How long Iran’s disarray will persist is unclear — certainly weeks, probably months, perhaps longer. It is possible that Khamenei, come the fall, may see in outreach to the United States a means to regain support in a country where whoever delivers normalization with Washington will be a popular hero. It is possible that Ahmadinejad will bring moderates into his government, to be formed in August, with a similar conciliatory aim. One key indicator will be whether he keeps Saeed Jalili, described to me as a chief architect of the clampdown, as his nuclear negotiator. If he does, talks are probably a waste of time. It is even a remote possibility that Ahmadinejad will be removed in the name of reconciliation. But one thing is certain: Iran’s upheaval has made Obama’s already ambitious goal of engagement far more arduous, and it reinforced the darkest views of Iran’s true nuclear ambitions, even as it chews up limited time. Normalization with Iran is a heady idea, comparable to the China breakthrough of 1972. It would create a far less dangerous world. The history-making idea captivated Obama, and it lingers still. Engagement remains on the table, and its unsettling effect on Iran’s domestic politics seem likely to endure. But since June 12, prospects of a U.S.-Iranian rapprochement have darkened. >>>
