INTERVENTION

    Abbreviations

    AIOC – Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
    CIA – Central Intelligence Agency
    NIOC – National Iranian Oil Company
    SIS – British Secret Intelligence Service

    Introduction

         This essay will trace the deterioration of Anglo-Iranian relations after the Iranian Government’s nationalization of the AIOC in March 1951, until the overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq, in August 1953, by the SIS-CIA orchestrated, Operation TPAJAX.  The essay comprises two parts and each part sets various objectives and poses a number of pertinent questions.  Some have been addressed in the extant historiography of the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute and coup d’état that brought Mosaddeq’s premiership to a premature conclusion.  

         On the one hand, I have tried to address treaded paths in a parallactic manner, in an attempt to see them through different eyes to which they have been accustomed hitherto.  While on the other, I have sought to address and emphasize issues that have previously either been thought negligible or at best attended to perfunctorily.  Although the intention is to focus on Anglo-Iranian relations, one cannot thereby obviate the pivotal role of the United States which profoundly affected the unfolding of events.  

        This essay will attempt to determine as precisely as possible the reasons that motivated British hostility toward Mosaddeq’s government.  Was there a genuine fear that Mosaddeq was incapable of acting as a bastion to Communist pressure threatening to envelope Iran?  Was British diplomacy simply a consequence of American pressure?  At what point and why did the British Government conclude that Mosaddeq was ‘unnegotiable’ i.e. that his overthrow was the only plausible alternative?  This will form the main body of the essay.  The essay will then go on to investigate British involvement in the development and modus operandi of Operation TPAJAX.  Would the coup have succeeded without British backing and support?  And what was the British division of labour in the coup’s execution?

         There has been a renaissance in the historiography of the Mosaddeq era, since the publication in 2000 of Donald Wilber’s ‘Overthrow of Premier Mosaddeq of Iran: November 1952-August 1953’.[i]  ‘Overthrow’ along with a number of other recently declassified documents, has shed considerable light on formerly nebulous terrain, and inspired a plethora of articles and editorials devoted to the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute and the 1953 coup, in both the press and academia.  The contemporary preoccupation with Islamic terrorism has also led some to read the Mosaddeq era with an eye to the present.  Some, for example Stephen Kinzer, believe it permissible to concatenate Mosaddeq’s overthrow with the Islamic Revolution in 1979, arguing that the latter was the direct cause of the former.  Although interesting, proleptic speculation of this sort is ultimately untenable, in the final analysis emerging as a futile battle of counterfactuals.  The remit of this essay may be more modest, but in being so, it importantly eschews the fanciful.     

     Britain, Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup D’Etat

      ‘God gave the world to the industrious and rational.’ -- John Locke

The National Front’s Bill for the nationalization of Iranian oil, north and south, was passed on 20 March 1951, unanimously by both the Majlis and the Senate with enthused and vigorous popular support.[i] According to Mark Gasiorowski, the nationalization of the AIOC placed Mosaddeq and the National Front, almost immediately at loggerheads with the British Government, which owned 50% of the AIOC’s stock.[ii]  Not only did the nationalization threaten existing AIOC investments in Iran, but also an important source of Britain’s foreign exchange earnings.[iii]   The total net profits of the AIOC from 1945 to 1950 after the deduction of taxation, royalties and exaggerated depreciation figures were £250 million.[iv]  Britain was suffering from an annual trade deficit of approximately $1 billion and struggling to recover from a state privation in the aftermath of WWII.[v]  Ernest Bevin, British Foreign Secretary from 1945 to March 1951,[vi] candidly remarked that without Iranian oil, there would be ‘no hope of our being able to achieve the standard of living at which we were aiming in Great Britain.’[vii]

         The British Government’s peremptory dismissal of Iranian nationalist aspirations is perhaps best exemplified by the attitude of Herbert Morrison, British Foreign Secretary from March to October 1951.[viii]  In his autobiography published several years after the ‘Abadan crisis’ he writes that ‘when Mosaddeq, the head of the Persian Government, whose fanaticism bordered on the mental, suddenly had the idea of nationalizing our oil wells at Abadan…My own view was that there was much to be said in favour of sharp and forceful action.’[ix]  This appraisal is not only, at least implicitly, consonant with the rubric of Orientalism,[x] but demonstrates contempt for Iranian sovereignty.  These sentiments would also be shared by the Conservative Government, which assumed power in October 1951.                  

         In contrast to the hawkish views of Morrison and the Minister of Defence Emanuel Shinwell,[xi] for a brief moment, Prime Minister Clement Attlee seemed disposed to compromise.[xii]  In his memoirs published just a year after the coup d'état that ousted the Mosaddeq government his more dovish stance towards the matter is clearly evinced. ‘It illustrated the kind of problem which arises when insurgent nationalism comes into conflict with old-established commercial interests…We were met by a demand for the nationalisation…a demand which we could not resist, provided that proper compensation was paid…any attempt to coerce the Persian Government by the use of force was out of question.’[xiii]  Attlee also showed a dislike, as did a number of other British officials, for the arrogance of the AIOC.  He comments somewhat ruefully that ‘The attitude of the Company generally was…contemptuous of the Persian Government…[it] showed a lack of sensitivity…and I think that successive British Governments, including the Labour Government, did not make enough use of the power which the Government’s holdings in the enterprise gave them to make changes in good time.’[xiv]  But had Attlee’s memory betrayed him when he claimed that forceful action was never an option?  I will return to this below.

         Nevertheless, it is generally recognised that Attlee was the exception, not the rule amongst the higher echelons of the Cabinet, and that his more conciliatory approach could stave off the belligerence of his more hawkish colleagues only so long.[xv]  Not to mention that with an election on the horizon Attlee could ill-afford to lose face on such a grand scale, alienating both the electorate and senior members of the Cabinet.  That the Opposition, championed by Sir Winston Churchill and Deputy Leader Anthony Eden,[xvi] sought to make political capital from the nationalization of the AIOC only antagonized the Labour Government hawks, fuelling their bellicosity towards Mosaddeq, who by the end of March 1951 had become anathema.  This strain of thought by April 1951 became prevalent within the Foreign Office.[xvii]     

         Wm. Roger Louis writes for example that ‘the key to British thought from the time of Mosaddeq’s ascendancy in April 1951 can be summed up in the description of him as a fanatically anti-British nationalist.’[xviii]  But were British attitudes really so transparent?  Was British animosity merely reducible to a dogged refusal to relinquish the vestiges of empire?  On many occasions this would seem to be the case.  By both Iranians and Britons, Iran was considered part of Britain’s ‘informal empire’: within the compass of the British Empire yet receiving none of the benefits of direct colonial administration that would have been conferred by accountability to Parliament.[xix]  Britain’s vast colonial empire had been unravelling for some years, and the AIOC’s nationalisation was a further severe blow to Britain’s dwindling prestige.[xx]  

    On the 1 May Mohammad Reza Shah signed the Nine Point Law revoking the AIOC’s concession and establishing in its place the NIOC.  At a Cabinet meeting on 7 May Morrison admonished Attlee that any concessions to Iran would cause irreparable damage to British prestige and encourage nationalists’ hopes everywhere.[i]  Attlee was persuaded and signed off on a cable to Ambassador Oliver Franks in Washington, which directed the latter to tell U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson that ‘Persian oil is of vital importance to our economy, and that we regard it as essential to do everything possible to prevent the Persians from getting away with the breach of their contractual obligations.’[ii]  The Truman Administration was unmoved, and pressed the British to begin negotiations.  Kinzer argues that it was entirely due to President Truman’s insistence that the British realized they would have to at least appear to be engaging Mosaddeq.[iii]  But was British diplomacy simply a consequence of American pressure?

         At Attlee’s suggestion, the AIOC in June 1951 sent a delegation of officials led by the company’s deputy chairman, Basil Jackson, to Tehran for negotiations.[iv]  The Iranian delegates were willing to negotiate provided that the nationalization was accepted as a fait accompli.  This was swiftly repudiated by Jackson who claimed that Iran was bound by the 1933 Oil Agreement which was not due to expire until 1993.  The 1933 accord was to be a serious bone of contention over the next few years.  It was almost universally held by the Iranian party to be illegitimate; imposed de facto upon Iran by the AIOC with the patronage of the British Government.[v]  Whereas amongst the British party it was adamantly felt that the 1933 accord was obliging and thus could not under any circumstances be abrogated by the Iranian Government.[vi]  

         The British delegation’s outright rejection of the principle of nationalization was a reflection of the Foreign Office’s position that there was room for flexibility ‘in profits, administration or partnership, but not in control.’[vii]  This was once again indicative of British disdain for Iranian sovereignty and was thus unacceptable to the Iranian negotiators.  This was a crux for Anglo-American relations until Dwight Eisenhower assumed the presidency in November 1952.[viii]  On June 20 Mosaddeq sent Mehdi Bazargan, Managing Director of the NIOC, to Abadan, where British administrators were still running the refinery.[ix]  The British unfazed adhered to the credo: ‘Just wait until the beggars are really in want of money – then they will come creeping on their knees’.  Henry Grady, American ambassador to Iran from June 1950 to October 1951, wrote that he ‘heard this so often that it gradually had the effect of a gramophone record.’[x]    

         Nonetheless, delusions of grandeur persisted, and blinded the majority of British officials from assimilating the nationalist fervour that was sweeping across the Middle East.  Even John Foster Dulles, U.S. Secretary of State under Eisenhower, whose Weltanschauung is often characterised in starkly bi-polar Cold War terms,[xi] recognized the inexorable wave of indigenous nationalisms and was at times critical of British haughtiness.[xii]  Grady also regularly poured scorn on British policy for its tendency to be short-sighted.  ‘The British adhered to power policy and the idea that if only they could produce economic chaos in Persia, and thus be quit of Mussadeq, everything would be all right again.’[xiii]  He argued British intransigence was largely responsible for Iran’s steady slip into the Soviet Union’s orbit, and seems genuine in his belief that the potential for catastrophe was ever-present.  

         By contrast, it should be fairly clear that the issue of Communist penetration has not made an appearance in this essay’s presentation of British thinking a propos Mosaddeq and the National Front.  Perusing the FO 371 and FO 248 series during this period, earnest fears of Tudeh Party intrigue and sedition are sparse and rarely voiced.[xiv]  In the British press Mosaddeq was almost without exception portrayed as a xenophobic, fanatical Oriental but never as a Communist or fellow-traveller.[xv]  This is salient because it is consistent with the contention that British hostility towards Mosaddeq did not emanate from his inability to forestall the Tudeh Party snatching power.  Throughout 1951-2 the Tudeh in fact virulently opposed Mosaddeq’s policy of oil nationalization, alleging that it was in fact an ‘American conspiracy’ designed to replace the AIOC with U.S. companies.[xvi]  On 1 July 1951 the Iranian Government impounded the files of Richard Seddon, the AIOC’S executive in Tehran.  It was subsequently claimed that these files contained damning evidence of AIOC chicanery; some of which were later distributed to the press and publicly displayed at a United Nations meeting.  Seddon has kept ‘a list, scrupulously up-to-date, of gifts made by the AIOC to a number of deputies, ministers and other politicians’; but more importantly for our discussion, the AIOC’s Central Information Bureau[xvii] (CIB) had succoured ‘the Tudeh press to render their opposition [to Mosaddeq] more effective’.[xviii]  The complicity of MI6 in these actions is unknown.  However, given the rapport and free flow of information between the AIOC and various parts of Whitehall,[xix] it is certainly possible that a number of individuals within the British Government were aware of the AIOC’s activities.  If this was the case, one might argue that Britain’s desire to recover the AIOC overrode one of its supposed obligations in the Cold War i.e. the protection of the Middle East from Soviet subversion.    

    At this point, Britain seems to be solely concerned with the protection of its economic interests and the valorisation of its reputation as a world super power.  The former category included assets in Iran worth around $1 billion,[i] tax revenues from the AIOC which in 1950 alone came to $142 million, foreign exchange earnings, and finally the loss of future profits.  The much vaunted Abadan refinery was not only Britain’s single largest overseas asset but also a source of national pride.[ii]  It was still thought by many high ranking British officialdom that Persian oil was actually and rightly British oil, because it had been discovered by Britons and developed by British capital, through British ingenuity and industry.[iii]  The sense of moral indignation at the nationalization was palpable enough, and on 22 June 1951 the British Government appealed to the International Court for an interim ruling to protect its rights in Iran.[iv]  But the Iranian Government denied the Court’s jurisdiction because ‘the exercise of sovereignty is not subject to complaint’ and refused to accept the terms of the decision of 5 July.[v]       

         With hindsight, however, it is plain that British fears for their regional prestige were warranted; the Nationalisation Law set a precedent that greatly undermined British hegemony in the region.[vi]  There was not a want of resistance to the numerous manifestations of imperialism and neo-colonialism in either Iran or the Middle East, hitherto.  But the Nationalisation Law and Mosaddeq’s premiership for many specialists in the field marks the cusp of a new era, inaugurating a period which saw the vehement rejection of foreign tutelage in favour of assertions and declarations of national independence, which would only subside in the late 1960s.  

         It is no coincidence that that the historical literature is replete with references to Gamal Abdel-Nasser and the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company.[vii]  After the fall of Mosaddeq would follow the Bandung Conference in April 1955, which advocated non-alignment in the Cold War; a doctrine propagated by Mosaddeq throughout the 1940s and 1950s, albeit entitled ‘negative equilibrium’.[viii]  And in July 1956 Nasser would nationalise the Suez Canal Company, kindling the conflagration of pan-Arabism that would set alight the entire Arab Middle East.  This essay is not arguing that the aforementioned events were merely scions of Mosaddeq’s premiership and the National Front, but rather that many of the same motifs were foreshadowed in the involutions of the oil dispute.       

         After this minor digression we can now return to the main undertaking: to determine the reasons that motivated British hostility toward Mosaddeq’s government.  Ronald Ferrier accurately captures the difference in priorities which motivated the British and American governments in the respective approaches.  The Attlee government was not prepared to consider the AIOC expendable in order to allay American trepidation for Iran’s vulnerability to Soviet infiltration.[ix]  While for the Americans, the strategic position of Iran transcended ‘the desirability of supporting British oil interests’.[x]  If one follows articles in ‘The Washington Post’ during the early 1950s, by the Alsop brothers, a pair of American journalists with intimate connections to the State Department, this position is incessantly reiterated.[xi]  For Truman and Acheson it was self-evident, that any alternative to Mosaddeq could only be more rebarbative.[xii]  While in some ambassadorial circles it was unequivocally opined that ‘“high up people” in London…would rather see Persia go Communist than make an unsatisfactory oil agreement.’[xiii]    

         An important stratagem employed by the British Government was to damage Mosaddeq’s domestic support by dint of economic sanctions and ‘gunboat diplomacy’, aggressively manoeuvring throughout the region.[xiv] The British Government began a campaign of intimidation, in mid-May despatching HMS Mauritius with a convoy of four destroyers and ten other ships to the Persian Gulf.[xv]  A plan had been drawn up in May 1951 for the invasion of Abadan, codenamed BUCCANEER[xvi] and the Commander-in-Chief at Khorramshahr suborned to offer no more than token resistance.[xvii]  BUCCANNEER forces were ready and waiting.  It was only the travail of Attlee that eventually put the plan to bed.[xviii]  This is not to say that Attlee never envisaged the use of force, but ultimately that it went against his better judgement,[xix] largely determined by formidable American pressure to foreclose any plans for a military incursion.[xx]  The occupation of Abadan by British troops would provide ample pretext for the occupation of northern Iran by Soviet Russia, in accordance with the Russo-Persian treaty of 1921.[xxi]

         Such an outcome would be intolerable to the Truman Administration and could under no circumstances be allowed to come to pass.[xxii]  On the 27 September 1951 the Cabinet after many hours of heated deliberation concluded that Britain ‘could not afford a break with the United States on an issue of this kind’.[xxiii]  This would seem to confirm the rhetorical question posed above: was British diplomacy simply a consequence of American pressure?  Was Averell Harriman correct when he claimed that ‘England is so weak she must follow our leadership’?[xxiv]  Although occasionally this comment does appear to ring true, if one surveys the imbroglio in its entirety, such an appraisal proves erroneous.  British diplomacy was more often than not a consequence of American pressure, but the British Government’s decision to protect its interests by other means i.e. covert operations, was largely unaffected by the disapprobation of Acheson and Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee.       

         According to Christopher Woodhouse, head of MI6 in Iran from 1951 to 1952, Morrison appointed a rather eccentric character by the name of Robin Zaehner in mid-August 1951 to spearhead the operation to depose Mosaddeq.[xxv]  There is a paper trail in the FO 248 series to support this claim.[xxvi]  Zaehner enlisted the help of three Anglophile brothers, Asadollah, Seyfollah and Qodratollah Rashidian.  The three brothers already well acquainted with Zaehner from the time he had spent in Tehran during WWII, pursued British machinations with alacrity;[xxvii] and in November 1951, Geoffrey Furlonge, Head of the Eastern Department, observed that covert activities were developing satisfactorily.[xxviii]  

         The AIOC began a production slow down in May 1951 and prevented tankers from loading oil at Abadan.  By the end of July there was a full-blown oil blockade, followed in September by an embargo on British exports to Iran.[xxix]  As time passed and the Iranian Government’s extant oil revenues dissipated, the political stability of Iran became a primary concern of the Truman Administration.     

         At this point I would like to reflect on an important historiographical aspect of the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute.  Homa Katouzian has been the most assiduous in depriving of credence the Foreign Office and State Department narratives used to justify Mosaddeq’s overthrow i.e. Mosaddeq’s dogmatism and unwillingness to compromise plunged Iran into the throes of economic chaos, and if action had not been taken, Iran would have almost certainly been lost to the ‘Free World’.[xxx]  In a number of books and articles he has systematically debunked this narrative which nevertheless, still continues to be pervasive.[xxxi]  He argues that ‘on purely economic grounds, the fall of Musaddiq’s government was by no means inevitable.’[xxxii]  Political propaganda from both inside and outside of Iran[xxxiii] in tandem with the diligence of agents provocateurs generated an image of the onslaught of chaos.[xxxiv]  This image was decisive in shaping the cosmology of the Eisenhower Administration in waiting.  The same however, cannot be said with respect to the Attlee and Churchill Governments.[xxxv]  The British dramatis personae were by the beginning of June 1951 resolute that Mosaddeq had to be got rid of, only the means by which this was to be achieved had to be decided.[xxxvi]  

         In a bid to break the stalemate, Truman, in July 1951, sent special emissary Averell Harriman to Iran in order to mediate an agreement between the Iranian Government and the associated British mission led by Lord Privy Seal, Richard Stokes.  The opposition of Morrison and Sir Francis Shepherd, the British ambassador to Iran, to the Harriman Mission, betrayed an inveterate distaste for unwanted American interference, and the worry that the semblance of Anglo-American disunity would dishearten anti-Mosaddeq sentiment.[xxxvii]  This, one might argue, supports the argument that British antipathy towards Mosaddeq was predominantly a consequence of the Nationalisation Law and its repercussions for British interests.  British officials were convinced that Mosaddeq was slyly using the ‘Communist card’ in order to elicit American aid and support.[xxxviii]  The Conservative Government would hold the same view.[xxxix]  While a more sanguine Harriman believed by trusting in the good faith of Mosaddeq, and ensuring the principles of nationalization were respected, that a reconciliation of British and Iranian interests could be eventuated.[xl]  There was however an important proviso.  The Iranians would have to abandon the 1 May Nine Point Law.[xli]  

    Iran specialists at the Foreign Office, such as Nancy Lambton,[i] were certain that this proviso would be unacceptable to the Iranians,[ii] even though before Stokes’ arrival in Tehran, Harriman had procured formal acceptance of the principle of oil nationalisation by the British Government, ‘qua itself, and on behalf of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’.[iii]  To divest the provisions of the Nine Point Law would mean retaining the form of the Nationalisation Law while forgoing its substantive content.[iv] Stokes admitted that, in terms of control, there would be no change whatsoever.[v]  This not only went against Mosaddeq’s most fundamental convictions, but would in one fell-swoop undercut the National Front’s legitimacy, in both the Majlis and the eyes of the Iranian public.[vi]  For Mosaddeq the nationalisation of the AIOC was at bottom a moral and political issue, not an economic one.  This was lost on a host of key individuals such as the British chargé d’affaires at Tehran, George Middleton,[vii] Deputy Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir Roger Makins, Peter Ramsbotham in charge of the ‘oil desk’ at the Foreign Office and Archie Ross at the Eastern Department.  Although there was on occasion frustration with the ‘Bourbonism’ of the AIOC and its staunch ally the Ministry of Fuel and Power,[viii] this did not in any way mitigate the Foreign Office’s disaffection with Mosaddeq who remained an object of derision and malign aspersions.

         This is where I diverge from Louis, who I think overstates the differences between the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Fuel and Power.  Any disagreements between the two ministries would be completely overshadowed by the indomitable personality of Churchill, after Eden was forced to take a leave of absence from the Foreign Office due to ill health in April 1953.  Churchill was undeterred by American reservations to intensify pressure on the Iranian Government,[ix] and took the reins at the Foreign Office, in particular vis-à-vis covert operations.[x] According to Woodhouse, it was in fact Churchill who gave authority for Operation Boot[xi] to proceed.[xii]  Churchill himself suffered a severe stroke in June that completely incapacitated him.  By this time, however, Operation Boot had been given sufficient momentum to continue along the trajectory he had envisioned.  There is by and large a consensus amongst historians that the arrival of Churchill at 10 Downing Street was responsible for enlivening British efforts to seize the initiative.  Throughout the 1951 election campaign he had chided what he regarded as the Attlee government’s defeatism,[xiii] and found it difficult to stomach the effrontery to British power of the unconscionable ‘old Mossy’.  Dialogue was not on the agenda.  Churchill like Mosaddeq saw the issue as an ‘assertion of right over wrong.’[xiv]    

         To avoid confusion it should be elucidated that although the spread of communism was a privileged concern of Churchill’s,[xv] this was not the basis of his desire to see the premiership of Mosaddeq brought to an abrupt end.  His view of the oil dispute remained unaffected with the move from Leader of the Opposition to Prime Minister, and was in his opinion a relatively clear cut matter.  Mosaddeq had already caused considerable damage and continued to pose a threat to British economic interests and prestige abroad.  Mosaddeq was ‘unnegotiable’, because he rejected the British terms of reference for negotiation; a more amenable or sympathetic replacement, preferably a ‘strong man’, therefore would have to be found.[xvi]  This individual would need to be capable of bringing an oil settlement to a swift conclusion while weathering the nationalist storm, which had already brought about the demise of so many Iranian statesmen.[xvii]  Thus the change of government in Britain did not alter the underlying motives for hostility towards the Mosaddeq government.  The Labour Government had become disillusioned when hopes faded of enforcing a settlement on British terms.  American recalcitrance to British methods and objectives also stymied the Labour Government’s ability to act untrammelled.  Although endeavours to topple Mosaddeq via ‘quasi-legal’ means were pursued with new vigour by Churchill, the reasons for adopting this course bore a remarkable constancy with those of the preceding Labour Government.  By contrast, the change of administration in the U.S. just over a year later would be a far more emphatic ideological shift.[xviii]   

          Disaster struck for Britain in July 1952 with the Qavam al-Saltaneh debacle.[xix]  Zaehner and the Rashidians had for some time been planning the replacement of Mosaddeq with Ahmad Qavam al-Saltaneh, a seasoned veteran of the Iranian political scene.[xx]  Although not a British darling he possessed many of the desired qualities outlined above, and because of his vast experience was thought capable of abetting the realisation of British ends.  An opportunity presented itself upon the resignation of Mosaddeq on 17 July.[xxi]  Despite prejudiced caricatures to the contrary, Mosaddeq was a stalwart supporter of representative democracy and had made it his objective to establish the primacy of the Majlis and reduce the Shah to merely a figurehead, bereft of political power.  To this end he asked the Shah to relinquish control of the War Ministry.[xxii] He believed that the armed forces should be subordinate and accountable to the democratically elected government, not one of the Shah’s prized accoutrements to be brandished ostentatiously, as a testament to his feigned machismo.  When the Shah flatly refused to comply, Mosaddeq resigned.  The Shah at the behest of the British Government thereafter appointed Qavam al-Saltaneh Prime Minister.[xxiii]  At Whitehall it was believed that with Mosaddeq now behind them the whole torrid affair could be speedily concluded.     

         The British Government’s sigh of relief however was drawn too soon.  Masses of people poured onto the streets of Tehran outraged by what had happened; partly organised partisans of the National Front and partly spontaneous expressions of protest.  In response Qavam al-Saltaneh called out elite military units onto the streets; as the crowds spiralled out of control, soldiers fired upon protestors.  This only served to inflame the popular uproar, which continued unabated.  A helpless Qavam al-Saltaneh now fearing for his life, could only hand in his resignation and for survival’s sake slip imperceptibly into obscurity.  The sum of Zaehner’s labours had reached their denouement but had bore no fruit.  The dilapidated British position if anything was further enervated.  Mosaddeq returned as Prime Minister upon a crest of popular support, with his status as the quintessential nationalist leader, now almost beyond reproach.  In the bat of an eyelid there had been a complete volte-face; while at the Foreign Office, jubilation was replaced by quiet desperation.[xxiv]                

         Churchill nevertheless remained unperturbed and unabashedly reminded Truman that the U.K. had committed troops to Korea in support of the U.S.  The Administration was now expected to reciprocate by supporting Britain in its altercation with the Iranian Government.[xxv]  Somewhat confounded by American reluctance Churchill wrote to Truman, ‘I do not myself see why two good men asking only what is right and just should not gang up against a third who is doing wrong.’[xxvi]  Like the Foreign Office, Churchill was sceptical that money would be sufficient to bring Iran political stability; and like the Foreign Office thought this approach the product of American naïveté vis-à-vis the Middle East.[xxvii]  But we must question his motives for arguing against American financial aid to Iran.  Was his opposition to this policy because he genuinely thought it would prove inefficacious in salvaging Iran’s political stability? Or because it was thought that American aid would alleviate the mounting financial pressure on Mosaddeq induced by the oil blockade?[xxviii]  The latter interpretation seems the more appropriate.  At the end of June 1952 Foreign Office officials acknowledged that there was no possibility of Mosaddeq falling without Britain, America and the Shah working in concert to achieve this aim.[xxix]  This is hardly the sentiment of one wishing to ensure stability.  The threat of Iran becoming a ‘second China’ or ‘another Korea’ continued to be of only minor import in British thinking;[xxx] other objectives were paramount.  By the end of July the Foreign Office had realised that the only way to ensure Mosaddeq’s downfall would be by means of a military coup d’état.[xxxi]  Nevertheless, Churchill’s entreaties steadily eroded Truman’s unwillingness to be seen as partial in the dispute.  Doubts however remained and commitment was qualified.[xxxii]

         The British economy by this time was beginning to suffer the adverse effects of the embargo on British imports to Iran;[xxxiii] and the oil blockade could not be sustained indefinitely, with cracks already emerging.[xxxiv]  There was also consternation that West Germany, amongst others, was reaping huge profits during Britain’s absence.[xxxv]  The longer that Britain languished without a resolution to the oil dispute, the greater the likelihood that Churchill would be compelled to broach reconciliation with Mosaddeq, due to economic considerations: ‘Hitherto we have strongly, and successfully, pressed the United States not to offer financial aid in any form to Musaddiq, as this would only serve to maintain him in power and reduce the pressure on him to negotiate a reasonable oil settlement.’[xxxvi]  In the adduced document there is also support for the aforesaid thesis espoused by Katouzian i.e. that the Iranian economy was not in a state of turmoil, as later alleged by the Eisenhower Administration,[xxxvii] and that Mosaddeq was capable of keeping the economy afloat without oil revenues.   

    The fated ‘imminent collapse’ was a trompe l’œil that had not convinced Churchill or British officials, but powerfully resonated with the Eisenhower Administration in waiting, and the upper reaches of the CIA.  In mid-November, after Iran had severed diplomatic relations with Britain, Woodhouse went to Washington in order to garner American support for Operation Boot.[i]  American support was seen by Eden and Churchill as the only sure-fire route to Mosaddeq’s removal.[ii]  In two very telling comments Woodhouse makes it clear that he intentionally catered his narration of events in Iran and belief of impending doom, to suit his Washington audience’s sympathies i.e. the threat of Communism.  He writes, ‘The Americans would be more willing to work with us if they saw the problem as one of containing Communism rather that restoring the position of the AIOC’[iii] and then several pages later, ‘Not wishing to be accused of trying to use the Americans to pull British chestnuts out of the fire, I decided to emphasize the Communist threat to Iran rather than the need to recover control of the oil industry.’[iv]  These admissions belie the argument that Anglo-American cooperation was predicated upon the same premise i.e. Mosaddeq’s fall and the Tudeh Party’s seizure of power was inevitable unless Mosaddeq’s removal was forthcoming.  

         British covert operations headed by Zaehner had failed miserably, and Iran had broken off diplomatic relations leaving Woodhouse and his team without a place from which to operate.  Contact with Tehran now had to be maintained from afar under cover of the military GHQ at Nicosia, Cyprus.[v]  There was also the issue of finance: ‘It would be costly: perhaps half a million pounds would be needed, in addition to the £10, 000 a month which we were currently supplying to the Brothers.’[vi]  For all these reasons ‘American support would be indispensable.’[vii]  Walter Bedell Smith, Director of the CIA, his deputy Allen Dulles, and Frank Wisner, Director of Operations, were receptive and all later become influential supporters of TPAJAX.[viii]  By contrast the State Department greeted Woodhouse’s proposals coolly, unconvinced by his performance.[ix]  As has been argued, it was the State Department that was the more attuned of the two to Truman’s own thinking on the matter.  In London it was realised that Operation Boot would have to remain in abeyance until a change of ethos at Washington.  

         With the election of Eisenhower to the Whitehouse in November 1952, Mosaddeq ceased to be discerned as the only alternative to the Tudeh Party,[x] and the covert use of force in order to instigate his downfall was no longer problematic.[xi]  John Foster Dulles now headed the State Department, and his younger brother Allen was made Director of the CIA; Bedell Smith was named Under-Secretary of State, and Frank Wisner became head of the agency’s clandestine services division.  All of these individuals had the ear of the president and were all favourably disposed towards Operation Boot.[xii]  The change of atmosphere in Washington was welcomed by Churchill, Eden and the Foreign Office.  J.F. Dulles and Bedell Smith were approvingly seen to be ‘adopting a much more robust attitude than the previous Administration.’  At the Foreign Office it was felt that with the Truman Administration they ‘were continually being pushed to make new concessions whenever Musaddiq shifted his ground.  The new Administration, however, seem to realise that we have now reached the limit of concession’;[xiii] and during spring in the midst of planning TPAJAX, ‘it seemed obvious’ to Wilber ‘that the British were very pleased at having obtained the active cooperation of the Agency and were determined to do nothing which might jeopardize US participation.’[xiv]      

         The plan to overthrow Mosaddeq was given additional impetus when former allies, Ayatollah Abolqasem Kashani and Mozaffar Baqa’i, turned on the Iranian Prime Minister.[xv]  It was thought in Washington that Mosaddeq as a result ‘may rely to an increasing extent on the Tudeh Party.’[xvi]  By March 1953, conjecture reflected perceptions and their symbiosis had entrenched the belief that Mosaddeq’s premiership and the loss of Iran to Soviet sphere of influence were inseparable.  On March 18 MI6 received a message from Wisner to the effect that the CIA was ready to hold detailed discussions for Mosaddeq’s overthrow.[xvii]  The significance of Eisenhower’s electoral victory for TPAJAX’s progression is rarely a moot point in the historiography and is almost uniformly seen as having a decisive impact upon the turn of events.  Alongside the Conservative Party’s victory in October 1951, it has been a fecund source for a deluge of ifs and buts e.g. what would have happened if the Democrats had won the election?  

         The essay will now turn directly to British involvement in TPAJAX.  Wilber’s history will be predominantly relied upon, cross-referenced where possible with the accounts of participants already published and supplemented with the secondary literature.  The value of the after-action report for the purpose of this essay is that it delineates without inhibition the extent of the British contribution.  Hitherto, either understated or subject to denials, on both sides of the Atlantic.  Even though the role of Britain is significantly amplified, the SIS nonetheless still emerges as the ‘junior partner’.[xviii]  

         Before delving further into ‘Overthrow’, it might be expedient to enumerate a few precautionary remarks.  As Nikki Keddie has observed, this document may not be entirely factual but in lieu reveal the predilections and biases of its author.[xix]  This however is not simply a characteristic of ‘Overthrow’ but the majority of historical documentation contemporary with the events under scrutiny.  Thus, just as with Foreign Office sources or the memoirs of officials, one must retain a critical distance not taking the opinions and assessments of officials at face-value, especially if written ex post facto, whereby self-justification often comes into play and evokes distortions.  

         On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that Wilber was an academic historian, which may detract from the document’s immediacy and inure a degree of formalization not commonly found in documents of this sort.  One should also be circumspect because Wilber was in Nicosia, acting as operational liaison, not Iran at the time of the coup, and his account could only have been based upon his debriefing of participants whom were in Iran, such as Kermit Roosevelt, head of CIA covert operations in the Middle East, and the coup’s most celebrated protagonist.[xx]  Gasiorowski the most prolific scholar of the coup argues that, ‘Some facts were inevitably lost or misinterpreted in this process, especially since this was a rapidly changing series of events.  This being said, I doubt that there will be any major errors in the 200-page history.’[xxi]         

    The decision to launch the joint CIA-SIS operation was taken in April 1953 and the plan completed on 10 June.[i]  After a meeting in Beirut of amongst others Roosevelt and Roger Goiran, CIA Chief of Station, Iran, the earlier plan Operation Boot with few changes, was submitted to SIS, London.[ii]  Roosevelt and British Intelligence thereafter continued the process of deliberation until the 19 June, when the final operational plan was submitted by the SIS to the Foreign Office for approval.  Meanwhile, the State Department before vouchsafing the plan required assurance ‘that the British Government would signify in writing…its intention to reach an early oil settlement with a successor Iranian Government’.[iii]  

         By mid-July 1953, the State Department, Foreign Office, and President Eisenhower had all authorized TPAJAX’s implementation.[iv]  General Fazlollah Zahedi, a former Nazi collaborator, was chosen by both parties as the candidate to replace Mosaddeq; as we have seen, Zahedi had already been designated by the Foreign Office and Woodhouse as a potential successor to Mosaddeq in the event of a successful coup.  The CIA and SIS supplied $35,000 and $25,000 to Zahedi respectively.[v]  In total, the SIS financed just under half of the total costs to implement the plan, approximately $137, 500.[vi]  

         In late April Wilber had been sent to Nicosia to act as an operational liaison in coordination with the SIS’s Darbyshire.[vii]  Darbyshire was a veritable asset to the mission; he was fluent in Farsi and had worked in Tehran for several years having thereby acquired an intimate knowledge of Iranian politics.  His role in the revision of TPAJAX throughout May undoubtedly stamped the tenor of the operation.  Darbyshire should also be credited with keeping the British Government behind the operation after it had become resigned to failure when the first attempted coup foundered on 15 August.[viii]   

              From Nicosia, there was regular contact with the Rashidians in Tehran,[ix] whom during June were placed under the command of the CIA’s Tehran Station.[x]  They were instructed to escalate the scathing propaganda campaign against Mosaddeq, so that ‘public opinion’ was ‘fanned to fever pitch…in the period just preceding the execution of the overthrow operation.’[xi]  Their ‘avowed willingness to risk their possessions and their lives in an attempt against Mossadeq’ was widely commended, and TPAJAX’s success was acknowledged as indissociable from their unrelenting efforts to depose Mosaddeq.[xii]  Even after the first coup attempt had been foiled by pro-Mosaddeq forces within the military, the Rashidians using their own resources remained determined to overthrow the Iranian Premier,[xiii] with a rented crowd of 4,000 at their disposal.[xiv]     

         Thus far it should be fairly clear that TPAJAX developed interstitially, at each stage open to the input and objections of the SIS,[xv] Foreign Office, CIA and State Department.[xvi]  And though not greatly exercised by the SIS, British influence remains conspicuous, permeating not only the plan’s formal construction but its final outcome, to which British expertise, contacts and agents made an invaluable contribution.  Despite the superiority of CIA funding and equipment,[xvii] MI6 were in possession of innumerable intangible assets that had been steadfastly cultivated and nurtured over many years; all of which played a key role in the coup’s success.  

         The Shah was seen by both the CIA and SIS as the lynchpin of the plan.[xviii]  His cooperation was necessary first, so that the coup could be made to ‘appear legal or quasi-legal’,[xix] since the Shah would have to issue the farman or royal edict dismissing Mosaddeq as Prime Minister.  The Shah would also have responsibility for rallying the armed forces under the imperial banner.  The British estimation of the Shah, however, was unflattering.  He was not only regarded as ‘indecisive’, but as ‘devoid of moral courage’,[xx] with a ‘pathological fear’ of the British intrigue.[xxi]  This foreknowledge was integrated into TPAJAX’s formulation, and was embodied in a crucial step of the plan’s several movements.  

         The return to Iran of the Shah’s ‘forceful and scheming’[xxii] twin sister, Princess Ashraf, on 25 July from her self-imposed exile in Europe was organised by the CIA and SIS.[xxiii]  Ashraf while on the French Riviera was visited first by Asadollah Rashidian, and then the following day, by Darbyshire and Stephen Meade, the former representing the SIS and the latter the CIA.  She was told to urge her brother to dismiss Mosaddeq, and agreed to carry out her part after receiving a quid pro quo from Darbyshire, a mink coat and an undisclosed amount of cash.[xxiv]  The second step, arranged that General Norman Schwarzkopf, former head of the U.S. Gendarme Mission to Iran, and a figure held in high esteem by the Shah, would further exhort the Shah to sign the farmans dismissing Mosaddeq, appointing Zahedi and calling upon the army to remain loyal to the Crown.  Like Ashraf, Schwarzkopf was crucially told to emphasise Anglo-American collusion.[xxv]  

         This was again compounded by a visit to the Shah by, ‘the principal indigenous British agent’, Asadollah Rashidian.[xxvi]  He told the Shah that he was ‘the official spokesman of the UK Government.’[xxvii]  As proof of his bona fides he arranged a phrase chosen by the Shah to be broadcast over BBC radio.  Rashidian then proceeded to act as a conduit for Roosevelt to broach contact with the Shah.  This was a precondition of Roosevelt’s success; the most prominent American agents, Ali Jalili and Farouk Kayvani,[xxviii] codenamed the Boscoe Brothers/Nerren and Cilley, had no such connections with the royal court; their influence lay with the Tehrani petit-bourgeoisie and mercantile classes of the bazaar.[xxix]      

         Although this character-profile of the Shah was not exclusively a British conception, the assurance given to the Shah that the initiative was not of only American provenance, exhibits his hesitancy and fear of complying without guarantee of British assent.  It can be reasonably countenanced that the young Shah was gripped with fear and possessed by a grossly exaggerated belief in the ubiquity and well-nigh omnipotent power of British intrigue.  This was well known to British officials.[xxx]  Without the palliative assurance of British complicity ‘it would have been impossible to get the Shah to move’ beyond his grave misgivings.[xxxi]

         Wilber asserts that ‘had not the UK assets been cut in on the operation, they would either have exposed whatever they learned about it to the government or tried actively to see that it failed.’[xxxii]  This is indeed tenable, but one can only speculate as to what would have happened had the Americans not enjoined British participation.  Of course one cannot say with certainty that the coup would have failed without British collusion; although I hasten to add that the likelihood of success would have been greatly diminished thereby.  Not only did the coup originate in British designs, but members of the SIS, such as Woodhouse and Darbyshire in conjunction with the Rashidians, made their presence felt throughout the operation’s manifold stages of development until its consummate fruition.[xxxiii]  

    Conclusion

         We can conclude that British antipathy toward Mosaddeq was due to the Nationalisation Law of March 1951 that came into effect with his premiership, and the associated desire to be free of foreign tutelage which he promulgated and sought to realise.  It did not stem from Mosaddeq’s inability to prevent a Communist seizure of power, but because of the threat that the Nationalisation Law posed to British economic interests and prestige.  British officials were especially concerned for the latter. They believed that if Mosaddeq was allowed to succeed unscathed British interests in Iraq and Egypt might too be lost.  Interestingly, during the course of the oil dispute King Farouk of Egypt was overthrown by the so-called Free Officers in a military coup d’état, who espoused the doctrines of Egyptian nationalism and anti-imperialism.  Morrison and later Churchill both regarded Mosaddeq’s downfall as necessary in order to neutralise this threat, and both became ‘fed up’ with the American ‘obsession with Communism in Persia’ while ‘Britain’s real interests’ were ignored.[xxxiv]     

         The invasion of Abadan by British forces was a bona fide possibility.  British diplomacy was elicited largely because of pressure applied by the Truman Administration.  But as has been shown, that did not prevent the Labour Government from protecting its ‘real interests’ by dint of covert operations, a policy vehemently pursued by Churchill.  It was Churchill that reinvigorated British hopes and overwhelmed interdepartmental differences by the sheer weight of his personality.  The motive underlying the operations to oust Mosaddeq remained the same despite the change of government from Labour to Conservative, and demonstrates the remarkable consistency of British attitudes toward Mosaddeq over the course of the oil dispute.  It also shows that almost from the outset the British Government, in particular Morrison and the Foreign Office, felt that Mosaddeq was ‘unnegotiable’, a euphemism for ‘unamenable’.  He therefore had to be toppled.

         After the Qavam al-Saltaneh debacle and Iran had severed diplomatic relations, the Conservative Government acknowledged that the overthrow of Mosaddeq could not be achieved without American support.  Both Truman and Eisenhower wanted to prevent Communist subversion in Iran, but ultimately their prescriptions differed.[xxxv]  While Truman and Acheson believed the only alternative to Mosaddeq was Communism, Eisenhower and his entourage were convinced that if Mosaddeq remained in power, Iran would be lost to the Soviets.  I have tried to show this was an incorrect assessment and one also not shared by the British Government.  They, as we have seen, despised Mosaddeq for other reasons.

         Britain could not overthrow Mosaddeq without American support, but whether TPAJAX would have succeeded without British participation is a complex matter.  I concluded that the possibility of success would have been greatly diminished.  British agents and expertise were integral to TPAJAX’s success, acting in many instances as preconditions for Roosevelt’s triumph.  Wilber’s claim that had Britain not been involved, MI6 would have attempted to induce TPAJAX’s failure, also supports this conclusion.  The irony of course is that rather than recovering the AIOC and salvaging British prestige, TPAJAX spelled the end of British hegemony in Iran, and inaugurated the period of American patronage that would last until the Islamic Revolution in 1979.

Copyright Sadegh Kabeer

   Archives

    1)     National Archives, London.

    2)       National Security Archive, //www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/.

    U.S. Government Sources

    1)       Koch, Scott A., ‘“Zendebad, Shah!”: The Central Intelligence Agency and the Fall of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq, August 1953’ (History Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, June 1998)

    2)       National Security Council, NSC 136/1, ‘United States Policy regarding the Present Situation in Iran’, Top Secret Report, November 20, 1952

    3)       State Department, ‘Proposed Course of Action with Respect to Iran,’ Top Secret Draft Memorandum, August 10, 1953

    4)       State Department, ‘First Progress Report on Paragraph 5-a of NSC 136/1, 'U.S. policy regarding the present situation in Iran'’, Top Secret Memorandum, March 20, 1953

    5)       State Department, ‘Measures which the United States Government Might Take in Support of a Successor Government to Mosadeq,’ Top Secret Memorandum, March 1953

    6)       United States Embassy, Iran Despatch from Loy Henderson to the Department of State. ‘Attaching Memorandum Entitled 'Report on the Use of Anti-Soviet Material within Iran during Period Covered by Last Two Years'’, May 29, 1953

    7)       Wilber, Donald N., ‘Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mosaddeq of Iran: November 1952-August 1953’ (Central Intelligence Agency, March 1954)

    Articles

    1)       Abrahamian, Ervand, ‘The 1953 Coup in Iran’, Science and Society, Vol. 65, No. 2 (Summer, 2001)

    2)       Abrahamian, Ervand, ‘The Crowd in Iranian Politics 1905-1953’, Past and Present, No. 41 (Dec., 1968)

    3)       Gasiorowski, Mark J., ‘Just Like That: How the Mossadegh Government was Overthrown’,

           (July 7, 2000, //iranian.com/History/2000/July/Coup/inde...)

    4)       Gasiorowski, Mark J., ‘What’s New on the Iran 1953 Coup in The New York Times Article (April 16, 2000, front page) and the Documents Posted on the Web’,            (19 April, 2000, //www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB28/inde...)

    5)       Gasiorowski, Mark J., ‘The 1953 Coup d’état in Iran’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Aug., 1987)

    6)       Ladjevardi, Habib, ‘The Origins of U.S. Support for an Autocratic Iran’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (May, 1983)

    7)       Risen, James, ‘The New York Times’, 16 April, 2000, ‘Secrets of History: The CIA in Iran – A special report: How a Plot Convulsed Iran in ’53 (and in ‘79’

    Books (English)

        1)       Abrahamian, Ervand, ‘Iran Between to Revolutions’ (Princeton University Press, 1982)

    2)       Ed. Amirsadeghi, Hossein, ‘Twentieth-Century Iran’ (Heinemann, 1977)

    3)       Ashton, Nigel J., ‘Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem of Nasser: Anglo-American Relations and Arab Nationalism, 1955-59’ (Macmillan, 1996)

    4)       Attlee, Clement R., ‘As It Happened’ (William Heinemann Ltd, 1954)

    5)       Behrooz, Maziar, ‘Rebels with a Cause: The Failure of the Left in Iran’ (I.B. Tauris, 2000)

    6)       Ed. Bill, James A. and Louis, Wm. R., ‘Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism and Oil’ (I.B. Tauris, 1988)

    7)       Ed. Byrne, Malcolm and Gasiorowski, Mark J., ‘Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran’ (Syracuse University Press, 2004)

    8)       Cable, James, ‘Intervention at Abadan: Plan Buccaneer’ (Macmillan, 1991)

    9)       Cottam, Richard W., ‘Nationalism in Iran’ (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964)

    10)    Devereux, David R., ‘The Formulation of British Defence Policy Towards the Middle East, 1948-56’ (Macmillan, 1990)

    11)    Diba, Farhad, ‘Mohammad Mossadegh: A Political Biography’ (Croom Helm, 1986)

    12)    Dorril, Stephen, ‘MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty’s Secret Intelligence Service’ (The Free Press, 2000)

    13)    Elwell-Sutton, Lawrence P., ‘Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics’ (Lawrence and Wishart, 1955)

    14)    Gasiorowski, Mark J., ‘U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran’ (Cornell University Press, 1991)

    15)    Goode, James F., ‘The United States and Iran’ (Macmillan, 1997)

    16)    Halliday, Fred, ‘Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East’ (I.B. Tauris, 2003)

    17)    Halliday, Fred, ‘Iran: Dictatorship and Development’ (Penguin Books, 1979)

    18)    Hinnebusch, Raymond, ‘The International Politics of the Middle East’ (Manchester University Press, 2003)

    19)    Katouzian, Homa, ‘Iranian History and Politics: The Dialectic of State and Society’ (RoutledgeCurzon, 2003)

    20)    Katouzian, Homa, ‘Mussadiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran’ (I.B. Tauris, 1999)

    21)    Katouzian, Homa, ‘The political economy of modern Iran : despotism and pseudo-modernism, 1926-1979’ (Macmillan, 1981)

    22)    Ed. Keddi, Nikki R. and Gasiorowski, Mark J., ‘Neither East Nor West: Iran, the Soviet Union, and the United States’ (Yale University Press, 1990)

    23)    Keddi, Nikki R., ‘Roots of Revolution: An Interpretative History of Modern Iran’ (Yale University Press, 1981)

    24)    Kinzer, Stephen, ‘All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror’ (John Wiley & Sons, 2003)

    25)    Locke, John, Ed. Peter Laslett, ‘Two Treatises of Government’ (Cambridge University Press, 1960)

    26)    Louis, Wm. R., ‘The British Empire in the Middle East: 1945-51’ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984)

    27)    Lytle, Mark L., ‘The Origins of the Iranian-American Alliance: 1941-1953’ (Holmes & Meier)

    28)    Morrison, Herbert, ‘An Autobiography’ (Odhams Press, 1960)

    29)    Musaddiq, Mohammad, Edited and introduced by Homa Katouzian, ‘Musaddiq’s Memoirs’ (JEBHE, National Movement of Iran, 1988)

    30)    Ovendale, Ritchie, ‘Britain, the United States, and the Transfer of Power in the Middle East, 1945-1962’, (Leicester University Press, 1996)

    31)    Palmowski, Jan, ‘A Dictionary of Contemporary World History: From 1900 to the Present Day’ (Oxford University Press, 2003)

    32)    Parsa, Misagh, ‘Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution’ (Rutgers University Press, 1989)

    33)    Rahnema, Ali, ‘An Islamic Utopian: A Political Biography of Ali Shari’ati’ (I.B. Tauris, 2000)

    34)    Roosevelt, Kermit, ‘Countercoup: The Struggle For the Control of Iran’ (McGraw-Hill, 1979)

    35)    Said, Edward W., ‘Orientalism’ (Penguin Books, 1995)

    36)    Saikal, Amin, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Shah 1941-1979’ (Angus and Robertson Publishers, 1980)

    37)    Taheri, Amin, ‘Nest of Spies: America’s Journey to Disaster in Iran’ (Hutchinson, 1988)

    38)    Wilber, Donald N., ‘Adventures in the Middle East: Excursions and Incursions’ (Darwin, 1986)

    39)    Woodhouse, Christopher M., ‘Something Ventured’ (Granada, 1982)

    Books (Farsi)

    Farsi titles are my own transliteration.

    1)       Abrāhamian, Ervand, ‘Irān beyn-e Do Enqelāb: Az Mashruteh tā Enqelāb-e Eslāmi’ (nashr-e markaz, 1377)

    2)       Ahmadi, Hamid, ‘Taqiqi Darbāre-ye Tārikh-e Enqelāb-e Irān’ (Enteshārāt-e Enqelāb-e Eslāmi, 1380)

    3)       Jafari-Qanavāti, Mohammad, ‘Moarefi va Shenākht-e Doktor Mohammad Mosaddeq’ (Nashr-e Qatreh, 1380)

    4)       Rohani, Fuad, ‘Zendegi-ye Siyāsi-ye Mosaddeq’ (Enteshārāt-e Zavār, Tehran, 1380)

    5)       Saidi, Hassan, ‘Zan-e Ejdehā Zendegināmeh-ye Ashraf-e Pahlavi’ (Firoozeh, 1380)

    6)       Torbati-Sanjābi, Mahmud, ‘Koo detāt Sāzān’ (Moaseseh-ye Farhang-e Kāvosh, 1376)

    Newspapers and Journals

    1)       ‘The Times’

    2)       ‘The Observer’

    3)       ‘The Financial Times’

    4)       ‘The Washington Post’

    5)       ‘The New York Times’

    6)       ‘Time’

    7)       ‘Kayhan’ (Farsi)

    Documentaries

        1)       History Channel, ‘Anatomy of a Coup: The CIA in Iran’, Catalogue No. AAE-43021

       Websites
     

    1)       //www.iranica.com/articlenavigation/index.htm...

    2)       //www.time.com/time/archive/

    3)       //iranian.com/

    4)       //cryptome.org/iran-cia/cia-iran-pdf.htm

    5)       //www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB28/inde...

    6)       //www.catalogue.nationalarchives.gov.uk/searc...

    7)       //www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk/cab45.htm

    8)       //pedia.newsfilter.co.uk/wikipedia/a/an/antho...

    9)       //www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/TUmorrison.ht...

    10)    //www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/TUbevin.htm

    11)    //www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB78/docs....

    12)    //www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB126/ind...

    13)    //www.time.com/time/time100/leaders/profile/c...

    14)    //www.archives.gov/research_room/arc/index.ht...

    15)    //www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk/man/con51.htm

    FOOTNOTES

[i] Donald N. Wilber, ‘Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mosaddeq of Iran: November 1952-August 1953’ (Central Intelligence Agency, March 1954)  is essentially an after-action report written in March 1954, by one of the coup’s leading planners; it details preparatory work and the covert operation in full.

    [i] Homa Katouzian, ‘Mussadiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran’ (I.B. Tauris, 1999), p92   

    [ii] Mark J. Gasiorowski, ‘U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran’ (Cornell University Press, 1991), p62

    [iii] Ibid, p62

    [iv] Nikki R. Keddi, ‘Roots of Revolution: An Interpretative History of Modern Iran’ (Yale University Press, 1981), p133

    [v] Gasiorowski, ‘U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah’, p62

    [vi] //www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/TUbevin.htm

    [vii] Cited in Stephen Kinzer, ‘All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror’ (John Wiley & Sons, 2003), p68

    [viii] //www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/TUmorrison.ht...

    [ix] Herbert Morrison, ‘An Autobiography’ (Odhams Press, 1960), p281, emphasis added

    [x] Cf. Edward W. Said, ‘Orientalism’ (Penguin Books, 1995); Fred Halliday, ‘Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East’ (I.B. Tauris, 2003), p195-217

    [xi] Shinwell’s hostility to the Nationalization Law is probably in part attributable to his holding the Fuel and Power portfolio from 1945-7.  //www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk/cab45.htm

    [xii] Kinzer, ‘All the Shah’s Men’, p91  

    [xiii] Clement R. Attlee, ‘As It Happened’ (William Heinemann, 1954), p175

    [xiv] Ibid, p175-6

    [xv] Mohammad Musaddiq, Edited and introduced by Homa Katouzian, ‘Musaddiq’s Memoirs’ (JEBHE, National Movement of Iran, 1988), p40  

    [xvi] //pedia.newsfilter.co.uk/wikipedia/a/an/antho...

    [xvii] Ed. James A. Bill and Wm. Roger Louis, ‘Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism and Oil’ (I.B. Tauris, 1988), p232

    [xviii] Ed. Malcolm Byrne and Mark J. Gasiorowski, ‘Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran’ (Syracuse University Press, 2004), p127

    [xix] Ibid, p130

    [xx] Gasiorowski, ‘U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran’, p62; Scott A. Koch, ‘“Zendebad, Shah!”: The Central Intelligence Agency and the Fall of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq, August 1953’ (History Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, June 1998), p14

    [i] Kinzer, ‘All the Shah’s Men’, p91

    [ii] Morrison to Franks, 7 May, 1951, FO 371/91535; cf. Kinzer, ‘All the Shah’s Men’, p93

    [iii] Kinzer, ‘All the Shah’s Men’, p93

    [iv] Ibid, p93

    [v] The 1933 Oil Agreement was agreed to by Reza Shah, after recriminations and saber rattling by the British Government, at a meeting with Sir John Cadman, then AIOC chairman, in Tehran, before cabinet approval, Majlis debate or any public knowledge of its terms.  Katouzian, ‘Mussadiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran’, p36

    [vi] Pyman, ‘Confidential’, 9 July, 1951, FO 248/1515

    [vii] Stephen Kinzer, ‘All the Shah’s Men’, p93

    [viii] Franks to FO, 19 August, 1952, FO 371/98694

    [ix] Stephen Kinzer, ‘All the Shah’s Men’, p94

    [x] Henry F. Grady, ‘Mistakes in Persia’, 11 August, 1952, FO 371/98694

    [xi] Raymond Hinnebusch, ‘The International Politics of the Middle East’ (Manchester University Press, 2003), p24

    [xii] John Foster Dulles, May 1953, ‘Conclusions on Trip’ (Seeley G. Mudd Library, Princeton, New Jersey, USA), p4-7 in Ed. Nigel Ashton, ‘HY 312: From Suez to the Six Day War: Britain, the United States and Arab Nationalism, 1952-70: Document List’ (unpublished)

    [xiii] Henry F. Grady, ‘Mistakes in Persia’, 11 August, 1952, FO 371/98694

    [xiv] The Tudeh Party was the most important Marxist party in Iran and received aid directly from Moscow.  Maziar Behrooz, ‘Rebels with a Cause: The Failure of the Left in Iran’ (I.B. Tauris, 2000).  ‘Tudeh’ means ‘masses’ in Farsi.

    [xv] For the British Press on Mosaddeq see Ervand Abrahamian, ‘The 1953 Coup in Iran’, Science and Society, Vol. 65, No. 2 (Summer, 2001), p193;  Also see, ‘A Persian Reply’, ‘Financial Times’, 17 September, 1952 and ‘Unacceptability of Persian Terms’, ‘The Times’, 17 September, 1952, in FO 371/98697; Also, Christopher M. Woodhouse, ‘Something Ventured’ (Granada, 1982), p106

    [xvi] Stephen Dorril, ‘MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty’s Secret Intelligence Service’ (The Free Press, 2000), p565

    [xvii] The CIB ran the AIOC’s very own intelligence network; it activities included bribing officials, funding newspapers, intelligence gathering, political intrigue and propaganda, ibid, p564

    [xviii] Cited in ibid, p565

    [xix] FO 248, FO 371, passim.

    [i] ‘Blow up?’, ‘Time’, 2 July, 1951,  //www.time.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,8...

    [ii] Ed. Byrne and Gasiorowski, ‘Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran’, p129

    [iii] Ibid, p129

    [iv] Ed. James A. Bill and Wm. Roger Louis, ‘Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism and Oil’ (I.B. Tauris, 1988), p182

    [v]  Ibid, p182

    [vi]Ramsbotham, 26 April, 1952, FO 371/98689

    [vii] Mahmud Torbati Sanjābi, ‘Koo detāt Sāzān’ (Moaseseh-ye Farhang-e Kāvosh, 1376), p123; Katouzian, ‘Mussadiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran’, p138; Ed. Byrne and Gasiorowski, ‘Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran’, p129; Musaddiq, Ed. Homa Katouzian, ‘Musaddiq’s Memoirs’, p39; Ed. Bill and Louis, ‘Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism and Oil’, p330, and the list goes on…

    [viii] Farhad Diba, ‘Mohammad Mossadegh: A Political Biography’ (Croom Helm, 1986), p84-90

    [ix] Ed. Bill and Louis, ‘Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism and Oil’ , p179-80

    [x] ‘Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defence: the Anglo-Iranian Problem’, 10 October 1951 cited in Ed. Bill and Louis, ‘Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism and Oil’, p180; Franks to FO, September 15, 1952, FO 371/98701: ‘The British did not attach so far as [Acheson] could see, any importance to keeping Musaddiq in office…a change from Musaddiq in the American view could only be a change for the worse.’ ; Franks to FO, 31 July, 1952, FO 371/98691.  This characterisation is frequently attested to in Foreign Office documentation.

    [xi] See for example, Joseph and Stewart Alsop, ‘Matter of Fact: The Unwatched Pot’, ‘The Washington Post’, 30 July, 1952 in FO 371/98603   

    [xii] Middleton to Ross, 6 October, 1952, FO 371/98701; Franks to FO, September 15, 1952, FO 371/98701

    [xiii] Burrows to Bowker, 30 July, 1952, FO 371/98603

    [xiv] Sanjābi, ‘Koo detāt Sāzān’, p124

    [xv] Diba, ‘Mohammad Mossadegh’, p120

    [xvi] James Cable, ‘Intervention at Abadan: Plan Buccaneer’ (Macmillan, 1991), p51-63

    [xvii] Woodhouse, ‘Something Ventured’, p111

    [xviii] Cable, ‘Intervention at Abadan’, p98

    [xix] Ibid, p102

    [xx] Ibid, p7

    [xxi] Ibid, p45; Henry F. Grady, ‘Mistakes in Persia’, 11 August, 1952, FO 371/98694

    [xxii] Cable, ‘Intervention at Abadan’, p99

    [xxiii] CM 60 (51) in CAB 128 20 cited in ibid, p99

    [xxiv] Cited in ibid, p89

    [xxv] Woodhouse, ‘Something Ventured’, p111

    [xxvi] Zaehner, 27 August, 1951, FO 371/1514

    [xxvii] Woodhouse, ‘Something Ventured’, p11

    [xxviii] Furlonge, 15 November 1951, FO 371/91465

    [xxix] This embargo encompassed sugar, iron, steel and oil processing equipment, ‘Financial Restrictions on Persia’, 12 September, 1951, FO/371/91491; Pyman, ‘Confidential’, 11 July 1951, FO/1515

    [xxx] E.g. Wilber, ‘Overthrow’, piii

    [xxxi] See Katouzian, ‘Oil boycott and the political economy: Musaddiq and the strategy of non-oil’ in Ed. Bill and Louis, ‘Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism and Oil’, p203-225; ‘Iranian History and Politics: The Dialectic of State and Society’ (RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), passim; ‘Mussadiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran’, p137-55; ‘The political economy of modern Iran : despotism and pseudo-modernism, 1926-1979’ (Macmillan, 1981), passim.

    [xxxii] Ed. Bill and Louis, ‘Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism and Oil’, p225

    [xxxiii] Ibid, p225

    [xxxiv] For a typical example see United States Embassy, Iran Despatch from Loy Henderson to the Department of State. ‘Attaching Memorandum Entitled 'Report on the Use of Anti-Soviet Material within Iran during Period Covered by Last Two Years'’, May 29, 1953.  This is just the tip of the iceberg.  For more see Gasiorowski on TPBEDAMN and ‘black’ propaganda, Mark J. Gasiorowski, ‘The 1953 Coup d’état in Iran’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Aug., 1987), p268

    [xxxv] Eden to Williams, 25 October, 1952, FO 371/98701

    [xxxvi] Lawrence P. Elwell-Sutton, ‘Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics’ (Lawrence and Wishart, 1955), p231-32; Pyman, ‘Minutes’, 23 July, 1951, FO 248/1515  

    [xxxvii] Shepherd to FO, 30 July, 1951, FO 371/91462

    [xxxviii] Berthoud, ‘Persia’, 13 October, 1952, FO 371/98701.  This is interesting because the Eden Government would say much the same thing vis-à-vis Nasser.

    [xxxix] Churchill to Truman, 23 August, 1952, FO 371/98694; Middleton to Eden, 23 September, 1952, FO 371/98604

    [xl] Ed. Bill and Louis, ‘Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism and Oil’, p183

    [xli] Ibid, p183

    [i] It was Nancy Lambton, a Reader in Persian at the School of Oriental and African Studies that recommended to Morrison, scholar/agent Robin Zaehner to organize and direct covert activities against Mosaddeq.   

    [ii] Berthoud, ‘Persia’, 13 October, 1952, FO 371/98701

    [iii] FO 371/91459/EP1015/201 cited in Wm. Roger Louis, ‘The British Empire in the Middle East: 1945-51’ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p679

    [iv] For an adumbration of the Nine Point Law and its place in the overall scheme of things see, Fuad Rohani, ‘Zendegi-ye Siyāsi-ye Mosaddeq’ (Enteshārāt-e Zavār, Tehran, 1380), p160-3

    [v] Stokes told the Cabinet prior to arrival in Tehran that he would accept the ‘flavour or façade of nationalisation while retaining the substance of control’, FO 371/91471, cited in Abrahamian, ‘The 1953 Coup in Iran’, p191

    [vi] Rohani, ‘Zendegi-ye Siyāsi-ye Mosaddeq’, p235-245

    [vii] Middleton would often refer to the failure of the Stokes’ Mission in order to vindicate his belief that Mosaddeq was intractable and unnegotiable.  See Middleton to Eden, 23 September, 1952, FO 371/98604; and Middleton to Ross  20 October, 1952, FO 371/98605

    [viii] Makins to Strang, ‘Persian Oil’, 7 June, 1952, FO 371/98690

    [ix] Churchill had a relationship of longstanding with the Admiralty prior to the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute, and oversaw many crucial reforms during the first two decades of the twentieth century.  He was thus acutely aware, not only of the abiding importance of oil for the Royal Navy, but also Britain’s future as a world power.  //www.time.com/time/time100/leaders/profile/c...

    [x] Woodhouse, ‘Something Ventured’, p125; Churchill ‘regarded SIS as his service, and that it was very close to his heart’, Wilber, ‘Overthrow’, p82

    [xi] The CIA codenamed Operation Boot, Operation TPAJAX.

    [xii] Woodhouse, ‘Something Ventured’, p125

    [xiii] Dorril, ‘MI6’, p570

    [xiv] Churchill to Truman, 23 August, 1952, FO 371/98694

    [xv] See Conservative Party Manifesto, 1951, //www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk/man/con51.htm

    [xvi] British Embassy, Tehran, 3 August, 1955, FO 371/114611

    [xvii] Middleton to Ross, 6 October, 1952, FO 371/98701; Rothnie, ‘The Internal Situation in Persia’, 2 March, 1953, FO 371/104563: General Fazlollah Zahedi is mentioned by name in both of these documents and posited as a potential successor to Mosaddeq.  Zahedi was the individual designated in Operation TPAJAX, to replace Mosaddeq as Prime Minister after the latter was ousted.

    [xviii] Gasiorowski, ‘The 1953 Coup d’état in Iran’, p267  

    [xix] Mark H. Lytle, ‘The Origins of the Iranian-American Alliance: 1941-1953’ (Holmes & Meier), p203

    [xx] Zaehner, ‘Minutes’, 7 November, FO 371/1514

    [xxi] Mohammad Jafari-Qanavāti, ‘Moarefi va Shenakht-e Doktor Mohammad Mosaddeq’ (Nashr-e Qatreh, 1380), p288

    [xxii] Ibid, p287

    [xxiii] FO to British Embassy, Tehran, ‘Confidential’, 18 July, 1952, FO 371/98690

    [xxiv] One should perhaps bear in mind that King Farouk of Egypt only a month earlier had been overthrown by the so-called Free Officers in a military coup d’état.  With Mosaddeq’s triumphant return to the premiership, there had been two debilitating blows to British interests in the space of a month.

    [xxv] Cable, ‘Intervention at Abadan’, p101

    [xxvi] Churchill to Truman, 23 August, 1952, FO 371/98694

    [xxvii] Franks to FO, 14 August, 1952, 371/98693

    [xxviii] Bowker, 19 August, 1952, FO 371/98694

    [xxix] ‘Persia’, 26 June, 1952, FO 371/98690; Also, FO to Franks, 9 August, 1952, FO 371/98691

    [xxx] FO to Franks, 7 March, 1953, FO 371/104614

    [xxxi] James F. Goode, ‘The United States and Iran’ (Macmillan, 1997), p83

    [xxxii] Truman to Churchill, 24 August, 1952, FO 371/98694.  Note Truman’s strong qualification of the terms of Anglo-American cooperation in this message.  Also see, Franks to Strang, 16 August, 1952, FO 371/98694  

    [xxxiii] ‘Internal Political Situation’, 28 July, 1952, FO 371/98691

    [xxxiv] ‘Draft Paper for Submission by the Secretary of State to the Cabinet’, 28 July, 1952, FO 371/98692

    [xxxv] Ramsbotham, 19 June, 1952, FO 371/98690

    [xxxvi] ‘Internal Political Situation’, 28 July, 1952, FO 371/98691, emphasis added; Middleton to FO, 25 July, 1952, FO 371/98691 also conforms to this interpretation.  

    [xxxvii] State Department, ‘Measures which the United States Government Might Take in Support of a Successor Government to Mosadeq,’ Top Secret Memorandum, March 1953, p3

    [i] Woodhouse, ‘Something Ventured’, p117; this is confirmed in Wilber, ‘Overthrow’, p1  

    [ii] Bowker, ‘Persia’, 23 August, 1952, FO 371/98694

    [iii] Woodhouse, ‘Something Ventured’, p110, emphasis added

    [iv] Ibid, p117, emphasis added

    [v] Ibid, p117; Wilber, ‘Overthrow’, piv

    [vi] Woodhouse, ‘Something Ventured’, p118; Norman Darbyshire, head of MI6 Iran station-in-exile in Cyprus after October 1952, claimed that the Rashidians received ‘well over £1.5 million’,  cited in Dorril, ‘MI6’, p564  

    [vii] Ibid, p118; Eden’s concurrence with this sentiment is again confirmed by Woodhouse on p133, referring to Operation Boot Eden is quoted as saying, ‘at the time in 1952 it was impossible, because the Americans weren’t ready for it.’

    [viii] Ibid, p117

    [ix] Ibid, p117

    [x] National Security Council, NSC 136/1, ‘United States Policy regarding the Present Situation in Iran’, Top Secret Report, November 20, 1952, p1

    [xi] Amin Saikal , ‘The Rise and Fall of the Shah 1941-1979’ (Angus and Robertson, 1980), p44

    [xii] This essay agrees with the concept of ‘a hidden-hand Presidency’ i.e. that Eisenhower had significant input into the formation of American foreign policy, and not merely a detached observer leaving the majority of decisions to the discretion of his Secretary of State;  Nigel J. Ashton, ‘Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem of Nasser: Anglo-American Relations and Arab Nationalism, 1955-59’ (Macmillan, 1996), p3-4    

    [xiii] Dixon to Eden, 19 February, 1953, FO 371/104613

    [xiv] Wilber, ‘Overthrow’, p6

    [xv] Ervand Abrahamian, ‘Iran Between to Revolutions’ (Princeton University Press, 1982), p276

    [xvi] State Department, ‘Proposed Course of Action with Respect to Iran,’ Top Secret Draft Memorandum, August 10, 1953, p2, emphasis added; Also Kermit Roosevelt ‘Countercoup: The Struggle For the Control of Iran’ (McGraw-Hill, 1979), p2

    [xvii] Dorril, ‘MI6’, p583

    [xviii] Wilber, ‘Overthrow’, p87

    [xix] Gasiorowski, Mark J., ‘What’s New on the Iran 1953 Coup in The New York Times Article (April 16, 2000, front page) and the Documents Posted on the Web’, (19 April, 2000, //www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB28/inde...)

    [xx] Ibid

    [xxi] Ibid

    [i]Wilber, ‘Overthrow’, piv-v

    [ii] Ibid, pv

    [iii] Ibid, pvi; the British Government’s pledge is contained in ‘Appendix C’.

    [iv] Ibid, pvi

    [v] Ibid, ‘Appendix A’, p1

    [vi] Ibid, ‘Appendix B’, p1

    [vii] Ibid, p5

    [viii] Ibid, p59-61

    [ix] Ibid, p10

    [x] Ibid, p14

    [xi] Ibid, p9, ‘Appendix B’, p16

    [xii] Ibid, p7, 49-50

    [xiii] Ibid, p52

    [xiv] Ibid, ‘Appendix A’, p7

    [xv] Ibid, p14

    [xvi] Ibid, pvi, 11, 13, 20; Dorril, ‘MI6’, p592

    [xvii] Ibid, p6

    [xviii] Ibid, p22

    [xix] Ibid, p9

    [xx] Middleton to Eden, 28 July, 1952, FO 371/98602

    [xxi] Wilber, ‘Overthrow’, p22, 30; Woodhouse, ‘Something Ventured’, p106

    [xxii] Wilber, ‘Overthrow’, ‘Appendix B’, p3

    [xxiii] Ibid, p23

    [xxiv] Ibid, p10

    [xxv] Ibid, p25, ‘Appendix B’, p4

    [xxvi] Ibid, pviii

    [xxvii] Ibid, p24

    [xxviii] Ibid, p47

    [xxix] Roosevelt, ‘Countercoup’, p17

    [xxx] Woodhouse, ‘Something Ventured’, p112, 115

    [xxxi] Wilber, ‘Overthrow’, p94

    [xxxii] Ibid, p94

    [xxxiii] Ibid, p28

    [xxxiv] Churchill quoted in Dorril, ‘MI6’, p583

    [xxxv] Ed. Byrne and Gasiorowski, ‘Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran’, p225