Enduring America reports that scientists have confirmed that Assad used chemical weapons in a recent attack on Homs civilians. Further confirmation comes from a defecting Syrian general who was directly involved in the incident.
What a blunder! What did he gain militarily in the above case? Zero. It can only be explained by the theory that Assad puts all faith in the power of intimidation. Events in Syria over the past tow years show that---while intimidation works up to a point--once people have been pushed too much it loses its power to frighten and becomes instead a prime driver of rebellion.
For the report on chemical weapons and my analysis of potential repercussions (all unfavorable to Assad) see the followin article and my subpost.
http://www.enduringamerica.com/home/2013/1/16/syria-feature-us-finds-assad-forces-probably-used-chemical-w.html
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FG
ReportMAJOR NEW SANCTIONS WILL COME INTO EFFECT ON FEBRUARY 8th
Ruling mullahs could be deprived of most remaining oil revenues, as the Christian Science Monitor explains (excerpt below). One thing I'd look for is a major impact on the rial which the regime can hardly afford and that may start even as the effective date nears. A second interesting question is how it will affect planned elections. I'd like to hear from readers on both matters.
EXCERPTS:
The aim of Washington’s February sanctions measure is for Tehran’s oil revenues to become largely “shackled” within any country buying oil from Iran, undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence David Cohen declared at a conference in Washington last month.
This means Iran’s international oil customers – EVEN THOSE WITH STATE DEPARTMENT WAVERS-- exempting them from US Treasury penalties for purchasing Iranian oil – will officially be at risk of being cut off from the US banking system if they allow transfers of Iran’s oil revenues back to Tehran’s Central Bank.
If implemented, the National Iranian Oil Company would be formally forced to keep its oil revenues in local bank accounts inside countries purchasing its oil, and could only use those oil earnings to purchase "permissible" services and goods, such as food, medicine, and basic medical equipment, from those oil customers as imports back into the Islamic Republic.
ALSO WORTH THINKING ABOUT
First, will the regime back down and cry "uncle" and can Khamenei (known for stubbornness in sticking to bad decisions) afford to do so?
Secondly, assuming Khamenei sticks to his guns and further economic crises follow, he could be faced with having to decide between two unpalatable and risky choices regarding the upcoming presidential elections: Can he risk holding them in an explosive context? Can he risk postponing or canceling them?
Finally, I wrote quite some time ago that its possible Khamenei could be hit by a double whammy about the time elections arise--extreme economic problems aggravated further by sanctions and Assad's fall. It's possible, though not certain, the latter could fall by election time. If not, his predicament will have worsened substantially.
Meanwhile, as many would suspected Omaba is soft-pedaling the effect of the cable on his "red line" threats. Though I voted for Obama and despise the extremist Republicans (including their hard line foreign policy) I wouldn't mind if they held an investigation to call him into account on this one.
In Obama's defense, I believe economic constraints caused by a GOP-caused recession and all related deficits have combined with the consequences of GOP choices in going to war in Iraq and Afghanistan to tie his hands.
FG
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FG
ReportWHY DID INIMIDATION SUCCEED (FOR NOW) IN IRAN BUT FAIL IN SYRIA?
One of many traits shared by Khamenei and Assad is the assumption that intimidation can always be effective in keeping people down. Most likely, Khamenei is more convinced of that than ever, given his success in 2009. That's important because it suggests he will respond with more of the same--as much as necessary--should the present volcano explode. This time, as in Syria, it is unlikely to work.
WHY INTIMIDATION COULD BE EFFECTIVE IN 2009
Like Tianneman Swuare, the base of protest was too narrow (confined mainly to the middle class). .
A key assumption was totally naïve--that because Gandhi-style tactics worked against the Brits (whose leaders had internatized ideas about rights) the same tactics would be equally effective against dictators like Stalin, Assad, Hitler, Khamenei) was simply naïve.
In 2009 the regime could rely on most rural people, the working class and the religiously devout. Most were then capable of believe the regime's claims of a fair election and that foreigners inspired the protests.
THE SAME TACTICS MAY NOT WORK NEXT TIME
Khamenei may have destroyed the middle class by driving it into poverty (and thereby damaging the economy further) but its former members are vastly more hostile to the regime than three years ago.
Most of the working class no longer trusts the regime to handle the economy and sees IRCG generals and ruling clerics as corrupt and thieving. This group is less likely to put up with Gandhi style nonsenses when Khamenei's clubs and snipers start doing their thing.
The regime's display of "no limits" ruthlessness has alienated many religious folk who once thought the clergy (and Khamenei--could do no wrong. Now they know better. One problem is using intimidation tactics is that they require widespread public knowledge if they are to intimidate.
How many people who believed the regime's election lies in 2009 now believe the protestors were correct. It has become obvious that a regime capable of so much horrific and open crimes would hardly hesitate at rigging an election.
KHAMENEI & ASSAD DISILLUSIONED THEIR SUBJECTS IN THE SAME WAY
When both crisis started people still believe it was possible to appeal to them for justice. Now the idea is laughable.
When troubles first erupted in Syria, demonstrators appealed to Assad for relief because it was still possible to believe he was a Good Guy Surrounded by Evil Advisors. Who believes that now?
When protests broke out after the rigged election of 2009, many appealed to Khamenei for justice, blaming Ahmadinejad, the Basilj and IRCG for rigging the election. Now they know better. The Man Who RIgged the Election is the same man who dispatch snipers and clubs wielders against them, tortured and arrested many and targeted their families, funerals and homes to bool: His Holiiness, Mr. Morality, the Supreme Moral Exemplar..
Thus in 2009, the Iranian people blamed Ahmadinejad, the Basilj, the IRCG and the Interior Ministry for stealing the election and appealed (ironically) to the man responsible for it all. His Assad-like response van