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By Hamid Zangeneh One thing that we all must do in the wake of the eighth presidential election in Iran is to collectively identify and discuss Iran's national interests and carefully and methodically prioritize them. This would create a by-partisan consensus and understanding that all politics would end at the "Persian Gulf water edges" and only Iran's interests are the driving forces behind any Iranian policy. Iranian people and other governments would know that the differences between Khatamis, Khameneis, and Rafsanjanis of Iran would be mostly stylistic. Something similar to the U.S., Britain, Japan, etc., where governments come and go, but policies, for the most part, remain in place, which reflects the stability of the system in these countries. For example, during the 1992 presidential campaign, Bill Clinton the candidate, excruciated George Bush (the father) for his China policy. However, after he became the president, he endorsed the same one China policy and business as usual. Similarly, George W. Bush was critical of Clinton's Kosovo policy but after the election, they are following the same path. National interests of any country could be listed to include political and economic sovereignty. The question is, therefore, what do they mean by political and economic security in this increasingly interdependent world? Throughout history, the world has been divided between those who frequently, through war and subjugation, set the path for interdependence, cooperation, and progress and those who insisted on sitting aside and trying to be "independent", for one or another reason. If for the sake of argument, we do not become absorbed in the discussion of imperialism and colonialism and their gory implementations and consequences, and concentrate on the post-Wold War II period, we could see that Western market-economy democracies enunciated explicit policies of inclusion, cooperation, and economic as well as political interdependence (globalization) as one of their national interests. They established institutions such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank as well as multinational and transnational corporations to fulfill their intentions through private and public channels and relentlessly pursued these explicitly stated goals ever since. Pursuit of these objectives has been vilified by many for a number of reasons. We have the Marxist-Leninist denunciation of these objectives as the evils of imperialism and in the last couple of decades, the Islamic Republic has replaced it with similar slogans to express a same sentiment. A relatively similar episode of radicalism that came to exist for a short period in the 60s was the failed Arab nationalism led by Naser of Egypt. They preached intolerance and Arab superiority rather than universal interdependence and cooperation as well. Even though Islamic Republic's analysis and means of achieving their objectives are different, they are designed and destined to achieve a similar end, i.e., isolation and slow but certain destitution relative to their Western brethren in the long run, if Iranian citizens allow them to continue on this path. Regardless of whether or not the Islamic regime survives in its current form and constitution, there are national interests that are and must be independent of the form, shape, and ideological tendencies of the current and/or any future government. These vital issues determine the long run fate and welfare of the country. These are what we call Iran's national interests. If I were to prepare a list of these national interest issues, the re-establishment of U.S. -Iran relations would be on the top of my agenda because of the importance of the U.S. in many national-interest issues of Iran, such as energy, WTO membership, trade, and defense needs. A cursory look at the balance sheet shows that the two countries' national interests would be served more by bilateral cooperation and normal relations than by disengagement. On the American side of the ledger we need to pay more attention to the following direct and indirect effects of disengagement and sanctions: 1-- It undermines the essence of free-trade policies that the U.S. has always relentlessly promoted. 2-- Iran is a large supplier of oil and gas, vital to industrial world economies. 3-- Iran has a large (60+ million) sophisticated and relatively young population, which is potentially, a profitable market for the U.S. exports and, more importantly, U.S. foreign direct investment. 4-- Iran holds a strategic key to the oil and gas of the Caspian Sea area. 5-- Since they are not multilateral and "leak proof", they will not succeed even if they are imposed by they most powerful nation on earth. They will just increase the marginal cost of doing business. 6-- They deny international business the ability to extend American style democracy and capitalism 7-- By denying dialogue and exchange with those who engage in international activities, a vital channel thorough which evolutionary changes are transmitted is blocked. Therefore, a valuable and influential channel and impetus for policy change is forsaken for the sake of immediate gratification. On the Iranian side of the ledger, if nothing else mattered, Iran needs to enter the WTO and since its rules require "unanimous consent" for accepting new members, there is no way that Iran could enter the organization without the U.S. acquiescence, or at least her tacit approval. Besides, assuming that Iran did manage to enter the organization without U.S. consent, the U.S. does not have to allow trade between the two countries and U.S.-Iran trade would stay at its current minimal level. And we all know too well that the U.S. market is indispensable for any credible export-led growth and development strategy, something that Iran needs if she is going to get out of her current economic rut. One cannot find any prosperous economy without a very good political or at least economic link to the U.S. today. So, from the Iranian point of view, ignoring all other potential benefits, acceptance in the WTO would worth the cost, if nothing else. Fortunately, during the presidential election in Iran, the candidates briefly discussed the subject. The discussions were not, however, deep and all encompassing but enough to break the so-called taboo barrier. They were good for a starter and they need to be continued until they come up with a concrete set of priorities on this issue to take to the negotiating table. Other national security issues on my list would be the relevancy and cost of Israeli-Palestinian conflict to Iran, security of both the Persian Gulf and the Caspian sea, and defense capabilities that must be highly competitive with Turkey and Arab states in the immediate region. Given the realities of the world, it must now be obvious to everyone in the IRI regime that there is no way that Iran could supplant Israel in the U.S. for many national interest reasons. A common misunderstanding is that the Washington's Middle East policy is based on the Jewish and Israeli lobbies' interests. Therefore, if one could out-organize, out-spend, and discredit them politically, we could "eliminate the competition" and Iran could establish cordial and mutually beneficial relationship with the U.S. This interpretation which is, unfortunately, the basis of many Iranian decisions, ignores a very important dynamic. The strength of Jewish and Israeli lobbies and their presence in the U.S. are all important and indisputable only as long as they advocate and enunciate what is in the national interests of the United States, not the other way around. That is, the U.S. national interests are not shaped and molded to enhance Jewish and Israeli's welfare and national interests. It is the national interests of the United States in the region that gives these lobbies the strength that they enjoy for the time being. If and when these national interests change, their strengths will wither on the vine as well. This is a one way street. Jews are successful only because they are beating the U.S. national interest drums. On the economic side of the ledger, I would include Iran's future water and energy needs (gas and oil but more importantly, renewable hydroelectric, solar, wind, and nuclear sources) on the top my priority list. Next would be membership in the WTO, and Iran's future economic role in the world trade. All of these could be more facilitated and made easier to achieve by re-establishing relations with the U.S. Author Hamid Zangeneh is professor economics at Widener University, Chester, Pennsylvania. He received his Ph.D. in economics from the University of Missouri-Columbia.
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