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Failing To Find Peace
25-Jan-2012
Excerpted from Trita Parsi's A Single Roll of the Dice: Obama's Diplomacy with Iran (Yale University press). Parsi, a Middle East foreign policy expert with extensive Capitol Hill and United Nations experience, interviewed 70 high-ranking officials from the U.S., Iran, Europe, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Brazil—including the top American and Iranian negotiators—for this book. Parsi uncovers the previously unknown story of American and Iranian negotiations during Obama's early years as president, the calculations behind the two nations' dealings, and the real reasons for their current stalemate.
The 30-year-old U.S.-Iran enmity is no longer a phenomenon; it is an institution. For three decades, politicians and bureaucrats in both countries have made careers out of demonizing each other. Firebrands in Iran have won political points by adding an ideological dimension to an already rooted animosity. Shrewd politicians, in turn, have shamelessly used ideology to advance their political objectives. Neighboring states in the Persian Gulf and beyond have taken advantage of this estrangement, often kindling the flames of division.
Israel and some of its supporters in the United States, in particular, have feared that a thaw in U.S. relations with Iran would come at the expense of America's special friendship with the Jewish state.
But the strategic cost to the United States and Iran of this prolonged feud has been staggering. Harming both and benefiting neither, the U.S.-Iran estrangement has complicated Washington's efforts to advance the peace process between the Israelis and Palestinians in the 1990s, win the struggle against al-Qaeda, or defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan and the insurgency in Iraq. Still, the strategic cost of this enmity has oftentimes been dwarfed by the domestic political cost to overcome it. In Washington, the political cost for attempting to resolve tensions with Iran has simply been too great and the political space too narrow to justify starting down a fraught and uncertain path to peace with Iran. Political divisions, in turn, have paralyzed Tehran at key intervals, with vying political factions not wishing to see their competitors define the outcome of a U.S.-Iran rapprochement or get credit for reducing tensions.
The hostility has been institutionalized because either too many forces on both sides calculate that they can better advance their own narrow interests by retaining the status quo, or the predictability of enmity is preferred to the unpredictability of peace making. Thus, over the years, this antipathy has survived -- and hardened -- because the cost of maintaining the status quo has not outweighed the risk of seeking peace -- until 2008, that is.
With the election of Barack Obama, the stars aligned for a radical shift in U.S.-Iran relations. Tensions between the United States and Iran had risen dramatically during the Bush administration, putting the two countries on the verge of war. While the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and the occupation of Iraq put American troops on Iran's eastern and western borders, respectively, the defeat of the Taliban and the end of Saddam Hussein's reign also removed two of Iran's key regional rivals from the strategic chessboard. Freed from the burden of its long-standing enemies, Iran was now a fast-ascending power that astutely took advantage of America's inability to win the peace in the Middle East. At the same time, Iran's advancing nuclear program added more fuel to the fire. Increasingly, Iran's rise, combined with America's painful predicament in the region, rendered a continuation of the U.S.-Iran rift too costly. Iran and the United States were gravitating toward a confrontation that neither could afford.
Meanwhile, the American public had turned against not only president George W. Bush's invasion of Afghanistan and occupation of Iraq, but also the ideological foundation of Bush's worldview. Previously, Beltway hawks maintained that negotiations and compromise were not mere tools of diplomacy, but rather rewards that should be granted only to states that deserved an opportunity to talk to the United States. Inspired by this philosophy, Bush refused to engage with Iran during his entire presidency, even on issues of such importance as Iraq and Afghanistan (with the exception of episodic instances of brief diplomatic outreach for tactical purposes). Moreover, the neoconservative philosophy, viewing the United States as the source of legitimacy at home and abroad, dictated that talking to the autocratic rulers in Tehran would help legitimize Iran's theocratic and repressive government. But while refusing engagement with Iran upheld a sense of ideological purity for the Bush White House, it did nothing to address the growing challenge that Iran posed to the United States in the region. During the Bush presidency, Iran amassed more than 8,000 centrifuges for its nuclear program while expanding its influence in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon.
This reality was widely acknowledged in the United States toward the end of the Bush administration. In March 2006 Congress appointed a bipartisan Iraq Study Group to assess the Iraq war and to make policy recommendations. One of the group's key endorsements was direct U.S. dialogue with Iran over Iraq and the situation in the Middle East--a stark refutation of the Bush White House ideology. And in September 2008, only two months before the U.S. presidential elections, five former secretaries of state -- Madeleine Albright, Colin Powell, Warren Christopher, Henry A. Kissinger, and James A. Baker III -- called on the United States to talk to Iran.
Then-Senator Obama recognized that unprecedented political space had emerged for new foreign policy thinking. So rather than shying away from the issue of diplomacy with Iran, Obama took the unusual step of making engagement with U.S. adversaries a central part of his foreign policy platform during the 2008 presidential election--something that, under normal circumstances in Washington, would have been considered political suicide. In the televised presidential debates, Obama boldly declared that it was "critical" that we "talk to the Syrians and the Iranians," and that those saying that the United States "shouldn't be talking to them ignore our own history."
Finally, the persona of Barack Obama himself was an important factor. He was a most unlikely candidate--and the most difficult one for the Iranian leadership to dismiss or vilify. Born to a Kenyan Muslim father and a American Midwestern mother, Obama spent most of his childhood in Hawaii and, later, in Indonesia, after his mother was remarried to an Indonesian. Having been exposed to both the Muslim and Christian religions, having grown up in a Third World country shortly after it had won its independence from colonial powers, and having the middle name Hussein--the name of one of the most revered figures in Shia tradition--Obama simply did not fit the Iranian stereotype of American, "imperialist" leaders--arrogant, ignorant, and incapable of empathizing with the grievances of Third World states against Western powers.
Clearly, Obama recognized the historic opportunity that lay before him. Only twelve and a half minutes into his presidency, he sought to seize it by extending America's hand of friendship in the hope that Iran would unclench its fist.
A year and a half into his presidency, President Barack Obama was celebrating not the diplomatic victory he had been seeking, but rather the imposition of sanctions he had hoped to avoid. Despite extensive outreach, clear strategic benefits, and an unprecedented opportunity for engagement, Obama found himself stuck in the same confrontational relationship with Iran as that of other American presidents before him. And, as many officials in his administration had suspected, while sanctions might have been politically imperative from a domestic standpoint and could make life more difficult for the Iranians, they were not a solution to the standoff with Iran. "While Iran's leaders are feeling the pressure, the sanctions have not yet produced a change in Iran's strategic thinking about its nuclear program," Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control Robert Einhorn told an audience at the Arms Control Association in Washington, D.C., on March 9, 2011. Instead, under Obama's watch, the cycle of escalation and counterescalation continued with no sign of a solution in the offing.
While most of Obama's domestic critics opposed his pursuit of diplomacy on the grounds that talking with Iran was useless and morally questionable, a few voices also disapproved of his engagement policy as being insincere and aimed only at paving the way for sanctions. Neither criticism is well grounded. Diplomacy was not only a strategic necessity, but also the least costly avenue to address the tensions with Iran. And rather than being a well-designed conspiracy, the president's vision for diplomacy was genuine, as was his initial outreach. But faced with overwhelming resistance from Israel, Congress, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab allies, skeptics within his own administration and, most importantly, the actions of the Iranian government itself, the president's vision and political space were continually compromised. In the end, the diplomacy Obama pursued was only a shadow of the engagement he had envisioned.
Obama's vision for engagement met stiff resistance from the outset. The Iranians themselves, however, dealt the biggest blow to Obama. The election fraud and ensuing human rights violations strengthened the arguments of Obama's domestic critics and made the administration all the more reluctant to defend its engagement policy. These events also bolstered the critics of engagement within the administration who viewed the election fallout as vindication of their skepticism.
"You have the rigged elections of June 2009. Then the protests. And then, in a way, the moment was lost," David Miliband, then-foreign secretary of the United Kingdom, told me. The elections had a deep psychological impact on the administration. Though it stuck to its engagement policy and refused to come out in favor of the Green movement, its willingness to take bold steps on Iran essentially ended. Engagement started to become too risky and, with no immediate political benefits for the president domestically, the inclination was to revert to one's comfort zone. "When you don't know what's going on, and you don't feel like you have somebody you can communicate with on the other side of the table, you are going to revert back to what's safe," a State Department official explained. "And what's safe in the Iran context is demonization and just general negativity." By the time engagement finally could begin, in October 2009, Obama's room for maneuverability -- and his political will to fight for greater flexibility -- were almost nonexistent. He desperately needed a quick victory to create more time and space for diplomacy. But precisely because of his loss of maneuverability, he had little flexibility in negotiations and the discussions quickly turned into a "take-it-or-leave-it" proposition -- the very approach that was doomed to fail.
In Vienna, the Iranians dealt a second blow to Obama by refusing to accept the Russian-American swap proposal without any revisions. Though administration officials recognized that the primary reason for Iran's refusal was paralysis caused by political infighting at home, the impact was the same: Obama had nothing to show for his outreach. His own party was revolting against him in Congress on this issue; many in his administration felt uneasy about the portrayal of the White House as insensitive to the plight of Iranian pro-democracy protesters defying the Islamic Republic's repression; and the Israeli government was reportedly turning to high-level Democratic donors to exert additional pressure on Obama to forsake diplomacy in order to save the Democratic Party in the upcoming midterm elections. Moreover, Iran's continued political paralysis made the potential for additional diplomacy unclear at best. Once the decision was made to activate the sanctions track, diplomacy had disappeared in all but name. That first became evident when Washington informed Tokyo that its efforts to mediate a solution were no longer welcome, and occurred again when Brazil and Turkey's successful bid to convince Tehran to agree to the Obama administration's terms for the fuel swap was brusquely rejected. Obama's open hand had turned into a clenched fist.
Throughout this period, despite the Iranian recognition of Obama's political dilemma at home, a combination of factors caused Tehran to refrain from helping create more space for engagement. On the one hand, doubts about Obama's intentions and abilities made an already risk-averse leadership in Tehran more disinclined to take a gamble for peace. "I don't think the Iranians quite knew what to make about the American outreach," Miliband said. "I think that it was such a change for them, that they didn't quite know how to handle it."
Even if the Iranians maintained the assumption that Obama genuinely wished to resolve the tensions between the two countries, they still doubted his ability to break with long-standing American policies on Iran in order to confront the forces of the status quo in Washington and beyond. Investing in an American president whose intentions and abilities were questionable was a tough sell in Tehran. The hard-line Iranian newspaper Kayhan called Obama "impotent" and asked rhetorically, "Who is wearing the trousers within the U.S. political hierarchy?" Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's insistence that Washington offer signs of real strategic change rather than just a change in tone was partly aimed at testing Obama's intentions and abilities for this very purpose. When I challenged one of Iran's nuclear negotiators on the Islamic Republic's deep skepticism of Obama and the unique opportunities Tehran risked missing as a result, the official was unapologetic. "The U.S. should resolve its domestic political issues itself," he said. As time passed and Tehran increasingly perceived Obama as "no different from Bush in action," Iran's attitude hardened and the absence of action to help Obama turned into a desire to see him fail. Obama's opposition to war, it was said, was due not to a desire for peace but rather to America's lack of capability for war as a result of its engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan.
According to a former Iranian diplomat who maintains close contact with the leadership in Tehran, the Iranians still "regarded U.S. engagement as another means to get Iran to surrender." And after the failure in Vienna, where the Iranians concluded that accepting the fuel swap would not end the demand for Iran to suspend its enrichment activities, the Iranian takeaway message was that America's position on Iran had not changed much.
"What had been a precondition under Bush -- the suspension of enrichment -- had become a postcondition under Obama," said Mohammad Khazaee, Iran's ambassador to the UN. But rather than engaging in deliberate deception, the Obama administration simply had not settled on a desired endgame with Iran, on the nuclear issue or otherwise. For the Obama White House, the destination of diplomacy was simply a function of the journey. Still, the lack of clarity on the endgame was not just a point of criticism by Iran or by the president's domestic opponents. Even senior Obama administration officials were unclear on the strategy and the endgame, as evidenced by the leaked three-page memo, signed by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, that warned of the
U.S. lack of a coherent, long-term plan to deal with Iran's steady progress toward a nuclear capability. The memo came to light in April 2010 but was penned in January of that year -- just as the U.S. was embarking on the sanctions track.
There is the question of whether the Iranian government actually desires a deal with the United States. A common school of thought in Washington states that enmity with America -- the "Great Satan" -- is one of the uncompromising pillars of the Islamic Republic. As a result, Tehran cannot come to terms with Washington without risking an internal identity and legitimacy crisis. The state ideology of the regime requires enmity with the U.S., and without it the internal contradictions of the Islamic Republic would reach a breaking point. Iran's periodic reluctance to engage with the U.S. is grounded in this ideological rigidity rather than in internal divisions in Iran, mistrust of the U.S., or disinterest in the specific deals the U.S. has put on the table. The main obstacle to a diplomatic breakthrough is not the manner of the diplomacy or its extent or lack thereof, or the specifics of the deal, but rather the regime's DNA.
The calculations of the Iranian hard-liners are, however, not so mysterious and incomprehensible that analysts have to resort to genetics to make sense of them. Part of the reluctance of hard-liners in Iran to negotiate with the U.S. has been rooted not necessarily in these ideological factors but in the fear that any relationship with the U.S. would force Iran to adopt policies in the region that are aligned with those of Washington and, to a certain extent, Israel. Iran would lose its independence and, much like Egypt after the Camp David agreement, its bid for leadership in the region. Moreover, by aligning with the U.S., Iran would be forced to invest in the survival of pro-American Arab dictatorships rather than pursuing policies that would win it soft power on the Arab street. Because the Iranian hard-liners have calculated that the Arab street will ultimately overthrow the monarchial and pro-American regimes in the region, Iran's long-term security would be best achieved by aligning itself with the populace. Consequently, agreeing to any engagement with Washington -- on its terms and designed to rehabilitate Iran as a compliant U.S. ally -- would contradict Iran's long-term security interests in the region.
Likely cementing the hard-liners' view of the U.S. as an increasingly irrelevant power incapable of adjusting to the new realities of the region are the continued decline of the U.S. in the Middle East, the Arab spring of 2011, and the downfall of the regimes in Egypt, Tunisia, and beyond. Any realization that an opportunity was lost with Obama in 2009 probably has yet to sink in. "What happened is clearly proving what our officials including Supreme Leader said," Soltanieh said. "The Americans come sometimes with the good words but in practice they might have a knife to [stick] in your back."
Iran's suspicions and mistrust, whether justified or not, were paralyzing. What the Iranians failed to appreciate was that Obama's ability to drive the policy and "wear the pants" within the U.S. government was partly a function of how willing Iran was to take the same risk for peace that it had grown accustomed to taking for a continuation of the long-standing "no-war, no-peace" stalemate. In retrospect, once George W. Bush took office in 2001 and adopted a confrontational approach to Iran, reformists in former president Mohammad Khatami's circle came to regret their failure to reciprocate President Bill Clinton's outreach. The unprecedented willingness of the Obama administration to reach out to Iran and embark on a cautious reconciliation process, even if inadequate, is unlikely to be re-created by any later U.S. administration for some time. Likewise, the opportunity Iran had with Obama in the first months of his presidency will likely not be fully appreciated by the decision makers in Tehran until much later.
Seeking to pin the failure on either side does not offer a better understanding of the complexity of the conflict. At times, both sides showed goodwill, but at other times both were overtaken by their suspicions and fears. Both sides miscalculated and made mistakes, and both sides felt that the other side was taking a smaller share of the risk for peacemaking. Both sides were interested at different times in some sort of a deal; the question was and remains whether they have been seeking the same deal. Only through sustained, persistent, and patient diplomacy can that question be answered.
Ultimately, the failure of diplomacy between the U.S. and Iran came down to insufficient political will and the atmosphere of mistrust that granted neither side any margin for error. The proposals put on the table may have been flawed; at different points either side may have played for time or sought to delay talks; and goodwill measures may not have been reciprocated. But these phenomena do not make U.S.-Iran talks unique; they are common features in almost all negotiations. Talks that succeed do not do so because the proposals are flawless and because both sides play fair. Rather, they succeed because the many flaws associated with the talks are overcome by the political will to reach a solution.
The will for a diplomatic solution must be strong enough to overcome every last hurdle. In the case of the U.S. and Iran, diplomacy was in effect abandoned at the first hurdle. And though the desire for diplomacy was genuine, the administration's lack of confidence in its chances of succeeding -- several high-level officials in the Obama administration told me separately that they did not believe diplomacy would work -- raises the question as to whether the White House would fully invest in a policy it believed would fail. Lack of political will also plagued the bureaucracy. After the June election in Iran, in particular, a combination of fear and "old think" -- sticking to old patterns because they were comfortable and less risky -- set in and helped reduce the will to see diplomacy through.
"People are just afraid of their own shadows," a senior State Department official said. "You propose something and people all scurry for cover. ... There is a collective inability to break the patterns of the past and the principles of the past. I mean, thirty years of doing something in a certain way is pretty powerful." This "collective inability," which is also present on the Iranian side but not necessarily for the same reasons, is what makes U.S.-Iranian tensions more than just an antagonistic relationship. It is an institutionalized enmity.
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| Bibi’s Three Steps Forward, One Back | 5 | Oct 13, 2012 |
| Mistaken Path | 18 | Jun 22, 2012 |
| Give Obama Elbow Room on Iran | 26 | Jun 15, 2012 |
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At the end of the day
by iraj khan on Fri Jan 27, 2012 08:29 AM PSTI prefer diplomacy to
as reported today in Iraq:
"Baghdad (CNN) -- A suicide car bomber targeted a Shiite funeral procession in the Iraqi capital Friday, killing 31 people and wounding 60 others, two police officials said.
The blast occurred as mourners passed by an outdoor market and headed toward a hospital in Baghdad's Zafarniya district to recover the bodies of three relatives shot the night before in the western part of the city, the officials said.
The police officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to release details to the media.
The bombing is the latest in a series of attacks in the nation that have killed more than 200 people this year. They occurred amid a political crisis raising fears of a return to the sectarian violence of last decade -- the Sunni-Shiite hostilities that engulfed Iraq at the height of the war."
One trillion dollars, hundreds of thousands gone,
destruction, etc.
//news.google.com/news/section?pz=1&cf=all&ned=us&topic=w&ar=1327681591
Dr. Mohandess aziz: char pari bedam ye dorsteh...
by Bavafa on Fri Jan 27, 2012 08:10 AM PSTAnd to refresh your memory, char pari is a quarter of a brick :)
Going to point that I was trying to make and seems to have been dismissed by you, was that one cannot blame a wrong act because of another wrong act,(i.e. if someone is driving erratically or without a license, you cannot go and T him with the intent to kill him just because he has done something wrong).
Also, as I had mentioned in my point, if we were going justify attacks on another nation solely based on belligerent talk from that nation, do you know how many nations would be justify to attack US? For how long has US tried to export its revolution and Capitalism to other nations? For how long has US designed and exported regime change in other nations? Would/should you justify at attack on US based on those criteria?
'Hambastegi' is the main key to victory
Mehrdad
Terita needs to interview
by vildemose on Fri Jan 27, 2012 07:47 AM PSTTerita needs to interview the ex-IRGC military commander:
Originally posted by FG:
//iranian.com/main/blog/fg/if-ircg-being-targeted-death-squad-ahmadinejad-next
“Now, as a full-fledged commander with several honors during the
[Iran-Iraq] war, which for security reasons I cannot divulge,” the
dissident commander tells Green Experts, “I perceive the comments made
by the high-ranking commanders of the Iranian military, especially
regarding the issues surrounding the threat of blocking the Hormuz
Strait and prohibiting American and NATO
fleets from entering, [as] exactly the same stupidity that lingers from
the period just before the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War. I envision
the US invasion of Iraq, and it makes me shudder.”
The commander
cites another appalling miscalculation of the Iran-Iraq War: the
decision to send two Iranian gunboats against US warships in the Persian Gulf that were there to keep oil flowing. The Iranian speedboats fired on a helicopter from the USS Vincennes, putting the ship’s captain on heightened alert. When an Iran Air civilian plane later took off for Dubai, the Vincennes mistook it for an Iranian warplane and shot it down, killing all 290 aboard.
The
commander warns the Iranian leadership that a war with the United
States is not like a war with an Arab nation – Iraq: “You will not
survive...”
//www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2012/0...
More fascinating stuff from an ex-CIA spy in the IRCGby FG on Thu Jan 26, 2012 01:47 PM PST
The two articles described here have appeared in the opinion section at Christian Science Monitor. The first one is from January 26th. The second is from January 4th but could explain some recent reports of new death squads targeting the IRCG.
"Ex-CIA spy: Iran's miscalculation over war"
Here is the introductory summary from an ex-CIA agent in the IRCG:
Leading Iranians are criticizing the regime,
including its war-like provocation and the foreign sanctions aimed at
its nuclear program. One Revolutionary Guard commander calls Iran's war
threats 'the same stupidity' and miscalculation that preceded the
Iran-Iraq war.
And here's a fascinating excerpt:
Most revealing, though, is the warning of one Revolutionary Guard commander, in an anonymous letter to the opposition group Green Experts of Iran.
The letter, posted on the group’s web site, says that the current
commanders of the various armed forces appointed by Khamenei are
delusional about their capabilities and have no clue as to the
consequences of a war with America.
The dissident commander cites a
disastrous miscalculation made by religious and military leaders
leading to the Iran-Iraq War. Revealing the cause of the war, the
commander says that Iraq’s Saddam Hussein repeatedly demanded of the Iranian ambassador to Baghdad that Iran recognize Iraq’s sovereignty and cease encouraging the Iraqi Army to revolt against Iraqi leadership.
Iranian leaders dismissed these warnings as mere psychological warfare
and continued to openly berate the Mr. Hussein despite reports from
Iranian intelligence and friendly countries that Iran was miscalculating
Hussein’s power. The denial of the possibility of a real war led the
leaders to mislead their own people.
At the time, I was serving in the Revolutionary Guard but as a CIA spy. I saw firsthand how the faithful were incited to believe that victory over Iraq was a given and that the destruction of Israel would be next. I saw up close how children as young as 10 to 12 years old were given machine guns and sent to the front
A state of war only serves as an excuse for domestic tyranny.--Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn.
Terita needs to interview
by vildemose on Fri Jan 27, 2012 07:42 AM PSTTerita needs to interview the ex-IRGC military commander:
Originally posted by FG:
//iranian.com/main/blog/fg/if-ircg-being-targeted-death-squad-ahmadinejad-next
“Now, as a full-fledged commander with several honors during the
[Iran-Iraq] war, which for security reasons I cannot divulge,” the
dissident commander tells Green Experts, “I perceive the comments made
by the high-ranking commanders of the Iranian military, especially
regarding the issues surrounding the threat of blocking the Hormuz
Strait and prohibiting American and NATO
fleets from entering, [as] exactly the same stupidity that lingers from
the period just before the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War. I envision
the US invasion of Iraq, and it makes me shudder.”
The commander
cites another appalling miscalculation of the Iran-Iraq War: the
decision to send two Iranian gunboats against US warships in the Persian Gulf that were there to keep oil flowing. The Iranian speedboats fired on a helicopter from the USS Vincennes, putting the ship’s captain on heightened alert. When an Iran Air civilian plane later took off for Dubai, the Vincennes mistook it for an Iranian warplane and shot it down, killing all 290 aboard.
The
commander warns the Iranian leadership that a war with the United
States is not like a war with an Arab nation – Iraq: “You will not
survive...”
//www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2012/0...
More fascinating stuff from an ex-CIA spy in the IRCGby FG on Thu Jan 26, 2012 01:47 PM PST
The two articles described here have appeared in the opinion section at Christian Science Monitor. The first one is from January 26th. The second is from January 4th but could explain some recent reports of new death squads targeting the IRCG.
"Ex-CIA spy: Iran's miscalculation over war"
Here is the introductory summary from an ex-CIA agent in the IRCG:
Leading Iranians are criticizing the regime,
including its war-like provocation and the foreign sanctions aimed at
its nuclear program. One Revolutionary Guard commander calls Iran's war
threats 'the same stupidity' and miscalculation that preceded the
Iran-Iraq war.
And here's a fascinating excerpt:
Most revealing, though, is the warning of one Revolutionary Guard commander, in an anonymous letter to the opposition group Green Experts of Iran.
The letter, posted on the group’s web site, says that the current
commanders of the various armed forces appointed by Khamenei are
delusional about their capabilities and have no clue as to the
consequences of a war with America.
The dissident commander cites a
disastrous miscalculation made by religious and military leaders
leading to the Iran-Iraq War. Revealing the cause of the war, the
commander says that Iraq’s Saddam Hussein repeatedly demanded of the Iranian ambassador to Baghdad that Iran recognize Iraq’s sovereignty and cease encouraging the Iraqi Army to revolt against Iraqi leadership.
Iranian leaders dismissed these warnings as mere psychological warfare
and continued to openly berate the Mr. Hussein despite reports from
Iranian intelligence and friendly countries that Iran was miscalculating
Hussein’s power. The denial of the possibility of a real war led the
leaders to mislead their own people.
At the time, I was serving in the Revolutionary Guard but as a CIA spy. I saw firsthand how the faithful were incited to believe that victory over Iraq was a given and that the destruction of Israel would be next. I saw up close how children as young as 10 to 12 years old were given machine guns and sent to the front
A state of war only serves as an excuse for domestic tyranny.--Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn.
Sohran Ahmari the neo-con
by Ramin J on Thu Jan 26, 2012 10:46 PM PSTthis neo-con guy who "reviewed" Parsi's book in the WSJ expressed support for the Mujahedin in a piece for Radio Free Europe. No wonder he didn't like Parsi's book - the Mujahedin are the enemies of democracy for Iran!
//www.rferl.org/content/moral_convolution_gri...
Ahmari is with the Henry JAckson Society, a Neo-conservative think-tank, the same people who brought you the war in Iraq and who are trying to bring you war with Iran. They are gunning for Parsi, no doubt.
Asaatid
by Dr. Mohandes on Thu Jan 26, 2012 10:42 PM PSTbavafa jan and Ostad Faramarz
WHile i hate to jump in like a construction worker/ brick handler and mostly bare-footed rigth into the middle of a great debate between to engineers... but something that dash mehrdad said really did not register well with me and i felt it was my melli and mihan duty to say something!
agha mehrdad.
At the bottom when you compare such warmongering policies and strategies based on provoking chaos and bloodshed, with someone women who might be screaming come do me. Just by the way she dresses, you could not be more wrong my friend.
You see. A woman who dresses up as trashy as she can , is not really being or doing anything belligerent. Can you say that she is , in the real sense of the term "belligerent"??? but when someone so loudly and clearly and poignantly, Goes on the pedestle and says things that directly and purposefully have the intention to rile people up and mess things up in a community, far away from his own land!!! you've got your "belligerence" on public display for ya! To the point that Some one could even ask you: Want fries with that??!
This IS a world where there are so many so - called leaders have been talking shit like that and HAVE cause massive headahces and been the prime reason for their own nation's misery...
HAla shoma "Y" bia...
this is what the REAL experts say about Parsi's book
by Ramin J on Thu Jan 26, 2012 10:41 PM PST“With the eye of a Washington insider, Trita Parsi assembles all the
pieces of this complex puzzle in an original and persuasive way. I am
aware of no one who has subjected the Obama administration’s policy on
Iran to this kind of sustained scrutiny. Parsi displays a nuanced
understanding of the historical context and an exceptionally fine-tuned
appreciation for the political conditions and vulnerabilities of both
Iran and the United States.”—Gary Sick, Columbia School of International
and Public Affairs
yeah, that is Gary Sick, former White House staff
“If you want to know the whole truth about how the Obama administration
deals with Iran, read this pathbreaking book. Parsi shatters the myth
that nuclear diplomacy with Iran is exhausted; it has yet to be
genuinely tried.”—R.K. Ramazani, Edward R. Stettinius Professor
Emeritus, University of Virginia
“Trita Parsi’s gripping account is a must-read for anyone fascinated by
the human details of recent diplomacy. Parsi recounts it all—the
misunderstandings, the fears, the prejudices, the ambitions, and the
misreading—that have hobbled American efforts to end three decades of
futility with Iran.”—John Limbert, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
under the Obama administration
Limbert was a former hostage in Iran!!!
“No one in the United States knows more about Iran, or can speak more
authoritatively about the complex historical relationship between Iran
and the US, than Trita Parsi. A Single Roll of the Dice is a must-read.”—Reza Aslan, author of No god but God: The Origins, Evolution, and Future of Islam
"Superb" and ""A must-read for all those interested in the relationship between Washington and Tehran."—Publishers Weekly, Starred Review
"Parsi has done a great service by writing the first book on how the
Obama administration and Iran missed yet another opportunity for
reconciliation . . . [He] explains what went wrong on both sides as well
the events and third parties that helped insure that diplomacy would be
given only a minimal chance to succeed. Parsi is well qualified to
analyse the sad course of U.S.-Iran relations . . . His new book will
appeal to specialists and the general public."—Barbara Slavin, IPS
Farmarz jaan: We could debate this endlessly….
by Bavafa on Thu Jan 26, 2012 10:28 PM PSTAnd I believe, the reason for this endless debate is that both sides have their share of fault. I have never tried to white wash and/or overlook the mistakes, atrocities and the crimes committed by IRI, both at home or abroad. In fact vast majority of my post on IC one way or another condemns those wild behavior. But I also try to stay objective and believe America has had a great deal of misdeed for the Iranian people which dates back to the 50s.
What is important though to learn from our past and be pragmatic and move forward, but keep the interest of ordinary people in mind first and foremost.
With regards
'Hambastegi' is the main key to victory
Mehrdad
P.S. Blaming Iran for the Iraq attach and invasion because of belligerent behavior of Khomenie is like blaming a woman for wearing provocatively when/if she is raped. Can you imagine a world if those sort of talk was a justifiable reason for invading another nation?
Mehrdad Jaan
by Faramarz on Thu Jan 26, 2012 08:52 PM PSTI did not go back 30 years, Trita did and I agree with him that the issues between the Regime and the US dates back to the late 70’s.
As for Iran-Iraq war, do you acknowledge any role that Khomeini played in sticking his nose in Karbala and Najaf and threatened Saddam and then weakened Iran’s military by killing our best and brightest military men. Let’s not blame the US for all our shortcomings and once in a while look in the mirror.
As for the incident about the Iran Air flight over the Persian Gulf, it is a tragedy. But you may not know that Iranian Air Force under the late Shah used to send recognizance RF-4 planes over Iraqi territory hiding under Air India commercial planes or other airliners that flew over Iraq to Syria or Lebanon and photographed Iraqi installations. Americans trained Iranian pilots to do this during Shah’s time and were worried that an F-14 was hiding under the Boeing Iran Air flight and mistakenly shot it down. It is a tragedy but why did the Regime get itself involved in killing Americans in Lebanon, Khobar towers in Saudi Arabia and IED’s in Iraq? These have nothing to do with Iran.
US helped the Regime by weakening the Taliban and removing Saddam. Saddam, if he ever got his hands on a nuclear bomb, he would have dropped it on an Iranian city without any hesitation.
Israelis did us a favor by destroying Osirak. But our blind hate doesn’t let us see the truth.
Farmarz Jaan: You could start by being objective….
by Bavafa on Thu Jan 26, 2012 07:53 PM PSTOtherwise a natural conclusion when we fail to examine events objectively.
As you may know, the enmity for the Iranians did not start 30 years ago but when the US helped and installed the pervious dictator in Iran. But since you go only thirty years back, let’s examine that period and the examples you brought up.
When you say “taking hostages and causing trouble in the region”, do you mean the Iran-Iraq war, where US supported and promoted that dictator who attacked and occupied parts of Iran and used chemical weapon which was sold to him by the West?
When you characterize the Iranian airliner being shot down as an accident, do you dismiss and reject the ample evidence (by the US sources) that such accident is virtually impossible and the fact that the admiral was awarded with a medal. Is that customary for the US military to award admiral with a medal who make such tragic mistake?
The facts are that far more Iranians have lost their lives as a direct and indirect results of American policies then Americans who have lost their lives at the hand of IRI direct/indirect involvement such as Beirut bombing.
And when you talk about American pragmatism, let’s not forget that America under GWB rejected an Iranian offer for coming to the table, this was while Iran showed a good will gesture by helping US in Afghanistan. It is just happens that now IRI is making that mistake by refusing to come to the table.
I trust you know me enough to know that I am not defending IRI by any long shot, I am just pointing that neither side are as innocent or fault free as any of us try to make it.
'Hambastegi' is the main key to victory
Mehrdad
Dear VPK, I agree w that kind of a Peace w Khamenei :-)
by IranFirst on Thu Jan 26, 2012 07:58 PM PSTDear VPK, I agrre w that kind of a Peace w Khamenei :-)
I hope he gets the same peace as Osama did, very soon.
Dear IranFirst
by Veiled Prophet of Khorasan on Thu Jan 26, 2012 06:06 PM PSTShould US had made peace w Osama too?
USA did make peace with him. Osama is at peace in the bottom of the ocean. US is at peace; we are all at peace!
Dear RG
I agree with you so no point repeating what we both know.
Mr Parsi: Should US had made peace w Osama too?
by IranFirst on Thu Jan 26, 2012 05:41 PM PSTWith your line of reasoning, US should have made peace with Osama Bin
Ladan too. Khamenei and Osama both have blood of Americans on their
hands (Khamenie has killed more Americans, in addition to all Iranians).
When do YOU draw the line between a criminal (such as Khamenei and
Osama) and a reasonable leader that has interests of his country (not
spread of Islam , getting a N-bomb and helping Lebanon and Palestine, at
any cost to Iranians) in mind and can be trusted in any negotiations?
...
by vildemose on Thu Jan 26, 2012 05:31 PM PST...
Dear Faramraz:
by vildemose on Thu Jan 26, 2012 05:30 PM PSTDear Faramraz: Well-done.
A state of war only serves as an excuse for domestic tyranny.--Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn.
Think Objectively & Globally!
by G. Rahmanian on Thu Jan 26, 2012 05:20 PM PSTAs I wrote on IC before:
"Think Objectively And Globally, and you'll get a different perspective! Perceive US's policies in isolation and you'll get stuck wondering about and attacking those policies.
Are Americans acting out of self-interest? Absolutely! Do America's interests coincide with the interests of every country in the world? Hardly! Do we need to agree with what the US does in the rest of the world? That is opening a Pandora's box. Should we, as Iranians be more concerned about our country's interests, first and foremost? Most certainly.
It is when we start seeing things in such terms that we can understand where the US government is coming from." Dec. 31, 2011
Mehrdad Jaan, where do I start?
by Faramarz on Thu Jan 26, 2012 05:13 PM PSTHis blog starts out by saying, “The 30-year-old U.S.-Iran enmity” as if two parties did harm to each other. But as we know, the US delivered Iran to Khomeini and wanted to work with him. And how did Khomeini reciprocate? Marg bar Amrika, taking hostages and causing trouble in the Region.
You can say that the US is responsible for the accidental death of the Iranians on that Iran Air flight shot down over the Persian Gulf, but how many dead Americans is the Regime responsible for? Quite a few, in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Iraq.
Having lived in the US for quite a while, I can say with certainty that Americans are not vindictive people. They are very pragmatic and can easily forget the past and move forward. I cannot say the same thing about the Iranians. If tomorrow Khamenei sends a message to the White House that he wants to talk and resolve the issues, Joe Biden will be in Iran next week fully authorized to negotiate and make deals.
What prevents this Regime from working out an arrangement with the US is not AIPAC, Israel or all the excuses that Trita comes up with. It is the inherent nature of the Regime that sees itself as anti-US, anti-west, anti-women, anti-democracy and anti everything that the civilized world stands for.
At the end, you cannot change these people, you just have to get rid of them, one way or another.
Thanks Faramarz:
by G. Rahmanian on Thu Jan 26, 2012 05:10 PM PSTAre you implying the whole NIAC world is cartoonish and "ersatz," to borrow a word from WSJ's article?
Uncle G., how about this?
by Faramarz on Thu Jan 26, 2012 04:51 PM PST//www.youtube.com/watch?v=wC2BGuXgqJ0&feature...
Farmarz jaan:
by Bavafa on Thu Jan 26, 2012 04:49 PM PSTI would be interested to know how/where you reach such impression and narrative from Titra Parsi?
My impression of it which coincide with my personal belief is that the challenges between US and Iran are enormous and not easily fixed, just like the Israeli-Palestinian issue, nevertheless one must keep at it with an open mind and with some give and take in order to resolve them. If one goes to the table with the intend of gaining all and not giving any, nothing will be resolved. Worse, if one side is not even willing to go to the table which both have been guilty of that. There was a time when US refused and now IRI is returning the favor.
In regards to the special interest and AIPAC role, I believe few if any doubt their role and effort to prevent any normalization between these two nations thus far. Is the fault entirely on their shoulder, hardly. Do they share some of the blame, certainly.
As always, with regards
'Hambastegi' is the main key to victory
Mehrdad
Wall Sreet Journal's analysis of Mr Parsi is one side and wrong
by iraj khan on Thu Jan 26, 2012 04:47 PM PSTI only had to read 2 paragraphs to see the flaws.
For example it says:
"In "A Single Roll of the Dice," Trita Parsi tries to account for this failure. But rather than re-examine U.S. policy and its underlying assumptions, Mr. Parsi spends much of the book casting blame on a wide range of actors for Mr. Obama's inability to disarm the clerical regime through diplomatic means. Such blame-shifting is not surprising. The author has spent years, as president of the National Iranian American Council, advocating for engagement with Iran; he is now determined to explain away the policy's inherent flaws."
I did not expected much from a news paper that represents the %1 of U.S. population, The Haves.
'Az Koozeh Boron Haman Taravad Keh Dar Ost'.
Dear Faramarz: Another Good Story!
by G. Rahmanian on Thu Jan 26, 2012 04:38 PM PSTI wish you could find a photo or an illustration to go with it.
Dear VPK:
by G. Rahmanian on Thu Jan 26, 2012 04:30 PM PSTYes! But my argument is based on our collective experience with the totalitarian rule of the mullahs and their armed foot soldiers.
WSJ sees things globally and with respect to US's foreign policy, whereas the most urgent question for us Iranians must be, how to react to both internal and foreign policies of the regime in Tehran, at the same time. And which side to blame first and foremost.
While IR's foreign policy has been most damaging where it concerns Iranians, it is its domestic policies which have deprived Iranians of the most basic rights.
The same internal policies which have resulted in transforming Iran with all its wealth into a poor country where more than 50% of the population lives under the official poverty line. The inhuman policies which have sent millions of Iranians into exile. Policies which see one execution every four hours.
I don't see any reason to go on because you know what the regime has done to our country.
Well said Faramarz
by Veiled Prophet of Khorasan on Thu Jan 26, 2012 03:52 PM PSTthat's all I got to say.
NIAC’s Cinderella Story!
by Faramarz on Thu Jan 26, 2012 03:53 PM PSTTrita has a very simple narrative for US-IR Regime relationship, just like the Cinderella’s story.
His story goes something like this. The US and the IR Regime are natural allies, and can fall in love with each other once they meet at the Ball, but there is a nasty stepmother, Israel/AIPAC that doesn’t allow these two young and beautiful people meet, get married and live happily ever after.
But if only the Prince Charming Obama is more persistent and doesn’t get discouraged by the Stepmother and Cinderella’s two ugly stepsisters, Sepah and Basij, they can finally meet and fall in love.
Well guess what. Obama looked hard and long and found out that Trita’s Cinderella was an old, bitter, vindictive, anti-west, anti-women, hateful man called Khamenei.
The real Cinderellas are those young and brave Iranians who have been fighting the Regime for the past two years, and the shoe will fit them perfectly!
A few things
by Veiled Prophet of Khorasan on Thu Jan 26, 2012 03:30 PM PSTThe WSJ review is very damning of the book. I don't base my opinions on reviews but WSJ does make sense in here.
Abarmard: I see plenty of your posts; what is missing?
Everyone Is Wrong Except IR Criminals!
by G. Rahmanian on Thu Jan 26, 2012 03:49 PM PST"Legitimate security concerns?" So, when IR threatens other states it should not be taken seriously, but when the threatened states react they want war?
Do I need Wall Street Journal to tell me if Mr. Parsi is being objective or not?
Do you read and comprehend only one type of English?
Can you tell Iranians how IR is going to liberate Jerusalem? And how and with which military power it is going to wipe Israel off the face of the world without getting one or two million Iranians killed?
"Exchange of strategic respect?" Are such cliches the things Iranians need?
How can one have any respect for a bunch of criminal mullahs and their hired goons who are holding tens of millions of Iranians hostage?
The same criminals whose hostage-taking of embassy staff and Iranians visiting their relatives back home has become part of their political agenda!
Respect for the mullahs and their goons, but not for Iranians?
Wall Street Journal Reviews Trita Parsi's Book
by Banafsheh Zolfaghari on Thu Jan 26, 2012 02:11 PM PSTNot sure where all this personalization leads, but the Wall Street Jounal's review of this book is quite very articulate, addressing the subject matter objectively: //online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204409004577156850984253714.html
what happened to my comment?
by Abarmard on Thu Jan 26, 2012 01:54 PM PSTIt was pretty funny. Well all has been said here. Have a great rest of the day.
Abar: Keep on shilling. I
by vildemose on Thu Jan 26, 2012 01:49 PM PSTAbar: Keep on shilling. I think fati commondos are mostly in your extended family....You are up to your old tricks. You often self-contradict your views within the same comment....I have been down this road with you before and you have nothing of substance to offer but old-tired rhetoric.
A state of war only serves as an excuse for domestic tyranny.--Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn.