ایران احتیاج به شاه الله هان نوکر و یا خر خمینی پرستان حزب الله ندارد.
This month is the 56th anniversary of America’s first overthrow of a democratically-elected government in IRAN.
In 1953, the CIA and British intelligence orchestrated a coup d'etat that toppled the democratically elected government of Iran. The government of Mohammad Mossadegh. The aftershocks of the coup are still being felt.
In 1951 Prime Minister Mossadegh roused Britain’s ire when he nationalized the oil industry. Mossadegh argued that Iran should begin profiting from its vast oil reserves which had been exclusively controlled by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The company later became known as British Petroleum (BP).
After considering military action, Britain opted for a coup d'etat. President Harry Truman rejected the idea, but when Dwight Eisenhower took over the White House, he ordered the CIA to embark on one of its first covert operations against a foreign government.
The coup was led by an agent named Kermit Roosevelt, the grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt. The CIA leaned on a young, insecure Shah to issue a decree dismissing Mossadegh as prime minister. Kermit Roosevelt had help from Norman Schwarzkopf’s father: Norman Schwarzkopf.
The CIA and the British helped to undermine Mossadegh’s government through bribery, libel, and orchestrated riots. Agents posing as communists threatened religious leaders, while the US ambassador lied to the prime minister about alleged attacks on American nationals.
Some 300 people died in firefights in the streets of Tehran.
Mossadegh was overthrown, sentenced to three years in prison followed by house arrest for life.
The crushing of Iran’s first democratic government ushered in more than two decades of dictatorship under the Shah, who relied heavily on US aid and arms. The anti-American backlash that toppled the Shah in 1979 shook the whole region and helped spread Islamic militancy.
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Thanks everyone for ....by Afshin_Afshar on Sun Aug 16, 2009 10:55 PM PDT
.. sharing your views. We all know that this topic is too big for us to discuss and analyze here, but we can always help each other with a spark of curiosity on a line of thinking that we had not pursued in the past.
In my case today that meant ordering a new book that will hopefully teach me a thing or two.
Warm regards to all.
Ali P.by Sassan on Sun Aug 16, 2009 04:54 PM PDT
I have read a great many of your posts in the past and respect your approach and tone, which is always civil, something that I admittedly have a problem with at times, specially when dealing with our IRI apologist.
To answer your question, why do I think that the threat of communist takeover was hyped in Iran in 1953, whereas in places like Hungry, Czech, Afghanistan, it was all too real.
Don't get me wrong, the Russian bear has always dreamed of having direct access to the warm waters of the Persian Gulf, but Iran is no Afghanistan, whose muslims are majority sunnis, with practically none of the resources of the shiite clergy establishment. The Afghans have no ayatollahs, and none of their networking apparatus. After all, the mullahs are all very ardent capitalists. In fact, the shiite establishment and the Bazaar have a simbiotic, familial relationship.
When the Qajars were giving away all of Iran's naturall resources, specifically Tobacco, in the late 1800's, it was the Ulama who rallied the Iranian nation to fight against the foreign incursion into Iran. One has to give the evil bastards their due, even though they were doing it mostly for their own self-interests.
Moreover, Afghanistan is a phony country penned by the British Empire. It's really not a country at all -- more like a collection of tribes with no unity, no memory of a founding father like Cyrus the Great, no history of monarchy dating back 2,500 years, no religious symbols like "Imam Hussein" to rally the poor masses. It was an easy prey, not to mention, miserably mismanaged, as were Hungry and Czech. after they were gutted following WWII.
Again, don't get me wrong, the Soviet threat was always very real in that they were expansionists, but it was never a mortal threat to Iranian soverignty. At most, the Soviets were seeking a sympathetic leader in Tehran, a client state, much like the relationship of Iran and the United States from 1953-1973.
After 1973, the Shah, emboldened by petro dollars, pursued a very independent foreign policy, which was at times hostile to the interests of the United States and its allies (Japan and Europe). If you believe the recent article in the LA Times, the destabalization of the Shah's regime started in 1975, under the Ford Administration. In fact, when Iran's economy faltered in 1977, the Americans convinced the Saudis to produce 11 million gallons of oil per day (a ridiculously massive output) in order to drive down oil prices and further weaken the Iranian economy, which is exactly what happened.
Moreover, there are the de-classified State Department documents which show that the real concern of American oil executives was nationalization, not communism (fearing the domino effect in other oil producing countries) -- and it's a long-held falsehood that the coup plans started with Eisenhower. In fact, they started in the fall of 1952, a few months before Truman left the White House.
Truman rejected the initial coup plans not because he was some sort of a democratic Ghandi, but because he felt that a coup was unncessary, and in the end, Mossadegh could be "played" like other middle-eastern premiers and kings. When they realized that Mossadegh was not going to play ball, the coup plans were set in motion during the final months of the Truman Administration and finalized shortly after the Eisenhower takeover.
Thank you all,by Noosh Afarin on Mon Aug 17, 2009 12:59 AM PDT
I enjoyed reading your comments and your contributions.
If you would like to know more, here you go:
اقای افشین گرامی؛Noosh Afarin
Sun Aug 16, 2009 03:52 PM PDT
با تشکر از توجه شما و اضافه کردن نظرتان در رابطه با کتاب ( همه مردان شاه نوشته« استفن کينزر »).با شما در مورد اینکه باید از مراجعه مختلف کسب اطلاع کرد ، کاملا هم عقیده ام، و خود نیز این مهم را همیشه مد نظر دارم. من هم مانند شما از همان نسل گمشده هستم، در دوران شاه بچه بودم چند سال اول انقلاب را در دنیای تینیجری گذراندم وبعد از ایران خارج شدم، بدون اینکه بدانم که چه بر ایران گذشت. سعی من در داشتن اطلاعاتیست که خارج از تعصبات یکطرفه باشد. در نتیجه بدنبال پیدا کرن واقعیتهای تاریخی در مورد دکتر مصدق ظرف چند ماه گذشته با نظریاتی که شدیداً کوبنده و مخالف با او و نظریاتی که بسیار مدافع او بودنند برخورد کردم. با شخصیت او چه در صحنه سیاسی و شخصی اشنا شدم. و چه بر او گذشت مرا متاثر کرد. بنابر این نمیتوان تاریخ را از دید دو سه چند نفر اموخت...از تمام این جستجو نتیجه گرفتم که اگر ایران تنی چند همانند دکتر مصدق های دلسوز را داشت این بلاها بر سرش نمیامد. او معنی وطن دوستی را میدانست. روح بزرگش شاد و همانکه لایق است در تاریخ به بزرگی از یاد شود. چونکه انسان والائی بود.
امروز، بايد بينديشيم كه چه نتيجههايى از اشتباههاى گذشته براى دورى کردن از تكرار آنها و تصحيح راه آينده مىتوان به دست آورد. استبداد و دیکتاتوری و خودرايى و بى توجهى به خرد مردم و نبود آزادى ، نادیده گرفتن حقوق مدنى و سياسى و غیره... به بر پا كردن حكومتی -( چون پادشاهى و اخوندی )، انجاميد. يعنى حكومت غير انتخابى و ثابت، که ان هم امتحان خود را پس داده و كشور را به لبه پرتگاه فنا كشانده است. امروز و فردای ایندگان ایران که بتوانند راه نجاتی از این تنگنای دشواری را که گذشتگان ان را بر ایران و این نسل به ارث گذاشته اند بیش از پیش مورد اهمیت قرار دارد. از گذشته باید اموخت و نباید از ان فرار کرد و یا انرا نادیده گرفت. تاریخ نگهبان گذرگاه است و وظیفه ما داشتن اگاهی از تاریخ.
کتاب و مصاحبه دکتر ایروند ابراهمیانNoosh Afarin
Sun Aug 16, 2009 03:10 PM PDT
Iran Between Two Revolutions By Ervand Abrahamian
Thank you all for yourby vildemose on Sun Aug 16, 2009 03:10 PM PDT
Thank you all for your contribution in such a courteous and delicious way, yes, **delicious**....lol
Nosh Afrin: Salute!
Ali P: Not to mention thatby vildemose on Sun Aug 16, 2009 03:07 PM PDT
Ali P: Not to mention that USSR invaded Afghnistan and for a while Afghanistan, a Sunni enclave of religious zealots had a Communist government.
Sun Aug 16, 2009 05:30 PM PDT
من بسیار خوشحالم که در دوره ای و کشوری زندگی میکنم كه آزادى برخوردهاى انديشه را داريم (بدون ترس از دولت)، و باز خوشحالم براى داشتن امكان بحث مسائل مورد توجمان ،كه بتوانيم درباره مسايلى كه امكان بحث آن را چه در نظام پادشاهى گذشته و چه در نظام ملایان نداريم و نداشتيم، آزادانه بتوانيم بگوييم و بنويسيم.
من بسیار حساس نسبت به انتخاب کلمه در مورد بیان نظریات افراد هستم. متاسفانه استفاده از روش هیجانات منفی که در نوشته شما اشکاراً بار توهین و کوچک شمردن، و بی احترامی را همراه دارد، مورد قبول من نیست. در نتیجه؛ اگر قصد شما شینده شدن بود، شنیده شده اید.
به هیچ وجه قصد جسارت به توان و اگاهی شما را در زبان انگلیسی ندارم،, فقط خواستم توضیح داده باشم که کلمه ( Masterpiece ) برای تهیه گزارش تاریخی استفاده نمیشود.
vildemoseby benross on Sun Aug 16, 2009 03:05 PM PDT
thanks for the credibility you gave me and I don't deserve. Afshin has a more intellectual distance to further study this matter if he could.
however, as any other intellectual and 'impartial' study of this issue, I suspect that the capability of Toodé party in taking the power in a Muslim country will be questioned because an impartial thinker can not possibly place himself or herself in the mind set of an Iranian communist. For that, it may help to study the actions of Toodé party during and after the Islamic revolution... which actually led me to question my beliefs and current conclusion.
Afshin, Oktaby, Benross & Sassanby Kaveh Parsa on Sun Aug 16, 2009 03:22 PM PDT
Thank you for your informative and balanced discussion.
Very refershing to see on IC.
Thank you Gentlmen...by Ali P. on Sun Aug 16, 2009 02:23 PM PDT
for such an unemotional discussion about 1953. The lack of namecalling is truely commendable (What kind of Iranians are you guys??). I am following this tread with much interest.
I, respectfully, have a question for Sassan:
The power and influence of Tudeh party and the communists, a possible invasion of USSR and a subsequent set up of a communist government in Iran at the time, is subject to much debate. The fear of communisn certainly existed; It's just that some claim the fear in the public arena was real and substansiated, and some call it overestimated and hyped.
The Big brother invaded Hungry (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968) later on , and an ocean of Godfearing, religious people did not stop the installation of a communist regime, next door, in Afghanistan, in 1978.
What should make us think it would not have happened in Iran, in 1953, had the coup not taken place?
P.S. "The Forensics of a Defeat"(in Persian), by Ali Mirfetrous also offers a fresh perspective.
re: Iran Between Two Revolutionsby Afshin_Afshar on Sun Aug 16, 2009 02:06 PM PDT
You just made me spend $30 on amazon for a used copy of the book! :-)
I checked it out and it sounded interesting so I ordered a copy. Thanks for the recommendation.
Now off to a nice hike in the woods :-)
Iran Between Twoby vildemose on Sun Aug 16, 2009 01:41 PM PDT
Iran Between Two Revolutions (Princeton Studies on the Near East) (Paperback)
A foundational text for any social scientist focusing on Iran,
Dear Afshin: I hope someday you do find the means. You certainly have all the ingredients of an analytical thinker and that's all you need.
re: Afshin and Benross: Whatby Afshin_Afshar on Sun Aug 16, 2009 01:19 PM PDT
Technically speaking, the answer is experience and resources. I can not speak for benross, but I do not feel that I have the means and the experience to take on a project like that and do a good job of it.
re: Afshin by Sassanby Afshin_Afshar on Sun Aug 16, 2009 01:14 PM PDT
I am not sure with what part of my point (fact) #4 you disagree. It is a documented fact that the English government tried to convince Truman administration to go long with the coup, that did not work. So they tried again with Eisenhower when he was elected as president.
Again, these are all documented facts. You and anyone who is interested can access these documents with a bit of time and effort.
I happen to agree with your point about "convincing the public"; however, convincing Eisenhower administration and convincing the Iranian public are not necessarily contradicting points. After Eisenhower was convinced, CIA took on the task of turning the people against Mossadegh.
Afshinby Sassan on Sun Aug 16, 2009 12:09 PM PDT
Your 4th point, that the "The CIA overthrew Mossadegh after England convinced the US that Mossadegh was leading Iran to communism." is way off and simplistic.
The threat of communism in Iran was completely hyped and a pretext to carrying out the coup -- just as WMDs were the pretext for going into Iraq to secure its oil reserves. Don't get me wrong, the Tudeh was very aggressive and organized back then, but Iran, a thoroughly Shiite, god-fearing country was never going to go under the Soviet umberella. The British knew this -- as they know Iran very well (unlike the Americans).
As such, they used the "communist" threat not so much to convince the CIA or Eisenhower (the White House and the CIA needs no convincing to further the national interests of the oil establishment), but rather, they used the "communist" threat to convince the public, just as they used the WMD threat to fool the public (while all along the CIA and the White House presumably knew better).
Of course it's not just a nationalization issue, it's also ensuring safe transport of the oil through the Persian Gulf, and ensuring no other rival state gets a foothold into the all-important oil fields (ex: China in today's geo-political maneuverings vis-a-vis Iraq).
I urge all to read Cyrus Ghani's "Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah," and Ervand Abrahimian's massive and brilliant undertaking, "Iran Between Two Revolutions." The works of American or European journalists should never be the Bible nor reference point (in my view) when discussing Iran and its history. Sadly, journalists, whether it be from the New York Times or the Washington Times, always either promote a leftist or right agenda. And the end result is all too often very simplistic and biased.
Afshin and Benross: Whatby vildemose on Sun Aug 16, 2009 11:53 AM PDT
Afshin and Benross: What makes Mr. Kinser more qualified than the two of you? His degree in Journalism?? What makes him more qualified than you and Benross?
re: Why don't people such asby Afshin_Afshar on Sun Aug 16, 2009 11:26 AM PDT
I barely qualify as a commentator on these blogs, but thanks for your confidence nonetheless :-)
Seriously though, aren't we all potential authors in our own rights? We all read a fair amount about topics that interest us, and we all form our own opinions based on our readings and life experiences, so what is more intellectually full filling than sharing those thoughts, in a civil way, with like minded people?
Why don't people such asby vildemose on Sun Aug 16, 2009 11:19 AM PDT
Why don't people such as Benross and Afshin agha don't write your own books about Mossadegh?? We need more perspective and analysis from Iranians rather than Kinser who is not really a historian but a journalist.
re: Afshinby Afshin_Afshar on Sun Aug 16, 2009 10:59 AM PDT
I agree with your analysis with one modification. I would not agree with “Mossadegh didn't have the intellect”. To the contrary he was an amazingly brilliant man (a judgment call on my part), but on the other hand the evidence strongly suggest that, as you put it, he did not have the “organizational skills” to lead the country towards true democracy. Toodeh party was very organized and enjoyed great deal of influence. It is very possible that Iran may have joined the Soviet Satellite countries in one way or another.
Having said that, we never know what would have happened if the country was given a chance to see this through on its own.
56 years later, we know how the other option (US interference in 1953) worked for Iran and Iranians. Just take a look and see who is ruling the country.
As one of my main principles I believe in the policy of non-interference. No country has the right to interfere with another’s internal affairs. Of course this is not how the world works.
There is a lot to be learned from 1953, but unfortunately because Iranians are so polarized in their views on the subject, an unbiased conversation is rarely possible.
re: One nuance that is well reflectedby Afshin_Afshar on Sun Aug 16, 2009 10:40 AM PDT
A very significant yet overlooked point in all of this is (quoting oktaby): "Shah was a man that grew into his throne over the years"
The Shah was only 34 years old in 1953. Mossadegh on the other hand was 70.
I encourage all the readers who have already celebrated their 34+ birthdays to do an honest soul searching and try to think of the names of all the 70+ year-olds that they personally know and see where they stand on political and social issues.
My point is that sadly for Iran there was very little chance that these two persons would see eye to eye and agree on what needed to be done for the better of the country. There was very little chance that Mossadegh would take the young king seriously, and there was equally little chance that the young king would concede many points to the stubborn old prime minister.
Afshinby benross on Sun Aug 16, 2009 10:38 AM PDT
I fully support your recommendations. However, just to avoid some misconceptions, I should clarify few things about my take on this issue:
Prior to 1979 and until about 1985 I was a communist. Not supporter of Toodé party, but a stalinist all the same. So I always thought of Mossadegh -and still do- as a true nationalist. I also agree that he would never have gone to bed with Toodé party. What I'm suggesting, and this is the knowledge I have from this side of the fence and not from the monarchic side, is that Toodé party could easily out smart Mossadegh, out power Mossadegh and take the power with a combination of civil unrest and military coup in no time. They were all geared and prepared and having almost the totality of the inteligencia at their disposal, they were heading toward a communist 'revolution' so to speak. Do not doubt about that.
What I'm suggesting is that Mossadegh didn't have the intellect, organizational skill or frankly any clout about what was about to come at him and he and his patriarcal and feodal culture was not a match to the modern thinking that Toodé party has developped for itself under Marx teachings, bringing it to the people with a strong stalinist approach which could make it very culturally attractive to the Iranian general public too... for taking the power of-course, not the aftermath, similar to the Islamic revolution.
One nuance that is well reflectedby oktaby on Sun Aug 16, 2009 10:17 AM PDT
in Kinzer's book is the significance of characters, strengths and flaws, that impact their decisions and destiny. Afshin correctly points out chronology of events and the strong emotional component of Mossadegh and Shah. Neither come out looking that great as astute politicians and each shows some strong and a few trivial character flaws that are material in the way they were impacted by events and/or made decisions. Truman was not about to cave in to the British manipulation while Eisenhower did. Mossadegh, while on a U.S. visit had the opportunity (according Kinzer) to keep America on his side or at least less anglo-centric. Looking at what was happening in America as it was establishing its dominance over the world helps put this in broader perspective in which Iran became a pawn. From a dometic perspective the best way to look at this beyond politics and emotion is to review Iran's finances that improved significantly on almost all fronts under Mossadegh and rather impressively given the shortness of his tenure. He proved to be a capable financier, manager and lawyer while his adherence to princples prevented him from taking the calculated steps on the personnel or negotiation front. Shah was a man than grew into his throne over the years and showed tremendous global vision and maturity in his last few years (my view not Kinzer's) but made some unforgivable missteps, including allowing deep penetration of many goups into various structurs of the power, building thousands of mosques that became mini HQs for forces that were leveraged to build the islamist extremism as a subset of building the 'Green belt' around Sovient Union, and of course, going along with 1973 oil Embargo to name a few. But those were decisions made in Iran's national interest (mosques were a concession and I'm still unclear to whom and why). Shah's larger than life ego was an Achille's heel comparable to Mossadegh's unbending adherence to principles in a political arena. I think questioning either's love of Iran is unsubstantiated and historically inaccurate. Together, they will have made Iran a great nation as it has the talent and capability to be. Individually, they created sparks of that greatness but succumbed to forces neither could manage alone. Individually, either will have (and did in their context) lead Iran forward to a reasonable global standing and standard of living, even if imperfect. None of these assertions, however, holds true for the islamic regime that from its unfortunate inception was not and is not of Iran or for Iran.
re: All The Shah's Menby Afshin_Afshar on Sun Aug 16, 2009 11:02 AM PDT
Dear Noosh Afarin,
Thank you for sharing this very interesting video. I read “All the Shah’s men” about three years ago and highly recommend it to all those who are interested in learning about the events of that period.
Having moved to the US as a teenager, my knowledge of the events that lead to the coup d’état of 1953 was build on various accounts by foreign authors. Over the years I supplemented that information with other accounts by various Iranian authors from far right to far left. Naturally I have formed my own opinions on the topic, but instead of sharing what I think, I encourage all Iranians, especially young Iranian-Americans, to educate themselves on the events of this period of our history.
Before you start reading, however, please keep these four facts in mind:
1) Mossadegh was a true Nationalist
2) Mossadegh was not a socialist or communist and was never in bed with them either
3) England saw Mossadegh as its biggest nemesis in the Middle-East at the time
4) The CIA overthrew Mossadegh after England convinced the US that Mossadegh was leading Iran to communism.
Read various point of views. Do not limit your readings to one side or the other, and try to draw your own conclusions after you have read a couple of different accounts.
This is a very emotional topic for all Iranians, especially those who lived a part of their adult lives in Iran prior to 1979. Everyone has an opinion, and everyone will quickly start foaming at the mouth pleading their case for or against Mossadegh.
Read for yourself and then make up your mind one way or the other.
Oh, and do add the Kinzer book to your list. It may have inaccuracies, but it is a significant book amongst the ones that have covered this topic.
Dear Sassan,by Maryam Hojjat on Sun Aug 16, 2009 04:10 AM PDT
thank you for clarifying & explaining what happened in that period in Iranian history. I had not had this detail info.
Payandeh Iran & Iranians
The cold warby benross on Sun Aug 16, 2009 04:08 AM PDT
I'm amazed how our most tragic historic event that led to so much other pains and perpetual hatred amongst political activists and general public, is still viewed in a gossiping perspective of he said she said.
US couldn't care less whether the oil is nationalized or privatized. England perhaps had some anger about loosing its imperial power. But for US, the one which actually took five million dollars out of its pocket and sent CIA to carry-out a coup, it was all about the cold war.
It was about oil too yes, but about oil NOT being in the hands of the soviet camp. A shore, the Persian golf shore, not being under control of the soviets. This is what it was all about. It is ridiculous thinking U.S concern was a democratic process in the governance of Iran. The young Shah would've loved to have a stable democracy in his country. If the patriarch Mossadegh was not so blinded by his own overrated importance, realizing that the Toodé party is right at his doorstep to do its own coup, then perhaps he could be smart enough -which wasn't- to cut a strategic deal with U.S in a peaceful way, saving a good chunk of democracy and freedom of expression, and let people, using their freedom, realize how the red reactionary and the black reactionary thinking is so dangerous and devastating... and not experimenting it the hard way.
Noosh Afarinby Sassan on Sun Aug 16, 2009 01:19 AM PDT
First of all, Kinzer's book is a hugely BIASED joke -- I caugt 7 errors of fact (names, dates) by the time I reached page 11. If you want detail and thorough analysis by a real "Iran expert" (and not some New York Times journalist with a huge liberal agenda), I suggest you go read Ervand Abrahimian's masterpiece, "Iran between two revolutions."
Secondly, your massively simplistic, completely artificial analysis of the coup events is patently pathetic. Mossadegh himself had destroyed democracy in Iran when he shut down parliment and ruled as a dictator. In reality, if you remove the idol-worshipping glasses, you'll realize that for many different reasons Mossadegh was nothing more than a glorified rabble-rouser.
Mostly, he was NAIVE beyond belief!
How could he think that America -- the bastion of greed and capitalism that is AMERICA!!! -- would help him against the British?! As we all know, when it comes to oil, their interests are very much alligned (Iraq is a perfect example).
And by the way, you're dead wrong -- the coup plans started in the fall of 1952 when Truman was still in the Whitte House. Even Truman had realized by then that they could not deal with Mossadegh.
More than anything, Iran was sooooooooo miserably weak back then. Only 6 years earlier, we had been invaded by 3 countries and occupied for 5 years! We were so utterly helpless! And it is so fucking ridiculous for this 73-year-old first time Prime Minister to think that Iran could dictate oil terms -- OIL TERMS!!! -- to the British (and their bulldog buddies, the Americans).
As a politician, Mossadegh was an utterly naive newbie, even though he was 73 years old!!! His cousins, Vosough-e-Dowle and Ahmad Khavam were far more skilled as politicians!
Back then, American oil executives were telling the State Department that they rather see Iran go communist than nationalize its oil -- because if Iran nationalized, the Americans feared Saudi Arabia would be next and then Venezuela. The oil domino theory.
Simply put, my rejection of Mossaegh-worshipping is not because I think he was a bad man -- hardly! I think he was a patriot, just like the Shah, but Mossadegh was way out of his league, so much so he was dangerous, to the point of being grossly reckless with the livelihood of a nation.
For the Iran of 1951 (only 6 years removed from occupation -- that's like Iraq of today waging an all out war against the US and a far stronger UK) -- for Iran back then to go up against these two superpowers is like a sick child going to war against 2 well-fed bullys!
And Mossadegh put Iran on this dangerous path. Sometimes when you're weak you have to accept your weakness and wait for another day to fight, when you're stronger, to increase your chances for victory.
Even in 1979, the superpowers were not willing to allow Iran a measure of oil independence, which is exactly why they supported Khomeini against the Shah, who had naively announced in public that in 1978 he would not extend the oil contracts with the big oil companies.
In the end, the Shah had not learned the lesson of 1953, or perhaps he thought he could rely on the newly created Iranian middle-class as a bulwark against any coups or revolutions. That mode of thinking also turned out to be predictably naive.
Back in 1952, when the British finally relented and offered Iran the same 50/50 deal that the Americans had given the Saudis, we should have taken it -- we were not going to get any better deals -- and we didn't!
This tragic episode of August, 1953 was still part and parcel of the "great game" played by the superpowers against Iran's national rights for nearly a century, but I'm afraid that was our lot in life back then. And sadly, we should have taken the 50/50 deal, because when Mossadegh expelled the British, it set in motions some very dark forces and plans -- plans which the Shah did not want to be a part of, which is why he left the country. And in fact, one can make the argument that the coup hurt the Pahlavi Dynasty far more than it hurt Mossadegh.
After 28 Mordad, the Shah was regarded as an illigitimate leader in the eyes of many, and this stain of illigitimacy opened the door perfectly for the evil mullahs, who blasted their way through. If Mossadegh had not been so utterly naive and so unreasonable (and more politically savvy), then perhaps the coup would not have happened in 1953, and most likely, the black revolution would not have happened in 1979.