraqi politics was restricted, one collateral benefit
from this peace deal brokered by Ali Sistani is that he has been
declared
a free man. The individual victory of escaping from a damning
indictment aside his ideological power base has been dented and
exposed.
The origin of the bloody feud is ensconced in ideological and
individual vendetta. Inspired by the religious leader Kazim al-Husseini
al-Hairi of Qom, calling for an Islamic government in Iraq some
clerics, most notably the young Muqtada al-Sadr of Najaf and Muhammad
al-Fartusi in Baghdad, issued bold statements. They moved to extend
their influence in some Shi'ite cities in the south and in the
slum area of Baghdad known before the war as Saddam City (now renamed
Sadr City, after the religious leader Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, who
was gunned down in Najaf in 1999).
The fierce struggle within Shi'ite
religious circles took an ominous turn with the murder of Abd
al-Majid al-Khoei, son of Abu al-Qasim, who had been brought to
Najaf by
American forces in the hopes that he would be able to exert his
influence in the city. The killing of Abd al-Majid, a man who
exemplified the sober and moderate face of Iraqi Shi'ism, has underscored
the
role of violence in Iraqi politics as well as the difficulty
of reaching an agreement with Sadr. Sadr was accused of collusion
in murder of Majid al-Khoei by an Iraqi judge.
This was the final effort by Sadr to control of mainstream Shi'ism,
the end game between Sistani of Najaf and the Ayatollahs of Qum
who were backing Sadr was an effective coup d'état to bury "quietism" practiced
by the al-Hawzah al-'Ilmiyyah in Najaf. Qum was playing the
game of ultimate ideological supremacy through their proxy Sadr.
Iraqi and Iranian Shi'ite strains have little love lost for
one another the differences borne out during the Iran-Iraq War
of 1980-88 and the 1991 Shi'ite uprising in southern Iraq.
During
the war with Iran, Iraqi Shi'ites, who formed the rank and file
of the Iraqi infantry, fought against their Iranian coreligionists,
demonstrating that their loyalty to the Iraqi state overrode
sectarian allegiance and their discontent with the Sunni-dominated
Baath
regime. Iraqi Shiites are known historically for their "Iraqi
nationalism" whereas Iraqi Sunnis have looked towards "Arab
nationalism" as the clarion call.
To understand the background of this schism between Qum and Najaf,
one needs to look profoundly at contemporary centers of Shi'ites
learning's. Four senior Grand Ayatollahs constitute the Religious
Institution (al-Hawzah al-'Ilmiyyah) in Najaf, the preeminent seminary
center for the training of Shiite clergymen. Before the 1979 Islamic
revolution in Iran, Najaf was the most important center of study
for Shia religious leaders.
However, Saddam Hussein ordered mass
arrests and the expulsion of senior clerics, giving the Iranian
seminary in the city of Qom the opportunity to take over the religious
leadership of the Shias. Qom became the pre-eminent religious center
for Shia Muslims since the Iranian revolution, however, Najaf has
a history of more than a millennium of leadership, and the Iranian
clerics who run the holy city of Qum, are facing a revived rival.
As of mid-2003 the seminary in Qom hosted between 40,000 and
50,000 clergy, while the number in Najaf stood at about 2,000,
down from
about 10,000 before the Ba'ath regime took. The first exodus from
Qom to Najaf is expected to be by exiled Iraqi clerics, estimated
to number between 3,000, and 5,000.
At the heart of schism
lies reluctance of seminary of Najaf to get involved in worldly
affairs -- in essence al-Hawzah al-'Ilmiyyah
in Najaf wants to shield the highest Shi'ite religious leadership,
the marjaiyya, from politics - this is an old tension within
Shi'ite Islam between two conflicting tendencies, quietism
and activism.
Whether clerics should confine their activities to
religious
affairs or also seek a role in politics has been a matter
of fierce debate among Shi'ites for well over a century. Sunnis,
who in theory
are expected to obey their rulers and even tolerate a tyrant
in order to avoid civil strife and preserve the cohesion
of the
Muslim
community, observant Shi'ites recognize no authority on earth
except that of the imam.
The twelfth imam is believed to
be hidden from
view and is expected to return one day as a messianic figure,
the Mahdi. In his absence, there can be no human sovereign
who is fully
legitimate. This ambivalence toward worldly power has resulted
in different interpretations within Shi'ite Islam regarding
government accountability and the role of the clerics in state
affairs.
Imam Khomeini's concept of the rule of the jurist is only
one among
several competing views.
 Qom is worried to face a challenge over the concept of the Velayat-e-Faqih
- the God-given authority for a top religious leader to oversee
secular in the absence of the Prophet Mohammad and infallible imams.
The Najaf seminary's view of the Velayat-e-Faqih is that of a supervisor
and adviser. The Qom school believes the opposite, with Iran's
supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, officially considered as
the highest religious authority of the world's Shias. Qom sees
the direct involvement of clerics in state ruling and executive
affairs as their legitimate right and moral obligation.
The battle of wills in present altercation was undoubtedly won
by the elder grand Ayatollah Sistani and his favored doctrine of "quietism" won
over calls of "activism." From designed chaos aimed
at popular uprising of the South to peaceful withdrawal Sistani
political maneuverings helped defuse the crisis, in the process
he has emerged as a new force to reckon with. Iranian born Sistani
plan to have higher goals his ambitions of Shiite heart and soul
stems from his desire to shift the thrust of Shiite theocracy from
Qum to Najaf and Karbela.
 The recent upspring of the Sadr rebels
was a blatant attempt to rob Sistani of its hardcore support, by
showing Sistani soft on resistance Sadr purpose was to build a
momentum that would lead to popular mass uprising those intentions
did not materialize. Sistani call to "mass popular uprising
for peace" was a de-facto call for Sadr withdrawal, that
Sistani achieved very ingeniously, someone who is not even a born
Iraqi to accomplish this ideological following in Iraq is matchless.
This is major victory of the al-Hawzah al-'Ilmiyyah and
the marjaiyya in Najaf over that of Ayatollahs of Qom, this may
not
be the last one too, in political pragmatism it is clear that Sistani
keeps his cards very close his chest, when he decides to play he
plays them well too.
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