Why Mojtaba is almost certain to be Iran's next supreme leader now

Balatarin
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FG
by FG
09-Jul-2011
 

With Ahmadinejad and his ultranationalists out of the picture, all obstacles to Sayyed Khameini’s offspring, Mojtanba, as successor appear to have vanished.   Only the downfall of the Islamic Republic can stop it now.  Who or what else can prevent it?

--Probably NOT the Iranian people who had the regime on the ropes right after the rigged election but screwed up by backing off and ignoring workers and the poor. 

 --Certainly NOT the Assembly of Experts or Guardian Council (loaded with “Khamenei-style” extremists).  

--Certainly NOT the Larijanis and other so-called “moderate” principalists (They echoed calls for the blood of protestors after the elections and have been Khamenei’s obsequious toadies ever since).

--Certainly NOT the IRCG generals who favor Mojtaba so they can continue to feed at the trough (Mojtana is very close to IRCG general Taeb who personally raped and murdered one female protestor after the election). 

All Middle East dictator, “holy” or otherwise, seek to emulate North Korea’s  Kim Jong-ILL at succession time.  See Egypt (the Mubarels), Yemen (the Selehs), Iraq (Saddam’s two sweet boys), Libya (the Khaddafis) and Iran (the Khameneis).

“But Iran is different.” Khamenei tells us.  “Unlike those cases the people REALLY do love the Great Leader.”   That’s exactly what other dictators assured us.  Who believes them now?   

A central goal  of the 1979 revolution was to get rid of absolute and hereditary monarchy and replace it with a democracy that gave power to the people and respected human rights.   After Islamist hard liners stole the revolution, Iranians ended up with a far more brutal regime.  Like the mullahs, the Shah took away political freedoms, but at least he left social and personal freedoms untouched.  Both regimes were economically corrupt but the Shah’s was at least competent in that area.  Iran had the fastest growing economy in the world in the late seventies.  The mullahs have succeeded in keeping Iranians poor and unemployed but they are much wealthier these days.   Most amusing of all: The mullahs have made people distrust Islam and its clerics in a way the Shah could never have imagined.

What model offers less for the people than Iran in this Arab Spring.  Islamist parties everywhere disassociate itself from wanting anything similar.  Yet suspicions linger.   They know the clerics stole one revolution, so why not another?   

Balatarin
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Maryam Hojjat

FG,Great Advice in Your Blog

by Maryam Hojjat on Sun Jul 10, 2011 04:14 AM PDT

 

As in Syria and Egypt, the working class must lead and regimes incapable of reform must  never again be given a respite.  The "Lesson of 2009" is that such respites only give an insecure, untrustworthy regime a better chance to crush people and regain the momentum. 


 


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FG

Suppose Iranians get one last chance at freedom

by FG on Sat Jul 09, 2011 01:18 PM PDT

The best hope is that a combination of factor--the fall of Iran’s Syrian ally, a working class uprising (most essential), ultranationalist defections, and increasing disgust with religious police and “Islamized” education.  (The latter moves are stupidly ill-timed, considering existing tensions.  They rub salt in the wounds and make life too unbearable and humiliating to tolerate).

 (From Scott Lucas at Enduring America:  Crimewatch. Iran Police Chief Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam has said that police will establish a website for people to post films from their mobile phone about the "vice" and immorality that they witness in Iran's streets.)

What Iranians need is a prolonged and popular explosion the regime can't easily cap.  Instead of backing down in the face of repression and brutality, the people’s anger and motivation must feed on it this time.  Will they learn from past mistakes?

As in Syria and Egypt, the working class must lead and regimes incapable of reform must  never again be given a respite.  The "Lesson of 2009" is that such respites only give an insecure, untrustworthy regime a better chance to crush people and regain the momentum. 


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FG

Will "rule of the generals" replace clerical rule someday?

by FG on Sat Jul 09, 2011 12:54 PM PDT

Real power in Iran now rests exclusivcely in the hands of two unequal partners--IRCG generals and reactionary clerics.   Neither would survive without the other for now but the alliance appears unstable in the long run.

“Ruling” (in theory) clerics provide the generals with a veneer of legitimacy along with “looting privileges” for their families and followers.  Right now the generals have much to gain and little to lose by obedience.   Unless they are backed into a corner or feel threatened, a move against the Supreme Leaders would be risky, especially given the popular tendencies of this Arab Sprig.   Time favors the IRCG, so why not be patient?

The reactionary clerics are easily the weaker of the two partners—a progressive and irreversible trend as clerics yield more power to the generals in return for protection from the people.  Naturally, the more rewards the generals get, the more powerful they become.  Immensely unpopular and despised these days (more so even thas generals), the reactionary clerics must continue to exchange bribes for survival until there is nothing left to give.   Having rejected major reforms, the clerics are stuck to the tar baby they created. 

If the generals were to turn on the clerics, the latter know they wouldn’t last a week.  Who would rally to defend the mullahs?   Why risk one’s life for a greater villain against a lesser one?

 

Time and again the generals have made clear that they will never allow any president who pushed for substantial reforms.  Though it hasn't been explicitly stated, that applies double to any Supreme Leader seeking to regain popularity as a counterbalance to the generals.


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