To read the original, please visit www.readingtehran.com
As Israeli troops are closing in on the ruins of Gaza City, it is imperative to put the current conflict into context. This war did not start just after Christmas Eve, and despite all talk of Hamas launching of home-made projectiles being the main cause of the Israeli onslaught, that is not the case. Since the fall of Saddam Hussein, a Cold War over the structure of the regional order is being fought between what mainstream analysts like to frame within a sectarian context; i.e. Sunni vs. Shi’a. The emergence of this Cold War has nothing to do with reinvented ideas of primordial rivalry — to this day no major conventional sectarian battle between national armies have been fought, and the two sects are theologically far closer than Catholicism vis-a-vis Protestantism.
Rather, it has to do with that in three years, the Americans managed to eradicate the only conventional threats post-revolutionary Iran has faced – Saddam’s Republican Guard and the Taliban – thus leaving a power vacuum naturally filled by an unnaturally isolated force. It is no coincidence that President-turned-Monarch Mubarak publically accused Iraqi Shi’as of being more loyal to Iran than the Arab World just around the time King Abdullah of Jordan coined the term “Shi’a Crescent”. The essence of the brewing Cold War in the Middle East, portrayed as between the Shi’a Crescent (stretching from Tehran to Beirut via Baghdad and Damascus) and the Sunni ‘moderate’ states of Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, thus lies in a fundamental struggle over the post-Saddam regional order. Under these circumstances, Israel is seen as the lesser of two evils in the eyes of the so-called ‘moderate’ Arab regimes, thus resulting in cooperation that otherwise would not exist.
As Seymour Hersh wisely points out in ‘The Redirection’, published in the New Yorker, supposedly ’sectarian’ violence is essentially proxy wars fuelled by the two blocs struggling for hegemony. In Lebanon, Saudi money and CIA operatives ferment the growth of Salafi Islamism in the north of the country, while the Bush administration strongly backed the former pro-Western Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. In this context, the 2006 war between Iran-supported Hezbollah and Israel was essentially a battle over the political order in Lebanon, and by extension the region. Remember that Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt were quick to condemn Hezbollah in the initial stages of the conflict, before reverting their positions as Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah’s soldiers turned out to be the first and only Arab army capable of withstanding Israeli military superiority. Putting up a fight with the IDF without being obliterated is a military victory in the 21st century.
The same type of proxy battle, although with a local twist, is currently being fought in Gaza. According to investigative reporter David Rose, talking points left by a State Department envoy “urged Abbas to dissolve the Hamas-led government if Hamas refused to recognize Israel’s right to exist, promising that the U.S. and its Arab allies would strengthen Fatah’s military forces to deal with the likely backlash from Hamas.” These exact talking points formed the basis for talks between State Department official Jake Walles and Palestinian ‘President’ Mahmoud Abbas in late 2006. Explaining things further in an interview in Vanity Fair, Rose essentially argues that the Fatah-Hamas split was more or less engineered by the U.S. State Department roughly 3 months after Israeli bombs sought to split and maim Lebanon.
Israel is very aware of Hamas’ relationship with Iran and Syria. In the West Bank, primarily Fatah supporters use the term ‘Shi’a’ derogatory in reference to Hamas-supporters, on account of its links with Tehran. Iranian policy towards the Palestinian issue has consistently been that it is first and foremost exactly that – a Palestinian issue. On a second level, it is assumed in Tehran that it is an ‘Arab’ issue, and on a third level, an ‘Islamic’ issue. This has consistently been Tehran’s position from Ayatollah Khomeini, to Reformist ex-President Khatami, to President Ahmadinejad. Despite calls for Israel’s destruction, Ahmadinejad and Khatami alike have both publically expressed that Iran will accept whatever the Palestinians agree to with the Israelis.
For all the talk of weapons smuggling to Gaza, the main Iranian clout in Palestine lies in Damascus, where its Syrian ally provides space for the exiled Hamas leadership to survive, and not in Palestine itself. This is well understood by Israel. Hence, when local Hamas leaders like Abu Hashem and Bardawil call for an immediate ceasefire, thus questioning Damascus-based Hamas leader Meshaal’s insistence on issuing statements calling for battle until death in front of Egyptian Intelligence Chief Omar Suleiman, it is evident that the Israeli’s aim with this operation is to drive a wedge within Hamas so as to weaken the influence of the exiled leadership, and therefore Iran and Syria. Remember that Ali Larijani and Saeed Jalili – the previous and current Iranian nuclear negotiator respectively – visited Damascus not long after hostilities broke out. The goal of the Gaza operation was never ‘regime change’.
Knowing that the declining Fatah is unable to negotiate any peace settlement on behalf of the Palestinian people, it seems as if the preferred option of Israel and US-Allied Arab regimes is to coax segments of Hamas into the mainstream. In this formula, America’s Arab Allies and Israel are waging their bets on a split between Hamas leadership in Gaza and in Damascus, on a far wider scale than it has so far. The consequence of the Gaza war in this regard is far more important than who is talking to whom in Cairo right now. If Damascus-based Hamas chief Meshaal’s authority remains intact, Iran will yet again have displayed an ability to increase its influence for a very cheap price. Needless to say, a scenario where Tehran will be able to display the Palestinian card in its hands for the first time, will significantly reduce the likelihood of the Obama administration being able to get Tehran to acquiesce to American designs for the region’s political order. Nevertheless, dividing Hamas enough to deflect Iranian influence in Palestine will not push back Tehran’s position very much –- after all, Iran still got the Lebanese, Afghan, and Iraqi cards in her hands. Ignoring the national in favor of a regional context, the Gaza war sadly seems like the second unnecessary conflict fought by Israel in three years without any positive outcome for Tel Aviv. Hopefully, that will be something Israeli voters will ponder when they go to the polls next month.
Mohammad Ali Shabani is Iranian-born, brought up in Sweden, and educated in the United Kingdom. Holding a Bachelors degree in International Relations, and a Masters degree in Middle East Politics from the University of London School of Oriental & African Studies, his consistent focus has been Iran in the World. Moreover, he has conducted research at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the University of Tehran Institute of North American & European Studies, and the Al-Ahram Center for Strategic & Political Studies.
