Easy does it
Iran's nuclear program, policy and the predicament
September 27, 3003
The Iranian
It is unfortunate to see an externally
driven process is affecting Iran's internal politics
in a way that, once again, the Iranian people neither have the
power to give their input nor affect
its ultimate outcome. As a none specialist on nuclear issues, I
fear a combination of current efforts by the neo-cons in Washington
and irresponsible statements by the
hardliners in Iran will have a negative impact on the
reformists and democratic forces in Iran.
It is evident that neither the Shah nor the Islamic
Republic consulted the public on
this matter of great national importance. Therefore their decisions
lack the essential elements of popular legitimacy and support.
However, the fact that Iran needs to acquire nuclear
technology for peaceful
applications within
scope of the country's national rights,
and the fact that the country has spent
a significant portion of its resources
to build and
rebuild the Bushehr nuclear plant for the past 30 years, make
it impossible to immediately halt the ongoing peaceful programs.
What
would therefore be a plausible solution to existing
predicament?
First, let's look at the opposing debates by the far
right groups in both countries. On one side, there are
the neo-cons, spearheaded by the American Enterprise
Institute and the Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, who are the proponents of "regime change"
through coercion and destabilizing measures from
outside.
The neo-cons have significantly contributed to the
formulation of President Bush's current Middle East policy.
Their philosophy differs from the moderates at the State Department
and
think tanks such as the
Middle East Institute who favor engaging Iran with the
hope of gradual change from within. An example of their approach
is well reflected in Patrick Clawson, the
deputy director of the Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, before the U.S.-Israeli Joint
Parliamentary Committee on 17 September 2003. There,
he argued:
Much progress has been made in exposing Iran's
nuclear program and in
forging an international will to respond vigorously. Now the
time has come to move to the next stage, that is, to develop
a consensus on possible Security
Council actions if the IAEA Board condemns Iranian
noncompliance. Developing such a consensus will be of
great importance -- for the Bush administration, for
the Security Council, for the global nonproliferation
regime, and for preserving peace in the Middle East. Given
the high stakes, the effort should soon move into high gear.?
(Patrick
Clawson: Evaluating the
Options Regarding the Iranian Nuclear Threat)
He proceeds by arguing
that the UN Security Council's options are not reassuring, since
consensus may not
emerge. This may lead to insufficient measures to
force Iran to abandon its nuclear program. Clawson
introduces four summary options that with intensive US
support may pass by the Security Council and thereby
halt Iran's nuclear program in its inception. Those
four options are:
1. Banning the export of nuclear and military
technology to Iran.
2. Freezing new economic agreements with Iran.(i.e.,
between the European Union and Iran)
3. Imposing broader economic sanctions on Iran.
4. Declaring unacceptable any Iranian acquisition of
nuclear weapons. He concludes that:
All the policy options for responding to Iran's
nuclear progress are seriously flawed: they may not be
particularly effective and they may come at a high
price. It is easy to criticize any one of the
policies, but the worst policy would be to do
nothing, which would lead to further
WMD proliferation. The Middle East will become a very
dangerous state if many states acquire nuclear
weapons.
It is unfortunate that by instigating such provocative
recommendations, Clawson and his colleagues undermine
the efforts by the reformers and moderates elements of
Iran's executive branch to get the current IAEA's
Additional Protocols signed. In doing so, they
actually enhance the possibility of Iran's withdrawal
from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NTP).
Some argue that Iran's departure from the NPT is
indeed what the neo-cons are ultimately striving for. At the same time, if
as a tactical objective, the neo-cons think that by pursuing the
WMD excuse they
can
destabilize the regime, they are badly mistaken. The
issue has not only brought the reformists and the
conservatives together along nationalistic
sentiments, it has also aroused public anger that is
well reflected in various editorials and newspapers
with different political orientations.
Indeed, the
magnitude of Iranians national sentiments with regards
to their right to nuclear technology is so strong that
even the late Shah's son Reza Pahlavi has been hesitant to publicly
endorse the idea of striking Iran's nuclear sites by
foreigners.
In contrast to neo-cons' narrow points of view, there are other
authoritative experts, such as Shahram Chubin at the Geneva Center of Security
Policy, who have suggested a less confrontational policy towards
Iran's nuclear program. In his article in the Swiss daily Le
Temps (June 19) Chubin argues:
Iran's programme is not as advanced as North Korea's
nor as secretive as that of Saddam's Iraq. Given the
lack of good alternative policy instruments (sanctions will delay but not stop
the programme;
threats will unite the country; regime change is not a
guarantee; attacks are neither feasible nor cost-free;
etc. etc.) a policy supporting a change in policy
based on an indigenous decision, has much to recommend
it.
The counterpart of the hawks and neo-cons in the
US, are the hardliners in Iran. They, irrespective of
the interest of the Iranian people, engage in
confrontational rhetoric against the US and Israel
which may expose the nuclear facilities to possible
strikes by these countries. That is, in addition to
possible loss of lives and property, such adventurous
rhetoric may jeoperdise current and future scientific
and technological advances for peaceful.
In a recent Tehran Friday Prayer sermon for example, Ayatollah
Jannati said Iran should defy demands
for tougher
nuclear
inspections and avoid signing an extra protocol to the treaty,
demanded by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Such inspections, he said,
would be an "extra humiliation".
He even suggested that Iran should pull out of the NPT. "North Korea
withdrew. Many countries have never entered it," he said.
Surprisingly, beside the hardline leaders, there are
open-minded officials
inside and outside the country who appear to be echoing the hardliner logic
in favor of gaining nuclear technology as a deterrent
against Israel, or a bargaining chip against US
expansionist policies.
In his recent article in Lebanon's Daily Star, Asgharkhani, a renowned
authority on Iran's nuclear program, argued:
If you ask me as to whether or not Iran possesses the
weapons, I would say no. If you ask me as to whether
or not Iran will live up to its NPT commitments, I
would say yes. If you ask me if Iran needs to
nuclearize itself, I would say this is a must for
Iran's strategy of survival. A nuclear Iran must not
be seen as a threat to its neighboring countries or to
Israel. The weapons would serve as a minimum
deterrence for self-defense in a world of uncertainty.
It is necessary not only as a substitute for fossil
energy but also for Iran's social cohesion and
prestige.
This line of argument seems to undermine the fact that
the policies of internal suppression and
international isolation advocated by the hardliners have brought Iran to a
point where the country may have to forfeit, or
significantly slow down, her legitimate national
aspirations to acquire nuclear technology.
Fortunately, the National Participation Front, the
main wing of the reformist movement, has wisely
recommended that Iran should sign the Additional
Protocols. The NPF has also harshly condemned those
international forces that do not like to see
advancement of any form of nuclear technology in Iran.
It seems that the more moderate members
in the Foreign Ministry have also sensed the gravity of the situation. Kamal
Karrazi has said that Iran is ready to
cooperate fully and closely with IAEA, but, the
ambiguous demands by the
United States and the rest of the international
community should be removed. In a meeting with Iranian-Americans
in New York, Kharrazi reiterated his assertion by saying
that Iran is willing to sign the Additional
Protocols. But, he added, "the problem is that it is not clear whether
or not the US will be satisfied with the current
language of the IAEA's Additional Protocols."
Karrazi's assertion, however, has been contradicted by the
fact that other Iranian officials have said Iran would scale back its cooperation
with the IAEA in response to the October deadline to "prove" it is not building
a nuclear bomb. The decision, announced by Iran's representative
to the IAEA, suggests that Tehran will cooperate only in areas
covered by agreements with the agency.
Obviously, one
has to be cautious about comments made by diplomats and
politicians, particularly in
Iran where it is widely believed that Supreme Leader Ayatollah
Khamenei and his inner circle make the final
decisions on key matters.
As Chubin eloquently argues:
A debate within Iran on the wisdom/desirability of
nuclear energy would wrench the issue out of the grasp
of hardliners, who have kept the programme shrouded in
secrecy. It would de-mythologize the benefits of
nuclear technology and make it harder for the [hardline] elements
of the government to use it as a cover for acquiring
nuclear weapons. It would create the basis for a
sensible agreement that could meet both Iran's
reasonable needs and the concerns of the international
community.
In addition Iran has the type of
political structure and political consciousness likely
to be receptive to this. Iranians are deeply skeptical
about the unelected parts of their government and
prone to question and debate decisions rather than
accept them blindly. It would make the programme more
democratically accountable. It would shine light on
policies that have been adopted in secrecy and by
cabals.
Domestic debate on the merits of the nuclear
energy programme outlined above could be a prelude to
a reversal of policy. Such a policy reversal would be
more durable than the other approaches noted. Finally,
in the worst case, if a democratic debate did not
produce a policy reversal, a more democratically
accountable regime with nuclear potential would be
more reassuring, and possibly even more tolerable, for
the international community.
I believe the National Participation Front's request
to sign the Additional Protocols should not only be
adhered to by the Iranian government but also be
considered as the starting point of a long and
informative national debate on the country's long term
nuclear policy. That is, Iran should come forward with full
transparency to demonstrate to the rest of the world
that her intensions are peaceful and legal.
In reply to skeptics who fear that spent fuel
rods from the Bushehr light-water reactor can be used to
produce highly enriched plutonium, the Russians have agreed
to purchase the spent fuel rods from Iran. Iran may also
have to consider bringing to a halt activities at the
Natanz and Kalaye sites where
there are allegations of activities to enrich
weapon-grade plutonium. Obviously, if there are other
hidden agendas,
concealed from the Iranian people and the
international community, then the historical blame and
responsibility for the future consequences will
directly go to those who made the ultimate decisions
at this time.
Author
Mehrdad Valibeigi is a professorial lecturer of economics at the
American University in Washington, DC.
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