Fatal attractions

The Perils and Costs of a Grand Bargain with the Islamic Republic of Iran


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Fatal attractions
by Masoud Kazemzadeh
13-Mar-2008
 

Abstract
In this article the author presents an analysis of the perils and costs that the United States is likely to incur if it enters into a grand bargain in general with the Islamic Republic of Iran or into a specific grand bargain based on the proposal advanced by Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann.

Introduction
Among other factors, the American failure to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan has fueled Iran's attempt at regional supremacy to the consternation of many in the region and beyond. The failure of the containment policy, fear that the Islamic Republic will develop nuclear weapons, and the bellicose rhetoric and policies of Iran's new president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, have given rise to urgent discussions about how best to counter the threat of the fundamentalist regime. The main policies under discussion are regime change; surgical strikes; reconfigured containment; limited, issue-based dialogue; and a "grand bargain."

The most detailed proposal for a grand bargain is articulated by Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann. Dr. Leverett served as a senior director of Middle East affairs at the National Security Council (NSC), Middle East specialist on the secretary of state's Policy Planning Staff, and a senior analyst at the CIA. He left the NSC in 2003. He is currently a senior fellow at the New America Foundation. Hillary Mann Leverett engaged in extensive negotiations with Iranian officials during her service at the Permanent Mission of the United States to the UN and the National Security Council.

After the White House demanded redaction of parts of their op-ed article for The New York Times, much controversy ensued. The New York Times published the redacted version of the original op-ed article on December 22, 2006. It is based on a larger study by Leverett entitled "Dealing with Tehran: Assessing U.S. Diplomatic Options Toward Iran," published on December 4.1 In this article, I present some of the perils and costs of a grand bargain in general and the grand bargain proposed by Leverett and Mann in particular.

The United States previously pursued containment of the fundamentalist regime that came to power in 1979. Initially this was conducted awkwardly via balancing through Iraq, which was closely allied with the Soviet Union and France. Saddam's invasion of Kuwait and the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed the Clinton administration to attempt to contain both Iran and Iraq, a policy aptly named "dual containment." Intermittently there have been attempts at rapprochement with the fundamentalist regime.

President Bush's overthrow of Saddam caused great anxiety among Iran's rulers. Concerned that a similar fate was awaiting them, in May 2003 the supreme leader agreed to send the Bush administration a roadmap, developed by Iran's ambassador to France and the Swiss ambassador to Tehran, to resolve U.S.-Iran differences.2 Initial reports that the roadmap was initiated by all of the regime officials are false. In addition, the reports that the supreme leader agreed with all of the serious concessions are false as well.

The actual text of the accompanying notes by Swiss Ambassador Tim Guldimann indicates that the roadmap was his brainchild and that of Iran's then Ambassador Sadeq Kharrazi (a nephew of the foreign minister and a former deputy foreign minister, whose sister is married to the supreme leader's son). Moreover, the text states that the supreme leader only agreed with 85 to 90 percent of the proposals. In other words, the supreme leader was opposed to 10 to 15 percent of the proposals. In his fax to the State Department containing the text of the roadmap, Guldimann wrote:

1. On April 21, I had a longer discussion with Sadeq Kharrazi who came to see me . During this discussion a first draft of the enclosed Roadmap was developed. He said that he would discuss this with the Leader and the Foreign Minister.

2. On May 2, I met him again for three hours. He told me that he had two long discussions with the Leader on the Roadmap. In these meetings, which both lasted almost two hours, only President Khatami and FM Kharrazi were present; "we went through every word of this [sic] paper." (He additionally had a series of separate meetings with both). The question is dealt with in high secrecy, therefore no one else has been informed. (S.Kh. himself has become also very discreet in our last contacts). S. Kh. presented the paper to the Leader as a proposal which he had discussed 'with a friend in Europe who has close contacts with higher echelons in the DoS'; The Leader explicitly hat [sic] asked him whether this is a US-proposal and S.Kh. denied this, saying that, if it is accepted, this friend could convey it to Washington as the basis for opening the bilateral discussion.

3. Then S.Kh. told me that the Leader uttered some reservations as for some points; the President and the Foreign Minister were very positive, there was no problem from their side. Then he said "They (meaning above all the Leader) agree with 85%-90% of the paper. But everything can be negotiated."3

The roadmap calls on the fundamentalist regime to stop providing material support to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) from Iranian territory, put pressure on Hamas and PIJ to stop violence against civilians within 1967 borders, take action on Lebanese Hezbollah to become exclusively a political and social organization within Lebanon, accept the two-state approach, help stabilize Iraq, make the nuclear program transparent, and take decisive action against Al Qaeda in Iranian territory. In exchange, the roadmap asked the Bush administration to give the regime a security guarantee ("The United States will refrain from supporting changes of the political system by direct interference from outside"), respect Iran's interests in Iraq; recognize "Iran's legitimate security interests in the region with the accompanying defense capacity," abolish all sanctions, release Iran's frozen assets, and take "action against MKO and affiliated organizations in the United States." Some of these have been further elaborated as immediate steps such as "U.S. commitment to resolve MKO problem in Iraq" and "Iranian commitment to decisive actions against Al Qaida members in Iran."4

A slightly different version of the roadmap has been provided by the fundamentalist regime.5 In this document the regime spelled out what it meant by "security guarantee." The fundamentalist regime expected the United States to "halthostile behavior and rectification of the status of Iran." The U.S. government must make a public statement that the fundamentalist regime "did not belong to 'the axis of evil'" and must take the fundamentalist regime off the State Department's "terrorism list."

Before analyzing the perils and costs of the grand bargain, it is necessary to discuss the wider political situation and the policy debates within both the American and Iranian sides. I begin with the Iranian side (both opposition and supporters), then proceed with the American side, and finally present my analysis of the grand bargain.

On the Iranian Side: Who's Who Among Iranian Opposition Groups

Opposition groups to the Islamic Republic can be divided into five categories: (1) democratic republicans, (2) monarchists, (3) the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran, (4) Communists, and (5) ethnic parties.

Democratic Republicans
The democratic republican groups want to replace the system of clerical rule (Nezam Velayat Faqih) with sovereignty of the people, that is, democracy.6 They advocate civil liberties, pluralist democracy, rule of law, separation of religion and the state, a republican form of government, and free and fair elections. They argue that all citizens should have equal political rights and thus oppose special privileges for any strata (Shiite clerics) and individuals or families (monarchy). They can be divided into two broad categories: established democrats and young democrats.

The established democrats trace their roots to the 1905 Constitutional Revolution and the 1950s oil nationalization movement under Dr. Mossadegh. The most prominent include Iran National Front (Jebhe Melli Iran), National Movement of Iranian Resistance (NMIR), Iran Nation party (Hezb Mellat Iran), and Liberal Democrats of Iran.7 The oldest and arguably the largest prodemocracy group operating inside Iran is the Iran National Front (INF), which also operates abroad. The INF was founded in 1949 and led by Mossadegh as prime minister between April 1951 and August 1953, when a CIA-engineered coup overthrew his cabinet. After the 1979 revolution, about one-third of cabinet posts - including foreign minister, defense minister, labor minister, and minister of treasury - were held by INF members. On April 15, 1979, Dr. Karim Sanjabi, INF leader and foreign minister, along with other INF ministers, resigned in protest against arbitrary arrests, gross violations of due process in revolutionary courts, and mass executions by revolutionary courts operating outside the provisional government's authority and under the direct control of Ayatollah Khomeini.8

In June 1981 INF was declared apostate by Khomeini and consequently was severely repressed. Between 1997 and 2005, the regime reduced its repression of the activities of the INF, although officially the INF remained illegal and under constant surveillance, harassment, and intimidation, including several hit-and-run attacks. The INF advocates a gradual, step-by-step transition from the incumbent clerical dictatorship to democracy. Issuing communiqués and pronouncements has become the hallmark of the INF. Members of the INF are secular liberal democrats and secular social democrats.

National Movement of Iranian Resistance (NMIR) was led by Dr. Shahpour Bakhtiar, the second highest official of INF. An old nemesis of the shah, Bakhtiar agreed to assume the prime ministership 37 days before the collapse of the monarchy in order to prevent Khomeini's rise to power. Bakhtiar formed NMIR shortly after the revolution. Bakhtiar was assassinated in Paris by agents of the fundamentalist regime on August 6, 1991. Earlier, on April 18, 1991, his deputy, Dr. Abdorrahamn Boroumand, was assassinated in Paris by agents of the fundamentalist regime.9 By and large NMIR members have been social democrats and secular. They have also tended to be more active and action oriented than INF members. In 2007 many members of NMIR, including its third and fourth highest ranked officials (Dr. Homayoun Mehmaneche and Dr. Ali Shakeri Zand), joined the Iran National Front-Abroad.10

The Iran Nation Party (INP) split from the INF in April 1979 when INP members decided to remain in the provisional government's cabinet. The entire cabinet resigned on November 4, 1979, in protest against the fundamentalist takeover of the American embassy in Tehran. In June 1981, after fundamentalists purged President Bani Sadr and captured all levers of power, INP founder and leader, Dariush Forouhar, was imprisoned and severely tortured. In November 1998, "rogue" agents of the Ministry of Intelligence assassinated Dariush Forouhar and his wife, Parvaneh Eskandari-Forouhar, the eminent feminist, prodemocracy activist, prolific poet, and university lecturer. It is widely believed that the official behind the operation was Hojatolislam Mustafa Pour-Mohammadi who became minister of interior in President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's cabinet in 2005.11

There is an emerging category of young democrats who are in their 20s and 30s. The most famous and said to be the most representative is Ahmad Batebi. Other leaders in this category are Manuchehr Mohammadi, the late Akbar Mohammadi (who died in prison in July 2006 after enduring a combination of severe torture, hunger strike, and lack of medical attention), Ali Afshari, and Akbar Atri. Impatient with the gradualism and cautiousness of the INF leadership, the young democrats tend to engage in actions such as civil disobedience and rallies instead of merely issuing endless communiqués. Compared to the established democrats, the young democrats tend to be more action oriented, more hostile to the regime, less hostile to monarchists, and friendlier toward the United States.

The prodemocracy student uprising of July 1999 was organized by this group. They have embraced Mossadegh as the symbol of their desire for a secular democratic republic. Several student organizations have grown inside Iran, but by and large, as a result of repression, they have not been able to organize themselves into strong organizations. Despite severe torture and an initial sentence of execution, Ahmad Batebi has continued his resistance to the regime. He has emerged as the iconic leader of the young democrats. Two organizations that have been formed by members of this category and express the sentiments of some but not all of the members of this category are the Alliance of Iranian Students and Glorious Frontiers party of Iran (HMPG).12 Both of these organizations had to go into exile after the July 1999 uprising.

In addition to the aforementioned categories, there are large number of individuals and intellectuals, both inside Iran and abroad, who are not members of any organization but are democratic republicans. They usually sign open letters and petitions on various issues such as human rights violations. There are also civil society organizations, both inside and outside Iran, such as human rights organizations, labor syndicates, and women's groups that may be classified as democratic republicans. One of the most interesting developments has been the gradual transformation of Daftar Tahkim Vahdat (Office for Fostering Unity), the official umbrella fundamentalist student organization created in 1979 as a federation of various fundamentalist students at universities to counter antifundamentalists students and faculty. Today the majority of Daftar Tahkim Vahdat (DTV) members have embraced democracy.13 In an unusually brave action, its members heckled President Ahmadinejad and burned his portrait when he delivered a speech at Polytechnic University in Tehran on December 11, 2006.14 One student held a sign stating "Fascist President, Polytechnic is not your place."15 Several dozen leaders of the DTV have since been imprisoned and beaten. In July 2007, in order to prevent celebrations of the July 1999 uprising, more officials of DTV were imprisoned and beaten.16

Monarchists
Iranian monarchists are supporters of the Pahlavi dynasty and want to restore Reza Pahlavi, the son of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, to the throne.17 Monarchists are divided into constitutional monarchists and absolute monarchists. Both subcategories condemn the 1979 revolution. The constitutional monarchists state that they want to have freely elected parliamentary democracy with Reza Pahlavi as a constitutional monarch. The main group in this category is the Constitutionalist party of Iran.18

Reza Pahlavi has repeatedly stated that he embraces this position. The absolutist monarchists support the reestablishment of dictatorship.

People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran
People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), also known as the MKO (Mojahedin Khalq Organization) or MeK (Mojahedin e Khalq), or NCRI (National Council of Resistence of Iran), is led by Masoud Rajavi and his wife, Ms. Maryam Azadanlou-Rajavi.19 The PMOI was established in 1965 as the result of a split from the Liberation Movement of Iran, which itself had split from the INF in 1961. The PMOI's ideology, "Classless Divine Society," combined a Maoist socioeconomic and political system with an egalitarian interpretation of Islam. In 1972, Masoud Rajavi described the PMOI's notion of freedom as that existing at that time in the Soviet Union and China. According to the U.S. State Department and many other sources, the PMOI assassinated several Americans in Iran in the early 1970s, although in the 1980s the PMOI denied this in order to gain U.S. support for its struggle against the fundamentalist regime.

The PMOI has been and remains highly disciplined and very well organized, although it is today only a fraction of what it was in the early 1980s. In the 1979-1982 period, the PMOI grew to become a large, mass-based movement. In June 1981 the PMOI called for armed struggle against the regime after Khomeini's removal of President Bani Sadr. The armed uprising failed to topple the regime. Rajavi and Bani Sadr went into exile in France. In 1986 the PMOI's headquarters moved to Iraq. The organization became closely allied with Saddam Hussein thereafter. By 1986 the PMOI had been transformed from a leftist guerrilla organization into a terribly dictatorial cult.20 The PMOI has carried out assassinations of the regime's military, intelligence, and political officials, as well as numerous mortar attacks on the regime's military targets.

In 1997 the U.S. State Department included the PMOI on its foreign terrorist organizations list. The British and the EU soon followed and added the PMOI to their terrorist lists. It is widely argued that the reason PMOI was declared a terrorist organization was to reward the newly elected President Mohammad Khatami for his moderation. The PMOI has been lobbying and litigating to have the terrorism label removed. About 4,000 PMOI fighters in Iraq were disarmed by American forces after the invasion of Iraq and remain under American protection in their camp. The PMOI also has about 5,000 highly committed supporters in Europe.


Communist Groups
Iranian communists are dispersed among more than two dozen organizations. The largest Communist organization in the 1980-1991 period, the Organization of Iranian People's Fedaian (Majority), has ceased to be Communist.21 Smaller groups remain committed to Marxism-Leninism. Today the most active Communist groups are the Workers' Communist party and the Union of People's Fedaian of Iran.22 Iranian Communists were very strong on university campuses in the 1970s and 1980s. Today Communists are very weak because of a variety of reasons, including their strong ideological support for a dictatorial form of government. Today's students and intellectuals crave freedom of thought, expression, and elections - all lacunae in Leninism that have undermined the appeal of communism among university students and intellectuals.
Ethnic Parties

Many ethnic communities in Iran feel oppressed by the fundamentalist regime. They include Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Balochis, Arabs, and Turkomen. The regime's de jure and de facto discrimination against Sunnis (i.e., all Balochis and Turkomen and about half of Kurds and Arabs), which has gone so far as to destroy Sunni mosques in Mashhad and prevent the construction of even a single Sunni mosque in Tehran, has made these minorities especially enraged at the regime. Increased violence in Balochistan, Khuzestan, Kurdestan, Kermanshahan, and Azerbaijan provinces has occurred in recent years.

The oldest and most powerful ethnic party in Iran is the Democratic party of Iranian Kurdistan (DPIK).23 The DPIK was a typical pro-Moscow Communist party before the 1979 revolution. However, under the able leadership of Dr. Abdo-Rahman Qassemlou, the DPIK became independent of Moscow, embraced democratic socialism, and became affiliated with the social democratic organization "Socialist International." It also moved away from separatist demands and called for autonomy within a federal Iran. The agents of the Iranian government assassinated Dr. Qassemlou and two of his lieutenants in Vienna on July 13, 1989. His successor, Dr. Sadegh Sharafkandi, along with his two lieutenants and another democratic socialist Iranian, were assassinated in Berlin on September 17, 1992, by agents of the Iranian government (and three members of the Lebanese Hezbollah).24

Neither Qassemlou nor subsequent leaders of the DPIK made clear exactly what they meant by autonomy and federalism. The DPIK usually uses the term "federalism based on nationality" [federalism bar asas meliyat]. The DPIK refuses to use the term "ethnicity" [ghomiyat] to refer to Kurds and other minority groups in Iran (e.g., Azerbaijanis, Turkomen, Arabs, Balochis) and instead uses the term nationality [meliyat]. Such usage has led many to believe that by "federalism" the DPIK really means "confederalism" where sovereignty resides in an ethnically demarcated unit. Some statements seem to suggest that the DPIK regards the Kurds in Iran as primarily Iranians, whereas other statements seem to suggest that they are primarily part of the Kurdish nation spread in Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Syria. Many believe that the ultimate goal of the DPIK is the creation of one Kurdish nation-state joining all Kurds (in Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Syria) in one state. Reading between the lines, it appears that there is a debate among the DPIK on exactly what their ultimate goal should be.

The leadership and cadres of DPIK operate both inside Iran as well as in Iraqi Kurdistan. In the past seven or eight years, the DPIK has become very close to the United States. In an unprecedented move by any Iranian party, the DPIK congratulated President Bush on his reelection in November 2004. The DPIK can count on the support of several million Kurds in Iran as well as many thousands of guerrillas in Iran and in the Kurdish regions of Iraq.

The second most powerful ethnic party in Iran is the Komala, a Kurdish group.25 Komala used to be a radical Marxist-Leninist party, but it moved away from communism several years ago. It engages in armed conflict with the regime's coercive apparatuses in the Iranian Kurdish region. In the past five to seven years, Komala, like DPIK, has developed a more positive view of the U.S. role in the region. Komala has several thousand guerrillas who operate in the border Kurdish region of Iran and Iraq. In the past few years, Komala and DPIK were able to resolve their earlier differences and have begun to work and coordinate closely.

In 2006 a small Kurdish group (PJAK) surfaced. It has been allied with the PKK, the radical militant Kurdish party in Turkey. The regime's elite Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps has exchanged fire with PJAK on numerous occasions.

Several Baloch groups compete among themselves and the central government. The Balochistan United Front of Iran (Republican Federal), Balochistan Peoples party, and Balochistan National Movement - Iran support a republican federal system. Like the statements of DPIK, their statements on "federalism" are vague, and it is not clear whether they mean a federal system like that of the United States or a confederal system. One group led by Amanoullah Khan Riggi has been accused by other Baloch groups of being monarchist.

The Jondollah Organization of Iran carried out military operations against the regime in early 2007. The regime accused it of being allied with Al Qaeda, but the group immediately denied and condemned the accusation. The organization has stated that it supports a democratic, federal, and secular system in Iran. It is imperative to seek information directly from the various opposition groups themselves because the fundamentalist regime has used proxies to spread false information on opposition groups. The most egregious example may be the regime accusation that Jondollah, a Sunni Baloch group, is Wahhabi and is connected to Al Qaeda. To counter the regime's propaganda, the group changed its name to Jonbeshe Moghavemat Mardomi Iran (Peoples Resistance Movement of Iran).26


Policies of Iranian Opposition Groups

All opposition groups, including social democrats, liberal democrats, Marxists, monarchists, and ethnic minority parties, have been pursuing regime change. Although they have not succeeded in toppling the fundamentalists, they have delegitimized the regime. Today the regime has lost its ideological hegemony and political legitimacy but not its ability to coerce and subdue. This political bankruptcy stems, in large part, from the resistance of the opposition groups and populace to the regime.

The opposition groups regard the fundamentalist regime to be among the most repressive, brutal, reactionary, and misogynist regimes in the world. Many have categorized it as a form of fascism. A few months after the revolution, Ali Asghar Hajj Sayyed Javadi published a series of newspaper articles criticizing the new system as fascistic. These articles were soon published as a pamphlet titled Az sedaye paye Fashism ta ghoole Fashism ke dar hale tassalot bar sarasar-e Iran ast [From Early Steps of Fascism to the Specter of Fascism That Is in the Process of Taking Over All of Iran].27 Hajj Seyyed Javadi was one of Iran's most respected and courageous intellectuals and Iran's most prominent social democrat who had played a prominent role in the anti-shah revolution. Soon he had to go underground and then into exile when the fundamentalist forces were able to crush liberal and leftist forces that had participated in the revolution.

As early as May 1979, the INF leaders condemned the fundamentalist regime as reactionary and fascistic. In the words of Dr. Sanjabi, the number one leader of the INF:

We believe that a monopolizing and reactionary force is taking shape in this country. This force cannot ignore and deny Iran's past history. It cannot negate Mossadeq or the significance of the oil nationalization movement. It cannot ignore the importance of pluralism and the freedom of the press. Accusations and intimidations are the manifestations of this fascist and reactionary tendency. The National Front of Iran has the responsibility of resisting reaction and dictatorship.28

When it was announced that the Assembly of Experts had written a constitution giving Shiite clerics monopolistic powers, the INF issued a strongly worded 10-page analysis. The document repeatedly calls the system religious dictatorship and repeats the earlier warning about emerging "fascism." The document states:

Individual and social liberties and rights that have been the goals of the revolution have to be respected in practice. Today, all of these liberties are in serious threats, and our country is being taken towards a form of fascism. The offices of political parties and societies have been attacked and shot down. Such meetings have also been attacked and closed down. Safety and security of political and social activities of other groups have been eliminated.29

Today most opposition groups regard the regime as fascist or fascistic. The Liberal Democrats of Iran regards the fundamentalist regime as fascist.30 The Green party of Iran calls the regime religious fascism.31 The Workers Communist party of Iran also calls the regime fascist.32 Amir Taheri, a prolific conservative commentator in the Iranian media and a frequent contributor to this journal, has described the regime as fascist.33 Even Mohsen Sazegara, a former fundamentalist, a founder of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), and the man who wrote the constitution of the IRGC, has used the term "fascist" to describe the system created by the Supreme Leader Ali Khamanehi.34 Akbar Ganji, another former fundamentalist and current dissident, regards the hard-line faction as fascist.35 Most interesting, even former President Mohammad Khatami recently referred to some of the hard-line fundamentalists who have been criticizing him as fascist.36

Describing Islamic fundamentalism as fascist or fascistic or a form of fascism is not limited to political actors in Iran. Many scholars have also described the system created by Khomeini in the same way.37 Like fascism, Islamic fundamentalist ideology is explicitly corporatist and organic (i.e., society is conceived of as an organic body in which all of the parts have to cooperate in order to ensure the healthy functioning of the system). Such a political system regards its leader as the brain of the polity that has the right to order others and others have to obey. This form of corporatist ideology explicitly denies civil liberties and the right of dissent. Thus individuals are crushed for the sake of the Islamic state. Like fascism, Islamic fundamentalism attempts to create a cult of personality of its leader.

Islam enjoys a rich tradition that includes both mercifulness and peace as well as violence and aggressive war. Moderate and liberal Muslims regard the merciful and peaceful aspects of Islam to constitute Islam's primary message and soul, whereas violence is interpreted as exceptional and historical. Islamic fundamentalists, on the contrary, regard jihad and violence to be primary aspects of Islam, whereas peace and mercifulness are interpreted as minor aspects practiced only after infidels have been vanquished and dominated.

Islamic fundamentalists excel in manipulating prejudices (usually against religious and ethnic minorities) and xenophobic fears of the masses. Islamic fundamentalists have succeeded in mobilizing the masses not through appealing to their best and most noble desires (e.g., tolerance, coexistence, amity, compassion, mercy) but rather to their basest (e.g., hate, prejudice, revenge, envy) feelings.

Like fascism, Islamic fundamentalism views political violence not as a necessary evil but as a desirable tool to subjugate and intimidate domestic and foreign opponents. Religious rituals and liturgy have been manipulated to create a cult of violence that glamorizes violence. Like fascists, Islamic fundamentalists violently attack ethnic and religious minorities, feminists, liberals, leftists, labor unions, professional associations, and homosexuals. Like European fascists, Islamic fundamentalists tend to pursue an extremely bellicose foreign policy.

Iranian opposition groups (prodemocracy, monarchists, PMOI, Communists, and ethnic parties) oppose appeasement of the regime in general and a grand bargain in particular. For Iranian prodemocracy forces, appeasement of such a brutal dictatorship is immoral and unethical on idealist grounds and counterproductive, on realist grounds.38 The opposition groups have not criticized the Bush administration for calling the regime evil. For Iranian opposition groups, calling the fundamentalist regime evil is like calling a spade a spade.

Some in the opposition support imposing sanctions on the fundamentalist regime similar to the sanctions imposed on the apartheid regime in South Africa. The Iranian state, under both monarchy and the fundamentalist regime, is a "rentier state," which means that it is highly dependent on oil. As long as oil income flows into the coffers of the state, the ruling regime enjoys a great deal of autonomy from domestic social classes and domestic pressures. If the oil income is stopped, however, the regime could face serious difficulties remaining in power.39 One of the main reasons that the shah was forced to leave power was the successful strike by workers in the oil fields and oil refineries. Because repression is far more severe under the current regime, which executed several thousands in a matter of weeks (e.g., June-December 1981 and September 1988), a level of repression that simply was not in existence under the monarchy, oil workers cannot be asked to go on strike under a regime that has no reservations about executing thousands of them and thus breaking the strike. Because the oil income cannot be stopped at the point of production, it is necessary to stop it at the point of exchange.

According to the Islamic Republic's Central Bank, oil accounts for about 80 percent of foreign earnings, about 60 percent of government revenues, and about 30 percent of GDP.40 The government received $55 billion from the export of oil and natural gas in the 2005-2006 fiscal year in comparison to $23 billion in the 2002-2003 fiscal year.41 All of this income goes directly into the hands of the fundamentalist regime. It is this income that allows the fundamentalists to pay for their coercive apparatuses, provide subsidies to maintain the allegiance of their social base, coopt nonfundamentalists through financial largesse, and prevent the economy from collapsing. By purchasing oil and natural gas from the fundamentalist regime, the outside world is helping it to remain in power. In other words, by purchasing oil and natural gas from the regime, the outside world is producing an impact on the internal struggles in Iran. In effect it conduces to the benefit of the fundamentalists and to the detriment of the opposition. Economic sanctions would deprive the fundamentalists of billions of dollars and thus weaken them substantially. This would in effect enable and empower the Iranian people themselves to undermine the fundamentalist regime. The recent riots after the price of gasoline was raised from about 40 cents a gallon to 50 cents are indications of popular discontent with the economic situation.

Some opposition groups advocate close cooperation with the United States, whereas others have taken a neutral position. The monarchists, DPIK, Komala, and PMOI have welcomed the Bush administration's strong stand against the fundamentalist regime. The PMOI, in particular, has lobbied hard and openly to be taken off the terrorism list. Several prominent groups in the United States have advocated that the United States unleash the PMOI to fight the fundamentalist regime.42 The most articulate think tank that has taken this position consistently is the Iran Policy Committee headed by the former senior member of the National Security Council staff during President Reagan's administration and several prominent national security experts.43 The Iran Policy Committee has argued that the United States should expunge the name of the PMOI from the terrorism list and provide it with support so that it can overthrow the regime.44


Weaknesses of Opposition to the Regime

Although any of the main opposition groups (democrats, monarchists, PMOI) could conceivably provide a political system and leaders far superior to the incumbent regime, a variety of factors have prevented the success of the opposition. One of the main characteristics of Iranian political culture is excessive self-centeredness. Another characteristic is the inability to cooperate with others for the greater good, punctuated by total obedience to a leader.

All indications are that if there were free and democratic elections, the democratic republicans would win. However, the democratic forces lack a strong party and a charismatic leader to unite and organize the various parties and their social base. Their nonviolent method of struggle has proved to be incapable of convincing a tyrannical and violent oligarchy to accept free elections. Although many in their social base would gladly vote for the democratic forces, they believe that such methods would not succeed and are not willing to sacrifice their jobs, wealth, liberties, and lives in a futile and idealistic struggle against the violent fundamentalists. The personal ambition for power shown by too many individuals, each one believing that all others have to follow his or her leadership, has further dispersed and weakened the democratic forces.

The monarchists have one leader, which is an advantage in Iranian political culture. Monarchy, by its very nature, however, demands special and permanent powers for one person and family (who inherits those powers without periodic elections). Monarchy has provoked intense and irreconcilable opposition from all other opposition groups in Iran. The monarchists' social base is too small to overthrow the regime by itself. Reza Pahlavi has failed to build any coalition. The intense hostilities between democratic republicans and monarchists have prevented any alliance between the two. Monarchists blame the democratic forces for cooperating with Khomeini and overthrowing them, whereas the democrats blame the monarchists for their dictatorship and repression. Moreover, democrats fear that monarchists wish to reimpose their dictatorship and simply do not believe Reza Pahlavi's repeated pledges to respect the vote of the people. Great amounts of time and energy have been spent by republicans and monarchists in debating and attacking one another instead of concentrating their activities on the fundamentalist regime. It appears that the only way to generate trust would be for Reza Pahlavi to renounce the monarchy and mobilize his supporters into a conservative republican party. Only such a creative and courageous move would unequivocally prove his commitment to democracy and virtually guarantee a broad based coalition capable of mobilizing the masses and undermining the fundamentalist regime.

The PMOI is by far the most organized and disciplined group in Iran. It is capable of carrying out military operations inside Iran and mobilizing many thousands of its supporters abroad. Because of its ideology, history, and leadership, it is resented and feared by the vast majority of Iranians. It is clear that PMOI neither could win any major election nor overthrow the regime. It is also clear, however, that it has enough muscle, organization, and committed members to be a significant player in Iranian politics. Its dictatorial leadership has alienated it from all of the major opposition groups.

Ethnic minority parties have proved that they are able to cause a great many problems for the regime, but they have not succeeded in making alliances with national parties. If a formula could be found that would both safeguard the civil rights of ethnic minorities and preserve the territorial integrity of Iran, a broad coalition would be possible. As long as ethnic parties demand "autonomy," it will be virtually impossible for national opposition parties to make coalitions with them.

In addition to the aforementiond factors, a number of cleavages exist among as well as within opposition groups and the society at large. Such opposition groups

  • engage in armed struggle or nonviolent methods of struggle or a combination of the two;
  • advocate the establishment of a unitary system or an American-style federal system or a confederacy based on ethno-sectarian autonomy;
  • advocate economic sanctions or oppose them or remain silent;
  • cooperate with the United States or remain neutral in the confrontation between the United States and the fundamentalist regime;
  • enter into overt or covert relations with the United States;
  • call on the people to vote for reformist members of the fundamentalist oligarchy under certain circumstances or advocate a boycott of elections.

These cleavages have led many opposition elements to spend a great deal of time debating and attacking other opposition elements instead of attacking the fundamentalist regime. The primary beneficiary has been the regime.

In sum, although the vast majority of the Iranian public opposes the fundamentalist regime and strong opposition groups exist, several serious issues divide the opposition groups. The failure of one leader (or a handful of leaders cooperating with one another) to emerge and present a formula capable of uniting the opposition has prevented the widespread dissatisfaction with the regime from coalescing and coming to fruition. This kind of divisiveness has enabled the regime to contain and suppress numerous actions by students, women, workers, writers, journalists, urban poor, human rights activists, and minorities.

On the Iranian Side: The Fundamentalist Regime
Great amounts of ink, paper, and byte have been devoted to analyzing the regime. Thus only a few sentences will be added to this subject here. All fundamentalist officials - hard-line and reformist alike - strongly resent President Bush's description of the regime as part of the "axis of evil." Limited, issue-based dialogue has been conducted numerous times between regime officials and the United States. Former Presidents Mohammad Khatami and Ali Akbar Rafsanjani and their supporters have advocated a grand bargain. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his followers are thought to be pushing for war.45 The Supreme Leader Ali Khamanehi has taken different positions at various times depending on the circumstances.

On the American Side
In an excellent article Kurt Campbell and Derek Chollet have described various foreign policy "cliques" in the post-September 11 period without mentioning their policy proposals toward Iran.46 In this section the policies of some of these groups will be discussed in order to provide the context within which to elucidate the grand bargain proposed by Leverett and Mann.

American neoconservatives and liberal hawks advocate regime change.47 For the neoconservatives and liberal hawks, the fundamentalist regime is truly evil and bent on undermining pro-Western governments in the region and can be toppled. Specific policies proposed include providing moral and political support to the opposition; providing financial and political assistance to opposition groups; imposing economic sanctions; sabotaging nuclear facilities; carrying out surgical strikes at nuclear facilities; conducting massive military strikes at coercive apparatuses; unleashing full-scale invasion; or a combination thereof.48

Rapprochement with the Fundamentalist Regime
Several groups promote rapprochement with the regime. Some are realists, whereas others are idealists. The most influential include "Oldsmobile Conservatives" in the Republican party and "Globalists" in the Democratic party.49 James Kurth has referred to the perspectives of Oldsmobile Conservatives as "conservative/realist."50 This group includes prominent Republicans such as General Brent Scowcroft (national security adviser to President George H. W. Bush), Richard Armitage (deputy secretary of state under President George W. Bush), and Richard Haass (director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff from 2001 to 2003 and president of the Council on Foreign Relations since 2003). Prominent Democrats are increasingly promoting a similar position. The National Interest has emerged as the main journal that publishes the views of prorapprochement realists.

The most detailed and sophisticated policy proposals promoting rapprochement with the fundamentalist regime are advocated by Ray Takeyh, Anatol Lieven, John Hulsman, and Gary Sick.51 Dr. Ray Takeyh was a professor at the National War College and the National Defense University. He is currently a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a contributing editor to The National Interest. Dr. Anatol Lieven is a senior research fellow at the New America Foundation, a contributing editor to The National Interest, and a former senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Dr. John Hulsman was a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation. He is currently a contributing editor to The National Interest and a scholar in residence at the Alfred von Oppenheim Center for European Studies in Berlin, Germany. Dr. Gary Sick served on the National Security Council under Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan. He is currently affiliated with Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs as adjunct professor and a senior research scholar.

Their argument is based on the following beliefs: (1) the fundamentalist regime is here to stay for the foreseeable future; (2) the United States simply is unable to invade and overthrow the regime; (3) mere military strikes on nuclear installations would provoke retaliation on the United States and its allies with grave economic, strategic, and political consequences that they could not absorb; and (4) the regime can be convinced to play by the norms of international conduct by a combination of carrots and sticks. The last belief is based on the assumption that the rationality that worked with Communists (which formed the foundation for containment, deterrence, and mutual assured destruction [MAD]) will also work with Islamic fundamentalists. They dismiss the fundamentalist ideological principles of mass martyrdom (e.g., guaranteed entrance to paradise) and rapture as determinants of the foreign policy of the fundamentalist regime.

For the realists in this group, interests, not ideology (communist or Islamic fundamentalist), play the main role in the making of foreign policy. For them, stability is the primary if not the sole concern. Issues such as democracy, human rights, and forms of government should be ignored for the sake of stability. For the realists in this group, dialogue, detente, and rapprochement do not constitute appeasement. For them, American power is very limited, as has been made painfully clear by the war in Iraq.

For the idealists in this group, the main fear is that President Bush will take America to yet another war in the Middle East based on a false pretext or exaggerated evidence and before all diplomatic avenues have been exhausted. Some are willing to accept the possession of nuclear weapons by the fundamentalist regime.52 Globalist democrats are not against the use of force; nor do they maintain that issues of human rights are irrelevant. After all, many in the Clinton administration did use force on many occasions, including massive force in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo and surgical strikes in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Antiappeasement Realists
This group includes prominent Republicans and Democrats such as Senator John McCain (R.-Arizona) and R. James Woolsey (director of the CIA under President Clinton). The most detailed and sophisticated policy proposals by antiappeasement realists were articulated by the late Fereydoun Hoveyda, James Kurth, and Peter Brookes.53 A frequent contributor to this journal, Ambassador Hoveyda was prerevolution Iran's ambassador to the United Nations. Dr. Kurth is the editor of Orbis. Dr. Brookes is senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation. Brookes served as the deputy assistant defense secretary in the George W. Bush administration, in the CIA's Directorate of Operations, and in the State Department.

The most prestigious scholarly and policy oriented journals that publish the analyses of antiappeasement realists include American Foreign Policy Interests and Orbis. It is imperative to add that both of these journals publish analyses of various realist traditions. Think tanks that include analysts that could be classified as antiappeasement realists include the National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP), Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), the Heritage Foundation, and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP).54

This group of realists views the fundamentalist regime in Iran as a serious threat to the United States. Some in this group argue that talking with one's enemy is necessary. Diplomacy is part of containment that was carried out with the former Soviet Union. Diplomacy, for example, has borne fruit in confrontations with North Korea and Libya. As a matter of principle, all realists, including antiappeasement realists, advocate diplomacy as a tool that should always be on the table. What distinguishes this group of realists is that they advocate that the United States should neither give in to the illegitimate demands of the fundamentalist regime nor be perceived as though it were willing to appease the regime. Unlike liberal hawks and neoconservatives, who oppose holding talks with a regime so odious that one ought to be trying to overthrow it, antiappeasement realists do not oppose talks and diplomacy with Iran.

Some in this group argue that dialogue with a hostile regime should be entered into only after a careful cost-benefit analysis. Put another way, engagement could be worse than containment or rollback. According to David Rivkin, American engagement with the Iranian regime would bestow legitimacy on the regime and would undermine the multilateral sanctions at the United Nations Security Council.55

The problem with the particular case of Iran has been compounded by the oligarchic nature of the regime's rift with factions and individuals, not one of whom seems to be able to speak with authority for long periods of time. In other words, the obstacle to talks with Iran has had more to do with Iran's lack of a leader with authorization to carry out talks with the United States than with its slogan of "Death to America" or its policies of assisting those who have carried out terrorist acts against Americans. One day Supreme Leader Ali Khamanehi condemns any one who proposes talking with "the Great Satan" as a traitor or a person of dishonor, a few days later he allows a person to carry out such discussions, and a few days or weeks later he dismisses the official who had engaged in the talks.

The perceptions of the antiappeasement realists about the wisdom of holding talks with the fundamentalist regime can be plotted along a continuum. At one end of the spectrum, Woolsey, Brookes, and the Heritage Foundation oppose holding talks with the fundamentalist regime. In their view, under current circumstances, such talks would be more harmful than beneficial. At the other end, the NCAFP is willing to consider talks if an official with authority were available to undertake that responsibility. Hoveyda was located in between, as is Kurth.

These realists view the fundamentalist regime as essentially an expansionist power and regard concessions made to it as appeasement. They argue that the actual policies of the regime since coming to power have repeatedly shown its determination to undermine pro-Western governments and install violent extremist, anti-American proxies and clients in Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Palestine. Moreover, they argue, the regime is committed to the destruction of Israel.

The realists have a point. Iran's export of the fundamentalist Islamic revolution to the entire world via violent jihad is a constitutional mandate. The constitution created by the fundamentalists in 1979 states:

With due attention to the Islamic content of the Iranian Revolution, the Constitution provides the necessary basis for ensuring the continuation of the Revolution at home and abroad. In particular, in the development of international relations, the Constitution will strive with other Islamic and popular movements to prepare the way for the formation of a single world community (in accordance with the Koranic verse "This your community is a single community, and I am your Lord, so worship Me" [21:92]), and to assure the continuation of the struggle for the liberation of all deprived and oppressed peoples in the world.

An Ideological Army
In the formation and equipping of the country's defense forces, due attention must be paid to faith and ideology as the basic criteria. Accordingly, the Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps are to be organized in conformity with this goal, and they will be responsible not only for guarding and preserving the frontiers of the country, but also for fulfilling the ideological mission of jihad in God's way; that is, extending the sovereignty of God's law throughout the world (this is in accordance with the Koranic verse "Prepare against them whatever force you are able to muster, and strings of horses, striking fear into the enemy of God and your enemy, and others besides them." [8:60])56

These realists argue that appeasement did not work with Hitler in 1938 and it will not work with fundamentalists today. Any concession would not only further embolden them but would also provide them with additional resources to carry out their expansionism. The interests of the United States and those of the fundamentalists are irreconcilable. Appeasement would allow the fundamentalist regime to choose the time, place, and manner of confrontation. Of most significance, additional time would enhance the fundamentalist regime's capability to acquire nuclear weapons, thus dramatically altering the balance of power in the region and increasing the likelihood that war and nuclear exchange would produce a far more devastating outcome than the stronger early policy. Unlike the Soviet and the Chinese Communists, whose ideology was materialist and rationally bounded and who believed that time was on their side, Islamic fundamentalists combine expansionism with an irrational metaphysical zeal for mass suicide, a combination that will not respond logically to concepts of MAD.57 In such hands, nuclear weapons would not bring Clausewitzian restraint for the sake of preserving the state58 but would provide the means for bringing Armageddon and the hoped for Shiite rapture.

This group of realists regards the prorapprochement realists as suffering from a prostatus quo bias. Such a bias has been responsible for overestimating the strength and legitimacy of many regimes and for underestimating the fragility and crises of legitimacy, thereby discounting the likelihood of regime change and rollback as a realistic policy. Antiappeasement realists share with neoconservatives and liberal hawks the belief that it is necessary to oppose appeasement and stand up to expansionist aggressive powers.

Reconfigured Containment
The high costs of regime change (at least in the short term) and the high, long-term costs both of limited issue based dialogue and the grand bargain seem to have given impetus to two new options involving low, short-term costs. One can be called tripartite containment and the other ethnic destabilization. Some postulate that a new strategy is emerging for a tripartite containment of Iran by the United States, Israel, and Sunni Arab states (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf Cooperation Council, an organization composed of the littoral Arab states of the Persian Gulf).59 This policy can be described as containment, although it is more a short- term tactic than a long-term strategy. If in fact the Iranian regime is developing nuclear weapons, such containment would neither change the regime's behavior nor its nature. It may, however, reduce its ability to expand its influence in the region. Such tripartite coordination may be particularly effective in Iraq and Lebanon if augmented by increased forces and resources on the ground.

The least discussed policy option is assistance to ethno-sectarian minorities in Iran. Although the fundamentalist regime discriminates against all Iranians who are not fundamentalist, including those from the majority Persian ethnicity (slightly more than half of the population), non-Persians and non-Shiites feel especially oppressed merely because of their ethnic or religious or ethno-religious backgrounds.60 Iran's minorities such as Azeris, Kurds (half are Sunni), Balochis (almost all are Sunni), Arabs (half are Sunni), and Turkomen (all are Sunni) live primarily in the sensitive border regions. Some suffer from de jure or de facto discrimination. Sunni Kurds (unlike Shiite Kurds) exhibit irredentist aspirations that have only increased in recent years.61 In the past few years, mass demonstrations by Azeris as well as major violent clashes between the regime's coercive apparatuses and the Arabs, Kurds, and Balochis have taken place. The result has been hundreds of deaths on all sides.62 The policy may be designed to put pressure on the regime in order to frighten it into compromising or to create enough trouble to compel the regime to redirect its forces from expansionism into internal security (containment)63 or to prepare for an invasion (regime change)64 in the not too distant future. Thus depending on their ultimate objective, many groups may promote this policy.65


Military Strikes

Many have advocated surgical military strikes on the nuclear facilities. If the fundamentalist regime did not retaliate, this tactic would postpone the nuclear program. But if the regime did retaliate, such action would begin a major war. If the regime were able to close off the Strait of Hormuz, it would be able to cut off oil shipments, thus crippling the world economy. There is no reason to believe that merely striking nuclear facilities would serve as a trigger for mass uprisings, as some in Washington seem to hope, the reason being that with coercive apparatuses intact, the regime would not only have the power to crush any uprising but would also have the added motivation and anger to do so. One could only expect a mass uprising if the military strikes target coercive apparatuses such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, the Basij militia, the Ministry of Intelligence, and so on.

Many believe that because of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States lacks the capability to make massive military strikes; therefore, the United States has to give in to the fundamentalist regime. Others believe that the Air Force and Navy have remained pretty much intact; therefore, the United States is capable of using massive missile and aerial attacks on the nuclear facilities and coercive apparatuses of the regime. Whether there will be a mass uprising resulting in the overthrow of the regime or, conversely, whether the masses will support the regime cannot be known beforehand. The behavior and public statements of top officials of the United States, the fundamentalist regime, and the opposition groups leading up to military strikes could have a determining effect on the reaction of vast numbers of the Iranian people. There is little doubt that there will be fundamentalists who will put up a fierce fight. There is also little doubt that the United States could arm and unleash a number of groups against the regime.

The belief among many in Washington that there is no military solution has caused many to advocate a grand bargain. The most detailed proposal has been the one advanced by Leverett and Mann.

A Grand Bargain
The Iraq Study Group (ISG), chaired by two prominent statesmen, James Baker and Lee Hamilton, promoted a limited, issue-based dialogue with the leaders of Iran and Syria in order to help the United States exit from Iraq. In their December 22 op-ed article in The New York Times, Leverett and Mann took aim at the ISG and argued that the policy of a limited, issue-based dialogue is doomed to failure. It reiterated the proposal of a grand bargain that Leverett had made in a longer study. In the earlier study, Leverett opposed the policy of regime change and harshly criticized the Bush administration for not accepting the May 2003 grand bargain.66

Leverett articulated a new grand bargain.

Leverett is aware that a grand bargain may be regarded as appeasement by many. In an op-ed article published in the January 24, 2006, edition of The New York Times, Leverett wrote: "Moreover, Ahmadinejad's execrable rhetoric about Israel and the Holocaust threatens to make future Western engagement look like appeasement." Then he proceeded to describe his proposal: "Such a framework would offer all parts of the Iranian political spectrum-even the hard-liners around Ahmadinejad - something they want: recognition of Iran's leading regional role."

Leverett and Mann have continued to promote a grand bargain despite the fundamentalist regime's more bellicose policies and rhetoric such as supporting the Lebanese Hezbollah in the summer of 2006 and holding an official conference on the Holocaust on December 11-12, 2006.67 It is significant that the conference was organized by Mohammad Ali Ramin who is a top adviser to President Ahmadinejad and is the secretary of "Rayeheh Khosh Khedmat," the electoral list of supporters of Ahmadinejad for the 2006 elections.68 In a lecture at the University of Gilan on May 30, 2006, Mr. Ramin said:

Among the Jews there have always been harmful and wicked elements who killed God's prophets and stood against justice and rights, and this ethnic group has done the most damage to the human society throughout history, and another group among them has engaged in conspiracies, inflicting harm and cruelties on other nations and ethnic groups.There are many accusations against the Jews throughout history, among them that they are the cause of spreading of diseases such as plague and typhus, because the Jews are very dirty persons.69

A Fatal Flaw in Any Grand Bargain
The essential component of their grand bargain (or any grand bargain) is the assumption that the fundamentalist regime will honestly declare all of the sites and the dimensions of its nuclear weapons program. This assumption goes against the actual history and behavior of the regime. The regime kept its nuclear program secret for 18 years until it was disclosed by the PMOI. Far more significant is the fact that the regime explicitly deceived the EU-3 (Britain, France, and Germany).

In the October 2003 meeting among regime officials and the foreign ministers of the EU-3, the regime explicitly agreed to provide full disclosure to the foreign ministers and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in exchange for the EU-3's agreement that it would oppose the American policy of referring Iran's case to the UN Security Council. In February 2006, during intense intraelite fighting, Hassan Rouhani revealed that Ahmadinejad and his hard-line colleagues had attacked Rouhani and the previous team as both incompetent and weak and claimed that their policies were responsible for undermining Iran's position in the nuclear conflict. Rouhani responded by publishing his remarks to the High Council of the Islamic Cultural Revolution.70 Rouhani said that in October 2003, after serious deliberations that included all of the main leaders of the regime, they collectively decided not to reveal all of the secrets to the Europeans and the IAEA because doing so would have caused Iran's file to be referred to the Security Council. One such case was the P2 centrifuge case. The regime was not aware that the Libyan government had disclosed all of its nuclear programs to the United States and Britain. Thus the fundamentalist regime decided not to reveal that it had secretly purchased the highly sophisticated P2 centrifuge plans. Because of the Libyan disclosures, the EU-3 and the IAEA were aware of the person who had sold P2 centrifuge plans to Iran. Rouhani stated that the exposure of Iran's explicit deceptions caused the EU-3 to mistrust Iran.71 This disclosure led the EU to support the American policy of referring Iran to the Security Council. It is imperative to add that engaging in deception about its nuclear file is not an exception for the Iranian regime. It has a long history of explicit lies such as its public denials of the assassinations of dissidents abroad despite the fact that its agents have been arrested, convicted, and imprisoned in many Western European countries. Although the regime has successfully lobbied for the extradition of the imprisoned assassins to Iran, it denies that those agents were sent by the regime.72 Lying is allowed in Shiite Islam under the practice of "taghiyeh" [lying, deception, dissimulation].

The belief that the regime has not declared all of its nuclear facilities is widespread. It involves the so-called problem of known and unknown nuclear facilities. In Leverett's words: "Numerous analyses have raised serious doubts that U.S. military strikes against Iran's nuclear infrastructure would delay significantly its nuclear development because of profound uncertainty about the reliability and comprehensiveness of target selection, the possibility that 'unknown' facilities are at least as close to producing weapons-grade fissile materials as 'known' facilities."

There is an internal logical inconsistency in Leverett's argument. On the one hand, Leverett uses this belief to argue against military strikes. On the other hand, Leverett's grand bargain is based on the belief that the regime will honestly provide a complete list of its hitherto "unknown" nuclear facilities and programs to the United States and will agree to dismantle them. In addition, the regime has the added incentive to continue to lie rather than to change its pattern of lying. Continuing to keep the "unknown" facilities "unknown" could enable the regime to take advantage of collaboration in the "known" facilities to advance its technological acquisitions in the "unknown" facilities. Once the regime developed nuclear weapons in the "unknown" facilities, it could then suspend the grand bargain.

Fatal Attractions of the Grand Bargain
In addition to the fundamental flaw in any grand bargain, the grand bargain that Leverett proposed in the longer study includes principles that would cause the fundamentalist rulers to reject it. The Leverett grand bargain includes implementing internationally recognized human rights conventions,73 recognizing Israel via accepting UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and stopping assistance to Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas. If the regime were to respect the basic human rights of the Iranian people, it would not last long. The fundamentalist regime needs massive coercion in order to remain in power, a fact obvious to regime officials but one that Leverett fails to take into account. It was one thing for Khatami in 2003 to say that if the Palestinians accept a deal with the Israelis, Iran would not be more Palestinian than the Palestinians; it is quite another for Khamanehi and Ahmadinejad today to accept Security Council resolutions officially recognizing the existence of Israel, a nation they want to wipe off the map. It is imperative to add that even in May 2003, Khamanehi did not accept all of the features of the roadmap.

The roadmap offered by the regime in 2003 reflected the interests of the fundamentalists ruling Iran at that particular moment. But would any grand bargain be in the interests of the United States?

The long-term interests of the United States involve cultivating and maintaining the good will of the Iranian people. The United States was intensely hated in Iran because of the CIA-engineered 1953 coup (which overthrew Iran's democratic government of Dr. Mossadegh) and the support the United States gave to the dictatorial regime of the shah. Since the early 1990s, however, Iranians have been one of the most pro-American populations in the world.


What Do Iranians Think?
Because of the highly repressive and brutal nature of the regime in Iran, one cannot expect respondents to give honest answers to sensitive questions, especially when they might lose their jobs or be imprisoned, tortured, or executed. Thus scientific polling, in which interviewers go from house to house or conduct interviews by telephone, is not a reliable indicator of genuine attitudes. A better indication of public sentiments may be various Internet polls in which the respondents believe that they can express their opinions safely. However, such Internet polls are not scientific and have to be taken with great caution.

In early 2003 a large Internet poll of students of the Amir Kabir University (the second most prestigious university in Iran) was conducted by the Daftar Tahkim Vahdat, the official student umbrella group. The result was posted on the university's student Web site until they were ordered to remove it. In the poll only 6 percent of the students said that they supported the hard-liners, whereas 4 percent said they supported the reformists within the regime. A mere 5 percent said they supported the return of the former monarchy. Of most significance, 85 percent of the students said that they would support the establishment of a secular and democratic republic.74 Although one cannot extrapolate from the sentiments of university students the attitudes of the entire population, one can appreciate the extent of the unpopularity of the fundamentalist regime among important segments of the population.

Based in the United States, Iranian.com is the oldest and one of the most widely read Iranian e-magazines. In one poll respondents indicated that they believed that Iranians are the most pro-American group in the Islamic world.75

President George W. Bush is popular among Iranians because he has repeatedly condemned the fundamentalist rulers while praising the Iranian people and their culture and history.76 This explains why Persian speakers were the only group in an October 2004 BBC World Service online poll that supported Bush over Senator Kerry.77 The various languages of the respondents were Arabic, English, Spanish, Persian, Russian, Urdu, Hindi, Portuguese, Chinese traditional, and Chinese Simplified. The number of total respondents was 73,547. Whereas 71 percent of all of the respondents voted for Kerry, only 20 percent voted for Bush. Among the 5,492 Persian-speaking respondents, 51 percent voted for Bush, 42 percent voted for Kerry, and 7 percent voted for Nader.

Similar sentiments were evident in another Internet poll at Iranian.com. Although in one poll the respondents in large proportions (54% to 17%) supported the Democratic party over the Republican party,78 in another poll at the same site respondents supported Bush over Kerry for the 2004 election.79 Senator Kerry's perceived failure to distinguish between the Iranian people and the ruling regime and his repeated calls for rapprochement with the fundamentalist regime were the main reasons for his lack of support among Iranians, including many Iranian liberals.

These Internet polls vindicate what Thomas Friedman wrote in The New York Times. According to Friedman,

Funny enough, the one country on this side of the ocean that would have elected Mr. Bush is not in Europe, but in the Middle East: it's Iran, where many young people apparently hunger for Mr. Bush to remove their despotic leaders, the way he did in Iraq.

An Oxford student who had just returned from research in Iran told me that young Iranians were "loving anything their government hates," such as Mr. Bush, "and hating anything their government loves." Tehran is festooned in "Down With America" graffiti, the student said, but when he tried to take pictures of it, the Iranian students he was with urged him not to. They said it was just put there by their government and was not how most Iranians felt.

Iran, he said, is the ultimate "red state."80

Why have Iranians who had so intensely hated the United States between 1953 and the late 1980s become so staunchly pro-American since the early 1990s? By extension, why is there no such positive sentiment toward other countries that have had friendly relations with the Iranian government? The answer to these questions could help guide American policy toward Iran.

The overwhelming majority of Iranians hated the shah's dictatorship. U.S. support for that dictatorship caused Iranians to hate the United States. Similarly, the overwhelming majority of Iranians have come to hate the fundamentalist regime, whose human rights record is far worse than that of the shah's. Those governments that have friendly relations with the fundamentalist regime are viewed negatively by the Iranian public. The Iranian public has high regard for the United States because the widely held perception is that it has stood by the Iranian people and has opposed the ruling fundamentalist dictatorship while Europeans and Russians have put profits before concerns over human rights and democracy in Iran.

A grand bargain would be in the interests of the United States only if one accepts the assumption that the regime is legitimate in the eyes of the vast majority of the Iranian people. If that assumption is valid, then one would expect that Iranians would continue to hate the United States and have positive feelings toward those who have had friendly political and economic relations with the regime. However, the well-known pro-American sentiment among Iranians casts doubt on that assumption.

The United States has won the hearts and minds of a new generation of Iranians. A grand bargain, which is regarded by vast sectors of the Iranian public as appeasement of their tormentors, would undermine that hard-earned positive sentiment.

This article was first published in American Foreign Policy Interests, Vol. 29, No. 5 (September-October 2007), pp. 301-327. I thank Dr. George D. Schwab for his kind permission to re-publish this article on iranian.com.


About the Author

Masoud Kazemzadeh is associate professor, Department of Political Science, Sam Houston State University.

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Dear Jahanshah Rashidian,

Thank you for your response, and kind words. I read your articles and enjoy and learn from them. You are doing a great job.

Soccer is one of the few things that our people can have and it is not an Islamic activity. It is one of those rare activities that brings joy (and collective sorrow) to our people. So, I think an international sanction on sports harms our people and does not harm the fundamentalist terrorist regime.

However, I agree with diplomatic and political sanctions. It is a great idea to have the International Criminal Court (ICC) at the Hague to take the cases of the crimes against humanity on Rafsanjani and Khamanehi, Por-Mohammadi, etc. Also I think it is a good idea to suspend the fundamentalist regime from holding our seat at the UN. Iran’s seat at the UN should remain vacant until the Iranian people in free and democratic elections choose their legitimate representatives.

Nooruz shoma piroz,

MK

 

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Dear Anonymous-2,

I am a member of Jebhe Melli (in exile). Dr. Mossadegh is our founder. JM is not a cult that we worship him or have to follow every thing he said. We, in JM, have the right to criticize Dr. Mossadegh. In my opinion, for example, Dr. Mossadegh made a mistake on 28 Mordad; he should have used the radio and call upon the people to come out to the street and confront the coup plotters. Had Dr. Mossadegh done that, then we would not have suffered 58 years of brutal savage tyranny. Dr. Mossadegh was not God, nor prophet, nor did he receive messages from Imam Zaman. He was the BEST statesman our nation has produced in many centuries. Like all human beings, he had his shortcomings.

We in JM uphold principles of independence, freedom, democracy, human rights, social justice. Particular ideology or policy is up to the constituent parties within JM and the individual. For example, one could be atheist and Marxist like Khalil Maleki, while another member could be devout Muslim like Dr. Sanjabi; one could be social democrat, another liberal democrat, another... JM has been and is a coalition of various parties and individuals. This has its advantages and disadvantages.

You cannot extrapolate from Dr. Mossadegh’s philosophy the psychology of JM members. Dr. Fatemi had one personality, Dr. Sanjabi another, Dr. Bakhtiar another, Parvaneh Eskandari-Forouhar another.

If you have any questions about my beliefs, simply ask. I will try to the best of my abilities to respond.

Nooruz shoma piroz,

MK

 

 

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Dear Anon7,

In the past 2 weeks, students at Shiraz university have been risking their education, liberties, and lives by engaging in protests. One of their slogans is "jonbesh-e daneshoyee amadeh ghiyma ast." Do you think that they are willing to put so much at risk because of high inflation or because they have had it up to here with the repressive policies of the sadeghi dude that is president of the univ?

Are the brave women organizing the million signature campaign to get rid of discriminatory laws, rising prison and torture because of inflation rate or because of oppressive laws discriminating against women?

Of course the incredible economic mismanagement in the past 29 years is a major reason of the economic misery of the Iranian people. This is due to that lack of education on modern economic by fundamentalist rulers from Khomeini who thought that "eghtesad male kharan ast" and thought that a country of then33 million people could have as its economics minister a baghal sare kocheh!!!!! The handful of second rate agha-zadeh-ha brought to govt to manage the economy could not solve the serious foundational problems of economy and political legitimacy in brought by the fundamentalist regime. To provide one simple example is they could not touch the bonyads. If you point is that modern economic illiteracy of Khomeini, Khamanehi, Ahmadinejad have contributed to poverty (despite getting billions and billions of dollars virtually effort-free from the sale of oil), and thus undermine the legitimacy of the regime, then to that extent you are right. If you mean to say that a lot of poor people in 2005 were so poor that at that juncture that primarily were concerned with economic issues, then you have a point.

If a political system is regarded as essentially legitimate, then economic problems will not cause serious political issues of legitimacy. They could cause serious changes in economic and political policies, but not foundational and constitutional changes.

The main problem with the fundamentalist regime goes much deeper than inflation rate. It is a foundational and constitutional crisis of legitimacy. Economic difficulties could (and usually do) exacerbate political problems and help push the non-politically active population (who always constitute the overwhelming majority of every country) to leave their regular lives and enter politics. The Shah’s regime was essentially illegitimate. But it survived. Between 1976 and 1979 due to a variety of factors including economic difficulties (compared to present-day Iran very very mild difficulties) the poor masses entered the struggle. Today the fundamentalist regime suffers from serious crisis of legitimacy, so if there is a serious economic collapse (due to sanctions of oil sales), the poor would probably enter the struggle and more likely than not, that would end in the overthrow of the regime.

MK

 

 

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Dariush jaan,

Thanks for the article and videos. As usual, very interesting.

If 70% of the Iranian public was for monarchy, then RP should have no problem overthrowing the fundamentalist regime.

Nooruzet mobarak,

Masoud

 

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Ola Nadia,

Houston!!!! Have you tried Caspian Café? Excellent Persian food.

Feliz Nooruz to you and your family,

Masoud

 

 

 

 

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Dear Anonymus-today,

Obviously you did not understand my article. Perhaps, you should read it again.

1. My argument in the article was NOT based on moral reasoning. It was based on the

 

A Fatal Flaw in Any Grand Bargain

The essential component of their grand bargain (or any grand bargain) is the assumption that the fundamentalist regime will honestly declare all of the sites and the dimensions of its nuclear weapons program. This assumption goes against the actual history and behavior of the regime. The regime kept its nuclear program secret for 18 years until it was disclosed by the PMOI. Far more significant is the fact that the regime explicitly deceived the EU-3 (Britain, France, and Germany).

In the October 2003 meeting among regime officials and the foreign ministers of the EU-3, the regime explicitly agreed to provide full disclosure to the foreign ministers and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in exchange for the EU-3's agreement that it would oppose the American policy of referring Iran's case to the UN Security Council. In February 2006, during intense intraelite fighting, Hassan Rouhani revealed that Ahmadinejad and his hard-line colleagues had attacked Rouhani and the previous team as both incompetent and weak and claimed that their policies were responsible for undermining Iran's position in the nuclear conflict. Rouhani responded by publishing his remarks to the High Council of the Islamic Cultural Revolution.70

Rouhani said that in October 2003, after serious deliberations that included all of the main leaders of the regime, they collectively decided not to reveal all of the secrets to the Europeans and the IAEA because doing so would have caused Iran's file to be referred to the Security Council. One such case was the P2 centrifuge case. The regime was not aware that the Libyan government had disclosed all of its nuclear programs to the United States and Britain. Thus the fundamentalist regime decided not to reveal that it had secretly purchased the highly sophisticated P2 centrifuge plans. Because of the Libyan disclosures, the EU-3 and the IAEA were aware of the person who had sold P2 centrifuge plans to Iran. Rouhani stated that the exposure of Iran's explicit deceptions caused the EU-3 to mistrust Iran.71 This disclosure led the EU to support the American policy of referring Iran to the Security Council. It is imperative to add that engaging in deception about its nuclear file is not an exception for the Iranian regime. It has a long history of explicit lies such as its public denials of the assassinations of dissidents abroad despite the fact that its agents have been arrested, convicted, and imprisoned in many Western European countries. Although the regime has successfully lobbied for the extradition of the imprisoned assassins to Iran, it denies that those agents were sent by the regime.72 Lying is allowed in Shiite Islam under the practice of "taghiyeh" [lying, deception, dissimulation].

The belief that the regime has not declared all of its nuclear facilities is widespread. It involves the so-called problem of known and unknown nuclear facilities. In Leverett's words: "Numerous analyses have raised serious doubts that U.S. military strikes against Iran's nuclear infrastructure would delay significantly its nuclear development because of profound uncertainty about the reliability and comprehensiveness of target selection, the possibility that 'unknown' facilities are at least as close to producing weapons-grade fissile materials as 'known' facilities."

There is an internal logical inconsistency in Leverett's argument. On the one hand, Leverett uses this belief to argue against military strikes. On the other hand, Leverett's grand bargain is based on the belief that the regime will honestly provide a complete list of its hitherto "unknown" nuclear facilities and programs to the United States and will agree to dismantle them. In addition, the regime has the added incentive to continue to lie rather than to change its pattern of lying. Continuing to keep the "unknown" facilities "unknown" could enable the regime to take advantage of collaboration in the "known" facilities to advance its technological acquisitions in the "unknown" facilities. Once the regime developed nuclear weapons in the "unknown" facilities, it could then suspend the grand bargain.

Fatal Attractions of the Grand Bargain

 

In addition to the fundamental flaw in any grand bargain, the grand bargain that Leverett proposed in the longer study includes principles that would cause the fundamentalist rulers to reject it. The Leverett grand bargain includes implementing internationally recognized human rights conventions,73 recognizing Israel via accepting UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and stopping assistance to Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas. If the regime were to respect the basic human rights of the Iranian people, it would not last long. The fundamentalist regime needs massive coercion in order to remain in power, a fact obvious to regime officials but one that Leverett fails to take into account. It was one thing for Khatami in 2003 to say that if the Palestinians accept a deal with the Israelis, Iran would not be more Palestinian than the Palestinians; it is quite another for Khamanehi and Ahmadinejad today to accept Security Council resolutions officially recognizing the existence of Israel, a nation they want to wipe off the map. It is imperative to add that even in May 2003, Khamanehi did not accept all of the features of the roadmap.

The roadmap offered by the regime in 2003 reflected the interests of the fundamentalists ruling Iran at that particular moment. But would any grand bargain be in the interests of the United States?

The long-term interests of the United States involve cultivating and maintaining the good will of the Iranian people. The United States was intensely hated in Iran because of the CIA-engineered 1953 coup (which overthrew Iran's democratic government of Dr. Mossadegh) and the support the United States gave to the dictatorial regime of the shah. Since the early 1990s, however, Iranians have been one of the most pro-American populations in the world.

 

 

2. The MORAL aspects of my arguments were on the IRANIAN parts. In the article, I wrote that many IRANIANS regard appeasement of their tormentors and oppressors as unethical and immoral. In my responses to the various commentators in this thread, I elaborated this moral dimensions for us Iranians.

 

3. When Kharazi explicitly states that Khamanehi agrees with 85 to 90 percent, it means that he opposed 10 to 15 percent of the draft written by Swiss ambassador and Kharzai. Therefore, those saying that all the fundamentalist leaders agreed to do xyz, and then say enumerate the various stuff in the draft are simply wrong.

The text of the fax speaks for itself. This draft was not initiated by Khamanehi, but rather by Swiss ambassador and Kharazi.

I believe the actual text PROVES that what had been propagated to be utterly false. The Swiss ambassador dude did NOT simply convery the message of Khamanehi to the US. Rather this dude sat for few hours with Kharzai and came up with a draft, a draft that even Khamanei opposed 10 to 15 percent of its content.

 

 

4. If Israel or India or Pakistan do NOT sign the NPT, then they do NOT have to abide by NPT, do NOT have to tell anything to the IAEA and are 100% within their right to develop nuclear weapons. They might wish to disclose their nuclear work or not. They have not given their commitment not to develop nuclear weapons.

Iran has been a signatory of the NPT. Therefore, the govt in Iran canNOT develop nuclear weapons. IAEA has the responsibility to monitor compliance.

One may argue that it was wrong for the Shah’s regime to sign NPT, or that it was wrong for the fundamentalist regime not to PUBLICALLY leave the NPT.

You do NOT understand these simple facts. Israel, Pakistan and India did not violate any treaties by developing nuclear weapons because they did NOT sign the NPT.

The leaders of the fundamentalist regime have a long history of LIES. They are proven LIARS and charlatan. They have a proven history of mass killings, mass torture, mass rape. That is why there is a concern about these mass murderers.

Best,

MK

 

 

 


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Sloppy reasoning

by Anonymous-today (not verified) on

Among the clutter of this article, the central argument seems to be the rejection of the so-called grand bargain with the Islamic Republic. Of course if you’re against the regime on moral grounds, then the notion of any kind of compromise is moot. But international foreign policy is not based on fine morals regardless of what demagogues on the left and the right would have you believe. Mr. Kazemzadeh of course has wrapped his piece in cloak of objective analysis. Geopolitics is about national and economic interests not human rights. Some of Kazemzadeh’s statements are downright strange. For instance he repeats in more than one instance that Khamenei didn’t agree with all the points of the proposal that Iranian ambassador in Switzerland (?) put forward to American officials; that he only ascended to 80%. He even downplays the proposal because it came from the ambassador and not Kahemeini directly (could any one believe the ambassador did this on his own and without at least indirect agreement by Khamenei?). This is frankly sophomoric reasoning with all due regards to the professor. The fact that Khaemeini had ascended to any compromise is quite significant. In foreign policy you have to get into the door before entering the room. Iran after all facilitated cooperation with Northern Alliance during the invasion of Afghanistan and Sistani who surely did and still does have close connection with the IRI played ball with Americans. Now you might say Sistani and the Shia leadership did that because they had learned from history that they had to play ball with the Americans to get power (the Sunnis did the same back in the 1920 with England and were favoured thereafter) but if Sistani had declared Jihad against the invaders then they would have been called tools of Iran’s expansionist policies in Iraq. Now, the professor surely can’t call US’s foreign policy moral and just. He keeps talking about Iran’s bellicose foreign policy but the only thing he has to show for it is Iran’s support for Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine. First off, Hamas is not Iran’s proxy; this is simply repeating pro-Israeli language of American media. They used to get aid from Saddam too (in their old incarnation as Moslem Brotherhood, they were even boosted financially by Israel because the oppose PLO), did that make them Iraq’s proxy? They are a Sunni nationalist organization that frankly will get the aid from wherever it can get it. Israel is the US’s largest recipient of foreign aid in the world. One out of every four dollars in Israel’s economy is American money, does that make Israel US’s proxy in the region? I guess some people would say yes. What do you think, the professor? Wahhabism is the most virulent, violent, fascistic strain in Islam. In spite of all reactionary behaviour of the IRI, and they are reactionary, the true reactionary heart of Islam beats not in Tehran or Qum or Najaf, but in Saudi Arabia. They’re the ones who call the Shia apostate, never mind the Jews and the others. Wahhabi schools are mushrooming all over the world funded by Saudi money. Al-qaeda is a Wahhabi group and yet in spite of all this, the US and Britain have had no problem with a grand bargain with the Saudis for over 8 years, never mind the Chinese with their massive human rights violation, etc. So moral reasons for rejecting the grand bargain don’t cut it. The US will shake hand with any devil for its national interests. Here is another truly bone head-statement, and I paraphrase, the IRI practices deception and cannot be trusted because of Shia practice of taghia (the practice of hiding one’s faith because of fear of persecution which the Shia did in Iran when they were a persecuted minority), which sanctions lying and deception. Really, professor? No other government in the world deceives and lies except the IRI? Hasn’t Israel hidden its nuclear arsenal from the world? Didn’t Israel put the whistleblower in jail for many yeas and other Israeli called him a traitor? For that matter, didn’t Pakistan deceive the world and then simply opted out of the Atomic Agency? Isn’t Iran at least a member and as such can be censured or be demanded to comply? Note everyone, including the professor that the Atomic Agency is a voluntary organization and at least on the surface the Mullahs have shown a willingness to be part of this, which is more than one can say about US’s behaviour in the past decade by refusing to be part of any international treaty that limits their ability to behave as an imperial force. This is almost as bone-head as the Bernard Lewis’s statement that the belief in Mahdi by the Shia means nuclear Armageddon if Iran ever acquires nuclear weapons. As well, quoting from the IRI’s constitution means very little. Commitment to some form of spreading the revolution, is no more than third-worldism wrapped in cloak of Khomeinism. Iran is not the only revolutionary country that postures like this. Sur they gave some aid to some ragtag groups in East African and so on but to hold that as the reason you can bargain and contain the regime is again not very solid. The US itself has been exporting Americanism for decades in South America and other places.
I’m not in favour or disfavour of grand bargain with Iran per se. I’d be glad if there was a bomb that could be dropped on Iran that only killed Mullas and their cronies (let’s call in M-bomb) and left the country relatively intact. By the way I’m not sure why the world has to revolve around America and what it wants or doesn’t want from the rest of the world. But I object to sloppy reasoning and repetition of accepted nonsense in American media when it comes to potentially concluding that the best way to get rid of the IRI is to invade Iran and potentially destroy it as a country.


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fundamental flaw of this article (to Anonuousk)

by Anonym7 (not verified) on

Anonymousk says: "The complacency observed among the population is not synonymous with approving the fundamentalist Islamic Regime. Your argument is predicated on flawed reasoning or you think Iranians are all fools and mentally challenged."

An may I ask what part of my statement implies Iranians are "fools and mentally challenged" and "complacent"?
On the contrary Iranians are very outspoken to point out their dissatisfaction. Here is what I said, read it again:
No, Mr. Kazemzadeh, although IRI does not have a good human rights record and it is a semi dictatorial regime the overwhelming majority of Iranians are discontent because of the economical hardship they are experiencing (high inflation .....) not because of IRI human rights records or its dictatorship! You are simply out of touch with Iran's realities, and As Ajam stated below you are repeating American mainstream media version of world issues!


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to anonym7: The complacency

by Anonymousk (not verified) on

to anonym7: The complacency observed among the population is not synonymous with approving the fundamentalist Islamic Regime. Your argument is predicated on flawed reasoning or you think Iranians are all fools and mentally challenged.

To a large extent this unfortunate complacency is a psychological outcome of population under years of oppression, extreme fear and intimidation, and brutality. In psychological term it is called *Learned Helplessness"...One out of 16 Iranian is a drug addict, another symptom of Learned Helplessnes...

Definition of Learned Helplessness:
//www.noogenesis.com/malama/discouragement/he...


Nadias

Houston area........

by Nadias on

best place to be in Texas. :o) Of course, it is my subjective opinion. 

Feliz Nooruz,

Solh va Doosti (paz a vosotros)

Nadia


Darius Kadivar

Massoud Jan I said Legacy Not Legitimacy

by Darius Kadivar on

Thank you Massoud for your kind comments. It is equally a pleasure to debate on such important issues in a civilized way regardless of whether we share or not the same views.

Your questions require a more in depth response than what you will read here but I am sure that we will have other oppurtunities to speak on this endless subject of legitimacy of the monarchy Vs the Republic or particularly on Reza Pahavi's role.

I do think however that Reza Pahlavi does have a historical legacy upon his shoulders and that is not something that should or can be solved be it in a congress or reunion between politicians. The issue of the Monarchy Vs Republic is too an important issue to be reduced to merely a question of form.

Your arguments are respectable but not irrefutable no more than mine, however I would most probably agree with you if lets say we were celebrating the 50th anniversary of the revolution or that like in France the revolution had taken place 200 years ago.

30 years that is barely one  generation is too short a periode to truly allow us to drop the question of the monarchy overnight or even judge it as an obstacle to democratic thought and evolution. All the more that the monarchy as an institution again has a long VERY long history in our nation.

I would like to sum my arguments partially through visual demonstrations in the following links. At best they can simply be seen as FOOD FOR THOUGHT ;0)

1) GATHERING STORM: A BBC TV series with Richard Burton:  

Even if the comparison may not be entirely the same, I would like to draw your attention to an exerpt from an excellent movie entitled The Gathering Storm a remake of which was also made recently with Albert Finney and Vanessa Redgrave . This was the one with Richard Burton in the title role of Winston Churchill. I feel that Burton's Churchill delivers some strong arguments ( based on WC true speaches and memoires) in regard to his refusal of seeing Great Britains King to Abdicate:

//www.youtube.com/watch?v=Amq7wEcd32U

2) Historical LEGACY Vs Political LEGITIMACY: Reza Pahlavi's speach of Oath as "Roi de Jure" made upon his 21st Year shortly after his fathers demise in Cairo.

This Oath was only a commitment by the Crown Prince of Iran to the cause of Freedom and Democracy of his fellow compatriots. It was not an actual Oath as King which can only be made in an elected Parliament in Iran. Given the particular circumstances in which he reached majority ( according to the previous Constitution) and the outcome of the Iran Iraq War during which he had also wrote to General Velayatollah Felahie, Chief Commander of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic, offering to fight in the air force for Iran in the war. The offer was rebuffed.

Part 1:

//www.youtube.com/watch?v=h09-snPfeK8

Part 2:

//www.youtube.com/watch?v=SBxYjjoKOro&feature=related

3) Shapour Bakhtiar's attitude towards Khomeiny and the Revolutionary mouvement. ( ALSO Joins the Argument above in regard to Historical Legacy VS Political Legitimacy) :

As the last days of the monarchy are looming ahead the Last Prime Minister of Imperial Iran Shapour Bakhtiar ( also member of Iran's National Front ) in interviewed about the possible arrival of Ayatollah Khomeiny to Iran. The last part shows footage of the Ayatollah's arrival at Mehrabad with the Air France flight and amongst the enthusiastic crowd the leaders of the National Front ( Sanjabi, Dariush Forouhar  ) who unlike Bakhtiar had joined the Revolution. //www.youtube.com/watch?v=biQaPNp-EXk Conclusion: I do not wish to conclude a debate that has hardly started but given that it would need more thought I would simply like to make an observation regarding the Secular Republican figureheads I feel that the choice of Mr. Amir Entezam as a successor to Dr. Mossadegh falls short. First of all because as the popular saying goes the Revolution often Eats its own Children. As you may know Mr. Entezam has little credentials other than being the longest political prisoner of a Regime he and his colleagues contributed in creating : That of the Current Theocracy. As you may know unlike Bakhtiar ( TRULY IRAN's CHURCHILL  but with a FATAL & TRAGIC END) Entezam, Sanjabi and many other members of the National Front joined the Revolution by betraying themselves and their secular party. Mr. Entezam other than having been a particularly handsom and suave and "well shaved" Ambassador to Sweden dressed in a "Western" aka "Taghouti" Outfit in contrast to the dressing norms of the post Revolution social laws can hardly be considered as a "hero". My comment should not be interpreted as an attempt to belittle the man, the political thinker or intellectual he appears to be. I have read about his sad predicament through the interesting articles on Mrs. Fariba Amini ( daughter of Dr. Mossadegh's Lawyer and private Secretary who visited him in Iran recently). But Come on lets be a little serious here, neither the Forouhar's tragically assassinated by the current regime death squads or Entezam and Sanjabi's could be seen as anything else than misleaded political figures who did not have the vision and clairvoyance of Dr. Shapour Bakhtiar in regard to what was brewing and awaiting Iran. History speaks for itself even if Bakhtiar was not flawless and did not have his shortcomings particularly as an opposition leader. But his moral and historical legacy remain intact 30 years after the fall of the Imperial Regime. Again I invite you to ponder on this speech ( after the Aghdashloo intro ) amongst the last ones by Dr. Bakhtiar given in the US shortly before his assassination : //www.youtube.com/watch?v=lMvWKRtbs9A If we need to look at our history it is not to mystify the past or glorify it but on the contrary to be able to make the proper decisions for today and hopefully for the future. We should not live on bitterness and on prejudice towards one another because in that case we will never take any steps towards eachother and a better understanding of the dillema's our society faces or will face. I believe that non of us has the response to ALL the problems or the right solutions but it is HIGH TIME for Republicans to also do their "examen de conscience" and be more flexible in their often stubborn resistance not only towards Reza Pahlavi but towards acknowledging some of their own contradictions. I can bring up dozens of arguments in criticism of how Reza Pahlavi handles his Public Relations or on his approach to certain issues but I would also like to see a genuine sincerity and honest self criticism expressed by my fellow Republican comrads in admitting some responsability ( which You have partially done in your article) in the current mess and state of the opposition today. As for the monarchy. I am willing to BET with you  ;0) that if the issue was even a slight reality IN IRAN TODAY 70 % of Iranians and not just this old woman : //www.youtube.com/watch?v=P-bRa86a8to would  vote in favor of its restoration EVEN in ITS ABSOLUTE form. NOT THAT I SHARE THIS TYPE OF RESTORATION, But because people are so fed up with this regime that they would go for anything as long as it doesn't imply having the mullah's run the country. I fully agree with you that it would NOT be based on Reasoning but on Emotion but NO More than The Referandum abolishing the monarchy in Iran was in the aftermath of the Revolution and the passionate atmosphere. This is why it is important to have this open dialogue between republicans and constitutional monarchists because it can only lead to clarification and mutual understanding on where they should each stand. I very much doubt that if at worst (in the republican view of things) the monarchy would be indeed be restored that the little Pahlavi princess' Noor,  Iman or Farah  in 10 years would become the next "Absolute Monarch's of Iranzamin" or represent a serious threat to democracy .... And if as you may wish the Republican scenario is finally chosen over the monarchy that Reza Pahlavi would stand against it. You may encouter some resitance from one or two Shahollahi's but certainly no more from the Pahlavi clan. I would even come to think that you may even have a harder time with "would be Napoleon's" in the likes of this gentleman ( who thinks he is the Next Napoleon and his Sun and Lion Flag displays a Straight Sword ) : //www.youtube.com/watch?v=r4NG5282ZWc   And who thinks that by Showing he is a dentist gives him extra credentials to lead the Opposition: //www.youtube.com/watch?v=UvbyBNdOxSs Personally I never trusted dentists ;0) LOL Fortunately unlike these Clowns ( who even attack the Royal Family and its best representative to date : the Former Shahbanou) there are many intelligent, educated and open minded Iranians in all walks of life who can contribute in building and empowering Iran's civil society and dialogue between ALL parties and promote the progression of democratic ideals and Human Rights in Iran. Fortunately I see a great deal of hope and oppurtunities in a near future for a more collaborative effort from all of the political spectrum in the Iranian Diaspora and Opposition to come to terms with eachother and dialogue in a more healthy and less paranoiac atmosphere than in the early days of the revolution or in the years that followed. Constitutional Monarchists and activists should stop seeing Republicans as a bunch of rascals and anarchists which I think is less and less the case. And Republicans in turn need to stop seeing Reza Pahlavi as a permanent threat to their sheer existance or as a potential dictator. Or boil down ALL monarchists to Shahollahi's. The chance should be given to open channels of dialogue and peaceful exchange between Republicans and Monarchists without despising one another even if it requires Time and Patience to get there slowly BUT Surely ! My Humble Opinion, DK

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fundamental flaw of this article (to author ,... , Ajam)

by Anonym7 (not verified) on

the author says: "Similarly, the overwhelming majority of Iranians have come to hate the fundamentalist regime, whose human rights record is far worse than that of the shah's. Those governments that have friendly relations with the fundamentalist regime are viewed negatively by the Iranian public ... The Iranian public has high regard for the United States because the widely held perception is that it has stood by the Iranian people and has opposed the ruling fundamentalist dictatorship while Europeans and Russians have put profits before concerns over human rights and democracy in Iran."

No, Mr. Kazemzadeh, although IRI does not have a good human rights record and it is a semi dictatorial regime the overwhelming majority of Iranians are discontent because of the economical hardship they are experiencing (high inflation .....) not because of IRI human rights records or its dictatorship! You are simply out of touch with Iran's realities, and As Ajam stated below you are repeating American mainstream media version of world issues!
Your update of state of Iranian opposition groups is fairly good though. So I think reading your long article is not a waste of time.


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Mr. Kazemzadeh, I would like to ask you one question!

by Anonymous-2 (not verified) on

Dear Professor Kazemzadeh:

With all due respects you have mentioned that you are with "Jebheye Melli" that is of course a group who believes in the philosophy of the great Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq. Is this correct?

Your answer to this will be quite useful to understand your psychology and your beliefs.

Regards


Jahanshah Rashidian

My solutions

by Jahanshah Rashidian on

I like to thank the author for his great article.

Despite increasing poverty, unemployment and inflation in Iran, the IRI has a high budget for its repressive organs which is invested from the national oil income. Therefore an eventual oil sanction results into weakening of the repressive regime and may be regarded as positive for the long-term struggles of people. Oil income, as said the author, has not improved our national economy. It is rather a tool of repression than a source of national income.


Other kinds of sanctions regimes which meet the basic needs of people, or a military attack on Iran without caring about the fate of 70 millions can result into more complicated casualties, damage of infrastructures, and unpreditable promlems without even a guarantee for a regime change.

A real opposition would condemn the whole IRI which has occupied and destroyed our country, and then would firstly rely on Iranians themselves to get rid of the plague of Islamism in Iran. As I described in my previous witings, our main problem is the lack of a democratic, radical --not appeaser--, secular, and trustful opposition to organise and lead different kinds of people's struggles to topple the regime.

As for the international support, I would propose appropriate international assistance with respect to all means of our independence and sovereinity. A democratic and secular opposition would campaign for the following requisitions:

The IRI must be internationally isolated, all diplomatic, and sport contacts with it must be suspended. All foreign accounts of IRI’s officials must be frozen. Their mafia activities in the Persian Gulf and around Iran must be internationally under controlled. International mandates must be issued against IRI’s officials for their crimes against humanity. So, there are many other sanctions that can be proposed on IRI’s officials, but neither military nor economic sanctions must be accepted because the dimensionality of national casualties cannot be predictable. So, once again, oil sanctions can be however be a long-term means of weakening the repressive organs and coercive apparatuses of the regime.

The UN and the Council of Europe should be demanded to approve resolutions putting the IRI and the political Islam on an equal status of fascist, racist, and criminal organisation. Such resolutions are not either beyond the legal competency of these organisations nor the judicial facts. This is an active contribution to elaborating a charter of principles for an IRI’s isolation.

In the meanwhile, such an Iranian democratic movement would try to form a front of all seculars and democrats with the acceptable principles as a common platform.


Bang Man

Limp Logic

by Bang Man on

 

 

 

When faced with irrefutable facts, You have nothing to say.

The most ridicules of all the statements you made is this :

"
The United States has won the hearts and minds of a new generation of Iranians."

"
President George W. Bush is popular among Iranians ..."

 

NO one and I mean no one with a sane mind would agree with the above statements.

USA is viewed as an OIL
PARASITE by the rst of the world.

Over 1000 000 Iraqis have been killed for OIL.

And you think Iranians love USA for it ?

 

If you want to have an honest debate, than respond to my
comments and do not make any personal statements. As far as KHODA I am
generational NON-KHODA ! MAZHABA MAN IRAN.

 

 

 

 

 

 


Masoud Kazemzadeh

responses

by Masoud Kazemzadeh on

Dear A347,

Thank you for your kind and generous comments.

Nooruz shoma pirooz,

MK

 

 

Dear Anonymoushk,

1. On the social bases of the regime, especially the hardline faction, utilizing govt generated data, my analysis just came out. If you have access to a university library (or willing to pay a little money through their Internet purchase), you could get it.

Masoud Kazemzadeh, "Intra-Elite Factionalism and the 2004 Majles Elections in Iran," Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 44, No. 2 (March 2008).

//www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a...

 

 

2. In Iran, the ideology of fundamentalism (transformation of religion into political ideology plus a reactionary interpretation of all political and religious issues) has been defeated. The current oligarchy faces problems of legitimacy far worse than those suffered by the communist regime in USSR in the late 1980s. This has come about due to a variety of factors, among which is the utter lack of competence by the regime (except manipulation of masses, use of extreme violence) in areas of economic management, political system, foreign relations. They consistently sacrificed long-term benefits to their narrow short-term benefit.

It is clear that demands for freedom, democracy, human rights, individual liberties have spread wide and deep in our society. Whereas in 1905, these demands were limited to a few percentages of the population (highly educated), in 1950s to the educated modern middle classes, today these demands are embraced by men and women, religious and non-religious, those living in big cities and small towns. Khatami and reformist faction of the fundamentalist oligarchy won elections not because of Khatami’s rosy cheeks, but because he echoed the demands of the masses for azadi, jama madani, hokumat qanon and the like. He won not by promising slogans of the revolution, but by echoing the slogans of the democratic opposition. And Ahmadinejad won by portraying himself as opponent of the status quo (as bizaare as that may seem), by opposing agha-zadeh-ha and by promising to bring oil money to the table of the people instead of to the pockets of the fundamentalist leaders.

 

3. Solution: There are several serious problems plaguing the opposition. Our leaders have been incompetent, self-centered, and short-sighted.

Our young generation does not suffer from the political short-comings of the earlier generation. Unlike other Islamic nations, our people do not suffer from the illusions (or delusions) of Islamist utopia (or more accurately dystopia).

Our political culture was terribly damaged by the long dictatorial rule, especially since 1953. Instead of healing and reconciliation, Khomeini and fundamentalist poured salt on our cultural wounds and made them much much much worse. Just compare what Mandela and ANC did in South Africa with what Khomeini did in Iran. Whereas Mandela brought reconciliation, democracy, pluralism, Khomeini brought blind revenge, mass slaughter, mass torture unprecedented in our history, and terrible dictatorship. Despite the fact that the 1979 revolution was truly a huge mass based revolution, Khomeini’s psychopathic and fascistic policies so brutalized our nation that today so many compared it with the previous dictatorship and say "Khomeini rooye Shah ro sefid kard," or refer to Shah as "khoda biyamorz"!!!! Khomeini’s brutal and pathological policies have so terribly harmed our political culture it will continue to harm our politics.

Unfortunately, I think more sufferings is on the way for the Iranian people. Fundamentalist regime is like cancer. It has, and continues to, kill our body politic. Healing can only begin after this cancerous tumor has been taken out. I don’t think most Iranians realize the gravity of the situation. By the time they realize how serious the problem is, I am afraid it will be too late.

We lack a Mossadegh that could galvanize the people and save the situation. The only distant second available is Abbas Amir-Entezam. Would our opposition leaders rise to the occasion and subsume their parochial short-term interests to the broader public good? Would our people rise to the occasion and participate in mass uprising to get rid of this cancerous tumor before it kills us all?

If Ahmadinejad provokes a war with the US or Israel, what will happen? Ahmadinejad thinks that his pro-war policies will cause the reappearance of Imam Zaman. If one believes that Imam Zaman will show up, end injustice, and usher in 1,000 years of perfect justice, then Ahmadinejad’s starting a war is religiously right. If you are a true believer, having the privilege of being Imam Zaman’s real soldier is worth a few million deaths. If you don’t believe that the 12th Imam will show up sometimes in 2009 or 2010 to assist Ahmadinejad, then we are in a very serious trouble.

In my opinion, the only thing that could change the current situation is a UN Security Council resolution imposing similar economic sanctions on the fundamentalist regime that we imposed on apartheid regime in South Africa. An immediate ban on purchase of oil and gas from the fundamentalist regime may cause serious economic collapse, run on the food stores, run on the banks, mass uprising that the regime could not control. This might work or it might not work. If it did work, it would free Iranian people from the misery of living under the fascist fundamentalist regime. If it did not cause the overthrow of the regime, it might at least postpone a war.

Fighting cancer is not pain-free. It is very very painful as is fighting fundamentalist regime. We need to be honest with ourselves and with Iranian people. There will be much pain and agony for us all. The cause of this pain is the fundamentalist regime and its leaders Khomeini, Rafsanjani, Khamanehi, Ahmadinejad.

 

4. I do not think we need another religion. What we need is a separation of religion and the state. Shia Islam of the Ayatollah Uzma Kazem Shariatmadari, or Ayatollah Uzma Zanjani (or perhaps Ayatollah Taleghani) was not incompatible with democracy. What is harmful for democracy is transforming religion into a political ideology (especially one like fundamentalism that presents a fascistic interpretation of religion and politics). Taleghani was against velayat faghih and opposed clerical dictatorship, but attempted to create a liberal Islamic party that would promote policies based on Islam but not a state that was ruled by clerics.

If we are lucky and can establish a secular and democratic republic, then each person could worship any religion he or she so desires, or have no religion at all.

What is essential is that we do not have a clueless reactionary cleric be Supreme Leader (Khomeini and Khamanehi), another clueless cleric president, another clueless one Head of the Judiciary, another gang to determine who can become president or member of Majles,...

 

Nooroz shoma pirooz,

MK

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Dear Arya,

Actually it is false to claim that there are harsh economic sanctions in place. In the past 29 years or so ONLY the US has not directly traded with the fundamentalist regime. Other than air-craft parts and some US military stuff, other American goods find their way to Iran via UAE and Qatar. The latest bank stuff is also relatively minor. The EU, Japan and China buy oil and gas from the regime and they (plus Russia sell it all sort of stuff). Therefore, it is FALSE to say that there are harsh economic sanctions.

 

The ONLY thing that can have serious impact will be a UN Security Council ban on the purchase of oil and natural gas from the fundamentalist regime. This will immediately cut off the oxygen that keeps feeding the cancerous tumor that is brutalizing the Iranian people. As long as fundamentalist regime can sell oil on large scale, not much will matter. Thus what has occurred so far is a little drop to what could happen if UNSC were to actually impose sanctions.

It would be false to say that this will be pain-free for the Iranian people as it would be false to tell a cancer patient that surgery will be pain-free or a dentist telling a patient that root-canal will be pain-free.

To remain silent and not discuss the real pain that will be visiting upon our people is not being responsible.

I am saying now what I have been saying in the past 7 years or so. I was against a war then, I am against a war now. You and I can jump up and down until we are blue in the face, but we cannot make US or Israel not follow THEIR national interests if military attacks are in THEIR interests. Obviously the likelihood of a peaceful transition to democracy has dramatically been reduced and the likelihood of a major war has increased. What I has been writing on the bb has now been put into an scholarly article which has been under review at a journal in the past 2.5 months. If it gets accepted, and published, I will try to get permission to re-publish it here, so it might help our people.

I think there is a very high likelihood of war in 2009 or 2010. A UNSC sanctions is probably the only thing that could postpone the war. I do not think it is likely that the US and/or Israel sit back and live with the possibility of fundamentalist regime continuing the nuclear enrichment and develop nuclear weapons capacity (which would allow the regime to develop nuke bombs shortly if it so desired). There is a lot of self-delusions and wishful thinking going on among Iranians inside and abroad. I have been writing and saying this for more than 7 years. I am afraid, when bombs drop, then people say, "Kazemzadeh was right." By then it will be too late.

 

Nooruz shoma pirooz,

MK

 

 

 

Dear Mr. Kadivar,

Let me begin by saying that I truly enjoy reading your many contributions. You are a credit to our community. Thanks for your superb works.

RP says that he will accept being a monarch if the people in a referendum would vote for monarchy. Do you seriously think that 50% of the Iranian people will vote to establish monarchy???????

Democratic republicans say that it is easy to promise freedom and democracy when one is out of power. Khomeini is Paris promised freedom and democracy and promised that he would not accept any role in the future govt. But as soon as he could, he established his tyranny. As I mentioned in my article overwhelming majority of republicans do not trust RP. Moreover, they think why in the world create a position (monarch) and then try to make sure that position will not amass and abuse power, considering that a monarch is a permanent position.

The institution of monarchy gains its legitimacy not from democratic principles but rather from tradition (traditional sources of legitimacy). If such legitimacy had in fact existed among Iranians (as it does among British, or Swedes), then we would not be having this debate. Traditional legitimacy exists not because it is rational, but because it exists despite rational and democratic precepts and sources. Constitutional monarchy is a hybrid system that lives with a non-democratic institution, struggling to restrain its power into merely symbolic ones devoid of actual real political power. It could survive only under special circumstances when the ruling dynasty enjoys great deal of legitimacy, in part due to its longevity, its actual being in power and gradually giving away its real power. It is a very dangerous situation when the monarch decides to abandon his earlier promises to respect the wishes of the people.

In my opinion, the Pahlavis do NOT enjoy widespread legitimacy. A small proportion of the population supports monarchy, many intensely so. RP has not succeeded in creating an alliance with non-monarchists. My proposal, would transform monarchists into a conservative republican party with RP as its head. This would allow an alliance with liberal and social democratic republicans. This would help create a powerful opposition against the regime. RP could run for presidency and if he won he could serve as president for lets say two terms. If he lost, then he could run for Majles if he so desired. If RP believes in democracy, then he should not demand special privileges for himself (and his family), rather be a person like all other Iranians: run for office in periodic free elections. I have no problem seeing RP become president (say in two consecutive terms in free and fair elections).

In order to get rid of the incumbent dictatorship, we need to have a broad-based alliance. This requires several things. One is our willingness and ability to openly and publically break some political taboos. We need to somehow being groups that have historically hated each other into some sort of understanding and coexistence. This in turn requires our leaders to LEAD our people by openly discussing some of these issues.

RP has taken some good steps, but in my humble opinion he needs to make more. The leaders on my side of the divide also need to make serious leading, and I believe that Abbas Amir-Entezam has indeed make great strides. I think communists (or former communists in many instances) and the ethnic parties have also taken some major steps. If we are able to come up with a formula that would make all these groups target solely the fundamentalist regime, then it that would spell the doom of the fundamentalist regime. Unfortunately, I am not very optimistic.

Nooruz ra be shoma va khanevadeh gerami tabrik migam,

MK

 

 

 

 

 

 

Dear Zion,

I disagree with you. If treaties had no effect, why then the US did not sign the Kyoto protocols, or the International Criminal Court, or the treaty banning landmines? If you are right, then the US could have signed them and them cheat as you suggest?

If the US signed a grand bargain with the fundamentalist regime, then it would have to remove the regime from the State Department’s annual publication’s Patterns of Global Terrorism’s "terrorist list." The US had to publically state that the regime was did not belong to the "axis of evil."

If a country signed a treaty and then cheated, then it will lose credibility. It is one thing to have one’s tukhuz kicked in global public opinion and say hell with it, I am going to bomb the hell of anyone who opposed me; it is quite another to lose credibility as govt that would carry out its signed treaties. If the latter, then no one would sign any treaty with that country, and thus that country would not benefit from treaties.

Best,

MK

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Dear Anonyousk,

There is no doubt that the fundamentalist regime leaders are charlatan and liars. And that is precisely why others do not believe when Khamanehi and Ahmadinejad say that the nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes. It is precisely due to the lack of credibility of the fundamentalist regime that others do not trust the treaties this regime signs.

Happy Nooruz,

MK

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Dear Bang Man,

As they say back home: "khoda shoma raa shafa bedahad" (if you believe in khoda); and if you don’t, may the Big Bang help solve your problems.

 

Nooruz mobarak,

MK

 

 

Dear Mr. Kashani,

Thank you for your kind and generous words. I have discussed the sabotage scenario in my forthcoming article is some detail. Have patience, it shall appear.

The US govt will do what is in the national interest of the US. The Israeli govt will do what is in the national interest of Israel. WE have to do what is in Iran’s national interests.

The govts in US and Israel are legitimate in the eyes of THEIR citizens. Americans widely respect and revere their constitution, and they can vote for anyone they so desire. Israeli system is regarded as legitimate by the Jewish citizens of Israel. They can vote for anyone from far right to far left, from religious to atheist. Therefore, when one party loses, it still regards the system as legitimate.

Unfortunately this is not the case in Iran. There is a small clique that not only oppresses those who think differently than extreme right-wing fundamentalists, but also bars members of the fundamentalist oligarchy from running for offices (e.g., sitting member of the Majles!!!!). There is an extremist fanatical regime that horribly oppresses our people. At the most basic level, the interests of the ruling oligarchy is in opposition to the interests of the Iranian people who oppose the regime. Time and again, the fundamentalists have harmed the national interests of Iran, whether it was the hostage crisis, Salman Rushdie affair, etc..

Until this regime is removed and a legitimate political system established in Iran, we will have resistance and struggle. Only with the establishment of a legitimate political system, could we all live side by side, have free and democratic elections, so that politics will NOT be a matter of life and death (LITERALLY). Only AFTER the establishment of such a legitimate system, we will have social peace, which will help economic investments, which will lead to prosperity. As long as this tyrannical regime stays in power, the misery of our people continues.

It is OUR responsibility to get rid of this nightmarish regime. If we want freedom, we have to be willing to pay the price. If we fail, then others will do what is in THEIR national interests. Those who support the regime and promote appeasement of the regime, prolong the incumbent dictatorship, which prolongs the misery of the Iranian people. To help the fundamentalist terrorist regime is against the interests of the Iranian people and the national interests of Iran.

 

On your reply to BID:

I am actually center-left. I am very liberal and am very secular. I do not classify JJ as right either. He is a decent man who truly believes in freedom of expression and has provided this wonderful forum for all perspectives to express their analysis. He has been publishing my articles for many years. The Iranian.com is an achievement of our community and we owe a great debt of gratitude to Jahanshah Javid. The existence of this site shows that despite all our flaws, we can have freedom and democracy. The fact that JJ published diverse and opposing perspectives is a major positive attribute of this site. It brings a lot people into one community; some read our serious articles and others watch anar anar. :-)

BID does not make sense. He criticizes me for having published my article at the journal of one of American’s major foreign policy think tanks. He does not know that last year, fundamentalist regime ambassador to the UN actually was personally present at this think tank along with Henry Kissinger. It their weird mind set, it is perfectly fine for fundamentalist to lobby Americans, but pro-democracy Iranian scholars should not publish their scholarly works in their journals!!!!!!

What he does is typical pro-fundamentalist regime propaganda. The Ministry of Intelligence has this cartoon video of Mc Cain, Soros, and calls Iranians who struggle for freedom and democracy and human rights as stooges of the US. Lets review: WHOOOOOOOOOOOOO had secret deals with officials of the US and Israel?????? Remember the Iran-Contra scandal. For the fundamentalists it is halal for Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini, then-president Khamanehi, Rafsanjani and Mir Hussein Mossavi (the prime minister) to SECRETLY meet and deal with American officials and Israeli agents. If getting assistance (especially secretly) is bad and punishable, then the Ministry of Intelligence has to arrest supreme Leader Ali Khamanehi, and Rafsanjani. Khomeini is dead and cannot be arrested for his secret dealings with the "Great Satan" and the "Little Satan"!!!!!!!!!!!

It is the job of pro-fundamentalist propagandists to attack Iranian democrats. BID is doing his job. Truth, honesty, and decency are alien values for fundamentalists. No person with much brain would believe the nonsense and lies of fundamentalists. Do you think anyone (other than supporters of the fundamentalist regime) believes that Dr. Jahanbegloo was a spy for the US? It is the job of Shariatmadari’s Keyhan and their supporters to throw mud; that is what they do.

The fact of the matter is that we Iranians have been struggling for azadi, hukumat mardom, hukumat ghanon since the Constitutional Revolution (1906), and under the able leadership of Dr. Mossadegh. Our struggle for freedom and democracy is more than 100 years!!! The fundamentalist have always opposed freedom and democracy. In 1907 it was Shiekh Fazlollah Noori, then Fadaian Islam and then Khomeini, and nowadays the fascists who rule Iran. Next BID and the Ministry of Intelligence will release a video saying that Sattar Khan took money from the CIA to kill Sheikh Fazlollah Noori.

Nooruz shoma piruz,

MK

 

 

Dear Nadia,

De nada. Thank you for your kind and generous words. Where in Texas are you from?

Happy Nooruz,

Masoud

 

 


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Interesting!

by Ajam (not verified) on

Interesting (in an entertaining way) article! Once I found "Ahmadinejad's belicose rhetoric and plicy" among the reasons for concern, I realised that I should look at this as an entertaining article whos's author buys into the American mainstream media version of world issues! Basing an argument on Ahmadinejad's cartoonish rants -- that only amount to attempts at capitalizing on the regional anti-Israeli sentiments that and even American pundits (neo-cons notwithstanding) don't take seriously -- as one of the factors involved was a dead give away!

And why does the author (much like a cult-member) refer to the IRI as the "fundamentalist regime," which among other things, lowers the level of the article to that of a gossip column such as Dr. Nurizadeh's?!

P.S. hoping this post geys through the censores, I keep my fingers crossed!!!


Nadias

Thank you!

by Nadias on

It was a very interesting article.

Solh va Doosti (paz a vosotros)

Nadia


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Bored Iranian dude, just as

by Farhad Kashani (not verified) on

Bored Iranian dude, just as much you don’t believe certain things, we, and I mean the majority of Iranians, are in disbelief that there are still Iranians who support this regime. You wrote” The Basij are 13 million disillusioned militia of poor people fighting "for the Khomeini revolution" armed with AK47's and bikes, any attack on them would kill fathers, brothers and husbands of thousands of Iranians.”. I’m sure you are well aware that not all the 13 million Basidjis are at all times mobilized to fight. And even if they were, the Basidj is like the Soviet Red Army or the Hitler Army. They are guilty of committing human rights violations against Iran and are one of the major terrorism sponsoring military units in the world. So its not fair for the majority of Iranians and other people around the world to live in fear and threat of the Islamic regime and its Basidjs. The other 57 million Iranians also have sons and husband and fathers, not just the Basidjis, they also have rights, and just like the Soviet Red Army who committed human rights violations in its country, then the Basidjs need to be treated the same way. We gave the regime 30 years worth of chance and opportunity to change its behavior, and what did it Mr. Khameni do? Become more radical day by day, and by the way, way before Bush was in power or the Iraq war started. You wrote” You must have amazing good faith in American bombs that hit the Chinese embassy by an accident during the Yoguslav campaign”. For your information, that wasn’t an accident ! If you really have bought the argument that smart bombs don’t work as affective as some news media reports, then you are very naïve my friend. Just read about the latest U.S strike on the Somali Kenya border where smart bombs were used. You wrote” Oh no you don’t, it is known beforehand that there will be NO uprising. Religious fanatics will rush to the street, protesters will be shot on sight and every right movement, woman movement and workers union will be dissolved in "the interest of the state”. I beg you not to claim that this hasn’t been reality in Iran in the last 30 years? Please don’t! You wrote” Well that idea assumes that the planners, Pentagon and the military industrial complex in the US are currently working hard to free the Iranian people because they love Iran so much they cant stand watching Iranians under a dictatorship. Not to break the sad news to you, but they don’t. If Iran was wiped off the map tomorrow, they wouldn’t care.” Although U.S support, (Mostly through non military support) has been essential in so many countries, for example, former Soviet block, to achieve democratic states, they are not obliged to “love” Iran. Can’t you see my friend that the problem that U.S and others (By far not only the U.S) and Iranian people, have with this regime is that they are the main source of inspiration and support of Islamic fundamentalism? You wrote” A grand bargain would make the middle-east stable from a catastrophic war and let the Iranian people decide by their own whether or not they chose to fight this corrupt theocratic system” Time has changed my friend and statements like this does not work in the 21st century and the information age. If we don’t do the dirty work, others will do it for us. And again, unlike lets say Burma or Zimbabwe or Turkmenistan or others who have dictatorial regimes but only affecting their own country and not others, Iran is a threat to peace and democracy reaching to as far as South America. So the world community definitely looks at them differently. You wrote” Can’t believe Iranian.com republishes crap from these so called "think thank" groups which 5 are formed every week now in the US like a F'ing fast food chain”. First of all, you’re obviously showing incredible intolerance. Second, Iranian.com used to be a much more left leaning site, and to a great deal still is, but it has improved much and the reason is that the silent majority of Iranians are waking up and expressing their voice and demand for change, people like Mr. Kazemzadeh, Fred, Zion, jamshid,myself and many others, specially the majority of people in Iran who have to deal with this regime 24/7….and it looks like Mr. Javid has realized that the voice of the majority of Iranians cannot be ignored anymore. We were silent for 30 years, and now we’re waking up.


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Mr. Kazemzadeh, this is one

by Farhad Kashani (not verified) on

Mr. Kazemzadeh, this is one of the most well written analysis’ of the fascist regime and its policies I read in a long time. You have spoken my and the vast majority of Iranian people’s mind. I like to applaud you on a job well done. The ones, who either out of amazing shallowness or incredible disregard and disrespect for the suffering of Iranian people in Iran and total denial of the brutality of this fascist regime, promote for a “dialogue” between Iran and others, specially the U.S, are doing enormous damage to the freedom movement in Iran. Those do not represent the majority of Iranians in any way, shape or form. Many of them actually promote for so called “dialogue” because in fact they would like the regime to stay! They actually want the U.S to sit down and give promises to the regime and they think in return, the regime will give up its anti U.S rhetoric, amazingly looking over the fact that the regime’s anti U.S rhetoric is one of the main oppression and survival tools of it. They day that this regime 1- Dismantles all oppression and inhumane laws and policies 2- Stops supporting Islamic fundamentalist terrorism 3- Stops using anti U.S propaganda, is the day this regime is no longer in existence!Offcourse no one is promoting for war on the Iranian people, they are innocent and first on a list of many victims of this regime, not to mention they are U.S and modernism –friendly, so it is wrong to wage war. But there are many different avenues to take to counter this regime besides a full scale war, and some of these IRI apologists and leftists on this site and elsewhere are not even for those measures! They are ill intentionally or misguidedly do not distinguish between the regime and the people of Iran. Their blind hatred for U.S, and other factors, has totally prevented them from seeing what actually is going on in Iran. I believe the best and most effective and less costly way of getting rid of this regime is a well planned and well executed sabotage campaign, including assassination of the 200 figures that have been controlling this regime since 1979. They are well known and identified. Instead of having U.S fighters bombing our country, maybe we can have some Iranian pilots bombing the few important and vital regime headquarters. The least, and I mean the least, that would do is cause a major shake up and installs fear in this regime. There are many unhappy and opposition members Iranians who are willing to participate in it.


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Mr. Kazemzadeh: I think Zion

by Anonymousk (not verified) on

Mr. Kazemzadeh: I think Zion is spot on. Unless, the regime wants to share dominance with the U.S. in the region, meaning a bigger piece of the pie...which will not go well with countries like Turkey (who has a much stronger economy and GDP) and Saudi Arabai or Kwait.

Here is the latest on Hamas and Iran:

Iranian daily, Entekhab, quoted Ahmad Yussef, Hamas's political adviser, denying to reporters in a press conference in Gazza that Iranian built rockets reach Hamas through intricate underground tunnels from Egypt. "Iranian rockets in fact reach us through the Mediterranean Sea" Yussef finished his statement with.

So no denial that Hamas's rockets come from Iran, just a question of how they reach Hamas :))

Even the Iranian daily can't hide its displeasure with Yussef's claim and finishes with this paragraph:
" سخنان این دشمنان دوست نما که روزگارشان با بیت المال ایرانیان سپری می شود، قرابت بیشتری با سخنان مقامات صهیونیسم دارد تا ایران.اما نکته مهم آن است که گروه حماس و اعضای بلندپایه اش از اعلام این دست اخبار چه قصدی داشته و چه هدفی را دنبال می کنند."

translated:
"Statements made by such enemies who pose as our friends and their daily lives passes with the hard earned money of the Iranian people is more in tune with statements made by Zionist officials. The important question however is, what is the intention of Hamas and its high ranking officials from making such statements and what purpose do they pursuit?"

Well that is the result of not making a sound judgement on what is in our national interest!

//www.entekhab.ir/display/?ID=57675&Send


Zion

Violating a treaty

by Zion on

You said,
`One might violate a written commitment/treaty but that comes with a huge cost, because that would undermine the reputation of the country that signed and then violated it.`

You are confusing things here. Giving security guarantees to another government is not an international treaty, it is not even a meaningful commitment. A government can`t ask for its own security from another government in a meaningful way. This kind of stuff is only bargaining chips and have no moral values anyway. A state that is so insecure that demands another state to give it guarantees that it won`t help its people to overthrow it is bankrupt. That is why even the mullah regime in Iran does not make any such official demands. And as I said, even if the US gives its assurances, even if official, there is no way to check this. Push for regime change can be made as always in discretion.

I might also add that you must be extremely naive to believe that nation states would remain loyal to anything, when they have ways to break it without being found out, and that they are not constantly doing this all the time. Nation states are bound only to the interests of their own citizens. International agreements are taken only for promoting that interest and are uphold only as long as that interest is served. This is the real world we are living in.


Darius Kadivar

More seriously Massoud Jan ...

by Darius Kadivar on

Interesting overview of the state of the opposition and the challenges faced in seeing an end to the 30 years theocracy as well as the strategic trap or morbid temptation of bargaining with the current regime.

I however do not agree with your suggestion that RP should renounce to the Crown in order to unite the opposition. It would be not only foolish but I believe a genuine error.

Why ? I will try and explain below:

No one except monarchists ( Constitutional ) until recently took Reza Pahlavi seriously until they realized the true vacuum of power and credibility in assuming it if ever the regime of Tehran was to implode or more likely go through a serious political crisis that would oppose reformists and hardliners. Added to this internal conflict you have an entire new generation of Iranians who for the most ( essentially because of what their parents say to them or what they have learned over the years ) want to see Real change. They remain facinated not particularly by the monarchy but the level of Freedom that existed before the clerical revolution succeeded. That Freedom of course was not political but certainly individuals and women in particular benefitted from the same freedoms as in the West in terms of civil and social rights as much as men. The contrast is obvious be it visually. It is because of the level of emancipation they had and lost in the process of the Revolution that the current generation is totally dissillusioned by not only the current theocracy but maybe also by empty promises of Freedom and Democracy.

The democratic Republican opposition has no real representative or figurehead who could enter the political arena without making more promises or even making political concessions to rally support from various parties or ideological sensitivities. Not that no competent figurehead cannot be found or would not appear in the course of the years but they cannot claim to any form of historical legacy as Reza Pahlavi can today.

The Defeat of the Religious Theocratic Republic will be interpreted by the people as a defeat of the Revolution. This is where I think the Constitutionalists can play a positive and constructive role that would benefit not particularly the monarchy or the potential monarch ( i.e: Reza Pahlavi) but the democratic society in the making.

Indeed if Reza Pahlavi were to renounce to the Crown as you seem to suggest the wish, it will I believe only create a terrible political and historical misunderstanding amongst Iranians and not just amongst the followers of RP or the monarchists ( Orthodox or Constitionalists) because it would appear as meaningless and defeatist by all means.

The Theocracy has lost total credibility including amongst its staunchest supporters. The granddaughter of the Ayatollah Khomeiny has even lost faith in the hardliners and their capacity in restoring faith in the ideals of the revolution.

The question today is not necessarily weather the IRI will fall but when it will fall.

In the process can and does the opposition ( by that I mean the democratic opposition ( Republican and Constitutional Monarchists)) as well as all who regardless of their ideological sensitivities can find common ground in this struggle offer a positive and hopeful alternative to this 30 year old nightmare that has plundged an entire nation to seeking its roots ( particularly pre-Islamic) and its quest in redefining or rediscovering its identity. Scars and bitterness towards those responsible for the current situation will be essentially oriented towards those in power today rather than anyone who was in power before the revolution. Not that this is entirely fair but you cannot expect the young Iranians who hardly lived under the Shah to blame the former regime for the current slump of credibility, international humiliation and general mismanagement of the economy and social life in the name of conspiracy theories in the lines of Stephan Kinzer & Co.

Reza Pahlavi comes across as "clean" since he was not even born at the time of the 53 coup or could be held personally responsible for his father's would be crimes or shortcomings. Pahlavi represents whether we want it or not the Future. Were he even to renounce to leading the opposition, the question of Monarchy VS Republic will appear quite naturally and by no other than the people of Iran themselves particularly those living back home. Why may you ask ? Simply because the comparison once again will appear very legitimately when historians and politicians of all grounds will have to set the record straight as to the achievements and failures of the revolution and why it went wrong.

What may appear logically sustained or debated amongst historians will not be the same on the political front. When the masses are hungry for change they turn towards the person who can bring that about. Ten years ago people thought that providential "hero" was Khatami but he did not become the Islamic Gorbatchev everyone hoped for.

Today the scenario is VERY different.

We have in front of us a system of government that has lost total credibility and a leadership that nearly everyone agrees has terribly damaged Iran's image in the world but also its long term interests.

The mascarad surrounding the upcoming elections reinforce this general feeling that "We Cannot Trust these Mullah's".

At this stage RP doesn't have anything to do but wait. Time seems to be on his side.

However let us not have any illusions about his role or true potential. The true fact is that we have no real opposition today. RP is the first to admit it. Yet for the first time in 3 decades Iranians seem to have achieved at least one thing in accepting that :

The future government has to be secular.

The Next challenge is to make sure it will be democratic !

RP ( even his website suggests it) is in favor of not only democracy but everything that this notion implies in regard to human rights.

In short he advocating Mark Anthony's famous speach as in William Shakespeare's Julius Caesar:

//www.youtube.com/watch?v=7X9C55TkUP8

But in RP's words it would sound like:

"I come to bury the Shah, NOT the Praise Him"

However Unlike Mark Anthony, Reza Pahlavi IS Crown Prince of the Peacock Throne ( regardless of the legitimacy or not of the monarchy as an institution ). He was born Prince and everyone remembers and associates him to the Imperial Regime. Is he worthy or not the title is another debate ...

But asking him to renounce to the Crown (all the more that he has already made great concessions by calling on a Referandum to determine his exact role in a future government and by doing that he has put the Crown in the Balance ) as an extra guarantee to Republicans that "Hey Guys look he is a Democrat ! "  is not only hypocritical of Republicans who have hardly made ANY concession in the past 30 years in improving the state of the opposition but it would Also be an Error of judgment on what RP represents not much as a person but as a democratic alternative to which the nation can turn too.

I think people prefer to see someone stand out straight for what he is than hide under a cloak of hypocrisy. Oh so he won't be King so he should be President ?

I prefer to know that Reza Pahlavi is a former Crown Prince that could eventually ( if the people wish so ) become a Constitutional King, than see Reza Pahlavi as renouncing to the Crown in order to become a potential future Peronist South American Like President. In the latter case he will only create an ambiguous political legacy that will neither benefit the Monarchists nor the Republican and even less the cause of Democracy for that matter.  

From that point of view I think that it is for instance not Reza Pahlavi's role to explain the future Constitution or his would be role to us a little like a professor in a University. That responsability should on the contrary be that of the opposition leaders or competant jurists/lawyers who would be in charge of drafting the future constitution. Unfortunately given that we don't have a structured opposition today, we simply see a Crown Prince trying to do his best to explain his role with more or less success but also unavoidable blunders in abrupt or sporadic interviews he is asked to make.

Ironically Reza Pahalvi the Crown Prince devoid of any "divine Right" but adament to respecting a constitution ( As he has been repeating it for years ever since he made his Oath de Jure 29 years ago in Cairo ) even to the dismay of some of his own followers would seem much less a threat to democracy than Reza Pahlavi the Politician and or candidate to Presidency of a Republic that has no name or identity ...

It is the role of those who will draft the future Constitution ( Republican or Monarchical)  to clearly define the role of the head of State, the role and power of the government and the parliament.

Iranian democracy would come out victorious in the light of a century old struggle that goes back to the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 if we don't mess it up again by reinventing concepts that have never been put into practice.

I don't really have a preference between a Secular Democratic Republic or a Constitutional Secular and Democratic Monarchy but we should begin by stopping to lie ot ourselves and to others by promising the paradise that does not exist.

The fall of the Islamic regime if it EVER occurs in our lifetime would simply mean "pulling our sleeves up" and getting back to work and civil participation in building a democratic society in a country that has always dreamed of having one but has never truly experienced it.

If Iran were indeed to restore the monarchy not in a desperate attempt but upon a collective national decision based on what RP's followers  suggest: that is an internationally supervised Referandum, then the Spanish model would not seem so absurd and even an Iranian Republican or Socialist Prime Minister like Zapatero would end up by defending Reza Pahlavi's legitimacy like recently observed during the 17th Ibero-American Summit :

//www.youtube.com/watch?v=X3Kzbo7tNLg

The Conclusion in my humble opinion boils down to CLARITY ! and UN AMBIGUITY ! And FALSE PROMISES OF FREEDOM IN 6 MONTHS !

Something that I believe was best expressed by the late Shapour Bakhtiar who gave his life in the process too:

//www.youtube.com/watch?v=lMvWKRtbs9A

Iran Hargez Nakhahad Mord ! BUT LETS GIVE DEMOCRACY A CHANCE !

My Humble Opinion

 

 

 


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bah bah Farhad 100

by Arya (not verified) on

MK:

Long time no chat. Given that your essay was way too long to read (I suggest cliff note versions for sites like this) -- I briefly went through it and as I finally scrolled my way down to the final paragraph I noticed you (and assumingly based on your scientific polling majority of Iranians) are against such a grand bargain -- if not a grand bargain then what?

You used to be against a military strike ... kind of like Pahlavi's position on this matter ... but your implicit positions seem to side with the agenda of hawkish neocons whom you are asking (and some begging) for their help to stop such engagement policies.

So my question is if you don't advocate a military strike - and we already have a pretty hard economic sanction in place and you don't want engagement then what do you expect a US administration to do ... and more importantly what do you expect Iranians to do?


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Dear Mr. Kazemzadeh: Please

by Anonymousk (not verified) on

Dear Mr. Kazemzadeh:

Please don't reply to trollish so-called rebuttle that are irrelevant to your post. You never advocated bestowing democracy upon Iran by foreign intervention.

I have a question for you. You correctly point out that our main problem is fundamentalism in Iran. Do you know what percentage of population in Iran can be classified as fundamentalists? What is their demographic? How much power (economic and military)do they possess?

How are we supposed to fight this deeply rooted fundamentalism in Iran? How do we expose the depravigty of their ideology? What kind of a force (nationalism, another religion??) do we need to counter and marginlize this reactionary force in Iran???


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Vanessa Redgrave

by Commentator (not verified) on

Mr. kadivar, Vanessa Redgrave was truly gorgeous. Wasn't she?

She was not only a great actress (and still is) but truly beautiful.


Darius Kadivar

I Hear You ! ;0)

by Darius Kadivar on


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Revoluntiany Guards now in FULL COMMAND

by Anonymous??? (not verified) on

Does anybody honestly think the U.S. can strike a genuine grand bargain with the IRRG whose hands have been involved in almost all Mideast and beyond anti-Israeli activities for the last 28-29 years?

//news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/72960...


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Great Article

by Anonymous347 (not verified) on

Great article Dr. Kazemzadeh.

Truthful and unbiased. I quite enjoyed reading it!


Bang Man

Struggle for freedom in what CONTEXT?

by Bang Man on

 

 

I will parse your article
and enumerate the main points and will respond to each one. I would like to hear your rebuttal.

 

1. M.K: Among other factors, the American failure to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan has fueled Iran's attempt at regional supremacy to the consternation of many in the region and beyond.

 

--This is a half-truth:
A. America has lost the war both in Iraq and Afghanistan

Bye-Bye Miss American Empire
Iran Celebrates Victory Over America!
As alliances shift, Iran wins. Again

B. The war is a major factor in pending economic catastrophe

War is hell - and hellishly expensive
Dollar meltdown

... take a moment away from
your work to watch reports of Ahmadinejad's visit to "surge"-occupied
Iraq. And then ask yourself,
"Does a country that goes bankrupt and dies in order to lose a war that
hands a country over to its sworn enemy...is this country at all mentally fit
to judge anyone else?"

 

 

2. M.K: The failure of the containment policy, fear that the Islamic
Republic will develop nuclear weapons, and the bellicose rhetoric
and policies of Iran's new president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, have
given rise to urgent discussions about how best to counter the
threat of the fundamentalist regime. The main policies under
discussion are regime change; surgical strikes; reconfigured
containment; limited, issue-based dialogue; and a "grand bargain."

A. Facing a predator

 

… Tush Factor is an important parameter for those Iranians sitting on the side lines and passing
pseudo intellectual comments in the form of geopolitical analysis. All the while, regurgitating
the same old rhetoric and labels trumpeted by mainstream US corporate media. The repetition is
an exercise in drone indoctrination. People the likes of Dr. Ahmad Chalabi. Hand picked and
trained to play the odds and the numbers for a future subservient Iraq as envisioned by the Zionist
project

The long sanctions and the war have resulted in heavy destruction of Iraq. Was there anything
Iraq could have done to stop the war? Hindsight, we must ask ourselves would have a nuclear-ready
Iraq helped to deter the war and the
destruction?



Let us not kid ourselves: we are faced with a predator who believes it is going to a 'generational
war '. Iran has to prepare for worst case scenario. Iran must be ready to defend itself.
In final analysis when the "Abu Ghraib" business goes Franchise in Iran, We only have ourselves
to blame for inaction.

3.M.K: A grand bargain would be in the interests of the United States only if one accepts the assumption
that the regime is legitimate in the eyes of the vast majority of the Iranian people. If that
assumption is valid, then one would expect that Iranians would continue to hate the United States
and have positive feelings toward those who have had friendly political and economic relations with
the regime. However, the well-known pro-American sentiment among Iranians casts doubt on that
assumption.

A. The disease that is US Hegemony is of less relevance to M.E in general and to Iran n particular today.

B. Cowboy pathology

A new regional security paradigm is needed:

Prospect of war and destruction is inherently the legacy of Zionism. Fathers who choose to
give such legacy to their children can hope their children do their dirty work for them.

The Islamic world has no choice but to create an alliance like NATO to defend itself.

Iran will have to have nuclear deterrence to avoid any future war.

 


4.M.K: The United States has won the hearts and minds of a new generation of Iranians.
A grand bargain, which is regarded by vast sectors of the Iranian public as appeasement of
their tormentors, would undermine that hard-earned positive sentiment.

A. M.k: Ha Ha …! and Pigs will fly
Bush and Company“will be greeted with sweets and flowers” … “Mission accomplished”

B. M.K: US is irrelevant as far as IRAN is concerned and will become even less relevant ever day.

IRAN has to continue on build on historical and cultural alliance with neighboring countries.

Iran must work towards building a new regional security paradigm to limit US influence
and secure a lasting peace.

Finally, you said , “we as IRANIANS have the responsibility to get rid of the fundamentalist
terrorist regime that is brutalizing IRANIAN people. I wish that all others elsewhere to also
have freedom, democracy and human rights. As Iranian it is my responsibility to get rid of
dictatorship in my homeland and establish freedom and democracy in Iran.”

 

Yes, but “we Iranians” does it include a little help from USA as well ?

What role do you do you see for USA in this regard?




Struggle for freedom in what CONTEXT?


There are groups of people who view destruction of Islam as a silver bullet to what ills Iran today.


In fact, given current geopolitical context, there motives fall in line with the US Neconsn.




CONTEXT is the key.




“Freedom and democracy” can not be from without and it can not be manufactured.




It is indeed a Generational struggle.




CONTEXT is generational. Building democracy will takes time and can only be achieved by applying


incremental change and not by any help (WAR) from the USA.

 

 

 

 


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Your analysis is not unbiased or based on facts ...

by A32 (not verified) on

Professor,
You need to prepare better. Read Iranian history and see that that in fact the crimes by the US government against our people are UNFORGETTIBLE and UNFORGIVABLE. If it were not for the terrorist acts of USA government against iranians in 1953, we would not be in the shape we are now. Now that we are here, we have to look forward and knowing our enemies (inclusing MKO whom you are a member of!), better the lives of iranians and our countrymen. War and destruction may bring Maryam Rajavi or her adultrous husband to power, but will do iran no good.


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Those realists who advocate

by Anonymousbg (not verified) on

Those realists who advocate appeasing the IR should know a little bit of Iranian history. The "revolution" of 1978 was the result of long power struggle between two historical ruling classes in iran, the Clergy and the king. The power struggle has always been about controlling and having access to national riches and wealth.

It is also informative that the clergy were a most integral part of the ruling classes all the way until 1920s, when the founder of the Pahlavi Dynasty, Reza Shah, summarily stripped the mullahs of almost all their social, economic institutions of power.
and confiscated large land holdings of the clergy and their access to wealth. However, many mullahs were on the Shah’s payroll and received monthly stipends until a few months before the revolution to keep them quiet so they wouldn't be able to use Islam as a tool to seize power and wealth like thay had been used to.

The root cause of the problem in Iran is Islamic fundamentalism. As long the mullahs have the support of this segment of the population, even some of the moderate mullahs have to cater to their needs in order to survive.

This group of Islamist/jihadist, though a minority, is extremely powerful, violent, and profoundly entrenched in the culture of Iran.
As one of the commencers pointed out in another thread, this group of reactionary Islamists did not revolt against the late Shah's SAVAK or corruption.

Their main objections to the secular Shah were deeply rooted in reactionary religiosity, anti-modernism, and anti-secularism. In fact, Khomeini astutely recognized that this group of fundamentalist was his meal ticket. He capitalized on the misogynistic and religious.

They are still very powerful and their strength lies not in the government but in their so-called "religious conviction" to kill and murder with impunity in the name of their God and their version of Islam. In fact, that is how they hijacked the revolution and slaughtered the secular democratic and progressive movements that existed in Iran after the 1978 “revolution”.

However, this group has become more sophisticated and Now they recognize that in order to release the pressure of their oppressive system within the society, they need to have a escape valve in form of 'the reformers' with a shiny packaging and all.

Once in a while, they let some air out from (read Khatami et al) this valve and allow some cosmetic changes like leniency in hijab to show that "change is possible" if they only try harder and wait longer.

This built-in mechanis in the structure of the regime prevents frustration in the society to reach a critical mass and paralysis ensues. The reformers are responsible for creating ‘false hope’ among the people to extend the life of the regime by creating bogus civil and fake women and human rights movements such as Islamic democratic or other oxymoronic organization like Islamic feminisim.

The U.S. foreign policy makers should not be deceived either by the hardliners or the reformers because they are both fundemantalists in nature driven by their militant shia ideology.


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IRAN like RUSSIA

by badbakht (not verified) on

Hey Bro

We are cutting a deal like we did with JOSEPH STALIN during Harry Truman administration. We might nuke NORTH KOREA. JUST KIDDING!!! IRAQ was different and AFGHANISTAN has a long way to go. This was the most unpopular war in the AMERICAN HISTORY. We are becoming a Third World nation. CHINA is the next superpower and they begin SCO trade corporation last year with RUSSIA, ISTAN STATES, MONGOLIA, PAKISTAN, INDIA, AND IRAN.


Masoud Kazemzadeh

response

by Masoud Kazemzadeh on

Dear Anonymous Person,

1. When the U.S. govt does something bad, we have to condemn it. Here are some of my work criticizing and condemning the US for its role in the 1953 coup:

//iranian.com/History/2005/January/Kinzer/index.html

//www.ghandchi.com/iranscope/Anthology/Kazemz...

 

2.

AP: "The number of civilians killed by the U.S. government in Iraq and Vietnam is exponentially larger than the number of civilians killed by the IRI (though that, of course, does not excuse the IRI's crimes)."

 

MK: You are comparing apples and oranges. It is NOT germane to domestic brutality of a regime on how many it kills in wars. We do NOT count how many Iraqis were killed by Iranians between 1980 and 1988 as atrocities of the fundamentalist regime. What is germane is how many IRANIANS are tortured, executed, raped and assassinated by the fundamentalist regime due to their political views (or activities). The US system is a democracy because you and I can criticize its policies and condemn them and not be imprisoned, raped, our little sons and daughters tortured in front of our eyes, lose our jobs. The fundamentalist regime is brutal dictatorship because if you criticize Khomeini, Khamanehi, you will lose your job, you will be imprisoned, you will be tortured, your little children could be tortured. What is germane is how many AMERICANS have been killed by US govt, or tortured, or raped by US govt employees because they criticized the US govt policies.

 

3. While I am at it let me explicitly condemn the US actions in Guatemala in 1954 (and during Reagan years), El Salvador (in Reagan years), Chile (1970-73, and since until early 1990s), Dominican Republic (1965), Vietnam (1954-1975), support of former Nazis, etc.

 

4. The US is a super power. If Khomeini or Khamanehi, or Rafsanjani or Ahmadinejad (or Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot, Saddam Hussein) had the same amount of power as the US, what would they do? Would they have killed more or less than Americans in order to achieve their foreign policy goals?

 

5. We have to condemn the US when it does bad things. But we have to be logically, politically and morally consistent: when the US does something good, we have to applaud and publicly approve those good actions. Such as fighting against Nazi Germany, standing up to Stalin in general (and as Iranians we own a huge debt of gratitude to President Truman for standing up to Stalin and supporting Iran in Stalin’s attempt to annex Azerbaijan and Kurdestan). We have to condemn atrocities by Stalin-USSR and Mao.

Shouldn’t we thank the US for militarily intervening in Bosnia to stop the genocide by Serbs? Shouldn’t we thank the US for intervening in Kosovo to stop that genocide? How about the military intervention in Haiti to overthrow the military junta and restoring President Jean-Bertrand Aristide?

In our particular issue of our struggles against the fundamentalist regime: should we ask the US to appease our oppressor and tormentor or should we ask the same thing that anti-apartheid activists demanded????????? That is why I condemn any appeasement of the fundamentalist regime.

 

 

6.

AP: "Yet, you don't consider the crimes of the world's most powerful government in history "the moral issue of our time and our generation(s)". Why is that? Are you an appeaser and apologist for the U.S. government? I would like to think not, but I haven't detected the least bit of criticism on your part against what is, without a doubt, the world's leading violator of other countries and enabler of right-wing dictators."

 

MK: There is a disturbing aspect/implication of your piece. You want me to stop my struggles against the fundamentalist regime before I criticize the U.S. This is logically, politically, and morally flawed argument. It is like demanding activists in the ANC and the anti-apartheid movement in the 1940s-1994 period not to struggle against the apartheid regime because there was a worse dictatorship in Soviet Union, or China, or Pol Pot’s Cambodia. Should pro-democracy activists in Chile not fight against Pinochet’s dictatorship because there were other dictatorships around the world?????? Should people in Iran not have struggles against the Shah because there other bad dictatorships around the world.

Should we not fight against the fundamentalist regime because there are other regimes around the world that are oppressive????????

The answer is obvious: we as IRANIANS have the responsibility to get rid of the fundamentalist terrorist regime that is brutalizing IRANIAN people. I wish that all others elsewhere to also have freedom, democracy and human rights. As Iranian it is my responsibility to get rid of dictatorship in my homeland and establish freedom and democracy in Iran.

 

 

 

7.

AP: "As a simple moral truth, our primary responsibility should be to denounce and bring to justice the rulers who rule over us first, before we start to denounce the actions of foreign leaders. Yet, you don't consider the crimes of the world's most powerful government in history "the moral issue of our time and our generation(s)". Why is that? Are you an appeaser and apologist for the U.S. government?"

 

MK: I regard myself as primarily an IRANIAN political activist. I am a member of the Jebhe Melli (in exile). I am NOT a member of any American political party.

Members and supporters of the ANC who resided in the US worked very hard to gather support against the apartheid regime. To demand that they should have stopped struggling against the apartheid regime and instead fight against the US govt is logically flawed.

As the prime responsibility of anti-apartheid activists was to struggle against the apartheid regime, the prime responsibility of Iranian-Americans, Iranian-Canadian, Iranian-British, Iranian-X, is to help Iranians inside in the common struggle to remove the fundamentalist tyranny and establish freedom, democracy and human rights in IRAN.

 

 

I have criticisms of the US government policies, but to compare the US with a fascistic brutal regime like the fundamentalist regime is weird. It is like in the 1930s and 1940s, saying the US is an imperialist regime and oppresses African-American in the Jim Crow south, therefore one should not struggle against Nazi Germany but rather fight against the US (or British imperialism). One could grant that the US under FDR or under Bush II is bad, but to compare it with Nazi Germany or fundamentalist regime is logically, politically, and morally flawed. Despite all its flaws, and there are many, no honest person could compare the US with the fundamentalist regime ruling Iran or the Nazi regime ruling Germany, or Stalin’s regime in USSR, or Pol Pot in Cambodia.

 

8. I f I missed any point, please let me know and I will try to the best of my abilities to respond.

 

I hope this is helpful.

Best,

MK

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


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Another delusional Guy with Altered Reality syndrome!!!!!

by Ye Irani (not verified) on

Wake up man.........Stop the hatred....spread the love.....you will harvest peace!!!!!!!!!!!!!

TALK IS CHEAP......especially the long ones!